MATERIALS FOR A MĀDHYAMIKA CRITIQUE OF FOUNDATIONALISM: AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF PRASANNApADĀ 55.11 TO 75.13

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Introduction

The Prasannapadā is an important but sometimes frustrating text. Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) is available to us today in the original Sanskrit only as embedded in this commentary by Candrakīrti (fl. 600 CE), which is the only commentary on Nāgārjuna’s text known to have survived in the original Sanskrit. But Candrakīrti himself seems to have had little influence on the subsequent course of Indian philosophy; it was, rather, almost invariably the works of Dharmakīrti and his philosophical heirs that were taken up by later Indian philosophers (Brahmanical and Buddhist alike). Despite that fact, Candrakīrti’s influence on the larger reception of Indian Madhyamaka has been considerable, owing to his having been judged by most Tibetan traditions of interpretation to represent the definitive interpretation of Madhyamaka philosophy, which is almost unanimously claimed by Tibetans to represent the pinnacle of Buddhist thought. This fact itself is striking, not only because of Candrakīrti’s negligible influence in the Indian context, but because the scholastic traditions of Buddhist philosophy were directly introduced to Tibet by Śāntarakṣita (725-788) and Kamalaśīla (740-795) — whose

1 My work on this text has benefited, over the years, from conversations and study with several people. I would like to thank, in particular, Larry McCrea (with whom I read through the whole text) and Shelly Pollock for discussions concerning various aspects of the Sanskrit; and, for their generously detailed and thoughtful readings of one of the most recent drafts of this article, Rick Nance and Ulrich T. Kragh. I also benefited from the helpful comments of an anonymous reviewer. It should be noted, in addition, that my work on this text would not have been possible without the fine work that has been done on this and related passages by David Seyfort Ruegg, Mark Siderits, and Tom Tillemans.

2 Ruegg 1981:1, n.3.
thought, though surely affiliated with the Madhyamaka tradition in which Candrakīrti stands, reflects the predominance of thinkers (like Dharmakīrti) whose approach is (on Candrakīrti’s own view, at least) generally antithetical to Candrakīrti’s. I suspect that this historical fact at least partly explains the extent to which Tibetan interpreters claim Candrakīrti as normative, while yet retaining much of the epistemological discourse that he so clearly rejected.

Not only, though, is the Prasannapadā thus historically puzzling, it is also discursively rather odd. In places, Candrakīrti’s Sanskrit is extremely lucid, almost conversational; there are sections that the intermediate Sanskrit student can pick up and read with some confidence. He displays a great familiarity with the grammatical traditions of Brahmanical learning — and also, as Karen Lang (2003) has emphasized particularly with respect to the first four chapters of the Catuḥsatakāṭikā, with the literature of Sanskrit stories and dharmasāstras. These facts are as befits someone who claims, as Candrakīrti characteristically does, always to defer to and exemplify “conventional usage” (lokavyavahāra). And yet, as no less a scholar than the estimable J. W. de Jong observed, the first chapter, in particular, is difficult. It seems to me that it is not always clear whether this is so chiefly because of Candrakīrti’s Sanskrit, or because the logic of the arguments is hard to follow. Like those of Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti’s arguments can seem at once pregnant with import, and maddeningly elusive and paradoxical. Candrakīrti’s examples of “ordinary” reasoning that is “familiar in the world,” for instance, are often counterintuitive, perhaps as much to his Indian readers as to the modern interpreter.

The elusive character of the arguments is often reflected in some puzzles concerning the deep structure of the dialectic — that is, even more than is typically the case with Sanskrit philosophical works, it is often a difficult question which voice, as it were, speaks each part of the argument. Needless to say, it makes a good deal of difference to one’s sense of the argument whether one takes a particular point to be made in sup-

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3 On the introduction of Candrakīrti’s thought to Tibet, see Lang 1992.
5 Cf., de Jong’s review (1981) of Sprung 1979, where he laments that Sprung’s knowledge of Sanskrit was insufficient to the task of translating “such a difficult text.”
port of the position that Candrakīrti is working to defend — or instead to be precisely the point he means to attack. Alas, it is not always compellingly self-evident simply from the formal features of text which of these is the case, and some tricky questions bedevil the would-be translator of Candrakīrti’s work.

While my familiarity with Tibetan traditions of interpretation is not great enough that I can comment authoritatively, it seems clear to me that the influence of these can be said particularly to inform much modern interpretation of Candrakīrti’s texts. A case in point is the “sva\(\text{nt}\)t\(\text{r}\)ika-pr\(\text{a}\)sa\(\text{n}\)ika” division of Madhyamaka philosophy — which, although not without basis in the antecedent Indian texts, represents a particularly doxographical lens imposed by Tibetans\(^6\). I would consider it an uncontroversial remark to say that David Seyfort Ruegg — long one of the leading historians and interpreters of Indo-Tibetan Mādhyaṃaka literature — has been influenced over the years by his significant engagement with certain Tibetan traditions of interpretation\(^7\).

Recently, Ruegg has made another signal contribution to the study of Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka; his modestly titled \textit{Two Prolegomena to Madhyamaka Philosophy} (2002) comprises a nearly complete translation of chapter one of the \textit{Prasannapadā}, along with commentaries thereon by the seminal dGe-lugs-pa thinkers Tsong-kha-pa and rGyal-tshab-rje\(^8\). The first chapter of Candrakīrti’s text has long been recognized to be of par-

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\(^6\) See Dreyfus and McClintock 2003. Cf., Ruegg’s comment (1981:51, ff.) on the likely Tibetan origins of these doxographical terms.

\(^7\) See, among his many works, Ruegg 1981 (which remains the definitive survey of the topic), 2000, and 2002 (which will be much engaged in the present article). For a critical assessment of some of the characteristically Tibetan interpretations generally upheld by Ruegg, see Oetke 2003a.

\(^8\) More precisely, Ruegg has translated that portion of Candrakīrti’s chapter that is framed as commenting specifically on the first verse of Nāgārjuna’s root text; in the standard edition of Candrakīrti’s text (La Vallée Poussin 1970a, as supplemented by de Jong 1978), that means pp.1-75, in a chapter of 91 pages. (The edition of Vaidya [1960] largely reproduces La Vallée Poussin’s edition, and gives the pagination thereof.) The first chapter of the \textit{Prasannapadā} was translated into English by Stcherbatsky (1927), whose work, though dated and eccentric, remains useful. The partial translation of Sprung (1979) is the closest there is to a complete translation of the \textit{Prasannapadā} into English, but should be used with caution; cf., the reviews by de Jong (1981) and Steinkellner (1982). Other Western-language translations from the \textit{Prasannapadā} (e.g., May 1959, Schayer 1931) do not include the first chapter.
particular importance, comprising as it does some of Candrākīrti’s most extensive and systematic engagement with what he took to be alternative understandings of Madhyamaka, and of Buddhist thought more generally. The first chapter of the Prasannapadā has become a locus classicus, in particular, for what Tibetan traditions emphasized as the split between the “Śvātantrika” and “Prāsaṅgika” schools of Madhyamaka. Perhaps following the emphasis of the Tibetan tradition, most contemporary scholars have been principally concerned to understand this aspect of Candrākīrti’s opening chapter⁹.

What has less often been appreciated is that the first chapter of the Prasannapadā also comprises a lengthy engagement with an unnamed interlocutor whose thought looks very much like that of Dignāga. In the standard edition of the Prasannapadā, this section spans some twenty pages¹⁰. Despite its thus constituting fully a fifth of the chapter, this section has been little studied. This scholarly neglect perhaps owes something to the fact that some influential Tibetan discussions of at least parts of this section take Candrākīrti to have been continuing his attack on Bhāvaviveka, so that what can very well be read as an engagement with Dignāga’s epistemology gets subsumed in the svātantrika-prāsaṅgika discussion that has instead preoccupied most scholars.¹¹ I would argue, though, that understanding Candrākīrti’s arguments here as an engagement specifically with the epistemology of Dignāga affords us an unusually good opportunity for appreciating the logically distinctive character of Candrākīrti’s Madhyamaka.

It should be noted that I am here making a chiefly philosophical point, and that the historical question of Candrākīrti’s target is perhaps more complex. As a matter of intellectual history, the texts of Dignāga were variously circulated and appropriated, and it may be difficult (if not impos-

⁹ In addition to the recent work of Dreyfus and McClintock, see Yotsuya 1999, which provides a useful text-critical analysis of the relevant passages from the original Indian sources of Candrākīrti, Buddhapālita, and Bhāvaviveka (or “Bhāviveka” — though Candrākīrti uses the former name).

¹⁰ La Vallée Poussin’s 1970a:55.11-75.13.

¹¹ For the view that Candrākīrti is still addressing Bhāvaviveka in at least part of this section of the text, cf., Thurman 1991:292-295, which translates a section of Tsong-kha-pa’s Legs bshad snying po based on a discussion occurring at Prasannapadā 66.1-68.4. Cf., also, Eckel 1978, Huntington 2003, Yoshimizu 1996:49-94.
sible) to determine whether Candrakīrti finally had Dignāga himself chiefly in mind, or Dignāga as appropriated by, say, Bhāvaviveka. (It is, though, interesting in this regard that although Candrakīrti recurrently names Bhāvaviveka as the target of his critique — and Buddhāpālīta as the thinker he defends — in the sections of the text that constitute the locus classicus for the svātantrika-prāsaṅgika debate, his interlocutor in the section here translated goes unnamed.) From a philosophical perspective, there is a sense in which it may not finally matter whether it is particularly Dignāga whom Candrakīrti had in mind, or whether he here targets that part of Bhāvaviveka’s project that is informed by Dignāga; for in either case, Candrakīrti can be said to have philosophical problems with Dignāga’s project. The logically distinctive character of Candrakīrti’s arguments, then, can in either case be appreciated by considering the arguments here developed vis-à-vis the arguments of Dignāga. There is, I am suggesting, some specifically philosophical value in appreciating particularly what it is about Dignāga’s approach that Candrakīrti would refuse12.

It is in the hope of facilitating the appreciation of this interesting exchange that I here offer a translation of this section of Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, and that I will occasionally identify Candrakīrti’s interlocutor as “Dignāga.” The most detailed study of the passage here translated is the illuminating work of Mark Siderits (1981), who evinces an insightful grasp of the conceptual significance of the passages, even where his translations are problematic. Siderits in turn gets some help from Satkari Mookerjee (1957), whose work basically paraphrases Candrakīrti’s text; and from Masaaki Hattori, whose extensively annotated translation of the first chapter of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya (1968) makes frequent reference to Candrakīrti13. Since the publication of Siderits’s article, our understanding of Candrakīrti’s principled objections to the foundationalist trajectory of Buddhist philosophy have been much advanced

12 Nevertheless, there are several points at which Candrakīrti seems clearly to have had Dignāga’s text before him (many of which were noted by Hattori 1968), and these will be noted as we proceed.

13 Hattori’s annotations thus represent a useful source for appreciating the likelihood that Candrakīrti’s interlocutor is Dignāga, with Hattori often pointing out where Candrakīrti’s engagement closely tracks Dignāga’s text.
by the work of Tom Tillemans, whose study and translation of Candrākīrti’s commentary on chapters 12 and 13 of Āryadeva’s Catuḥśatāka represent a philosophically sophisticated engagement with texts that closely parallel the arguments in our section of the Prasannapadā. The characterization of Candrākīrti’s critique of Dignāga’s foundationalism that is ventured by Georges Dreyfus (1997:451-60) chiefly follows the work of Siderits and Tillemans.

While the aforementioned works are enormously helpful in philosophically situating Candrākīrti’s Madhyamaka vis-à-vis the foundationalism of Dignāga, it can still be said that there is a relative paucity of studies of this important text, and that close readings of Candrākīrti’s critique of Dignāga as that is developed in the Prasannapadā remain a desideratum. I have developed a philosophical interpretation of this section elsewhere. It is partly owing to the rather more speculative character of my other works (which, though interpreting his texts, amount to “rational reconstructions” of Candrākīrti’s arguments) that I here want to venture a more literal interpretation in the form of a translation. I also venture this, however, in light of the extent of occasionally significant divergence between my translation and that of Ruegg. To be sure, Ruegg’s translation — which is informed by Ruegg’s particular appreciation for the Tibetan reception of Candrākīrti — is likely to become a standard reference for this portion of the Prasannapadā. This is as it should be, since Ruegg’s translation is (as expected) generally quite reliable. It is also, however, not likely to be very accessible to non-Sanskritists. More significantly, there is an important sense in which Ruegg’s translation — which occasionally deploys the kinds of locutions that Paul Griffiths memorably characterized as “Buddhist hybrid English” — may undermine Candrākīrti’s own points; for insofar as Candrākīrti finds it in principle important to defer to conventional usage, it becomes important to capture the naturalness of his Sanskrit. This is not achieved when, for example, an important expression like lokavyavahāra (“ordinary usage,” though the

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14 See especially Tillemans 1990: vol. 1, pp.41-53. Among more recent works by Tillemans, one can also usefully consult, inter alia, that of 2003.
15 Arnold (2005), Chapters 5-7; see also Arnold 2001, 2003.
term also has an eminently mercantile connotation that I think is nicely captured by “business as usual”)17 is rendered, as it is by Ruegg, as “transactional-pragmatic usage.”

Moreover, given the difficulty of some of the exchanges in the first chapter of the Prasannapadā, it is to be expected that different judgments can be made about how to understand the text. Having carefully considered Ruegg’s translation of this section, I have judged that in the places where our readings diverge, mine are at least defensible, and in some cases (particularly towards the end of the passage) significant. Thus, in the hope of further advancing our understanding of a surprisingly neglected (and very interesting) philosophical exchange, I propose the following translation, which could, I think, quite profitably be used in consultation with that of Ruegg — as well as with the work of Siderits, and with my own, more speculative interpretation.

The following translation is intended to stick closely to Candrakīrti’s Sanskrit (though I have taken the liberty of inserting material in brackets where that is required to make the sense of the English more plain) — though it is hoped that it will also be experienced as being in English. In my annotations to the translation, I have given the Sanskrit text (from the edition of La Vallée Poussin), noting de Jong’s proposed revisions as well as a few emendations of my own. Where I have found it useful to consult the Tibetan translation by sPa-tshab nyi-ma-grags (as available in the sDe-dge edition of the bsTan-’gyur), I give the Tibetan as well. In addition, I have also provided in the annotations something of a commentary, briefly explaining what I take to be the salient points particularly of more complex passages. I have also noted significant indications of the interlocutor’s likely identity as Dignāga — with some interesting clues to be found, in this regard, in Yoshiyasu Yonezawa’s recent edition of the *Lakṣaṇaṭīkā, a very brief commentary (really more like a student’s personal annotations) on the Prasannapadā dating to probably the 12th century18.

17 See Apte 1992:1514: “Affair, business, work… profession, occupation… dealing, transaction… commerce, trade, traffic….” See also Rhys Davids and Stede 1995, s.v. vohāra.
In the following translation, numbers given in square brackets represent the page and line numbers of La Vallée Poussin’s edition. For ease of use, the dialectical flow of the argument has been signaled by indicating the main changes of voice in bold type.

Translation

[55.11] At this point, some object: Is this certainty\(^1\) that existents are not produced\(^2\) based on a reliable warrant (\textit{pramāṇa}),\(^3\) or is it not based on a reliable warrant? In this regard, if it’s accepted that it’s based on a reliable warrant, then you have to explain: which warrants, having what characteristics and what objects? Are [these reliable warrants] produced from themselves, or from something else, or both, or altogether without cause? On the other hand, if [your certainty] is not based on a reliable warrant, this doesn’t make sense, since comprehension of a warranteable

\(^1\) Or conviction; see n.27, below.

\(^2\) Candrakirti’s interlocutor here refers to MMK 1.1 (which is the verse being commented on for most of chapter one), according to which “There do not exist, anywhere at all, any existents whatsoever, produced either from themselves or from something else, either from both or altogether without cause” (La Vallée Poussin 1970a:12.13-14: \textit{na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyaṁ nāpy ahetutāḥ i utpannāh jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana}).

\(^3\) In translating \textit{pramāṇa} as ‘warrant’ (cf., Apte 1992:1101, meaning 6), I have in mind the sense of the latter word as meaning “justification for an action or a belief; grounds” (American Heritage College Dictionary). There is a systematic ambiguity in the word \textit{pramāṇa} in the Indian philosophical tradition, this word alternately referring to a reliable means of knowing (\textit{sa yenārthaṁ pramiṇoti, tat pramāṇam}), and to an episode of veridical cognition such as results from the exercise thereof (\textit{pramāṇyate iti pramāṇam}). This ambiguity is preserved in the translation of \textit{pramāṇa} as “reliable warrant”: warrant can refer to the outcome of a cognitive episode, to what one \textit{has} (“justification”) in virtue of having formed a belief in a reliable way (so Plantinga 1993:3: “that, whatever precisely it is, which together with truth makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief”); but it also conventionally denotes justification in the sense of the criterion or \textit{grounds} of belief (“What is your warrant for thinking there was a fire?”; “I saw it,” or “I saw smoke”). A good translation of \textit{pramāṇa} in the latter sense might be (following Alston 1989) “doxastic practice” — but this fails to capture the other sense. The idea of ‘warrant’ (and of being warranted), I think, also captures (without begging any important questions) the complex relation between \textit{pramāṇa} and ‘knowledge’ or ‘truth,’ and is in this sense to be preferred to standard translations like “valid cognition” (Dreyfus 1997:570) or (translating this passage) “valid means of right knowledge” (Ruegg 2002:95). See, however, the next note on one problem with my translation.
object (prameya)\textsuperscript{22} depends on reliable warrants\textsuperscript{23} — for an uncomprehended object can’t be comprehended without reliable warrants. Hence, if there’s no understanding of an object because there is no reliable warrant, how is [yours] a justifiable certainty (samyagniścaya)? So it doesn’t make sense to say, [as in MMK 1.1, that] existents are unproduced\textsuperscript{24}.

Or again: It will be my [certainty] precisely that all existents are unproduced! And just as your certainty is that all things are unproduced, in exactly the same way, [56] mine will be that there is production of all things\textsuperscript{25}.

