

# JIABS

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## Articles

Megan BRYSON

*Mahākāla worship in the Dali kingdom (937–1253) – A study  
of the Dahei tianshen daochang yi* . . . . . 3

Thomas CRUIJSEN, Arlo GRIFFITHS, Marijke J. KLOKKE

*The cult of the Buddhist dhāraṇī deity Mahāpratisarā along  
the Maritime Silk Route: New epigraphical and iconographic  
evidence from the Indonesian Archipelago* . . . . . 71

Roderick ORLINA

*Epigraphical evidence for the cult of Mahāpratisarā in the  
Philippines* . . . . . 159

Vincent ELTSCHINGER

*Aśvaghoṣa and his canonical sources II – Yaśas, the Kāśyapa  
brothers and the Buddha's arrival in Rājagṛha (Buddhacarita  
16.3–71)* . . . . . 171

Paul K. NIETUPSKI

*Atha niryāṇavṛttam: Reflections on the first sūtra and the  
opening passages of Guṇaprabha's Vinayasūtra and Auto-  
commentary – With reference to Indian and Tibetan  
commentaries* . . . . . 225

Reiko OHNUMA

*An elephant good to think – The Buddha in Pārileyyaka for-  
est* . . . . . 259

Jin Y. PARK	
<i>A Huayanist reading of the Lotus Sūtra – The case of Li Tong-xuan</i> .....	295
Barbara GERKE	
<i>‘Treating the aged’ and ‘Maintaining health’ – Locating bcud len practices in the four Tibetan medical tantras</i> . . . . .	329
Eviatar SHULMAN	
<i>The Aṭṭhakavagga as Buddhist poetry</i> .....	363
Chizuko YOSHIMIZU	
<i>Reasoning-for-others in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka thought</i> . . .	413
	•
<i>Notes on the contributors</i> .....	445

***Atha niryānavṛttam: Reflections on the first  
sūtra and the opening passages of Guṇaprabha's  
Vinayasūtra and Autocommentary***

With reference to Indian and  
Tibetan commentaries<sup>1</sup>

Paul K. Nietupski

**Introduction**

Guṇaprabha lived in about 550–630 CE.<sup>2</sup> His rather fantastic pedigree, here compiled from divergent Tibetan and Chinese sources includes associations with Vasubandhu (4<sup>th</sup>–5<sup>th</sup> century), Dignāga (5<sup>th</sup>–6<sup>th</sup> century), Dharmakīrti (c. 650), Sthiramati, and others. He

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<sup>1</sup> I am indebted to David S. Ruegg for his comments on a draft of this essay, to Yoshiyasu Yonezawa for his work and generosity, to the anonymous JIABS reviewer for precision, and to Sandar Aung for her patience. For a partial edited version of Guṇaprabha's *Autocommentary*, the *Svavyākhyānābhīdhānavinayasūtravṛtti* based on two Sanskrit manuscripts and the Tibetan translation see Yonezawa 2002–2013. This also includes a transliteration of the facsimile version, noted below; see Yonezawa et al. 2001; see *The Facsimile Edition of a Collection of Sanskrit Palm-leaf Manuscripts in Tibetan dBu med Script*. See Nakagawa 2002, and BG. Luo Hong has studied the stylistic peculiarities and transmission history of Guṇaprabha's Vinaya texts in detail, including Indian manuscripts from Zhalu Monastery and in central Tibet, see Luo Hong 2009a. See also the extended analysis in Luo Hong 2007. For a summary of the texts in Sanskrit and Tibetan, and a discussion of the evolution of the *Vinayasūtra* and its probable recension history, and a discussion of Guṇaprabha as a redactor, not an author of the *Vinayasūtra* see Luo Hong 2011, especially pp. 175–178; see also Luo Hong 2009b, especially pp. 201–202. Nakagawa Masanori has published extensively on the *Vinayasūtra* in Japanese language, not cited here; his publications are listed in Yonezawa 2011 and in Luo Hong 2011: 183–184. See Nietupski 2009.