\textsuperscript{22} The translation of prameya as “warrantable” is not unproblematic; for it is beliefs that are warranted, not (what is typically characterized in Sanskrit as prameya) objects. It is difficult, however, to find translation equivalents for this pair of words (pramāṇa and prameya) that avoid this problem while yet reflecting the fact that they are permutations of the same verbal root. ‘Knowable’ seems better to capture the sense of prameya as describing any possible objects of (warranted) cognition; but as indicated in n.21, if we then translate pramāṇa as “means of knowledge,” we risk begging important questions about the relations between justification and truth. It is, then, my translation of pramāṇa as “reliable warrant” that informs the rendering of prameya as “warrantable” — but the latter should, in this context, be understood as short for the more cumbersome object regarding which one could have a warranted belief.

\textsuperscript{23} With this point (pramāṇādhīnatvāt prameyādhigamasya; Tib., gshal bya rto gs pa ni tshad ma la rag las pa’i phyir te), Candrakīrti seems to allude to Dignāga (as noted by Ruegg 2002:95, n.155), whose Pramāṇasamuccaya begins with the claim that “understanding of a warrantable object depends upon reliable warrants” (in Kanakavarmān’s Tibetan, as given at Hattori p.175, gaṅ gi phyir gsal bya rto gs pa ni tshad ma la rag las pa yin). Cf., Hattori’s n.1.10, p.76; and n.47, below, for another citation of Dignāga’s point.

\textsuperscript{24} 55.11-16: Atra kecit paricodayanti: Anutpanṇā bhāvā iti kim ayaṃ pramāṇajō niścaya uta-apramāṇajō? Tatra, yadi pramāṇajō iṣyate, tadā-idaṃ vaktavyaṃ: kati pramāṇāni, kimlakṣanāni, kimviśayāni, kim svata utpannāni, kim parata ubhayato ‘hetuto vā-iti? Atha-apramāṇa-jō sa na yuktajō, pramāṇādhīnatvāt prameyādhigamasya. Anadhigato hy artha na vinā pramāṇa-jair adhigantoṃ śakyata iti, pramāṇāḥbhāvād arthādhigam-ābhāve sati, kuto ‘yam samyagniścaya iti? Na yuktam etad anutpanṇā [de Jong] bhāvā iti. Clearly, the challenge begins with this section thus begins is very much like challenges anticipated in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartani (VV). Interestingly, though, Candrakīrti does not note the VV’s argument against this challenge until several pages into the present section (cf., n.47, below).

\textsuperscript{25} 55.16-56.1: Yato vā-ayaṃ niścayo bhavato ‘nutpanṇā bhāvā iti bhaviṣyatī tata eva mama-api sarvabhāvāḥ santi-iti! Yathā ca-aayaṃ te niścayo ‘nutpanṇaḥ sarvadharmā iti, tathā-eva [p.56] mama-api sarvabhāvośipti bhaviṣyatī.

That is, if Candrakīrti is willing to give up on thinking his own beliefs to be demonstrably warranted, then he cannot think there are any grounds for preferring his beliefs to those of his interlocutor.
Or [perhaps you will say] you have no certainty [to the effect that] “all existents are unproduced.” In that case, since there’s no persuading another of something not ascertained for oneself, it’s pointless to begin this treatise, and all existents stand unrefuted.26

We reply: If we had anything at all like certainty, it could be said to be based on a reliable warrant, or not based on a reliable warrant. But we don’t! How so? If there were the possibility of doubt (aniścaya) in regard to this, there could be a certainty opposed to that and dependent upon it. But when we have no doubt in the first place, then how could there be certainty opposed to it?27 For [such certainty] would be independent of anything else sharing the relation, as in the case of the longeness or shortness of a donkey’s horn. And when, in this way, there is no certainty, then we will imagine reliable warrants for the sake of proving what? How, then, will they have number, characteristic, or object? Whether their production is intrinsic, dependent, both, or causeless — none of this has to be explained by us.28

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26 56.1-3: Atha te na-asti niścayo ‘nutpanṇāḥ sarvabhāvā iti, tadā svayamaniścitasya parapratyāyanāsambhāvāc chāstrārabhāvaiyarthyam eva-iti, sany apratiṣiddhāḥ sarvabhāvā iti.

27 It is chiefly having in mind these first sentences of Candrakirti’s response that I have translated niścaya, here and in the preceding paragraph, as “certainty.” One might more appropriately render this as “conviction” or, more weakly, “opinion” — but this seems to me not as sharply to capture the contrast between niścaya and aniścaya, or (more significantly) the force of Candrakirti’s claim here that there can be no question of the latter. It is not clear what it would mean for Candrakirti to claim that there is no possibility of “non-conviction” (aniścaya) in regard to the issue in question. If, in contrast, he is saying there is no room for (what is the opposite of certainty) doubt in the matter, it becomes possible to understand him as suggesting (what I take him to be arguing) that constitutively Mādhyamika claims cannot coherently be thought to require the same kind of justification here demanded by his interlocutor, insofar as the truth of MMK 1.1 is a condition of the possibility even of expressing any doubt. Such is the line of interpretation I have more generally advanced in Arnold (2005).


This passage is translated by Huntington (2003:77-78), who identifies Candrakirti’s interlocutor as Bhāvaviveka (despite the proximate allusion to Dignāga; cf., n.23, above). Can-
[Objection:] If, in this way, [you have] no certainty at all, then how is your own statement — which has the form of something ascertained, to wit “not from themselves or from something else, nor from both nor altogether without cause, do existents exist” — understood?29

We reply: This statement is ascertained by reasoning that is just familiar for ordinary people, not for the venerable (ārya). Does this mean the venerable have no reasoning? Who can say whether or not they do? For ultimate truth is a matter of venerable silence. So how could there be, in regard to it, any possibility of [the sort of] conceptual elaboration that is reasoning or non-reasoning?30

[Objection:] Well, if the venerable do not expound reasoning, then how, here and now, will they awaken the world to ultimate truth? 31

[Response:] The venerable surely do not expound reasoning according to ordinary usage.32 Rather, granting, for the sake of awakening others, reasoning that is familiar only in the world — in just that way they awaken the world33. For example, those in the throes of passion, com-

29 57.4-5: Yady evaṁ niścayo na-asti sarvataḥ, kathāṁ punar idaṁ niścitarūpaṁ vākyam upalabhyaṁ bhavatāṁ? Na svato nāpi parato na dvāḥyāṁ nāpy ahetuto bhāvā bhavantīti.
31 57.9: Yadi hy ārāya upapattīṁ na varṇayanti kena khalv idāṁci paramārthaṁ lokāṁ bodhayāvantī?
32 Ruegg (2002:99) translates: “The Āryas do not propound any justified ground in virtue of the transactional-pragmatic usage of ordinary folk in the world.…” There is a sense, however, in which such a technical rendering of this makes Candrakārti’s own statement of his argument performatively incoherent; his use of ordinary language is best understood as itself exemplifying his deference to such. In this regard, we might also render lokasyāvyavahāreṇa as “according to business as usual,” capturing the eminently conventional, mercantile sense of the word vyavahāra (see n.17) — but my taste for this translation has met with such howls of protest that I here defer to cooler heads.
33 There seems to be a tension here; why is the latter (i.e., the venerables’ causing the
mitted to a mistake, do not apprehend even the actual (vidyamānām api) impurity of the body — and having imputed an unreal aspect of beauty, [they] suffer. For the sake of [cultivating] their dispassion, a manifestation of the Tathāgata or a god could describe in detail the defects of the body, which were previously concealed by the idea of beauty. [They will describe these, for example,] by saying things such as that there are hairs on the body34. And those [who had been passionate], by abandoning that idea of beauty, could attain dispassion. [p.58] So, too, in this context: by virtue of being [ones] the eye of whose mind is impaired by the cataracts of ignorance35, ordinary people — imputing to existents an essence (and in some cases, some particular qualification) whose nature is not at all being perceived by the venerable — suffer excessively36.

Now the venerable awaken them [to all this] through reasoning that is familiar to them. For example, it’s [generally] granted that there is no

world to understand “having accepted reasoning that is familiar in the world”) not a case of their propounding something “according to ordinary usage”? Siderits (1981: 125-126) comments: “Here we must note the extreme care which Candrakīrti takes to avoid the suggestion that the āryas seek to prove the ultimate truth. When they set out to… instruct the world through the manipulation of the conventionally accepted epistemic practices, what they construct is not a proof but rather what would be considered by the world to be a well-established proof. The qualification is crucial, for if the Mādhyamika is said simply to prove the ultimate truth, there is the implication that he is in possession of ultimate means of proof, that is, that he is in possession of a theory of pramāṇas which he knows to be unconditionally valid.” Siderits’s point is recommended by the contrast here signaled only by Candrakīrti’s emphasis: the venerable do not, as it were, themselves depend for their knowledge on “ordinary usage”; rather, they provisionally adopt “that reasoning which is familiar only in the world” (lokata eva yā prasiddhopapattis tām).

34 As La Vallée Poussin notes (57: n.5), Candrakīrti here alludes to the practice of smṛtyupasthānabhāvanā, as described, for example, in the Śikṣāsamuccaya; cf., Bendall 1970:235.
35 This would seem to be a favorite expression, for Candrakīrti uses it repeatedly. Cf., inter alia, p.261.4, where precisely the same expression is used.
production of an [already] existent jar from the clay and so forth; in this way, it should be determined that there is no production, since what exists prior to production already exists\textsuperscript{37}. Or, for example, it’s accepted that a sprout is not produced from the coals of a fire, which are other than it; likewise, it should be ascertained that [production] is not from the seeds and so forth, even though they are intended [as the cause of sprouts]\textsuperscript{38}.

\textbf{[Objection:]} Then one could [rejoin that] “this is our experience\textsuperscript{39}.”

\textsuperscript{37} That is, the causation of something \textit{from itself} would entail that the thing in question already exists — in which case, its coming-into-being would no longer require explanation. This basically reproduces Buddhāpālita’s argument regarding the “\textit{na svato}” part of the tetralemma presented at \textit{MMK} 1.1; Buddhāpālita’s Sanskrit is cited by Candrākīrti at p.14.1-3. (The Tibetan translation of Buddhāpālita’s entire commentary on \textit{MMK} 1.1 can be found in Walleser 1970:11.8, ff. See also Saito 1984.) The argument is traditionally understood as directed against the Saṃkhya proponent of the doctrine of \textit{saktaśraya} — i.e., of the view that effects “pre-exist” in their causes (insofar as there is, for the Saṃkhya, properly speaking no causation whatsoever, but only the “transformation” \textit{pariṇāma} \textsuperscript{36} of \textit{prakṛti}).

\textsuperscript{38} 58.3-6: \textit{Tān idānīṃ āryās tatprasadadhayaivopapattā paribodhayante. Yathā vidyamānasya ghaṭasya na mṛdādibhyo utpāda ity abhyupetam, evam utpādaḥ pūrvam vidyamānasya vidyamānātvaṁ, na asty utpāda ity avastiyatāṁ. Yathā ca parabhūtebhayo jvālā-gārādibhyo ‘ikārasyotpattir na asīty abhyupetam, evam vivakṣītebhhyo ‘pi bijādibhyo na asīty avastiyatāṁ.}

In other words, \textit{seeds} are what the proponent of this account of causation intended to allow to stand; but these cannot be allowed, either, because they are just as “different” from the sprout as coals are. Particularly here, Candrākīrti’s argument seems not to have a very strong claim to represent “reasoning that is familiar.” It can, though, be so understood, if it is appreciated that the argument here is a basically \textit{a priori} analysis of concepts, and not \textit{an a posteriori} analysis of the phenomena putatively explained thereby. Specifically, the argument turns simply on the definition of “other”; the point is that the general concept of “otherness” leaves us with no principled way to know which other things are relevantly connected to the thing whose arising we seek to explain, and we are thus left to suppose that anything that is “other” than the latter (even, e.g., the coals of a fire) could give rise to it. Candrākīrti’s argument again repeats that of Buddhāpālita, who had similarly argued only by reducing to absurdity the opponent’s account of “arising from another,” without offering his own, alternative account of causal production. Thus, Buddhāpālita (Walleser 1970: 11) says: “Existents do not arise from something other. Why? Because it would follow that anything [can] arise from anything else” (\textit{gzhan las kyang skye ba med do / ci’i phyir zhe na / thams cad las thams cad skye bar thal bar ’gyur ba’i phyir ro}). Cf., \textit{Prasannapadā} 36.11-12, where Candrākīrti approvingly quotes Buddhāpālita’s Sanskrit (\textit{na parata utpadyante bhāvāḥ, sarvataḥ sarvasvaṃbhavaprasaṅgāt}).

\textsuperscript{39} 58.7: \textit{Athāpi syād anubhava esō ’smākam iti.}

The point of the objection, it seems, is that surely we all just \textit{see} that things are produced from other things. We can follow the lead of the \textit{Madhyamakāvātāra} in finding here a discussion of the status of what is, for Dignāga and his foundationalist heirs, the privileged faculty of \textit{perception} (with the issues raised by following this avenue being issues that Can-
This doesn’t make sense, either, since this experience is false, [simply] because of its being experience — like the experience of two moons on the part of someone with cataracts. Therefore, by virtue of the fact that experience similarly requires proof, this objection doesn’t make sense.

Therefore, “existents are not produced” — in this way, the first chapter [of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā] begins first of all by countering the imputation of a false nature. Now, the remainder of the treatise is undertaken for the sake of refuting some qualifications that are imputed in particular cases. Dependent origination does not have any single qualification, not even such as being the agent, the locus, or the action of motion — [this treatise is undertaken] for the sake of showing [that].

[Objection:] It is only ordinary usage (vyavahāra) regarding warrents and warrantable objects that we have explained with [our] treatise.

Drakīrti will go on to elaborate in the section of the Prasannapadā that is presently unfolding). Thus, in considering the same objection, Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya specifically introduces “perception” (pratyakṣa) as what chiefly informs our “experience” (anubhava). (On the basic equivalence, for Dignāga, of anubhava and pratyakṣa, see Dignāga’s commentary on Pramāṇasamuccaya, 1.6ab, in Hattori 1968:27.) It is, the interlocutor there argues, evident simply on the basis of perception that existents are produced from other existents; and “appeal to reasoned argument is appropriate only with respect to things that are not perceptible, and not with respect to what is perceptible. Therefore, even without any argument, it must still be true that existents are produced from other [existents].” La Vallée Poussin 1970b:101:

Ruegg translates: “… the remaining chapters [of the MK] have been taken up [by Nāgārjuna] in order to exclude… some particularity… [mistakenly] imputed in some place, and this with the purpose of conveying… that also no particularity at all… exists [as a hypostatic entity] for origination in dependence….” (2002:102; as in all of my references to Ruegg’s translation, the ellipses here represent places where Ruegg has supplied the Sanskrit or Tibetan terms)

If we take sāstrenā here in the sense of “treatise,” then perhaps the reference is specifi-
[Response:] Then it should be explained what the fruit of [your] explanation of this [ordinary usage] is.

[Objector continues:] It [i.e., ordinary usage] has been destroyed by sophists (kutārikaiḥ), through their predication of a mistaken definition. [p.59] We have stated its correct definition.

[Response:] This doesn’t make sense, either. For if, based on the composition of a mistaken definition by sophists, everyone were mistaken regarding what’s being defined (kṛtam laksyavaiparītyam lokesya syāt), [then] the point of this [proposed re-description of our epistemic practices] would be one whose effort was fruitful. But it’s not so, and this effort is pointless.45

Cally to Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. Ruegg (2002:102) instead translates “by means of the [philosophical] science”. Following that lead, we might better render this adverbially: “which has been explained by us philosophically.” That reading particularly underscores that though he claims to offer an account of our conventions, Dignāga does so by way of a peculiarly technical re-description thereof. This is, in any case, a crucial juncture in the argument; for having thus anticipated his interlocutor’s claim only to be offering a conventionally valid account, Candrakīrti will be concerned from here on to argue only that Dignāga cannot coherently claim this. What is conventionally true is just our conventions, and it is therefore self-contradictory to elaborate a project that purports to be “conventionally” valid, while yet deploying words in something other than their conventional sense. From this point on, then, Candrakīrti will argue only that Dignāga’s use of the key terms svalakaṇa and pratyakṣa cannot accommodate ordinary usage of these words.

43 58.15: Tadanuvārṇasya tarhi phalaṃ vācyam.
44 58.15-59.1: Kutārikaiḥ sa nāsītī viparītalakṣaṇaḥ-[p.59]-bhidhānena. Tasya asmābhīḥ sanyāglakṣaṇam uktam iti cet.

It is with respect to this passage that the anonymous author of the *Lakṣaṇātikā* specifically identifies Dignāga as Candrakīrti’s interlocutor: “He says that on this view, it makes sense only [to speak of] the worldly convention regarding warrants and warrantable objects, not [what is] ultimately the case. [This is what is said in the passage] beginning ‘Atha…’ [‘Its correct characteristics have been explained’ by us] means by Dignāga, et al. It is the master [i.e., Candrakīrti] who says, at this point, ‘the fruit of this intention should be explained,’ and it is Dignāga who rejoins, ‘It has been destroyed’ by sophists. ‘It’ [here] means convention.” (Lakṣaṇātikā 2b4; Yonezawa 2004: 142: laukika eva pramāṇa-prameyavyavahāro yuktio na pāramārthikā ity asmin pakṣe aha / athetyādi / asmābhīr Dignāgadibhīn / tadanubandhanasya phalaṃ vācyam ityatrāryaḥ, kutārikaiḥ iti Dignāgaḥ, sa iti vyavahāraḥ).
Moreover, if comprehension of warrantable objects is dependent upon reliable warrants\(^{46}\), [then] by what are these reliable warrants [themselves] ascertained? This fault was pointed out in [Nāgārjuna’s] Vigrahavyāvar-tanī. Since you still haven’t answered this, there’s no illumination of the correct definition [by you].\(^{47}\)

Moreover, if you say there are [only] two reliable warrants, corresponding respectively to the two [kinds of warrantable objects, i.e.,] unique particulars and abstractions\(^{48}\), [then we are entitled to ask,] does the subject (lakṣya) which has these two characteristics exist?\(^{49}\) Or does it not

\(^{46}\) Candrakīrtī here again alludes to Dignāga’s claim that pramāṇādīnāḥ prameyādhiyāgamāḥ (with the Tibetan here matching the Tibetan translation of Dignāga: gzhal bya rtogs pa tshad ma la rag las pa yin; cf., n.23, above).

\(^{47}\) 59.4-6: Api ca, yadi pramāṇadhīnāḥ prameyādhiyakānas tānī pramāṇāni kena paricchediyanta ityādīnā Vigrahavyāvartanyāṃ vihito doṣāḥ. Tadaparihārat samyaglakṣaṇadvyottakvam api nāsti.

Candrakīrtī here finally refers to the main argument against the main objection from the Vigrahavyāvartanī — specifically, the argument at Vigrahavyāvartanī 31-33: “If your establishment of all these points is based on pramāṇas, we say: how is there establishment of these pramāṇas of yours? If the establishment of pramāṇas is by other pramāṇas, there would be an infinite regress…” (Bhattacharya 1990:15-16: yadi pramāṇatas te teṣām teṣām pratisiddhir arthañāṃ, teṣāṃ punah pratisiddhiṃ brūhi kathaṃ te pramāṇānāṃ. Anyair yadi pramāṇaḥ pramāṇasiddhir bhavet tadanaavasthā...) It is interesting, though, that while Candrakīrtī clearly endorses the argument, he does not elaborate on it, instead merely noting that it has not yet been met by his opponent. Here, he has other fish to fry — specifically, relating to the ordinary use of conventional terms.

\(^{48}\) I render svalakṣaṇa as “unique particular” when it is Dignāga’s usage that is in play (though Candrakīrtī’s point will be that the word cannot coherently be thought to mean this): I render sāmānyalakṣaṇa as “abstraction” (rather than more customarily as “universal”). The category of sāmānyalakṣaṇa would, to be sure, include such examples of universals as “sets” and (if such were ever explicitly discussed in the Indian context) “propositions.” It is also meant, however, to include items such as samātānās, mental “continua” — cases, that is, such as later exponents like Mokṣākaragupta will characterize as vertical, as contra horizontal, sāmānyalakṣaṇas.

\(^{49}\) This could also be rendered: “… is that which has these two characteristics a lakṣya, or not?”; or, taking lakṣya more literally as a gerundive, “is that which has these to be characterized, or not?” On any of these readings, though, the effect of Candrakīrtī’s point remains substantially the same: svalakṣaṇa, which etymologically refers to an act of “characterizing” (lakṣaṇa), must involve the characterizing of something. Dignāga cannot allow this to the extent that his use of the term involves a fairly radical commitment to the idea that unique particulars (which is what svalakṣaṇa denotes for him), if they are really to count as unique, can neither be nor have any properties; for any reference to properties is, ipso facto, the kind of discursive activity that trades in things (namely, the referents of words) that are constitutively not unique.
exist? If it exists, then there is an additional warrantable object\(^{50}\); how, then, are there [only] two reliable warrants?\(^{51}\) Or perhaps [you will say] the subject [that is characterized by these characteristics] does not exist. In that case, the characteristic, being without a locus, doesn’t exist either; how, [in that case,] are there [as many as] two reliable warrants? As [Nāgārjuna] will say [in MMK 5.4]: “When a characteristic is not operating, a subject to be characterized doesn’t stand to reason; and given

\(^{50}\) Namely, the subject of which these different lākṣaṇas are “characteristics.”

\(^{51}\) That is, insofar as the number of pramāṇas, for Dignāga, tracks the number of kinds of existents, the need to introduce an additional kind of existent would undermine his epistemology. Ruegg seems to understand this passage a little differently, translating as follows: “Furthermore, if [Dignāga] has stated [the existence of] a pair of pramāṇas in conformity with the pair [comprised] of the own [i.e. particular characteristic] and the generic characteristic, does there exist this characterized definiendum [i.e. the twofold pramāṇa] for which there is this pair of defining characteristics?” (2002:104; insertions original; emphasis added) As reflected in his final insertion, Ruegg here takes the point to concern the “definition” (lākṣaṇa) — hence, the existence — of the two pramāṇas (which are thus taken as what is lakṣya, “being defined”). But the point here does not, I think, concern the “definitions” of the pramāṇas themselves; rather, the point is simply that the words sva- and sāmānya-lākṣaṇa, insofar as they are forms of the word lākṣaṇa (which denotes an act of “characterizing”), constitutively involve some relationship — specifically, between a “characteristic” (lākṣaṇa), and the thing “characterized” thereby (lakṣya). And Candrakīrti’s point is that Dignāga cannot concede this, insofar as he understands “svalākṣaṇa” as a unique or “bare” particular — that is, as neither being nor having any “properties” or “characteristics” at all.

This point is further obscured by translating svalākṣaṇa, on what Candrakīrti (at least) takes to be Dignāga’s use thereof, as “particular characteristic” (as Ruegg does; consider, as well, Dreyfus’s rendering of this [1997:580, et passim] as “specifically characterized phenomenon”). Shoryu Katsura, in explaining a critique of Hattori’s translation of Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.2, makes a point that cuts as well against these renderings of svalākṣaṇa (again, on Dignāga’s understanding thereof); specifically, they “may suggest that the object to be cognized is a possessor of the two lākṣaṇas and [is to that extent] something different from them…. [But] I do not think that Dignāga admitted any bearer of the two lākṣaṇas.” (Katsura 1991:136; cf., Arnold 2003) Similarly, Candrakīrti thinks Dignāga cannot admit that svalākṣaṇa are (as Ruegg says) “particular characteristics” (or as I will translate what Candrakīrti takes to be the conventional sense of the word, “defining characteristics”) at all, since that would compromise his commitment to the view that there are only two types of existents; for on the conventional sense of the word, svalākṣaṇas would thus have to be the properties (or “characteristics”) of some additional kind of existent. Candrakīrti is not, then, here talking about pramāṇas as the “characterized definiendum” (lakṣya); he is simply starting to make his point that Dignāga’s use of the word svalākṣaṇa is incoherent.
the unreasonableness of a subject to be characterized, there is no possibility of a characteristic, either.” 52

[Objection:] [p.60] It is not that lakṣaṇa means “that by which [something] is characterized.” Rather, [according to the rule that] “the -ana affix is variously applicable,” 53 taking the affix in the sense of an object (karmaṇi), lakṣaṇa means “what is characterized.”

[Response:] Even so, the same problem [still obtains], because of the impossibility of something’s being characterized by itself; for that instrument by means of which a thing is characterized is something different from the object [that is characterized thereby] 55.

52 59.7-11: Kim ca yadi vavsāmāṇyalakṣaṇadvayānurodhena pramāṇadvayām uktaṃ, yasya tallakṣaṇadvayām kim tal lakṣaṃ? jpg pā’i phyir / stong nyid dngos po ’jig pa’i phyir / de phyir dngos po ’jig pa’i rgyur ’gyur na / de ni rigs med de phyir dngos yod min (6.34; La Vallée Poussin 1970a:117: “If [an entity exists] in dependence on a svalaṣaṇa, then through negation of that the entity would be destroyed, and emptiness would be the cause of its destruction [i.e., if “emptiness” were taken as negating really existent svalaṣaṇas, then it would be a nihilistic doctrine]. This is not the case, however, because entities do not [intrinsically] exist.” And 6.36 (p.123): de’i phyir rang gi mtshan nyid kyi skye ba ni bden pa gnyis char du yang yod pa ma yin no (“Therefore, from the point of view of either of the two truths, there is no production of particulars”).

The latter point (i.e., that this sense of svalaṣaṇas does not obtain from the point of view of either of the two truths) neatly expresses Candrakīrtī’s contention that Dignāga’s account of our epistemic practices is not only not ultimately, but not even conventionally valid.


54 60.1-2: Atha syān na lakṣyate ’neneti lakṣaṇam. Kim tarhi “kṛtyalyuṭo bahulaṃ” iti karmanī luṭaṃ kṛtvā lakṣyate tad iti lakṣaṇam. The same rule from Pāṇini can be invoked to explain the different senses of the word pramāṇa (cf., n.21, above), which too is formed by affixing the -ana suffix to a verbal root.

55 60.2-3: Evam api teneiva tasya [de Jong] lakṣyaṃvānāvatāṃbhavād — yena tal lakṣyate [de Jong] tasya karaṇasya karaṇo ’rthānāturavāt — sa eva doṣaḥ. I thus take the force of eva (tenaiva) to be “by that very same thing”; hence, I translate, “by itself.” Candrakīrtī’s point is the evidently grammatical one that the instrument by which something is effected (in this case, by which something is “characterized”) is, by virtue of its being an instrument, something that cannot at the same time be an object. Thus, just as a
[Objection:] Well, perhaps this could be said: Because of cognition’s being an instrument, and because of the inclusion of this in [our concept of] the unique particular (svalakṣaṇa)\(^\text{56}\), this is not the problem [you have said it is]\(^\text{57}\).

[Response:] In this connection, that which is the unique, intrinsic nature (svarūpa) of existents is [what is conventionally referred to as] their defining characteristic (svalakṣaṇa)\(^\text{58}\). For example, earth’s [defining characteristic] is resistance, [that] of feeling is experience, [that] of perceptual cognition is the specific representation of an object.\(^\text{59}\) Therefore, taking [svalakṣaṇa] in the sense of ‘what is characterized,’\(^\text{60}\) and [thus] disregarding the etymology that follows the familiar sense, [our interlocutor] takes it as denoting an object (karmasādhanam)\(^\text{61}\). And by semantically complete verbal construction requires reference to various kārakas, so, too, the act of “characterizing” constitutively involves reference to the discrete components of that action.

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\(^{56}\) Here, I again translate svalakṣaṇa to reflect Dignāga’s use of the word.

\(^{57}\) 60.4: Atha syāt: Jñānasya karaṇatvāt, tasya ca svalaṅkāṇāntarbhāvād, ayam adoṣa iti.

\(^{58}\) In this crucial passage, Candrakīrti explicitly states what he takes to be the conventional sense of the word svalakṣaṇa — which, as made clear by the examples he gives, is to be translated as “defining characteristic” when it is his favored sense of the word that is in play.

\(^{59}\) Note that Candrakīrti’s examples can be found in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa; thus, the svalakṣaṇa of vijñāna is adduced at Abhidharmakośa 1.16a (Pradhan 1975:11), and that of prthivī at Abhidharmakośa 1.12 (Ibid.: 8). My rendering of vijñāna as “perceptual cognition” reflects my agreement with the observation of Bruce Hall (1983: 84n), who notes, with the Abhidharmakośa’s definitions of the terms in mind, that vijñāna in the Abhidharmakośa roughly corresponds to the sense of pratyakṣa (“perception”) recommended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and that the Abhidharmakośa’s usage of saṃjñā (“conception”) corresponds to their sense of anumāna (“inference”). Cf., also, Madhyamakāvatāra 6.202-3 (La Vallée Poussin 1970a: 316), where Candrakīrti trots out a similarly Ābhidharmika list of “defining characteristics” (svalakṣaṇas) of all of the skandhas: “Form has the defining property (svalaṅkāṇa) of color and shape (rūpāṇa); vedanā has the nature of experience; saṃjñā grasps characteristics; saṃskāras fashion [things]; the defining property of perceptual cognition is a conception regarding any object” (gzugs ni gzugs rung mthshan nyid can / tshor ba myong ba’i bdag nyid can / ’du shes mthshan mar ’dzin pa ste / ’du byed mngon par ’du byed pa’o li / yul la so sor rnam rig pa / rnam shes rang gi mthshan nyid do /).

\(^{60}\) See n.54, above.

\(^{61}\) The Tibetan translation renders this as las su sgrub pa, which suggests “established as an object.” But the sense of -sādhanas as “denoting” or “expressive of” (cf., Apte, p.1666, meaning #4) comes from its being a synonym for kāraka — the Sanskrit gram-
positing [at the same time] the instrumental nature of perceptual cognition, it is said [in effect] that one unique particular has the quality of being an object, and another unique particular has the quality of being an instrument. [p.61] In that case, if the svalaśaṇa of perceptual cognition is an instrument, then it must have a separate object (tasya vyatiriktena karmanā bhavitavyam). This is the fault (in your position).

marians’ category for designating the various components of an action. Cf., in this regard, not only Abhyankar 1977:423 (s.v. sādhanā; cited by Ruegg, p.106, n.188), but also Bhattacharya 1980 (especially pp.87-89), who cites similar uses by Candrakīrti of the term sādhanā in the sense of kāraka. See also Bhattacharya 1980-81. (There is a precisely similar usage of the term -sādhanā in Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭṭikā: kāraṇasādhanena mān-aśābdeṇa sārūpyaśaṇaṃ pramāṇam abhidhiyate [“by virtue of the word ‘māna,’ which denotes an instrument, pramāṇa is defined as characterized by conformity”]; Malvania 1971: 39.) In characteristically Sanskritic fashion, then, the argument here is advanced entirely in grammatical terms.

Particularly in this section, it is often difficult to translate this word one way or the other, without begging precisely the question at issue (viz., what the word should mean). Cf., nn.69, 98, below.

Here, note the use of the gerund bhavitavyam to indicate something like the mode of necessity. This bhāve prayoga construction is missed by Siderits, who instead translates “But then if the consciousness svalaśaṇa is the instrumental, it should be by means of a distinct accusative of that, just this is the defect” (p.134; my emphasis). This translation leads him to suppose there is a problem understanding the antecedent of the final pronoun (“of that”), which he then spends a couple of pages explaining. On my reading, though, the point is straightforward.

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This has seemed to me to be a difficult passage, though I have been persuaded by one of my readers that the problems are resolved by translating the passage as I have here. The problems start with the passage “tena hi tal laksyata iti kṛtvā” (60.6). (This is La Vallée Poussin’s conjecture. His manuscripts read “tena hi tad vā na laksyate”; see his note 6, p.60.) The particle hi suggests that the phrase qualifies what immediately precedes it, explaining why the defining characteristics just adduced should be reckoned as the “svalaśaṇa” of the things in question; thus, we could (as I had originally wanted to) read, “for [in these cases,] by that [quality the thing in question] is characterized.” So, too, Ruegg (2002:106): “this [particular entity] is characterized by this [its specific characteristic] (tena hi tal laksyata).” The Tibetan translation, too, seems to take the passage this way, moving “tena tal laksyata” up to the beginning of Candrakīrti’s own definition, thereby clearly including this as part of what Candrakīrti commends: … bshad par bya ste
[Objection:] Then it could be this way: What is apprehendable (gamya) by perceptual cognition, such as the resistance and so forth that are comprised by things like earth — that just is the direct object\textsuperscript{65} of

\begin{verbatim}
/ re zhih 'dir ji ltar des de mtshon par byed 'di sa'i sra ba dang / tshor ba'i myongs ba dang / rnam par shes pa'i yul so sor rnam par rig pa ltar bdag nyid kyi rang gi ngo bo gzhan dang thun mong ma yin pa gang yin pa de ni rang gi mtshan nyid yin na. (Cf., La Vallée Poussin's reconstruction of the Sanskrit from this, his note 6.)

Although this is a conceptually possible reading, the placement of the phrase in the Sanskrit text — together with its echo of the alternative interpretation of 'lakṣaṇa' proposed above (n.54) — recommends instead taking "tena" in the transitional sense of "therefore," and "tal lakṣyate" as a quotation of the earlier attempt to salvage the interlocutor’s favored sense of svalakṣaṇa. Not only does this yield a more forceful indictment of the interlocutor, but it makes better sense of the two continuative "ca" particles that follow: thus it is the same person who takes the word this way (tal lakṣyate iti kṛtvā); who thus disregards the familiar sense (pratidhiyaṅgatām ca vyupattim avadhūya); and who also wants to allow that cognition is an instrument (vijñāṇasya ca karanabhāvan pratipadymāṇena…). The passage might be rendered a little clearer by emending abhyupagacchati (at 60.7) to abhyupagacchatā; this would complement pratipadymāṇena, giving two instrumental present participles to construe with "idam uktam bhavati." Consider, by contrast, Ruegg’s translation, which rather obscures the fact that Candrakūṭi is here indicating that two contradictory things are said by the same person (which is why he can conclude by convicting his interlocutor of incoherence): “… having put aside the derivation [of the term lakṣaṇa] that has been generally acknowledged, one takes it to have an objective realization. Apprehending the cognition to be an instrument, one states that the specific defining characteristic itself has the condition of being the object and that another specific defining characteristic has the nature of an instrument…. Here the fault lies precisely in the fact that if the svalakṣaṇa of a vijñāna is an instrument, there has to exist for it an object… separate [from it]" (2002: 106).

Rendering the passage literally, with the emendation here suggested, we get instead: “\textit{By one who is taking} [svalakṣaṇa] as denoting an object — taking [svalakṣaṇa] in the sense of ‘what is characterized,’ and disregarding the etymology that follows the familiar sense — \textit{and who is} [also] positing the instrumental nature of perceptual cognition, \textit{it is said}…” (This is clear in the Tibetan, which subordinates the first two clauses to the third, which is then the subject of “idam uktam bhavati”: \textit{rab tu grags pa dang rjes su ‘brel pa’i bye brag tu bshad pa bor nas / las su sgrub pa khas len zhih rnam par shes pa byed pa’i ngo bor rtogs pas ni / rang gi mtshan nyid kho na las nyid yin zhing rang gi mtshan nyid gzhan ni byed pa’i ngo bo yin no zhes bya ba ‘di smras par ‘gyur ro.) I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer of this article for some of the foregoing suggestions. The proposed emendation of abhyupagacchati accomplishes (though perhaps more straightforwardly) the same thing as an emendation suggested to me by Sheldon Pollock (personal communication): if abhyupagacchati were read as a locative present participle, pratipadyāṇena could be emended to pratipadyāṇane, giving two locative absolute constructions: “When, disregarding the usage which follows the familiar sense, one accepts..., and \textit{when} one [at the same time] accepts…”

\textsuperscript{65} That is, in the grammatical sense that still governs the discussion. Throughout this section, the expression “direct object” will here render karma in this grammatical sense.
that [perceptual cognition], and it is not distinct from the unique particular (svalākṣaṇa) [that is really being perceived].

[Response:] Even so, then because the defining characteristic (svalākṣaṇa) of perceptual cognition is not [itself] a direct object [of cognition], it could not be a warrantable object (prameya), since only a svalākṣaṇa in the form of a direct object can be a warrantable object.

And thus, since you have specified (ity etad viśeṣya) that two kinds of things — unique particulars and abstractions — can be the objects of reliable warrants, you’re now forced to say: one unique particular is the...

66 61.3-4: Atha syāt: Yat pṛthivyādīgataṃ kāṭhinyādīkaṃ vijñānagamyam, tat tasya karmāsty eva, tac ca svalākṣaṇāvyātiriktaṃ iti.