<sup>2</sup> Yonezawa 2011: 9–19, *passim*.

was mentioned by Xuanzang (602–664, who traveled 629–645), and in other Chinese sources,<sup>3</sup> but with the possible exception of a version of the *Vinayasūtra* itself, in a translation now lost, his works were not translated into Chinese.<sup>4</sup> The inherited tradition describes him as an erudite monk from a brahmin family in the Mūlasarvāstivāda system, later an abbot who lived and worked in Mathurā.<sup>5</sup> He is called a mentor to seventh century King Harṣa and a contemporary of one Ratnasimha.<sup>6</sup> He is also called a bodhisattva,<sup>7</sup> is credited with authorship of commentaries on three Mahāyāna texts,<sup>8</sup> and he is said to have had audiences with the Buddha Maitreya in the course of his many sojourns to Tuṣita, Maitreya’s heaven. The precise details of his life are buried and embellished in these accounts.

Guṇaprabha is known as one of the “Two Superiors,” with Śākyaprabha the second, in the well-known formula, the “Six

<sup>3</sup> See Yonezawa 2011: 12–14; Luo Hong 2008.

<sup>4</sup> Luo Hong identified a passage by Yijing in the *Datang xiyu qiufa gaosengzhuan* which attests to a translation of a *Vinayasūtra* into Chinese, now lost. See Luo Hong 2011: 175, 175 n.17.

<sup>5</sup> See Chimpa & Chattopadhyaya (trans.) 1970: 176; Banerji 1970: 95; Barua 1969: 89. In a further albeit inconclusive clue to the provenance of the authors and the institutions, the commentator Dharmamitra is identified in the colophon to his *Ṭīkā* as a native Tokharian, in central Asia.

<sup>6</sup> Guṇaprabha, *Vinayasūtra and Autocommentary* (BG xxii) state that this mention of Ratnasimha “... may be a marginal remark of some later reader of the text.” BG xxii quotes Takakusu 1982: LVIII, 184: “I-tsing mentions one Ratnasimha as living then at Nālandā at about 649 A.D.” See Luo Hong’s comments on Ratnasimha and Guṇaprabha in Luo Hong 2008: 70 n. 3. See also Luo Hong 2007: 5–12.

<sup>7</sup> In the opening of the *Vinayasūtra Autocommentary*.

<sup>8</sup> Three texts in the Cittamātra section of the Tibetan *Tripitaka* are attributed to Guṇaprabha, the \**Bodhisattvabhūmivṛtti* (*Byang chub sems dpa’i sa’i ’grel pa*), the \**Bodhisattvaśīlaparivartabhāṣya* (*Byang chub sems dpa’i tshul khriims kyi le’u bshad pa*), and the \**Pañcaskandhavivarāṇa* (*Phung po lnga’i rnam par ’grel pa*). (*sDe dGe bsTan ’Gyur Series*, ’i, si) These texts and the evidence of Guṇaprabha’s authorship need further investigation.

Ornaments and Two Superiors.”<sup>9</sup> He likely compiled<sup>10</sup> the *Vinaya-sūtra* from earlier sources and composed the *Autocommentary* at a time when Indian Buddhist monastic, educational, and worship institutions were very much alive. Dharmamitra's *Ṭīkā*, Guṇaprabha's *Vṛtti*, and Prajñākarā's *Vyākhyāna* are explicitly based on the *Vinayasūtra*. The *Vṛtti* and the *Vyākhyāna* may have been collected notes taken by Tibetan scholars,<sup>11</sup> and the *Vṛtti* only attributed to Guṇaprabha.

Other Indian scholars of monasticism of the day made references to Guṇaprabha's works in their writings. These latter include two texts attributed to Śākyaprabha, the \**Āryamūlasarvāstivādiśrāmaṇerakārikā* and especially his own commentary on this text, the \**Āryamūlasarvāstivādiśrāmaṇerakārikāvṛttiprabhāvatī*. Both show close familiarity with Guṇaprabha's works on monasticism.<sup>12</sup> Vinītadeva's (c. 630–700) \**Triśatakārikāvyaḥkyāna* includes close analysis of Śākyaprabha's \**Āryamūlasarvāstivādiśrāmaṇerakārikā*, and includes mention of Guṇaprabha.<sup>13</sup> There is here a con-

<sup>9</sup> *Rgyan drug mchog gnyis*: Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti are the Six Ornaments. Śākyaprabha and Guṇaprabha are the Two Superiors.