Here, I think, two points are being made. In the grammatical key that is here predominant, the interlocutor’s point is that vijñāna — which conventionally occurs (as at n.59, above) in the expression “the svalākṣaṇa ['defining characteristic'] of vijñāna” — is, as designating an act of cognizing, a grammatical instrument (that by means of which some agent apprehends something); and as such, it must itself have some direct object. By pointing this out, he hopes to meet Candrakīrti’s immediately preceding point that his position entails an infinite regress. His point is that with vijñāna, we do have an instance of something that is both itself a svalākṣaṇa in the sense of a grammatical instrument, and that yet has a svalākṣaṇa (“unique particular”) as its direct object. This proposal further amounts, I think, to a second point: that svalākṣaṇa as “defining characteristic” is the same thing as svalākṣaṇa as “unique particular,” so that, e.g., if we speak of the earth’s “resistance” as its defining characteristic, we can do so because there is a corresponding “unique particular” that we perceive. Thus the thing commonly adduced as “earth’s svalākṣaṇa” (i.e., hardness) in fact has an ontological correlate, in the form of Dignāga’s “unique particular.” We can, then, speak of “perceiving” something’s “defining characteristic” just insofar as there invariably corresponds to this some unique and concrete particular. Again, this is proposed as a way for Dignāga to retain his commitment to the view that svalākṣaṇa means “unique particular,” while yet explaining common expressions like “resistance is the svalākṣaṇa of earth.”

67 That is, it could not itself be the object of a pramāṇa — which would, for Dignāga, be tantamount to saying that it does not exist. Again, the point is here made in grammatical terms: an act of pramāṇa (“warranting”) must have a prameya, a direct object — and to the extent that vijñāna is instead thought to be (grammatically) an instrument, it therefore could never fulfill this role.

68 61.4-5: Evaṃ tarhi vijñānasvalākṣaṇasya karmatvābhāvāt, prameyatvaṃ na syāt, karmarūpasāyaiṣva svalākṣaṇasya prameyatvaṭ.

Here, Candrakīrti has effectively rejoined that the interlocutor’s previous move will no longer allow us to accommodate the conventional usage, according to which there is a “defining characteristic” (svalākṣaṇa) of vijñāna; for if, instead, we read this conventional expression as meaning “the unique particular which is vijñāna,” then this is tantamount to saying that the subjective cognitive act of awareness is really the object of some other cognitive act, insofar as Dignāga’s usage takes the word as karmasādhanam (“denoting an object”).
object of a reliable warrant— the one thus pointed out as what is characterized; and one is *not* the object of a reliable warrant — the one by which something is characterized.\(^69\) [Perhaps you will rejoin that] that one, too, denotes an object (*karmasādhana*)\(^70\). Then *that* one must, [in turn,] have some other instrument\(^71\). And given this conception of the status of an instrument on the part of *another* [moment of] cognition\(^72\), an infinite regress ensues\(^73\).

\(^69\) Ruegg translates: “Some thing, a *svalaśaṇa* which is the *prameya*, is designated as what is definingly characterized; and some thing [other], which is not the object of a right cognition, is designated as definingly characterized by that” (2002:107). But this misses, I think, the order of predication; that is, the salient point of the sentence is that *prameya* and *aprameya* are here *predicated* of these two kinds of subjects, so that the interlocutor is forced to admit that one of them is *aprimeya*. Consider, as well, Ruegg’s annotation of the passage (107, n.190): “In his discussion here Candrakīrti seems to conjoin *lakṣaṇa*, or *svalaśaṇa*, ‘(specific) defining characteristic’ of a thing (in the Abhidharma example), or of a term, and *svalaśaṇa*, ‘particular characteristic’ which (in the Pramāṇa-school) is the cognitive object of *pratyaśaṇa*…” (Cf., n.98, below, for a similar point by Siderits.) While Ruegg is surely right to note that this passage (like this entire section of the text) crucially involves some alternation in meaning, the point to be made is not, I think, that Candrakīrti thus conflates these; rather, Candrakīrti is offering “defining characteristic” as the conventional sense of the word, and “unique particular” as the sense that Dignāga presupposes — and he is saying that Dignāga ends up with a contradiction, unable both to remain true to his spartan epistemology, and to explain familiar uses of the word.

\(^70\) That is, that the *svalaśaṇa* of perceptual cognition (vijñāṇa), too, is a (perceptible) *object*. The upshot of this is that if a cognition, in order to count as such, must be not only an instrument but also an *object*, then each instance of cognition must be accompanied by a further cognition for which it is such an object. Candrakīrti is here driving towards a consideration of Dignāga’s idea of *svasaṃvitti* — which, however, will chiefly be considered, in this context, as the unique example of something that is at the same time an *instrument* and an *object*. The point in Dignāga’s introducing the idea at this juncture, in other words, will chiefly be to salvage the possibility that his *svalaśaṇas* might be (as Candrakīrti thinks he must say) simply self-characterizing.

\(^71\) *tadā tasyānyena karaṇena bhavitavyam*. Siderits again misses the sense of the *bhava pravoga* construction, instead giving “If the means of action [the cognition] is just that [the svalaśaṇa], then it should come to be by means of another instrumental of that [cognition]…” (p.136; my emphasis) But the third case here (karaṇena) indicates not an “instrument,” but the *subject* of the verb *bhavitavyam*, i.e., the thing which must (despite the interlocutor’s view to the contrary) exist “on the part of that” (*tasya*). Such constructions are clearly expressed in the Tibetan, which handles them without use of the gerundive: *de’i tshe de la byed pa gzhun zhig yod par bya dgos la*…

\(^72\) I.e., given that it, too, would have to be the object of a *further* cognition if it is to count as an instance of cognition that yet counts as a *svalaśaṇa* (where, of course, that is understood as *karmasādhana*).

\(^73\) 61.5-9: *Tataś ca dvividhāṃ prameyaṃ svalaśaṇasāṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇāṃ ca. Ity etad viśeṣya vaktavyaṃ: kimcīt svalaśaṇaṃ prameyaṃ yāl lakṣyata ity evaṃ vyapadiśyate,*
Perhaps you think there exists [the faculty of] apperception (svasaṃvitti). Based on that, [you maintain that], given that [cognition’s] being an object obtains due to [its] apprehension by apperception, [cognition] is included among warrantable objects. To this we respond, based on an extensive refutation of apperception in the Madhyamakāvatāra: it doesn’t make sense to say a svalakṣaṇa [p.62] is characterized by another svalakṣaṇa, and that one by apperception. Moreover, this latter cognition doesn’t exist at all, since — given that there’s no subject to be characterized (lakṣya), owing to the impossibility of [its] establishment by a separate svalakṣaṇa — there is no possibility of the operation of a characteristic without a locus.

And thus [it says] in the Venerable Questions of Ratnacūḍa [Sūtra]:

Not seeing thought, he [the bodhisattva] investigates the stream of thought as to whence it has its arising. Its [arising] is thus: Thought arises when...
there is an intentional object (ālambana). Is it, then, [the case that] the intentional object is one thing, and the thought another? Or is that which is the intentional object precisely the [same as] the thought? If, first of all, the intentional object is one thing and the thought another, then there will obtain [its] being two thoughts (dvicittatā). Or if the intentional object itself is the thought, then how does thought perceive thought? For thought does not perceive thought. Just as a sword-edge cannot be cut by that same sword-edge, [p.63] and a finger-tip cannot be touched by that same finger-tip, in just the same way, a [moment of] thought cannot be seen by that same thought. For one who is thus properly disciplined79, thought has the quality of not abiding (anavasthānata), the quality of being neither interrupted nor eternal (ucchedāśāsvatatā), of not being the paramount self (na kūṣṭhatatā), of not being causeless, nor of being negated (viruddha) by conditions80, neither from this nor from that, neither this nor that — [the bodhisattva] thus knows that stream of thought which [has all of these qualities], that creeping vine of thought (cittalatām), that reality (dharmatā) of thought, that unlocatedness of thought, that immovability of thought, that unseen-ness of thought, [the fact of] being the defining characteristic (svalakṣaṇatām) of thought; thus does [he] see [this] as suchness (tathatā), and [he] does not obstruct it. Thus does [he] realize this analysis of thought, thus does [he] see. This, son of noble family — the bodhisattva’s consideration of thought with respect to thought — is the foundation of mindfulness.

Thus, there is no [faculty of] apperception; [and] since it is non-existent, what is characterized by what?81

And would it be a characteristic by virtue of difference from the subject to be characterized, or by virtue of non-difference? In this regard, if,

of consciousness?” (p.137, my emphasis) Thus, he correctly reads asamanupaśyan, but mistakes the subject of the sentence. The problem vanishes if we consult the Śikṣāsamuccaya, which quotes precisely this passage (in the Bibliotheca Buddhica edition of Bendall, p.235; cited by de Jong). That the text given by La Vallée Poussin is correct is suggested by what there precedes the present quote: “Examining thought he [i.e., the bodhisattva] does not see it as internal, he sees it not outside him, nor in the conformations, nor in the elements, nor in the organs of sense. Not seeing thought, he follows the course of thought, asking, ‘Whence does thought arise?’….” The point, then, is that, after prior investigations, he (“the bodhisattva”) has failed to find anything answering to the designation “thought,” and it is this failure which impels the present search into the nature of the “stream of thought.”

79 tasya evaṃ yoniśah prayuktasya: Tib., de ’di ltar tshul bzhin rab tu sbyor ba la.

80 Ruegg (110): “contrary to condition.”

81 62.4-63.8: Tathā ca-uktam āryaratnacīdapi pṛcchāyāṃ: Sa cittam asamanupaśyan, cittadhārāṃ paryeṣate: kutaś cittasya utpattir iti? Tasyaivaṃ bhavati. Ālambane sati, cittam utpadyate. Tat kim anyad ālambanam anyac cittaṃ, atha yad evālambanam tad eva cittaṃ? Yadi tātād anyad ālambanam anyac cittaṃ, tadā dvicittatā bhavisyati. Atha yad
on one hand, it’s by virtue of difference, then because of being different from the subject characterized, the characteristic wouldn’t be a characteristic, either, as though it were a non-characteristic. And because of [its] being different from the characteristic, the characterized subject wouldn’t be a characterized subject, either, as though it were a non-subject. [p.64] In this way, because of being different from the subject to be characterized, the characteristic would have a subject-to-be-characterized with no need for a characteristic — and hence, because of being without need of a characteristic, it could not be a subject to be characterized! [It would, then, be] just like a sky-flower.

On the other hand, if subject-to-be-characterized and characteristic were not distinct [from one another], then, because of [its] not being distinct from the characteristic, it couldn’t be a characterized subject, either, as though it were a characterizing — of there being, that is, at least something essentially like a sky-flower. And because of [its] not being distinct from the characteristic, the characterized subject would have a subject-to-be-characterized with no need for a characteristic — and hence, because of being without need of a characteristic, it could not be a subject to be characterized! [It would, then, be] just like a sky-flower.

Candrakīrti’s conclusion here (“what is characterized by what?”) makes clear that the discussion of svasaṃvittī has in this context been chiefly meant to address the possibility of there being something essentially self-characterizing — of there being, that is, at least some example of a “characteristic” (lakṣaṇa) that is not the characteristic of anything (which is how Dīngāga must understand svatvaṃsams). The critique of svasaṃvittī, like that of svatvaṃsams, thus chiefly turns (like many characteristically Sanskritic arguments) on eminently grammatical presuppositions. In both cases, the point that Dīngāga wants to salvage is shown to require that there be some verbally expressible action (“characterizing,” “cognizing”) that is not the characterizing or cognizing of anything — which, on the kāraka-analysis of actions, is incoherent.

82 In characteristically Buddhist (not to say Mādhyamika) fashion, Candrakīrti here makes an argument that depends on taking “different” to mean altogether unrelated.

83 63.9-2: Kīṇ ca, bhedena vā tal lakṣaṇaṃ lakṣyaḥ syād, abhedena vā. Tatra yadi tavad bhedena, tadā lakṣyād bhinnavād, alakṣaṇavāl lakṣaṇam api na laksāṇaṃ. Lakṣaṇaṃ ca bhinnavād, alakṣyaavyāl lakṣyaṃ api na [p.64] lakṣyaṃ. Tathā lakṣyād bhinnavād, lakṣaṇasya lakṣaṇānirapekṣaṃ lakṣyaṃ syāt; tataś ca na tal lakṣyaṃ, lakṣāṇānirapekṣaṃtvā, khapispavat.

Something “like a sky-flower” would, of course, be altogether non-existent, which therefore simply could not have any properties or characteristics.
feited, as though [the subject] were itself the characteristic. And because of [its] not being distinct from the subject to be characterized, the characteristic would not be one whose essence was that of a characteristic, either, as though it were itself the subject. As it is said [in Nāgārjuna’s Lokātātavāda]: “If the characteristic were other than the subject to be characterized, then the subject to be characterized would be without characteristic; [and] it is clearly admitted by you that if there is no difference [between them], then neither one exists.”

And with respect to establishment of subject and characteristic, there is no other way than as being the same or different. Thus, [Nāgārjuna] will say [in MMK 2.21]: “How can there be [any] establishment of these two when their establishment is neither as being the same or different?”

Alternatively, if it is said that there will be establishment [of lakṣya and lakṣaṇa] as being ineffable (avācyatā), [we respond that] it is not so. For

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84 Ruegg (2002:112): “… in the same way as the nature of the lakṣaṇa....”
85 Ruegg (ibid.): “… just like the nature of a lakṣya....”
86 Lokātātavāda, verse 11; see Lindner 1987:132.
87 64.2-9: Athābhinate lakṣyalakṣaṇa, tadā lakṣaṇaṁ avyatirikta-bhāvāḥ lakṣaṇasvātmavād vihiyate lakṣyaṁ yādāca avyatirikta-bhāvāḥ lakṣya-yādāca avyatirikta-bhāvāḥ api na lakṣaṇasvabhāvaḥ. Yathā coktaṁ: “Lakṣyāḥ lakṣaṇaṁ anyyacam syat! Tāl lakṣyam alaṁkāraṁ; tayo bhavan ‘nanyavat vispaśaṁ kathitaṁ tvayaṁ” iti. Na ca vinā tatvavāyataṁ asīd Hindhavanyatvaṁ api na lakṣaṇasvabhāvaṁ vā yāyōḥ, na vidyate; yāyōḥ siddhir kathāṁ na khalu vidyate” iti.

This passage, it seems to me, represents what is not only a characteristically Mādhyamika display of linguistic pyrotechnics, but one that is characteristically Sanskrit, in general. (For insightful reflections on the extent to which Sanskritic philosophy is motivated by grammatical and linguistic categories, see Ingalls 1954.) While this type of argument is likely to strike the non-Sanskritic reader as rather underwhelming, it should be remembered that Candrakīrti’s overriding concern here is with how words are conventionally used, and that this all represents an eminently conventional sort of discourse. It seems to me that the conceptual force of this particular passage is much the same as that of his opening rejoinder (i.e., at 59.7-9; n.52, above). The characteristically Mādhyamika deployment of such an argument is similarly on display in Nāgārjuna’s Vigrāhavyāvartanī; thus, with respect to the mutually reciprocal terms pramāṇa and prameya, Nāgārjuna is there concerned to argue (as Oetke puts it) that “means of knowledge cannot be what they are, namely means of knowledge, without the existence of that for which they are means, whereas the objects of knowledge cannot be what they are, i.e. prameyas, if there are no pramāṇas.” (Oetke 2003b: 144n) Indeed, all that Mādhyamikas are finally concerned to show, in a sense, is that any proposed explanatory terms turn out to be constitutively relational — in which case, none can be thought to provide any “ultimate” explanatory purchase on the phenomena putatively explained thereby.

88 Here, Candrakīrti may have in mind Dignāga’s characterization of svalaṁkāras as
ineffability, by definition (nāma), obtains [only] when there is no recognition of the mutual classification of terms; and where there is no recognition of [such mutual] classification, there is complete absence of these two, as well — for there is no possibility of specifying, according to the difference [between them] (viṣeṣatas), “this is the characteristic, this is the subject.” Therefore, there is no establishment as being ineffable, either.

Moreover, if cognition is the instrument with respect to the determination of an object, what is the agent? For without an agent, there is no possibility of instruments and so forth, just as in [the case of] the action of cutting [wood].

Then [perhaps] it is imagined that in this case, thought (citta) has the quality of agency. But this doesn’t make sense, either, since, [on your own theory,] the function of thought is apprehension of a bare object (arthamātradarśana); apprehension of the qualifications (viṣeṣa) of an object [is the function] of [other] derivative mental operations (caitas) — this based on [your] acceptance [of the authoritative text which says that] “in this regard, apprehension of an object is perceptual cognition (vijñāna), while derivative mental operations concern its qualifications.”

“indefinable” (avyapadeśya), etc. (cf., e.g., Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti ad 1.17). Dignāga’s point in so characterizing (?) svalakṣaṇas seems to be simply (but in the end, radically) that “unique particulars” cannot themselves be the referents of words. Candrakīrti, however, introduces this move as specifically meant to explain how there could, in fact, be some way, other than by “identity” and “non-identity” (ekbhāvena or nānabhāvena), of establishing how the lakṣaṇa and lakṣya of his svalakṣaṇa might be related. Cf. Ruegg, 2002:113, n.202.

Candrakīrti’s point here — again, an eminently Sanskritic one — follows the standard analyses of the Sanskrit grammarians, for whom any action can be analyzed into the terms required to express it as a semantically complete verbal construction. Candrakīrti thus has in mind the kāraka analysis of sentences — on which, cf., e.g., Matilal 1990:40-48.

Candrakīrti here quotes Madhyāntavibhāga 1.8 (Pandeya 1999:27). (Ruegg [p.113] erro-
For when one governing action (pradhānakriyā) is to be effected, instruments and so forth have their instrumentality and so forth because of the acceptance of their being subordinate, by virtue of [their] respectively (yathāsvam) performing subordinate actions (guṇakriyā)⁹². But in this case, cognition (jñāna) and perceptual cognition (vijñāna) do not have one principal function [in common]. Rather, the principal function of perceptual cognition is determination of a bare object (arthamātrarparicchitti), while that of cognition is determination of its qualifications (viśeṣa); hence, cognition does not have any instrumentality, nor does thought have any agency. This, then, is the problem⁹⁴.

[Objection:] Well, perhaps it could be that, since scripture says “all dharma are without self,” there is no existence of any agent whatsoever

neously attributes this text to Sthiramati; while Sthiramati wrote a jīka on Vasubandhu’s bhāsya on the Madhyāntavibhāga, the root text here quoted is traditionally attributed to Maitreya. Candrakārti clearly alludes to Dignāga’s recurrent point that the distinguishing of separate viśeṣa and viṣeṣya (“qualification” and “thing qualified”) is a constitutively conceptual operation — in which case, perception can never itself register such a distinction; cf., e.g., Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.23. In regard to the way the categories in play here all line up, La Vallée Poussin (p.65, n.3) offers many useful textual citations (starting with the Nyāyabinduṭīkā), summarizing thus: “Soient les équivalences: cittam = vijñānam = nirvikalpajñānānam = arthamātragrāhi; caitasāḥ = jñānam = savikalpakajñānam = arthaviśeṣagrāhi.” See also n.59, above, citing Bruce Cameron Hall’s observation that the Ābhidharmikas’ vijñāna basically corresponds to what Dignāga calls pratyakṣa, while the Ābhidharmikas’ saṃjñā corresponds to anumāna. Candrakārti’s text here seems to recommend Hall’s observation, effectively attributing to his interlocutor a usage according to which vijñāna=pratyakṣa. This is further clarified in the immediately ensuing passage. Regarding Candrakārti’s textual citation, Ruegg (2002:113, n.203) comments: “Candrakārti’s reference here to a major source for the Vijnānāvāda in support of his own view is noteworthy; this might suggest that here his opponent was a Vijnānāvādin.” Indeed, the Madhyāntavibhāga seems a perfectly natural text for Dignāga to defer to (and thus, for Candrakārti to cite as something that Dignāga ought not to contradict). Cf., Hattori 1968: 101-102 (n.161).

⁹² Ruegg’s reading of yathāsvam is unintelligible to me: “… in virtue of assuming subsidiarity through effecting a subordinate activity in accord with the possessed” (2002:114).

⁹³ 65.4-8: Ekasyām hi pradhānakriyāyām sādhyāyām yathāsvam guṇakriyānirvṛttidvāreṇa-angibhāvopasamāt [here, I decline to accept de Jong’s emendation: aṅgabhāvopasamāt] karaṇādīnām karaṇādīvam. Na ca-īha jñānavijñānayo eva pradhānakriyā, kim tarhy arthamātrarparicchititī vijnānasya pradhānakriyā, jñānasya tv arthaviśeṣa-pariccheda; iti nāsti jñānasya karaṇatvam, nāpi cittasya kartrtvam. Tataḥ ca sa eva doṣah.
— hence, even without an agent, ordinary discourse, involving verbs and other [parts of speech] does transpire.\(^95\)

[Response:] This isn’t right, either, for you have incorrectly ascertained the sense of scripture. This is explained in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*.\(^96\)

[Objection:] Even when there is no possibility of qualifiers (viṣeṣaṇa) that are separate from a “body” or a “head” — as [in the expressions] “the body of a statue (śilāputraka)”\(^97\) or “the head of Rāhu”

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\(^95\) 65.9-10: *Atha syāt, anātmānaḥ sarvadharmā ity āgamāt, kartuḥ sarvathābhāvāt, kartāram antarenāpi vidyata eva kriyādvyavahāra iti.* Ruegg: “Therefore, there is indeed found to exist a transactional-pragmatic usage that relates to an act, etc., even without an agent” (2002:114).

\(^96\) 65.10-11: *Etad api nāsti, āgamasya sāmyagarthānavadhāraṇāt. Etac cokta [de Jong] Madhyamkāvatāre.* Ruegg counter-intuitively reads *artha* here as though it meant something like *ālambana:* “For no correct intentional object has been specified by the [cited] scriptural testimony” (2002: 114). Stcherbatsky (2002:157, n.8) cites *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.68, ff., as what is likely referred to, although I don’t see how the passages he cites relate to the discussion at hand. Ruegg (2002:114, n.205) more helpfully cites, instead, the *bhāṣya* on *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.76, which argues that Dignāga’s notion of *svasaṃvitti* is incoherent given typical Sanskritic analyses of the verbal expression of actions — though the relevance of this to the present point is not altogether clear to me. I confess, though, to being unable to venture an alternative suggestion.

\(^97\) The primary sense of the word *śilāputraka* is “millstone” or “pestle,” which is reflected in the Tibetan translation (*mchi gu*). If (with Ruegg [2002:115]) we take it that way, the point of this example would differ slightly from that of the other — and indeed, would not be altogether clear. The point would perhaps be that, insofar as the word involves a semantic unit that ordinarily refers to persons (i.e., *putra*, such that the word’s *nirukti* makes it mean something like “stone boy”), one might be inclined to suppose that the body of such is, like the body of a person, animate — hence, the force of the subsequent part where we’re told that the *ākāṅkṣā* that goes with this word is *buddhi*, “intellect.” Thus, the reason a *śilāputraka* just is a body is that it is inanimate (whereas a statue would only be a “body” if it happened to be a headless statue). However, it seems to me preferable to follow Stcherbatsky (1927:158) in reading this to mean “statue” — in which case, the point of the example is exactly the same as that of the “Rāhu’s head” example (where the mythological ‘Rāhu’ in question is a celestial being who, having been beheaded, now exists only as a head); viz., both cases involve a genitive relation between two referents when there is in fact only one thing (i.e., a statue just is a body). The example of the expression “Rāhu’s head” is common in Indian philosophy; cf., e.g., the usage attributed, in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, to the (materialist) Cārvākas, who point out that expressions like “my body” ought not to be taken as evidence of a really existing subject of the genitive; rather, such expressions are, like “Rāhu’s head,” merely “figurative” (*Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, p.2: *mama śarīram iti vyavahāro rāhoḥ śira ityādīvād aupacārikāḥ).*
— there is [nevertheless] a relation of qualifier and qualified; just as [in that case], here, too, there will be [a relation] even when there is no possibility of any earth apart from its *svalakṣaṇa*, [so that we are, after all, in a position to make sense of the familiar expression.] “earth’s *svalakṣaṇa.*”\(^{98}\)

**[Response:]** This isn’t so, because [these cases] are not the same. For the use of words like ‘body’ and ‘head’ depends on other associated categories, such as, [in the case of ‘heads,’] intellect, etc., and, [in the case of bodies.] hands, etc. That being the case\(^{99}\), the production of an idea based only on the words ‘body’ or ‘head’ creates a semantic expectation regarding the other associated categories\(^{100}\), [such that one expects to know] whose body? whose head? Another [person], with a desire to preclude connection with any other qualifiers\(^{101}\), removes an interlocutor’s semantic expectation by suggesting the qualifications that are statues and Raḥu\(^{102}\) — [a suggestion that] is in conformity with mundane convention (*saṃketa*). This makes sense. But in the present case, where there is no

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\(^{98}\) 66.1-3: *Athāpi syāt: Yathā śilāputrakasya śarīram rāhoḥ śira iti, śarīrasīrovya-
atiriktaivīṣaṇaśaṃbhave ‘pi, viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo ‘sti. Ēvaṃ prthivyāḥ svalakṣaṇam iti, svalakṣaṇavyatirikta-prthivyasaṃbhave ‘pi, bhaviṣyatīti.*

I have, once again, left these occurrences of the word *svalakṣaṇa* untranslated in order to reflect the fact that Dignāga is here simply reporting the attested example, while remaining neutral with respect to how we understand the word. Siderits observes that “it should be pointed out that here the opponent has reverted to the traditional usage of ‘svalakṣaṇa’, as meaning ‘own defining characteristic’; this is made clear in his reference to hardness as the svalakṣaṇa of earth” (1981:142). But I think we should understand Candrakīrti’s interlocutor as simply reporting the example that Candrakīrti has challenged him to accommodate; thus, Dignāga’s task here is to show that the word can mean what he takes it to mean (“unique particular”), and yet make sense of this attested usage. Naturally, it favors Candrakīrti’s point that the examples he adduces can only be *translated* using the expression “defining characteristic.”

\(^{99}\) The first phrase is all a locative absolute, with the “subject” of the phrase here translated (*pravṛtti*) actually occurring in the locative.

\(^{100}\) More literally, “the arising of this idea only functions along with a semantic expectation regarding the other associated categories” (*buddhyupajananaḥ sahacāri-

\(^{101}\) That is, one strives to eliminate his interlocutor’s “syntactic expectation” out of a desire to render the reference more precise, to “preclude connection” with some other possible referent.

\(^{102}\) That is, these terms, when related to them in the genitive case, *qualify* (respectively) “body” and “head.”
posibility of earth and so forth apart from [defining characteristics] such as resistance\textsuperscript{103}, the relation of qualifier and qualified doesn’t make sense\textsuperscript{104}.

\textsuperscript{103} Candrakārti’s point is that the conventional understanding of a “defining characteristic” (svalakṣaṇa) is not that it qualifies some particular example of the kind in question (as, e.g., “red earth”), but rather, that it makes something an example of that kind in the first place. Thus, adjectival “qualification” (viśeṣaṇa) is called for only when there is some syntactic “expectation” (ākāṅkṣā), such that we need to know more in order to know precisely which token of some type is being picked out. In contrast, since there cannot meaningfully be any earth which is not “earth” by definition — which is not, that is, possessed of the characteristic that makes it an instance of “earth” — we do not, when encountering some instance of “earth,” wonder what it belongs to; for when one encounters an instance of “earth,” one just is encountering an instance of “resistance.” This is just what it means for the latter to be a defining characteristic of the former. This point can be understood as counting against Dignāga’s contention that perceptual cognition affords access to uninterpreted data; for Candrakārti’s argument here advances the point that we invariably encounter things as they are defined. That is, tokens of the type “earth” are invariably encountered under a description (viz., as “hard” or “resistant”).

\textsuperscript{104} Prasannapadā 66.3-8: Naitad evam, atulyatvā. Śārīrasāraḥśabdāyor hi buddhādhipāṇḍavatsahābhāvāvipaḍārthāntarasāpeksatāpravṛttah, śārīrasāradhābdamātrālam-bano buddhyupajananah sahacāripaḍārthāntarākāṅkṣa eva vartate. Kasya śārīraṁ, kasya śira iti? Itaro ‘pi viśeṣanāntarasambandhanirācikīrṣayā śilāpurakarārāhuviśeṣa-nadhvaninā laukikasamketānvidyāyānā pratipattuḥ kāṅkṣām upahāntiti yuktam. Iha tu kāthīnyādipyātriptīprthivyādyaṁsabhāve sati na yuktō viśeṣanaviśeṣayābhāvā. This is the passage discussed by Thurman and Eckel, both of whom follow Tsong-kha-pa in taking Candrakārti’s target here to be Bhāvaviveka; cf., n.11, above. We can understand why Tsong-kha-pa sees here an engagement with Bhāvaviveka if we appreciate that on Tsong-kha-pa’s view, the distinction between the “Śvātantrika” Madhyamaka of Bhāvaviveka and Candrakārti’s “Prāsaṅgika” Madhyamaka centrally involves the concept of svalakṣaṇa. Specifically, Tsong-kha-pa thinks that Bhāvaviveka must accept the existents posited by an opponent as “being established by virtue of svalaṅkaśa” (rang gi mshin nyid kyi grub pa = svalaṅkaśena siddha). But Tsong-kha-pa’s understanding of this issue involves a sense of svalaṅkaśa that is, I think, not present in Candrakārti. Thus, we can note that Thurman (translating Tsong-kha-pa) is right to see the present discussion as turning on different understandings of the word svalaṅkaśa: “… the intrinsic identity (svalaṅkaśa) involved in (this sort of) intrinsically identifiable status is altogether quite different from the ‘ultimate particular’ (svalaṅkaśa) explained precisely as ‘functional capacity’ in the logicians’ treatises, and from the ‘defining characteristic’ (svalaṅkaśa) explained as that which characterizes (something as) different from everything else, such as heat in the case of fire, in the Abhidharma Scripture, etc.” (Thurman 1991: 292) But it is really only the latter two senses of svalaṅkaśa that are in play in our text from the Prasannapadā, with Tsong-kha-pa himself having introduced (in the first occurrence reflected in Thurman’s translation) an additional sense. On this point, cf., Ruegg 2004:338-9.
[Objection:] Because of the acceptance by non-Buddhists of distinct subjects (lakṣya), in accordance with that, [our] definition of characteristic is without fault.  

[Response:] [p.67]: This isn’t so; for it is not suitable to accept, with regard to your own occasion (svasamaye), the categories imagined by non-Buddhists, which are devoid of arguments (yuktīvidhūra); for you would have to admit, as well, [their] additional [list of what count as] reliable warrants, and so forth.  

Moreover, because of the real existence of the qualifier, familiar without analysis, which is a statue — [conventionally described as] an appropriator (upādāty) whose appropriated basis (upādāna) is a body, [a relation] that is included in ordinary discourse — and because of the real existence of the [qualifier, familiar without analysis], which is Rāhu, [conventionally described as an] appropriator whose appropriated basis is a head — [because of the real existence of these,] just as [in the case of] derivatively [existent entities] like the person, this example doesn’t make sense.
[Objection:] In fact, the example is established, since, because of
the non-establishment of any other object apart from the body and the
head, there is apprehension only of these [a body and a head]112.

[Response:] This isn’t so, because such critical analysis doesn’t oper-
ate in ordinary discourse, and because the existence of ordinary categories
is not based on such critical analysis. Just as a self, critically considered,
is impossible as [something] distinct from form and so forth113, but
nonetheless, relative to the aggregates (skandhān upādāya)114, conven-
tionally has existence115 — so, too, in the case of Rāhu and the statue.
Hence, there is no establishment of the example116. In the same way, even
if, on the part of things like earth, there is no subject [when] being con-
sidered apart from [defining characteristics] like resistance, and [even if
the] characteristic, when separate from the subject, is without a locus —

112 67.6-7: Sariraśirovyatiriktasya-arthāntarasya-asiddhes, tanmātrasya-upalambhā, siddham eva nidarśanam iti cet.
That is, the interlocutor here suggests that the various properties (or “qualifiers”) of any
unique particular are not among the things perceived, and hence cannot be thought real
— in which case, he may after all salvage his understanding of svalaksāna as the “unique
particulars” that alone are perceived (and therefore still say that an expression like “earth’s
svalaksāna” is to be understood as having only one ‘real’ referent).

113 That is, apart from such analytic categories as the skandhas.

114 This phrase, I have argued in Chapter 6 of Arnold (2005), is central to understand-
ing Nāgārjuna’s constitutively Mādhyamika category of upādāya prajñapti.

115 Ruegg (2002:117): “…it exists in supported-dependence…..” It might be thought
counter-intuitive that the self’s existence (qualified as “skandhān upādāya”) is allowed as
“conventional”; for if the whole Buddhist critique of a “self” is to have any purchase, it
would seem that the “convention” in the matter would really be that the self exists aţmanā
or svabhāvena (that is, that it exists “in itself” or “essentially”). Perhaps it was this thought
that led Siderits to translate this passage thus: “but by worldly convention there is the
reality of that, not depending on the skandhas…” (1981:144; my emphasis) — as though,
presumably (but impossibly), skandhān upādāya were to be construed as a compound
(“skandha-anupādāya”). But Candrakīrti’s point here is not that the self’s existing “relative
to the aggregates” is the content of the convention; rather, his point is just that, given
the aggregates as a basis of imputation, there can arise the convention that the self exists.

116 That is, the interlocutor had invoked these examples (a statue’s body, Rāhu’s head)
as meant to show that there are cases where we speak as though there were two things,
even though we all know there is only one real referent; and Candrakīrti has responded
as meant to show that there are cases where we speak as though there were two things,
even though we all know there is only one real referent; and Candrakīrti has responded.
nevertheless, this is the convention\textsuperscript{117}. The teacher [Nāgārjuna]\textsuperscript{118} settled the matter by establishment [of all these categories] as simply being mutually interdependent (\textit{parasparāpekṣāṃtratayā})\textsuperscript{119}.

And this is necessarily to be accepted in this way; for otherwise, the conventional [p.68] would not be [characterized by its being] free from reasoning — this would be \textit{reality}, not the conventional\textsuperscript{120}. And it is not [the case that] there is the impossibility only of things like statues when they are investigated by reasoning\textsuperscript{121}. Rather, according to the argument that is going to be set forth, there is no possibility of form and feelings and so forth\textsuperscript{122}, either; hence, their existence, too, like that of the statue, would have to be accepted as conventional. And this is not how [you accept them]; hence, [your position is] false.\textsuperscript{123} This presentation of rel-

\textsuperscript{117} That is, the reference of words is explicable with reference only to what \textit{convention} requires, and cannot itself be \textit{explained} by anything “more real” than such conventions — which, on Candrakīrti’s reading, is precisely what Buddhists like Dignāga are after.

\textsuperscript{118} Ruegg (118): “Teachers have propounded....” But it seems clear that Candrakīrti is here (in eminently conventional fashion) using the honorific plural to refer to Nāgārjuna.

\textsuperscript{119} 67.7-12: \textit{Na etad evaṃ.} Laukike vyavahāra ithamvivārṇyavṛtyer avicārata sa laukikapadārāthānām asitvā. Yathaiva hi rūpādivyavatirekena vicāryamānā śāmā na sambhavati, api ca lokasamvyrtā skandhān upādāya asya-asitvāṃ, evam rāhuśilāputraś ca api nāsti nidarśanasiddhiḥ. Evaṃ prthivyādīnām yady api kāthivyādivyādiviriktaṃ vicāryamānāṃ laksyam nāsti, laksyavatirekena ca laksāmaṃ nirāśrayam, tathāpi samvṛty eseti, parasparāpekṣāṃtratayā [de Jong] siddhyā siddhyam vyavasthāpayāṃbhāvār uccāryāḥ.

\textsuperscript{120} Ruegg (2002:118): “...otherwise, \textit{samvṛty} would not be deprived of a justified ground; and it would then be reality itself, and not \textit{samvṛty}....” Candrakīrti’s point seems simply to be that critical analysis is, \textit{ipso facto}, constitutive not of the conventional but of (a search for) \textit{ultimate} truth; thus, if it were thought that conventionally admitted existents could withstand this kind of “ultimate” analysis, then they could not be described as conventionally admitted, and would instead have to be said to exist “ultimately.” Of course, Candrakīrti’s characteristically Mādhyaṃika point is that there is \textit{nothing} that can thus withstand analysis.