<sup>10</sup> Luo Hong argues that Guṇaprabha may well have been a redactor, not an author of a version of the *Vinayasūtra* circulated prior to his compilation. See Luo Hong 2009b: 201–202, 201 n. 6, 201 n. 7; Luo Hong 2011: 175–178; Luo Hong 2007: 19–20.

<sup>11</sup> Bu ston mentions that the *Vṛtti* and *Vyākhyāna* may be notes of Tibetan scholars: *slob dpon shes rab byed pa'i 'grel pa dang 'grel chung du grags pa 'di bod kyi zin bris su byas pa yin nam yang snyam mo*, Bu ston rin chen grub, *'Dul ba spyi'i rnam par gzhaḡ pa 'dul ba rin po che'i mdzes rgyan sogs chos mtshan khag cig*, 57a4. Noted in Luo Hong 2009a: 328.

<sup>12</sup> Śākyaprabha, \**Āryamūlasarvāstivādiśrāmaṇerakārikā* (*'Phags pa gzhi thams cad yod par smra ba'i dge tshul kyi tshig le'ur byas pa*); Śākyaprabha. \**Āryamūlasarvāstivādiśrāmaṇerakārikāvṛttiprabhāvatī* (*'Phags pa gzhi thams cad yod par smra ba'i dge tshul kyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa 'od ldan*).

<sup>13</sup> Vinītadeva, \**Triśatakārikāvyaḥkyāna* (*Tshig le'ur byas pa sum brgya pa'i rnam par bshad pa*), 167a4, in the colophon, and on several occasions in the text. The dates, sectarian affiliation, and homeland of Vinītadeva are tentative, but he likely lived around 630–700 (see Dreyfus 1997: xvi), not far in time from the dates suggested for Guṇaprabha. For evidence of later

fluence of myth, historical data, inter-text references, canonical continuity, and sectarian doctrine, but more specific information is necessary to pinpoint actual times, places, and affiliations of these authors and their communities.

### Opening the texts

The terse first *sūtra* in Guṇaprabha's *Vinayasūtra*, *atha niryāṇavṛttam*, is deceptively simple.<sup>14</sup> The simplicity is soon lost in Guṇaprabha's *Autocommentary* (*Vinayasūtravṛttyabhidhānasvavyākhyānam*) and Dharmamitra's *Ṭīkā*, which go on to include very specific, even sectarian assumptions of meaning. These ideas are expanded in the related Indian and Tibetan texts.<sup>15</sup> The reader soon gets the impression that entry into an Indian Buddhist monastic order and observance of the monastic rules was not intended to be only a matter of acceptance of institutional rules and lifestyles.<sup>16</sup> Instead, the first *sūtra* shows that educated monks understood ethical rules in the context of a worldview that postulated among other things, a causal connection between the exercise of ethical behavior in a monastic lifestyle and progress on the path to Buddhist enlightenment. In Buddhist terms, the addictive, habitual, emotional afflictions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) are very much connected to epistemological, intellectual, or gnosis afflictions (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). Put simply,

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currency of this corpus, see the Fifth Dalai Lama's use of Vinītadeva's text (including lexical items used in Guṇaprabha's and Śākyaprabha's works) in his biography of Zhwa lu ba Rin chen bsod nams mchog grub, in Jackson 2010: 297.

<sup>14</sup> I have noted that "Guṇaprabha's opening *sūtra* seems to be in the style of many Indian *sūtra* texts. Pāṇini's (ca. fourth century BCE) *Aṣṭādhyāyī* begins with the statement *atha śabdānuśāsanam*, Patañjali's (ca. 200) *Yogadarśanam* begins with *atha yogānuśāsanam*, Bādarāyaṇa's (ca. second century BCE) *Brahmasūtra* and Śaṅkara's (788–820) *Bhāṣya* with *atha brahmānuśāsanam*" (Nietupski 2009: 2).