\textsuperscript{121} Ruegg: “Nor is there [simple] non-existence of a śilāputraka and the like that are in fact being analytically investigated as to [their having a] justified ground” (2002:118). This misconstrues the eva (“in fact”) as though it qualified \textit{vidyāmāna} (rather than, as I take it, \textit{śilāputraka}). Candrakīrti clearly means to emphasize that once we open up a critical analysis, it is not only conventionally admitted existents that are undermined, but the putatively “ultimately existent” (\textit{paramārthaśat}) analytic categories of the Abhidharma tradition, as well.

\textsuperscript{122} That is, the \textit{skandhas} (of which these are the first two), which are among the subjects to be treated in the remainder of the \textit{MMK}.

\textsuperscript{123} 67.12-68.4: \textit{Avaśyaṃ ca itad evam abhyupeyaṃ, anyathā hi samvṛty upa-} [p.68]
ative indication (upādāya prajñāpīti) is also extensively taught in the Madhyamakāvatāra, so that should be consulted, too.\(^{124}\)

pattyā na viyuṣyeta, tadā-iyam [de Jong] tattvam eva syān, na samvyrtiḥ. Na ca upapattyā vicāryamāṇānāṃ śīlāputrakādānāṃ eva-asāṃbhavaḥ, kiṃ tarhi vāsyamāṇāyā yuktyā rūpavedanādānāṃ api nāsti śaṃbhava iti; tesām api samvyrtā śīlāputraka iva-astitvam āstheyam syāt.

The last underlined portion here reflects a possible textual problem. I have made what seems to me the best sense of this passage by refusing an emendation proposed by La Vallée Poussin, who follows some versions of the Tibetan (de dag kyang mchi gu la sogs pa bzhiṅ du kun rdzob tu yod pa ma yin pa nyid du khas blangs par ’gyur na) in suggesting the reading: tesām api samvyrtā śīlāputrakādīvan nāsitvam āstheyam syāt... (Vaidya [1960:23] adopts La Vallée Poussin’s emendation. De Jong [1978] does not comment.) This gives the opposite of my sentence: “They, too, like statues and so forth, would have to be disallowed if it were thought (counterfactually) that the conventional could be characterized by critical examination. It would, then, be the latter that Candrakīrti here means to deny; for what cannot be doubted, in any case, is that the skandhas fail to survive critical examination.

The reading I prefer, though, seems more straightforwardly to follow what precedes it, as Candrakīrti’s point is instead that the merely “conventional” existence of the skandhas is precisely what we have to accept. I take this as stated counterfactually, then, insofar as it is a conclusion that Candrakīrti thinks his interlocutor wishes to avoid (though of course Dignāga’s generally Ābhidharmika idea that there is an enumerable set of “ultimately existent” entities involves only svalakṣaṇas, not the skandhas). (For a conceptually similar passage, see n.141, below.) I would venture that it is the optative here that gives pause; for this makes the sentence counterfactual, but it is not immediately clear (given the characteristically laconic na caitad evam ity asad etat that follows) what is counterfactual about it. My reading is warranted, though, by all of the manuscripts available to La Vallée Poussin (cf., his n.3, p.68). Ruegg (2002:118, with n.217) reads the Sanskrit as I do, noting some divergence between different editions of the Tibetan canon, with the sDe-dge edition not warranting La Vallée Poussin’s emendation. Ruegg translates, however, very differently (although plausibly): “Hence, as in the case of the śīlāputraka, etc., on the surface-level their existence is to be accepted. But since it is not [really] so, [in ultimate reality] it is non-existent.” (Ruegg 2002:118; my emphasis)

\(^{124}\) This sentence is not in the available Sanskrit manuscripts, but is preserved in the Tibetan (and quoted by Tsong-kha-pa as occurring in Candrakīrti’s text; cf., Thurman 1991: 295): brten nas brtags par rnam par bzhaṅ pa ’di yang dbu ma la ’jug ba las rgyas par bstan pas de nyid las yongs su bṣal bar bya’o. Candrakīrti refers us to the Madhyamakāvatāra throughout the Prasannapadā, so that the reference given here in the Tibetan is not at all out of place — though it is not immediately clear how much of the foregoing discussion is to be included as having been concerned with a “presentation of upādāya prajñāpīti.” Presumably, though, Candrakīrti refers back to where he first exemplifies what he takes as the conventional usage of svalakṣaṇa (p.60.5), and it is quite possible that he means to characterize the entire discussion of svalakṣaṇas as concerning upādāya prajñāpīti. Ruegg (2002:119, n.218) cites Madhyamakāvatāra 6.120, ff., for other discussions of upādāya prajñāpīti. In a footnote to Tsong-kha-pa’s reiteration of Candrakīrti’s con-
[Objection:] What’s the use of this hair-splitting? For we do not say that all discourse involving warrants and warrantable objects is true; rather, what is familiar in the world is [all that is] established by this argument\textsuperscript{125}.

We respond: We, too, say, What’s the use of this hair-splitting, which delves into ordinary discourse? Let it be! Until there is understanding of reality, the conventional — its existence \textit{(sattākā)} come into being \textit{(ātmabhāva)} as projected by nothing but error — is, for those who desire liberation, the cause of the accumulation of the roots of merit that convey [one] to liberation\textsuperscript{126}. [p.69] But having introduced reasoning at some point, you incoherently \textit{(anyāyato)} destroy it\textsuperscript{127}, because of being one whose intellect is ignorant of the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth. I am the one who, based on skill in settling conventional truth, situate myself in the \textit{ordinary} perspective. Like a respected elder \textit{(lokavṛddha)}, I overturn one argument dedicated to the refutation of one part of the conventional by another argument — and in so doing, I refute only you, who are deviating from the conduct of the world. But [I do] not [refute] the conventional\textsuperscript{128}.

cluding sentence, Thurman (1991: 295, n.19) refers us instead to \textit{Madhyamakāvatāra} 6.32, ff. I take 6.158-165 as the section to which Candrākārti here alludes — though of course it is difficult to be certain. I have developed my analysis of the expression “\textit{upādāya prajñāpti}” in Arnold (2005), Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{125} 68.5-6: \textit{Atha syā: Kim anayā sākṣmekṣiyā? Naiva hi vayaṁ sarvapramāṇapra- meyavavyāvahāram satyaṁ ity ācākṣmahe, kim tu lokaprasiddhir eṣāmnā nyāyena vyavasthāpyata iti.}

\textsuperscript{126} Ruegg: “What, indeed, is the use of this subtle [investigation] that introduces into [sic] the transactional-pragmatic usage of ordinary folk in the world? To begin with, let there be this \textit{saṃsvṛti} wherein the existence of an entity is acquired through mere misaprehension, [but which may none the less be] the motivating cause… so long as there is [yet] no knowledge of reality.” (2002:119-20)

\textsuperscript{127} Thus I take \textit{etām} to pick up \textit{upapatti} (“reasoning”), not (from the preceding sentence) \textit{saṃsvṛti}. If, as it would be possible to do, we read \textit{etām} as thus referring back to \textit{saṃsvṛti}, Candrākārti’s point would be the similar one that his interlocutor undermines the \textit{conventional}, simply \textit{by} introducing a putatively probative argument — with the conventional, Candrākārti has already said, being constitutively lacking in critical analysis. On my reading, by contrast, the point is that the problem is with Dignāga’s \textit{replacing} the conventional with something else that is not itself “conventional” (i.e., with a peculiarly technical account thereof, a putatively probative \textit{“upapatti”}), while at the same time claiming that his own account is conventional. On this reading, Candrākārti is basically charging Dignāga with self-referential incoherence.

\textsuperscript{128} 68.7-69.5: \textit{Ucyate: vayaṁ apy evaṁ brūnah: Kim anayā sākṣmekṣiyā laukikavyava- hāre ‘vatārikaya? Tiṣṭhatu tāvad eṣā viparyāsāmātṛāśādītātmabhāvasattākā saṃsvṛtir}
Therefore, if it is ordinary discourse, then there must also be a subject that possesses a characteristic (lakṣaṇavallakkṣyeṇāpi bhavitavyam)\textsuperscript{129}. And therefore just this is the problem [with your conception]. But in terms of ultimate truth, since there [ultimately] are no subjects (lakṣyādbhāvā), this pair of characteristics [i.e., sva- and sāmānyalakṣaṇa] does not exist, either; whence, then, [your] two reliable warrants?\textsuperscript{130}

Now perhaps it is not accepted [by you] that the derivation (vyutpatti) of words thus depends on a connection between action and agent\textsuperscript{131}. This is extremely problematic. You engage in discourse (vyavaharati)\textsuperscript{132} using those very words whose use (pravṛttta) depends on a connection between action and agent — and yet you do not acknowledge the sense of words as involving things like actions and instruments. You fool! Your sense is bound to a mere fancy\textsuperscript{133}.

129 I thus read lakṣaṇavallakkṣyeṇa as a compound, and the -vat suffix in the sense of possession — and not (as the Tibetan translation construes it) as the indeclinable lakṣaṇavat, which would read “as in the case of a characteristic, there must also be a subject.” (So Ruegg: “Therefore, if [this be] worldly transactional-pragmatic usage..., then, necessarily, there must exist a lakṣya in the same way as a lakṣaṇa...” [2002:120]. The Tibetan reads: de‘i phyir gal te ‘jig rten pa’i tha snyad du yin na ni, de‘i tshe mtshan nyid bzhin du mtshan gzhir yang...). Given that Candrakīrti has wanted all along to show that Dignāga’s conception of svalaṅkaṇa founders on the necessity of admitting that there must be some lakṣya in which it is instantiated, the reading I have chosen seems to make more sense. Thanks to Rick Nance for pointing this out to me.

130 69.5-7: Tasmād yadi laukiko vyavahāras, tadā-avaśyam lakṣaṇavallakkṣyeṇāpi bhavitavyam; tataś ca sa eva duṣṭaḥ. Atha paramārthas, tadā lakṣyādbhāvā lakṣaṇ advayam api nāśīti, kutaḥ pramāṇadvayam?

131 That is, perhaps Dignāga will deny that the kāraka analysis of verbal expressions (conventionally normative in the Sanskritic world) should hold sway. Candrakīrti takes this concession as an occasion to restate the extent to which his whole critique of Dignāga’s account of svalaṅkaṇas (according to which, svalaṅkaṇas — constitutively neither having any properties, nor being the properties of anything — are simply “self-characterizing”) has been informed chiefly by the characteristically Sanskritic analyses of language that were conventionally normative for his context.

132 Ruegg (121): “Your honour engages in transactional-pragmatic activity.....” Here in particular, I might have liked, “You conduct your business...”; see nn.17, 32, above.

133 69.8-10: Atha śabdānām evam kriyākārakaṣaṇībandhapūrvikā vyutpattir nāngikriy-
And when, in this way, it has not been shown that there are [only] two kinds of warrantable objects, then, by virtue of their not having as objects either unique particulars or abstractions, [it follows that] tradition and so forth [can also] have the status of additional reliable warrants.134

Moreover, because it doesn’t include instances of ordinary discourse like “a jar is perceptible,”135 and because of the acceptance of the discourse of ordinary people (anārya), [your] definition (lakṣaṇa) has insufficient extension136 — it doesn’t make sense.137

[Objection:] [p.70] Things like color, which are what is appropriated (upādāna) as jars, are [said to be] ‘perceptible’ [simply] because of [their]

134 69.11-12: Yadā ca-evam prameyadvayam avyavasthitam, tadā [sva]sāmānyalakṣaṇāṁ/viduatvam-āgamādīnām pramāṇāntaravām.

135 Here, Candrakīrti turns to a consideration specifically of Dignāga; Candrakīrti here approaches his concluding endorsement of the Naiyāyika pramāṇas as representing the best account of our conventional epistemic practices; cf., 75.6-8 (n.182), below.

136 Ruegg: “…for the [postulated] lakṣaṇa, there exists no (logical-epistemological) pervasion…” (2002:122) But Candrakīrti would not, I think, have in mind this peculiarly technical, dialectical use of the word, which has a quite common sense in grammatical literature; cf., Abhyankar 1977:48 (s.v., avyāpta).

137 69.13-14: Kim ca “ṛgatḥ pratyākṣa” ity evam ādikasya laukikavyavahārasya-asamgrahād, anāryavavyavahārabhyupagamāc ca, avyāpitā lakṣaṇasya-iti na yuktam etat.
determinability by the reliable warrant which is perception. Hence, just as it is taught that “the birth of buddhas is bliss” — [an expression that is understood as] involving figurative reference to the effect with respect to [what is really] the cause — in the same way, a jar, even though occasioned by perceptibles like its color, is designated as ‘perceptible,’ making a figurative reference to the cause with respect to [what is really] the effect.

[Response:] [Appeal to] figurative usage does not make sense with respect to a cognitive object of this kind. For in the world, birth is apprehended as separate from happiness. Indeed, because of its being the cause of many hundreds of evils — which is because of its having as its nature the characteristic of [being] compounded — it [i.e., birth] is precisely non-bliss. With respect to the sort of object where what is being taught — “it [i.e., birth] is happiness” — is incoherent (asamabhaddha eva), figurative usage makes sense. But in the present case — “a jar is perceptible” — there is nothing at all called a jar which is imperceptible, [noth-

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138 That is, Dignāga — once again challenged to show how his peculiarly technical usage of words can be reconciled with examples of their ordinary use — here suggests that the adjectival sense of the word pratyakṣa is derivative, and that the word primarily functions to pick out an epistemic faculty.

139 70.1-3: Atha syāt: ghatopādānānīlādayaḥ pratyakṣāḥ, pratyakṣapramāṇānaparicchedatvā (Tib., mgon sum gyi tshad mas yongs su gcad par bya ba yin pa’i phyir mgon sum yin te). Tata ca yathāiva kārane kāryopacāram kṛtvā, “buddhānāṃ sukhā upādā” iti vyapadiṣyate, evam pratyakṣanīlādinimittako ‘pi ghaṭaḥ kārye kāraṇopacāram kṛtvā pratyakṣa iti vyapadiṣyate.

The same example (for which, cf., Dhammapada 14.16: sukho buddhānāṃ uppādo sukha saddharmadesanā / sukha saṅghassa sāmaṅgī samaggānāma tapo sukho !) is cited and discussed in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakoṣābhyāsyam (ad Abhidharmakośa 1.10; Pradhan 1975:7), where it is also an example of kārane kāryopacāra. Cf., also, Nyāyabindu 3.2 (and Dharmottara’s commentary thereon; Malvania 1971: 120-21), where the case of parātthānumāna is similarly considered a figurative usage of the word anumāna. Dignāga’s appeal to upacāra in his account of pratyakṣa is much as Candrakīrti here represents it: “The word pratyakṣa is used with respect to three things: the reliable warrant, the awareness [that results from the exercise thereof], and the object [of this awareness]. With respect to these, [the usage designating] the reliable warrant is primary, and the others are secondary (nye bar btags =Skt. aipacārika). In this regard an object is [figuratively] characterized as ‘pratyakṣa’ since it is cognized by [the reliable warrant called] pratyakṣa.” (Pramāṇasamuccayaśāstī ad 1.41c-d; Tibetan from Hattori, pp.233: mgon sum gyi sgra ni tshad ma dang shes pa dang yul gsum la ’jug go, de la tshad ma la ni gtso bo yin la, gzhon dag la ni nye bar btags pa yin te: de la yul la ni mgon sum gyi gzhal bya yin pa’i phyir mgon sum du btags pa yin no.)
ing at all] separately apprehended (prthag upalabdha) to which perceptibility could figuratively belong\textsuperscript{140}.

If it is said that perceptibility is figurative because of the non-existence of a jar apart from [perceptible qualities] like color, then [appeal to] figurative usage makes even less sense, since there is no basis which is being figuratively described; for the sharpness of a donkey’s horn is not [even] figuratively asserted (upacaryate). Moreover, if it is imagined that a jar, which is part of ordinary discourse, has [only] figurative perceptibility since (iti kṛtvā) it doesn’t exist apart from things like its color, then since things like color don’t exist apart from things like earth, either, the [merely] figurative perceptibility of that color and so forth would also have to be posited. As it is said [in Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka]: [p.71] “Just as a pot does not exist as separate from things like its form, so, too, form does not exist as separate from [basic elements] like air, etc”\textsuperscript{141}.

\textsuperscript{140} 70.3-7: Na evamvidhe viṣaya upacāro yuktah; utpādo hi loke sukhavyatirekenopalabdhah. Sa ca saṃskṛtalakṣaṇasvabhāvatvād anekaduṣṭkarasatadhetutvād, asukha eva. Sa sukhā iti vyapadiśyamāno ‘saṃbaddha evety; evamvidhe viṣaye [de Jong] yuktā upacārāh. Ghātāḥ pratyakṣaḥ ity atra tu, na hi ghaṭo nāma kaścid yo pratyakṣaḥ prthagupalabdho yasya-upacārāt pratyakṣatvaḥ syāt.

The point is that recourse to upacāra requires two terms: the thing figuratively described, and the thing appealed to so to describe it. One is entitled to (indeed, one must) seek a secondary or figurative meaning, then, only when the two terms in play are such that, given their primary meanings, their association produces an incoherent (or otherwise unexpected) sentence. Thus, if we are to say that a jar is only perceptible, then, only when the two terms in play are such that, given their primary meanings, their association produces an incoherent (or otherwise unexpected) sentence. This point is obscured, I think, in Ruegg’s translation, which I do not find clear: “… no such thing as a pot not directly perceptible is separately apprehended which percep-
tibility otherwise required recourse to figurative expla-

\textsuperscript{141} 70.8-71.2: Niłādiyatyairikaṇya ghaṭasya-abhāvād aupacārikaṃ pratyakṣatvat iti cet, evam api sutārām upacāro na yukta, upacāryamāṇasya-aśrayasya-abhāvāt; na hi kharavisāne [de Jong] taikṣṇyam upacaryate. Api ca, lokavyavahārāṅgabhūto ghaṭo yadi niłādiyatyairikto nāstīti kṛtvā tasya-aupacārikaṃ pratyakṣatvat parikalpayate, nāv evaṃ sati prthivyādiyatyirekena niłādi kann api nāstīti, niñāder aṣya-aupacārikaṃ pratyakṣatvat kalpyatām. Yathoktaṃ: “Rūpādiyatyirekena yathā kumbho na vidyate, vāyūdibhyatirekeṇa tathā rūpam na vidyate” iti.

Candrakīrti thus argues that an appeal to figurative usage based on its really being the parts of a jar (or jar-apparing “sense data”) that are perceived is even less promising for Dignāga, since that only opens the way for Candrakīrti’s characteristic point against the reductionist version of Buddhism. That is, Candrakīrti will gladly concede that medium-
Therefore, since [your] definition does not accommodate these examples of ordinary discourse, [your] definition has insufficient extension142. For143 the perceptibility of things like jars and colors and so forth is not accepted from the point of view of one who knows reality (tattvavid apekșayā); but according to worldly convention, the perceptibility of jars and so forth is precisely to be accepted! As it is said in the [Catuhsa]taka: “The whole jar, unseen, is present even when only its color is seen; but what knower of reality would say that a jar is [ultimately] perceptible? By this very same reasoning, sweet fragrance, melodious sound, softness — all [of these] are [similarly] to be denied by one possessed of supreme intellect”144.

Moreover, because of the fact that the word ‘perception’ is expressive of the meaning visible (aparokṣa), an object that is plainly before us is sized objects like jars are analytically reducible — but once having opened the way for this kind of critical analysis, he will then press the point and urge that there is no irreducible remainder, so that analytic categories like sense data must themselves be understood as dependent. This passage, it seems to me, provides some warrant for my reading of the problematic passage at 68.2-4; cf., n.123, above. The verse cited is Catuhsa 14.15; cf., Lang 1986:130-31.

142 That is, it doesn’t cover all the usages that a successful definition would have to cover; cf., n.136, above, and Ruegg (2002:123).

143 Ruegg (2002:123) here begins a new paragraph, and indicates that a different point is being addressed. I follow the paragraphs of La Vallée Poussin’s edition, though, and take Candrakīrti here to be amplifying the same point.

144 71.3-9: Tasmād evamādikasya lokavyavahāryasya lakṣanena-asamgraḥād, avyāpitaiva laksanasyeti. Tattvavidapekṣayā hi “pratyakṣatvam ghatādināṁ nīlādināṁ ca na īṣyate”; lokasamāvṛtyā tv abhyupagantavyam eva pratyakṣatvam ghatādināṁ. Yathokta: “Sarva eva ghaṭo ‘dṛṣṭo rūpe dṛṣṭe hi jāyate, brāyāt kas tattvavinnāma ghaṭā pratyakṣa ity api? Etenaiva vicāreṇa sugandhi madhurāṁ mṛdu, pratiṣedhayitavyāṁ sarvāṇy uttamabuddhiṁ” iti.

The last passage quoted is Catuhsa 13.1-2 (Lang 1986:118-9; Tillemans 1990: vol. 1, 175). I take the point to be that, conventionally, one speaks of the whole jar as “perceptible,” even though it is of course technically true that one only really “perceives” various aspects of it. It is, nevertheless, said to be perceptible from the conventional perspective, and the contrast is thus with the perspective of a “knower of reality” (tattvavid) — that is, the perspective of a fully realized Buddha, who of course realizes that there is nothing that is ultimately “perceptible.” This quotation furthers Candrakīrti’s critique of pratyakṣa as a privileged pramāṇa. It is fitting that Candrakīrti should begin this section by quoting the Catuhsa; for arguments like those advanced here are also developed in chapter 13 of Candrakīrti’s Catuhsatakṛiti, which is a key source for this argument against pratyakṣa; in Tillemans 1990, vol.1, pp.175-199 (trans.), and vol.2, pp.60-127 (Tibetan text, Sanskrit fragments); and especially p.277n, 287n.
[conventionally said to be] ‘perceptible.’ By virtue of the fact that (iti kṛtvā) the sense organ (akṣam) is directed towards it, the perceptibility of visible things like jars and color and so forth is established. [p.72] Since a cognition that discerns these [jars, color, etc.] has a perceptible [object] as its cause, [it] is designated [as] being a perception, as [in the case of] a straw- or chaff-fire. But the etymology of one who etymologizes (vyutpādayati) the word ‘perception’ as [what] is directed towards each sense faculty (akṣam akṣam prati vartate) doesn’t make sense, because of the cognition’s not having the sense faculty as its object — rather, its object is an object. [Following the etymology of Dignāga,] we should

145 If I rightly understand the section that begins here, Ruegg (2002:124, ff.) has significantly mistaken the dialectical flow of the argument here; for Ruegg introduces this passage as having been spoken by Candrakirti’s imagined interlocutor — whereas on my reading, this passage advances Candrakirti’s preferred account of the word pratyakṣa. That is, Candrakirti is here elaborating what he takes to be the conventional — the primarily adjectival — use of the word, according to which cognitions are so called only in the derivative sense that they arise in connection with something ‘perceptible’.

146 That is, such fires are similarly so-called because of having straw or chaff as their causes. This is Candrakirti’s preferred way of explaining the (nominal) sense of the word pratyakṣa as denoting an epistemic faculty. Of this move, Tillemans (1990, vol.1: 44) aptly says: “By shifting etymologies Candrakirti tries to make perception banal: any consciousness, conceptual or not, caused by a perceptible (pratyakṣa) object will be termed pratyakṣa.” As we will see below (at p.75.2-4; cf., n.179, below), one of the upshots of this is that, given the range of objects conventionally described as “perceptible,” it becomes appropriate to say (contra Dignāga) that what Dignāga would consider to be “abstractions” are among the objects of perception.

147 Ruegg (2002:125) takes this to begin Candrakirti’s response to the preceding; on my reading, though, Candrakirti is here building on the same point. More particularly, Candrakirti now proceeds to show that Dignāga’s preferred etymological explanation of the word cannot be made to fit with the preceding observations — which, again, describe Candrakirti’s sense of the conventional usage. It would, then, be incoherent to attribute the preceding passage to Dignāga, since Candrakirti’s point now is to show that the preceding is precisely what Dignāga’s usage cannot explain.

148 Hattori notes (1968: 76-77, n.1.11) that Candrakirti here critiques the etymology given by Dignāga in his *Nyāyamukha; cf., Ruegg (2002:125, n.233). As Ruegg there notes, Dharmottara’s Nyāyabindutiṇī also discusses Dignāga’s etymology, against which Dharmottara proposes his own account of pratyakṣa — interestingly, one that does explain the adjectival sense of the word (though the main objective of Dharmottara and his commentator Durvekamiśra is to argue for an etymology that makes it possible for mānasa-, yogi-, and svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa to count as instances of pratyakṣa, whereas given the etymology of Dignāga, it only makes sense to think of indriya-pratyakṣa as properly an example of the genus.) See Malvania 1971:38-39 (where Durvekamiśra specifically names Dignāga as the one whose view is there under critique).
[counterfactually characterize the faculty that picks out perceptible objects like jars as] “occurring in connection with an object” (prati-viṣayam) or “occurring in connection with a thing” (praty-artham)149.

[Objection:] Even given that the functioning of perceptual cognition (vijñāna) is dependent upon both [the sense faculty and an object], it is based on conformity with the acuity150 of the basis (āśraya) — i.e., because perceptual cognitions have the quality of changing as that [basis] changes151 — that there is designation [of the epistemic faculty] precisely in terms of the basis [thereof]. [Thus, for example, we speak of] ocular cognition (cakṣurviṣijñāna), [which is named for the eye]. In just the same way, even if it proceeds always towards objects, nevertheless, proceeding always in reliance upon the senses, the cognition is designated in terms of the basis [upon which it thus relies]; hence, it will be [called] ‘perception’ (praty-akṣam, “with respect to the senses”). For it is [com-

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With this last point, Candrakīrti effectively charges that Dignāga’s own etymology doesn’t serve his purposes; for insofar as Dignāga wants primarily to designate the privileged epistemic faculty that “operates with respect to” (prati vartate) perceptibles, he would be better off etymologizing viṣayam viṣayam prati vartate — in which case, though, the faculty would be called prativiṣayā (or pratyarthā), not pratyakṣa. Ruegg, thinking that Candrakīrti is here giving his preferred account, misses the fact that Candrakīrti is adducing what is an unwanted consequence for Dignāga. Thus, Ruegg seems not to appreciate that the optative verb at the conclusion is meant to indicate something counterfactual, and instead translates the last sentence thus: “But let there stand [the expression] prativiṣayam, or [the expression] pratyartham.” (Ruegg 2002:125-6)

150 āśrayasya paṭumandatā; literally, “the basis’s being sharp or dull.”

151 Literally, “because of cognitions’ being possessors of change when there is change of that…” The reference here (noted by Ruegg [2002:126, n.235]) is clearly to Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam 1.45 (Pradhan 1975:34), which begins tadvikāravīrtvāb āśrayāś caḍṣurādayāḥ (“the loci [of the senses are] the eyes, etc., because of [cognition’s] changing when there is change in those”). The bhāṣya (Ibid.) explains: caḍṣurādyāḥ hi viκārena tadviṣijñānāṁ bhavyat anugrahopaghāta-paṭumandatānudvādānām na tu rūpādānām viκārera tadvikāraḥ (“for [change] arises on the part of cognitions arising from [the senses], inasmuch as they are functioning or destroyed, sharp or dull, etc., according to change on the part of the eyes and so forth; but change in that [i.e., cognition] is not according to change on the part of the [cognized] forms, etc”).
monly] seen [that there is] designation [of a thing] in terms of its specific cause (asādhārana), [as, e.g., we speak of] the sound of a drum, a sprout of barley, [even though there are also other causes operating to produce these effects]\(^{152}\).

**[Response:]** This [case of pratyakṣa] is not the same as the foregoing\(^{153}\); for in that case, if perceptual cognition (vijñāna) were being defined in terms of its object — as, for example, “perceptual cognition of form,” etc. — then the difference[s that obtain] on the part of the sixfold perceptual cognition could not be made clear, since mental cognition (manovi-jñāna) proceeds with respect to the very same object as visual cognition\(^{154}\). [p.73] That is, if the sixfold cognition of color, etc.\(^ {155}\), were [merely] called ‘perceptual cognition’ (vijñānam), [simpliciter,] there [would] arise a conception accompanied by an expectation, [to wit:] “is this a perceptual cognition produced by the senses that possess form\(^ {156}\), or is it a mental [cognition]?” But when the specification is in terms of the basis [of the sense], even given the possibility that mental cognition

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\(^{152}\) 72.4-7: Atha syāt, yathobhayādhīnāyām api vijñānapravṛttāv, āśrayasya paṭumandatā-anuvīdāṇād vijñānānām tadvikāravikārītvād, āśrayeṇa vyaṇadeṣo bhavati, caksuravi-jñānam iti; evaṁ yady api arthaṁ arthaṁ prati varṣate, tathāḥ aksam aksam āśrita vartamānām vijñānam, āśrayeṇa vyapadeṣāt; pratyaśaṁ iti bhaviṣyati. Drṣṭo hy asādhāraṇeṇa vyapadeṣo bheriśabdo yavāṅkura iti.

Here, it is a discussion in Dignāga’s Pramānasamuccaya (1.4a-b) that is likely referred to. Hattori gives the Sanskrit of Dignāga’s kārikā at p.87, n.1.32: asādhāraṇaḥ tetvād aksais tad vyapadiṣyate. The νṛti on this passage then proceeds to discuss precisely the examples here adduced by Candrākīrti (viz., those of the “sound of a drum” and “sprout of barley”). Hattori’s translation of the νṛti here is at 1968:26, and the Tibetan is at pp.179-181; cf., also, Hattori’s n.1.33, p.87; and Ruegg’s comment (2002:127, n.237).

\(^{153}\) That is, the example of caksuravi-jñāna’s being so called is not relevant to the case of pratyakṣa’s being so called, for reasons to be made clear presently.

\(^{154}\) That is, the only reason for specifying the different vijñānas in terms of the various indriyas from which they arise is to distinguish them from manovi-jñāna (“mental cognition”); for according to standard Ābhidharmika analysis, the proper object of “mental cognition” just is the outputs of (the “cognitions” yielded by) the other five senses. Manovi-jñāna, then, cannot be distinguished in terms of its object insofar as it has as its object the outputs of the other vijñānas — and hence, their objects. The point that mental cognition thus bears, in a sense, on the same object as the various sensory cognitions is, it seems to me, not clear from Ruegg’s translation: “…for a mental cognition bears on a single object, along with eye-cognition, etc…” (2002:127).

\(^{155}\) That is, of all of the various things that respectively constitute the proper objects of the six kinds of sensory cognition.

\(^{156}\) That is, by one of the five bodily senses.
functions with respect to the objects of the ocular and other [sensory] cognitions, the difference between them is [nonetheless] established\textsuperscript{157}.

But in this case [i.e., that of \textit{pratyakṣa}]\textsuperscript{158}, if, with a desire to explain the definition of reliable warrants, it’s accepted [by you] that the fact of being a perception belongs only to what is devoid of conception\textsuperscript{159}, [then] because it’s desired [by you] that we distinguish that [i.e., perception] only from conception, no benefit whatsoever is seen in designation according to the special cause\textsuperscript{160}.

And given that the function and number of reliable warrants are dependent on warrantable objects, and because of the presentation of the nature (\textit{svarūpa}) of [your] two reliable warrants — whose reality is gained by virtue of the fact simply of [their] following the forms of [the two kinds of] warrantable objects — specification in terms of the sense [faculties] does not help at all; hence, designation precisely by the object is in every way suitable\textsuperscript{161}.

\textsuperscript{157} 72.8-73.3: \textit{Na-etat pūrvena tulyaṃ.} \textit{Tatra hi viṣayaṇa vijnāne vyapadiśyamāne, rūpavijñānām ityevamādinā, vijnānaśaṭkasya bheda na-upadarśitah syāt, manovijñānasya caksurādivijñānānhā sahaika-[p.73]-viṣayapravṛttatvāt.} Tathā hi niśdīvijñānaśaṭke vijnānam ity utkā, sākāṃkṣa eva \textit{pratyayo jāvate [de Jong]: “kim etad rūpindriyajāmaḥ vijnānam, āhosvin mānasam?”} iti. Āśrayeṇa tu vyapadeśe, manovijñānacakṣurādivijñānaviṣaya-pravṛttisamābhave ‘pi, parasparabhedahā siddho bhavati.

\textsuperscript{158} Here, the \textit{īha} still relates to the previous paragraph’s \textit{na-etat pūrvena tulyam} (“this is not the same as the preceding”). Thus, the interlocutor had wanted to say that \textit{pratyakṣa} should be named in terms of its \textit{āśraya} (i.e., the senses), just as the various \textit{viṣṇaḥ} are. Candrakīrtī has responded that the cases aren’t comparable, and has just explained why the \textit{viṣṇaḥ} are designated as they are. Now, he explains why \textit{pratyakṣa} is designated as it is — or rather, as Dignāga’s project would require.

\textsuperscript{159} Here, Candrakīrtī brings in Dignāga’s definition of \textit{pratyakṣa} as constitutively “devoid of conceptual elaboration” (\textit{kalpanāpodha}).

\textsuperscript{160} 73.4-6: \textit{Iha tu pramāṇalakṣaṇavivakṣayā kalpanāpoddhamātrasya pratyakṣatvābhyupagame sati, vikalpakād eva tadviśeṣavābhihatatvād asādharānakārānena vyapadeśe sati [strike this], na kim cīt pravojananam upalakṣyate.}

Here, I read according to La Vallée Poussin’s n.8, p.73, which indicates that the second \textit{sati} in this sentence (i.e., p.73.5) is lacking in the Tibetan, and should be struck, so that the locative can be taken as a \textit{viṣaye saptami}. The point is just that, given Dignāga’s definition of \textit{pratyakṣa}, all he should be interested in doing is being sure to advance a \textit{nirukti} that excludes \textit{kalpanā} — just as \textit{caksurviṣṇāna} is so called only in order to distinguish it from \textit{manovijñāna}. But taking \textit{praty-aksam} to refer to the \textit{āśraya} does not advance that cause in any way.

\textsuperscript{161} 73.6-8: \textit{Prameyaparatantrāyāṃ ca pramāṇasamkhya-pravṛtttau, prameyākārānukāri-tāmātrataya ca samāśādītmatmahāvastavattakayoḥ pramāṇayoḥ svarūpasya vyavasthāpanān,}
[Objection:] Since the word ‘perception,’ in the sense intended, is well known in the world, and since the word ‘with respect to an object’ (pratyartha) is not well known, the etymology just in terms of the basis [of the sense faculty] is followed [by us].

We respond: [p.74] This word ‘perceptible’ is indeed well-known in the world; but it is explained by us [and not by you] precisely as it is in the world. But if, with disregard for ordinary categories as they are established, your etymology is being offered, then there would also be disregard for the expression ‘well-known’! And based on that [disregard], what is [commonly] called ‘perception’ would not be such.

Again, Candrakīrti here accepts, ex hypothesi, Dignāga’s goals, noting that according to these one ought to want a nirukti that etymologizes pratyakṣa in terms of its object, since the whole point of Dignāga’s account is that pramāṇa follows/corresponds to prameya. But of course, if Candrakīrti wins this concession, then he’s well on the way to advancing the trivialization of Dignāga’s privileged epistemic faculty.

162 73.9-74.1: Loke pratyakṣaśābadasya prasiddhatvād, vivakṣite ‘ṛthe pratyarthāśabdasya-apratissiddhatvād, āśrayeṇaiva vyutpattir āśrīyaṁ iti cet. Here, Candrakīrti’s interlocutor turns the tables, rejoining that, on Candrakīrti’s etymological principles, the epistemic faculty that picks out perceptibles ought to be called prat-yartham — and since such is clearly not the case, it cannot be that the adjectival sense is rightly thought to be primary.

163 Ruegg (taking astī in an existential sense, and not as a copula): “There is this word pratyakṣa which is current among ordinary folk in the world…” (2002:129).

164 Ruegg misses the disjunctive sense of tu here, taking it instead as vacuous (“indeed”): “We have indeed expressed this just as it is in the world” (2002:129). This misses the contrast that Candrakīrti here urges between his own deference to conventional usage, and (what he takes to be) Dignāga’s inability to accommodate such usage.

165 The compound prasiddhāśābda could also be rendered thus: “there would also be disregard for the well-known word [i.e., pratyakṣa].”