<sup>15</sup> The Indian and Tibetan commentators clearly make reference to non-Buddhists and to other Buddhists. See Eckel 2008: 4–8; Eckel draws our attention to the work of Jonathan Z. Smith (2004: 252). See Smith's chapter 12, "What a Difference a Difference Makes" (Smith 2004: 251–302).

<sup>16</sup> See Berkwitz 2009: 43–47.

ethical behavior has an impact on mental states; Buddhist ethics, here framed in the rules for conduct of monks, is a method for Buddhist insight.

The comments on the first *sūtra* in the *Autocommentary* explain the idea that ethical activities result in mental states and finally lead to Buddhist enlightenment. They include the literal and implied meanings of the *sūtra*, and a summary list of the seventeen *skandhaka* sections of the Mūlasarvastivāda Vinaya, still in comment on the first *sūtra*.<sup>17</sup> The comments serve to emphasize that the first *sūtra* does indeed refer to the entire text, the entire Vinaya, to the Buddhist path, and to its result. Here, the lexical highlights are presented, followed by interpretations of meaning.

Guṇaprabha's first *sūtra* is *atha niryāṇavṛttam*, here translated as "This [book] is about behavior that leads to liberation."<sup>18</sup> There are considerable variations in two of the Tibetan translations – the *Vṛtti* and the *Vyākhyāna* – of this aphorism from Indian sources, but outside of these two all writers follow the ninth century translations of the *Vinayasūtra* itself and Dharmamitra's *Ṭīkā*, and the twelfth century Tibetan rendering of the *Autocommentary*.<sup>19</sup>

The variant interpretations, or glosses in Guṇaprabha's *Vinayasūtravṛtti* and Prajñākara's *Vinayasūtravyākhyāna* use the Tibetan *gtogs pa* for the Sanskrit *atha* (but place the word in dif-

<sup>17</sup> The sequence of the seventeen sections and their sources have been studied in detail by Yonezawa. See Yonezawa et al. 2001: 9–22. See also the outline of the text in the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center, <http://www.tbrc.org>.

<sup>18</sup> T 60.5; BG 3.6. Here, *niryāṇa* means "liberation" or "release," based on the meaning in the texts, and instead of other uses of the term. D.S. Ruegg suggested "exit" for *niryāṇa* in this context, but I prefer "liberation," in spite of its use for other words, e.g. *mokṣa*, etc.

<sup>19</sup> Luo Hong presents evidence for the hypothesis that the *sūtras* in the *Autocommentary* are older than the commentary itself. See Luo Hong 2009a: 320–334. See the extended analysis in Luo Hong 2007: 53–70. Luo Hong also presents evidence for the antiquity of Guṇaprabha's *Vṛtti* and Prajñākara's *Vyākhyāna*, including analogues found in the Dunhuang document P.T. 903, fragments of the *Vinayasamgraha*, 'Dul ba'i bsdus pa. See Luo Hong 2009a: 320–333.

ferent syntactic positions), and the Tibetan *theg pa* for the *yāna* in *niryāṇa*, instead of the Tibetan *'byung ba* used in all other texts. Neither the *Vṛtti* nor the *Vyākhyāna* use the word “ethics,” in Sanskrit, *śīla*, and in Tibetan *tshul khrims*, instead opt for the more literal *tshul* for the Sanskrit *vṛttam*. With one exception in the Sanskrit manuscript, at the end of the comments on the first *sūtra*,<sup>20</sup> *tshul khrims (śīla)* appears only in the Tibetan translations of the other Indian commentaries and texts – except for the *Vṛtti* and the *Vyākhyāna* – and in the later native Tibetan commentaries. The translations of *atha niryāṇavṛttam* are:

Guṇaprabha's *Vinayasūtravṛtti*: *gtogs pa nges par theg pa'i tshul te*<sup>21</sup>

Prajñākara's *Vinayasūtravyākhyāna*: *nges par theg pa'i tshul du gtogs pa ste*.<sup>22</sup>

And again, the much more explicit rendering found in all other Indian and Tibetan versions, which include the word “ethics” (*śīla*), here for example from the *Ṭīkā* commentary:

Dharmamitra's *Ṭīkā*: *de nas nges bar 'byung ba'i tshul 'khrims kyi dbang du byas te*.<sup>23</sup>

The *Ṭīkā*, the *Autocommentary*, the texts by Śākyaprabha and Vinītadeva, and all native Tibetan commentaries include detailed explanations of the first *sūtra*, from the outset taking the position that ethical behavior can yield a cognitive result.

In Guṇaprabha's *Vṛtti* and in Prajñākara's *Vyākhyāna* the rendering of the Sanskrit *–yāṇa* (*yāna* in stem form, a derivative of the root *yā*, “go,” “understand”) with the Tibetan *theg pa*, “vehicle, going” contrasts to the more obviously acquisitive Tibetan *'byung ba*. The rendering of Sanskrit *vṛttam* with Tibetan *tshul* contrasts with the more obvious *śīla/tshul khrims* in all other texts. In addition to being an interesting example of historical editing, these

<sup>20</sup> *Śīlam*, T 61.14; this section is missing in BG 3.20, and reconstructed by the editors, but not with *śīlam*.

<sup>21</sup> DV 1a1.

<sup>22</sup> DP 1b2.

<sup>23</sup> D 1a3.

variations in all versions appear to display an effort to express specific Buddhist epistemological meanings. By this I mean that the authors and redactors of the *Vinayasūtra* texts were concerned with preserving the monastic texts and institutions, and at the same time they showed that the exercise of ethical behavior was important to mental development and progress on the Buddhist path.

### Ethical behavior and Buddhist enlightenment

The word *niryāna* is often translated as “renunciation,” inadequate for the nearly opposite meaning of ethical behavior that leads to the certain acquisition or attainment of liberation expressed here. Śākyaprabha explains in a verse:

Ethical behavior that leads to liberation (*niryāṇavr̥ttam*) eliminates suffering.

It destroys the root of realist views (*'jig tshogs lta ba*), a demon.<sup>24</sup>

It is elevated status (*dpal 'byor sa*) and [it] destroys the god of love.<sup>25</sup>

I bow to the Buddha, and will explain.

...

Ethics is a way to conquer the enemy, addictive desires.

Ordained (*śrāmaṇera*) behavior builds a bridge and

Is a way to uproot the fangs of death.

It is initiation to the glorious vessel of complete enlightenment.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> *'Jig tshogs lta ba gdon gyi rtsa ba 'joms*, “It destroys the root of realist views, a demon.” *Gdon/graḥa* and *bdud/Māra* can refer to embodied demons, or metaphorically, to demonic behavior.

<sup>25</sup> *Me tog mda' can* refers to the “god of love,” the *lha'i bu'i bdud* noted in the *Prabhāvatī* (74b7) in Sanskrit, *devaputramāra*. It can refer to an embodied divinity, or metaphorically, to a mental habit.

<sup>26</sup> Śākyaprabha, \*Āryamūlasarvāstivādaśrāmaṇerakārikā, 63a7–63b2: *Nges par 'byung ba'i tshul khrims sdug bsngal spong/ 'jig tshogs lta ba gdon gyi rtsa ba 'joms/ dpal 'byor sa dang me tog mda' can 'joms/ sangs rgyas la ni mgos gtugs bshad par byal ... nyon mongs dgra g.yul rgyal byed tshul khrims te/ dge tshul brtul zhugs chu lon brtsigs pa dang/ 'chi ba'i mche ba 'byin par byed pa'i thabs/ rdzogs pa'i byang chub dpal nod dbang bskur yin/.*

Śākyaprabha explains in his *Prabhāvatī* that “... liberation is liberation from the three realms. Ethics that cause that are ethics that lead to liberation.”<sup>27</sup> The thirteenth century Tibetan commentator Mtsho sna ba emphasizes that the implied meaning of *niryāna* is ethics (*śīla*), and that “... the word *śīla* when translated is ‘cool attainment’ (*bsil thob*) ...”<sup>28</sup> This preserves the sense of human ethical behavior in the world and attainment of liberation mentioned by the