166 74.1-3: Ucyate: asty ayaṁ pratyakṣaśābda lokaprasiddhah [de Jong]. Sa tu yathā loke, tathāsmābhir ucyata eva. Yathāsthita{laukikapadārthī}tirāskāreṇa tu tadvyutpāde kriyamāne, prasiddhaśābadīrirāskāro ’pi syāt [de Jong], tataḥ ca pratyakṣam ityevaṁ [na] syāt. Again, Ruegg reads the optative (syāt) in an existential rather than a copulative sense (cf., n.163, above): “Thus there would not exist the term ‘pratyakṣa’.” (2002:130) But Candrakīrti’s point, I think, is one that is comparable to a point made by many twentieth-century “ordinary language” philosophers: viz., that one cannot use a well-known, ordinary word, and yet substitute for it a peculiarly technical sense — for in that case it’s then no longer the same thing that is under discussion. What Candrakārti is saying, then, is not that the word pratyakṣa would not exist, but simply that the things conventionally designated by the word would not be rightly so called — in which case, most people would be wrong in their use of what is supposed to be a conventional word (a supposition that contradicts its being “conventional”).
And there could not be, on the part of one visual cognition, whose basis is a single moment of sense faculty, the quality of being a perception, since there would be no point in repetition (vīpsārtabhāvāt)\textsuperscript{167}; and if there is absence of the quality of being a perception on the part of one [such moment], there would be [such absence] on the part of many [instances of cognition, i.e., a continuum], too\textsuperscript{168}.

And because you accept that only cognition that is devoid of conception is perception\textsuperscript{169}; and since nobody’s discourse is by way of that [kind of cognition]\textsuperscript{170}; and because of the desirability of explaining worldly 458 DAN ARNOLD

\textsuperscript{167} Here, Candrakīrti begins a new tack, one that again accepts, \textit{ex hypothesi}, Dignāga’s commitments — here, presumably, the idea of kṣaṇikatva (“momentariness”), according to which \textit{pratyakṣa}, like any cognitive event, would be constitutively episodic — would, that is, have to consist in atomic moments of sense-function. This, then, is the context for Candrakīrti’s reference to the grammarians’ device of \textit{vīpsa} (Tib., zlos pa), “repetition” — specifically (according to Apte, p.1487, s.v., meaning #2), the notion of “Repetition of words to imply continuous or successive action.” (Apte gives the example “यक्षम यक्षम सिंचति.”) This is the device that is invoked in etymologizing \textit{pratyakṣa} as \textit{aṅka}\textit{ṁ aṅka}\textit{ṁ prati vartate}, and Candrakīrti is pointing out that “repetition” (\textit{aṅka}\textit{ṁ aṅka}\textit{ṁ}) implies a continuity or successiveness such as could not obtain given the idea of radical kṣaṇikatva. Thus, a single, atomic moment of (say) ocular perception could not warrant the grammarians’ device of \textit{vīpsa}.

\textsuperscript{168} 74.3-5: \textit{Ekasya ca ca kāسكان्यानाये-केकर्मस्याश्रयस्या \textit{pratyakṣāt}vam na syād vīpsārtabhāvāt (Tib., zlos pa’i don med pa’i phyir) ekakāsya ca \textit{pratyakṣāt}vābhāve, bahūnām api na syāt.}

This last point is then reminiscent of one of the fundamental points of Vasubandhu’s critique of atoms in the \textit{Viśeṣatīkā} (and of Dignāga’s similar arguments from the \textit{Ālambana-pārīkṣā}): if a single, “atomic” moment of perceptual cognition does not make sense (here, insofar as it renders the repetition \textit{aṅka}\textit{ṁ aṅka}\textit{ṁ} meaningless), then there is nothing out of which to build up a \textit{succession} (or “continuum,” \textit{samtāna}) of sensory cognitions, either. This is all put very elliptically, and the point, again, is simply to argue that Dignāga’s proposed account does not advance (because it is not coherent with) his own goals.

\textsuperscript{169} Ruegg (2002:130) here, as throughout this section, renders \textit{pratyakṣa} as ‘perceptible’; but I think that if we are to make sense of these passages, we must take Candrakīrti to be provisionally adopting Dignāga’s preferred sense of the word. As with the earlier discussion of \textit{svalakṣaṇa}, then, the debate concerning \textit{pratyakṣa} similarly involves some alternation in meaning, insofar as it is precisely \textit{what the word should mean} that is most basically in question.

\textsuperscript{170} The word \textit{tena} here will, I think, admit of two readings: it can mean something like “thus” or “therefore,” in which case what follows (\textit{lokāya samyavahārabhāvāt}) is intended counterfactually (“because there would be no meaningful discourse on the part of the world”); or it can refer back to \textit{kalpanāpādhañjāna}, in which case (as in my translation) it simply says there is no meaningful discourse in the world of the \textit{sort that makes use of this conception}. The latter is probably the more Sanskritically straightforward read-
discourse with respect to reliable warrants and warrantable objects — [your] conception of the reliable warrant that is perception becomes quite senseless\textsuperscript{172}.

[You have cited, in support of your claim that perception is constitutively devoid of conceptual elaboration, a familiar Abhidharma text that says.] “A man endowed [only] with visual cognition senses\textsuperscript{173} blue, but [he does] not [know] that it is blue.”\textsuperscript{174} The point of this authoritative text (āgama) is not to state a definition of pratyaksā\textsuperscript{175}, but [is instead simply

\textsuperscript{171} vyākhya\textsuperscript{t}um iṣṭa\textsuperscript{t}vāt. This could be read in a couple of ways — it could be taken normatively (i.e., as reflected in the translation I have given here), in which case we might prefer here to see a gerundive; or it could simply be stating Dignāga’s own avowed interests (in which case, we might render, “since you desire to explain…”).

\textsuperscript{172} 74.6-8: Kalpanāpodhasyaiva ca jñānasya pratyakṣavābhyyapagamāt, tena ca lokasya saṃvyavahārābhāvāt, laukikasya ca pramāṇaprameyavyavahārasya vyākhya\textsuperscript{t}um iṣṭa\textsuperscript{t}vāt, vyarthai ca pratyakṣapramāṇa\textsuperscript{Kalpanā} samjāyate.

\textsuperscript{173} Here, I read (following a quotation of this sentence by Yaṣomitra) vijānāti (rather than with Candrakīrti’s jānāti). See n.174.

\textsuperscript{174} “Caśkṣuṣvijñānasamantaḥ nilam jānāti no tu nilam iti.” Dignāga cites this quotation in his vr̥tti to Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.4 (translated at Hattori, p.26; Tibetan at Hattori, p.179), where he reports that it is said “in an Abhidharma treatise” (chos mngon pa las). The passage can be found in, e.g., the Abhidharmakosāvyākhya of Yaṣomitra, whose text reads vijānāti (in contrast with Candrakīrti’s jānāti); see Shastri 1998: 72. (According to Ruegg [2002:131, n.254],Yaṣomitra is quoting the Vijñānakāya.) Hattori succinctly summarizes the motivation behind Dignāga’s citation of this: “The expression ‘nilam vijānāti’ implies that one has an immediate awareness of the object itself. On the other hand, ‘nilam iti vijānāti’ implies that one forms a perceptual judgement by associating a name with the object perceived. Thus, the above Abhidharma passage expresses the thought that perception is free from conceptual construction (kalpanāpodha).” (1968: 88, n.1.36) On my rendering “nilam iti” with a “that-clause,” see Arnold (2005), Chapter 7.

\textsuperscript{175} āgamasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇābhidhānārthasya-aprastutavāt. Though a Sanskritically natural way to express Candrakīrti’s point, this phrase is particularly difficult to render in a syntactically literal way into English. Such a rendering would go something like this: “because the point (arthā) of stating a definition of pratyaksā is not the subject (a-prastuta) of this āgama” — or more precisely (disclosing the fact that this predication is stated in the form of a genitive-plus-rva construction), “because of [this] point’s not being the
demonstrating \((pratipādaka)\) the insentience \((jaḍatva)\) of the five \(\text{bodily}\) senses\(^{176}\). Hence\(^{177}\), not on the basis of authoritative texts, either, \([\text{can it be said that}]\) the quality of being perception belongs only to cognition that is devoid of conception; hence, this \([\text{characterization of}]\) \(pratyakṣa\) as \("\text{devoid of conceptual elaboration}\"") does not make sense\(^{178}\).

Therefore, in the world, if \(any\) \((sarvam \text{ eva})\) subject of characterization \((lakṣya)\) — whether it be a \(svalakṣaṇa\) or a \(sāmānyalakṣaṇa\) — is visible, because of being directly apprehended, then it is established as perceptible, along with the cognition that has it as its object \([\text{which is deriv-}\)] the subject of this \(āgama\)." Such constructions are, I think, generally best rendered in the latter way \(\("X\)’s being \(Y\)\)”, which discloses that such constructions generally state simple identities \(\("X\) is \(Y\)"") — but do so in such a way as to make it possible to show the inferential consequences of such identities \(\text{(so that, putting the} \(Y\) term in the ablative, we get, \("\text{because of} \(X\)’s being} \(Y\))\). But when the term in the genitive \((arthasya)\) is, as in this case, the final member of a lengthy \(tatpuruṣa\) compound, this becomes impossible. It is, however, important to see that the construction can be read this way, since, in the present case, another alternative is to take the second genitival compound as a \(bahuvrihi\): \("\text{because of the irrelevance of} \(āgama, \text{which has as its purpose the expression of a definition of perception.}\)\) So Ruegg: \(\ldots\) there is no relevance \([\text{here}]\) of the \(Āgama\) \(\text{which has the sense expressing the defining characteristic of direct perception.}\)\) (2002:131; my emphasis) The problem is that on this construal, the claim does not effectively counter Dignāga’s appeal to it. Ruegg tries to salvage Candrakīrti’s point by taking the sentence to mean that this passage, though defining \"perception,\" is not relevant here. On my reading, in contrast, Candrakīrti more basically contests Dignāga’s understanding of the passage. In fact, the context for Yaśomitra’s citation of the passage \(\text{(see n.174)}\) recommends Candrakīrti’s point; for Yaśomitra addsuces the quotation in commenting on the part of Vasubandhu’s text that treats the cognitive outputs of the five \(\text{non-mental}\) senses — and the point of the passage is (as Candrakīrti goes on to say) thus to urge simply that the outputs of the five sense faculties are not meaningful until they have become the objects, as well, of the \(manovijñāna\). This quotation, as deployed by these \(Ābhidharmikas\), therefore indeed does not state a definition of perception, but instead makes a characteristically \(Ābhidharmika\) point about the relationship between the five bodily \"\(\text{vijñānas}\)" and the \(manovijñāna\).

\(^{176}\) That is, their being \"non-epistemic\" until they have become the objects of the \(manovijñāna\); see the preceding note. Ruegg’s rendering of the first reason \(\text{(preceding note)}\) obscures the recognition that this second reason represents a contrasting interpretation \(\text{of the same text}\) \(\text{(i.e., of the quotation adduced by Dignāga)}\); thus, Ruegg translates: \"\ldots\) and \(\text{(ii)}\) \(Āgama\) makes known that the five cognitions belonging to the sense faculties are \([\text{in themselves}]\) insentient.\" (2002:131)

\(^{177}\) Both of the foregoing phrases occur in the ablative, giving two reasons for the conclusion now stated.

\(^{178}\) 74.8-75.2 \"\(\text{Cakṣurviṣṇijānasamaṅgi} \text{nīlāṁ jānāti no tu nīlām iti} \) ity \(\text{ca-} \(\text{āgamasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇābhidhānārthasya-aprastutatvāt, pañcā-p}[\text{p.75}]\text{nām indriyavijñānānāṁ jaḍatvapratipādakatvāc ca, na-} \(\text{āgamād api kalpaṇādhaśayaiva vijñānasya pratyakṣatvam iti na yuktam etat.}\)"
atively called ‘pratyakṣa’]. But twin moons and other such [illusions] do not, from the point of view of the cognition of one without cataracts, have the quality of being perceptible (aprtyakṣatvam) — although from the point of view of one with cataracts, [such illusions] have precisely the quality of being perceptible.\(^{180}\)

\(^{179}\) This, then, is the point Candrakīrti has been driving at all along: if it is finally the adjectival sense of pratyakṣa (“perceptible”) that is primary, and if this motivates the derivative usage of the word that denotes as well “the cognition that has [any perceptible thing] as its object” (tadviṣayena jñāṇena saha), then the word cannot be thought to pick out a privileged cognitive instrument (one that is “kalpanāpodha”). In that case, it must be allowed that “abstractions” (sāmānyalakṣaṇas), too, are “perceptible.” Ruegg’s translation misses what I thus take to be the point: “Therefore, for ordinary folk in the world, if [as claimed by you, there indeed exists] a laksya, or if [there indeed exists both] a svalakṣaṇa and a sāmānyalakṣaṇa, all will in fact be not unamenable to perception, for there will [then] be immediate apprehension.” (2002:131) As quickly becomes clear, the confusion here follows from Ruegg’s not taking this all to represent Candrakīrti’s own conclusion about the proper understanding of pratyakṣa. Hence, Ruegg completes this passage thus: “And [by you] the pratyakṣa is accordingly set out systematically along with the (vi)jñāna having it for its object.”

\(^{180}\) 75.2-5: Tasmāl loke yadi laksyaṁ, yadi vā svalakṣaṇaṁ sāmānyalakṣaṇaṁ vā, sarvam eva sāksaṁ upalabhyaṁānātvaṁ āparoksam, ataḥ pratyakṣam vyavasthāpyate tadviṣayena jñāṇena saha. Dvicaṇḍrādīnāṁ tv ataimirikajñāṇaṁ eya-apratyakṣatvaṁ, taimirikādyapekṣaya tu pratyakṣatvaṁ eva.

Ruegg takes the last sentence as stating an unwanted consequence for Dignāga: “However, [following your doctrine,] in respect [even] to those who are affected by eye-disease and the like there will indeed be direct perceptibility.” (Ruegg 2002:132; cf., his n.256) I take it that this is, rather, part of the account of pratyakṣa that Candrakīrti is commending as contra Dignāga’s, and that it therefore states a positively desired consequence — desired, that is, insofar as it undercut the privileged status of Dignāga’s category of “perception.” Candrakīrti’s point, then, is that perception is not intrinsically better suited, independent of context, to confer justification; rather, what is “perceptible” is always relative to perceivers and their contexts.

Candrakīrti’s point about the genuine “perceptibility” of “twin moons” represents precisely the sort of claim that is reversed by such later “svātāntrikas” as Jñānagarbha and Sāṇtaraṅga. Consider, e.g., Ichigō’s statement of the impetus behind the svātāntrika distinction between “true” and “false conventional”: “… Sāntaraṅgaıśa owes one of his definitions of conventional truth… to Jñānagarbha’s basic idea of conventional truth ‘as it appears.’ This being the nature of conventional reality, should we then also regard as conventional truth the double moon that appears to those who have defective vision? Partly in response to this issue, Jñānagarbha distinguishes two types of conventional truth, namely true and false conventional truth.” (Ichigō 1989:169) To the extent that Candrakīrti’s point is to emphasize only how dramatically limited is our perspective relative to the ultimate truth, he is not simply saying that, on the conventional level, “anything goes.” Indeed, Candrakīrti may posit something analogous to the svātāntrikas’ mithyāsāmyṛti in the form of “alokasāmyṛti” (‘non-worldly conventional’); cf., Prasannapada 493.2-4. With his char-
But cognition whose object is [something] invisible, [when such cognition is] produced by a mark that is invariably concomitant (avyabhicārin) with the thing to be proven, [is known as] inference. The speech of those who are accomplished, who know directly things that are beyond the senses — this is [known as] tradition. Understanding of a thing not [previously] experienced, based on [its] similarity [with something familiar, is known as] comparison — for example, [when one learns that,] “a cow is like an ox.” Just so: everyone’s understanding of things is established based on this fourfold [scheme of] reliable warrants.

Not having seen that the preceding section represented Candrakīrti’s preferred account of pratyākṣa, Ruegg now seems not to see the natural segue here to Candrakīrti’s endorsing (as conventionally valid, at least) the standard Naiyāyika list of pramāṇas. Thus, Ruegg translates: “On the other hand, a jñāna that….” (2002:132) But Candrakīrti is not, I take it, here offering an alternative to the foregoing; rather, having endorsed a characteristically Naiyāyika understanding of perception (i.e., as including “abstractions” among its objects), he is now proceeding more generally to endorse this alternative to Dignāga’s spartan epistemology.
And these are established in dependence upon one another: given reliable warrants, there are warrantable objects, and given warrantable objects, there are reliable warrants. But it is emphatically not the case that the establishment of reliable warrants and their objects is essential. Therefore, let the mundane remain just as it is seen.

Enough of this subject! We will explain the real matter at hand. The teaching of the dharma of the blessed Buddhas having located themselves precisely in the worldly perspective.

Abbreviations


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183 Cf., Oetke’s comment, n.87, above.

184 Here, Candrakīrti finally makes clear the presupposition that, on his view, guides Dignāga’s whole project (and the presupposition, therefore, that he finally means to target with all of the foregoing critique) — viz., that Dignāga’s having abstracted privileged pramāṇas is tantamount to his having posited them as independent (or “essential,” “natural,” etc.) epistemic perspectives on what there is. Against this, what Candrakīrti has chiefly wanted to stress all along is that pramāṇas and prameyās are, like everything else, upādāya prajñāptayāḥ — that is (as he puts it elsewhere), they exist “simply as being mutually interdependent” (parasparāpekṣāmātratatayā).

185 That is, let it not be thought (per the interlocutor’s contention at p.58.14, ff.; n.44, above) that a systematic re-description of our conventional epistemic practices is called for. Ruegg translates: “Let there be, therefore, only the worldly [i.e. transactional-pragmatic convention of ordinary folk] that conforms with what is known by experience” (2002:134).

186 75.10-13: Tāni ca parasparāpekṣāyā sidhyanti: satsu pramāṇeṣu prameyārthāḥ, satsu prameyēṣv artheṣu pramāṇāni. No tu khalu svābhāvikā pramāṇaprameyayoh siddhir iti; tasmāl laukikam eva-astu yathādyṛṣṭam ity; alam prasaṅgena. Prastutam eva vyākhyāyāmataḥ. Laukika eva darśane sthitvā buddhānāṃ bhagavatāṃ dharmadeśanā. This programmatic statement concludes the part of Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā* that is framed specifically as commenting on *MMK* 1.1 — and it is with this passage that Ruegg’s translation from chapter one ends, as well.


Cabezón, José Ignacio. 1992. *A Dose of Emptiness: An Annotated Translation of the sTong thun chen mo of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang.* Albany: SUNY Press.


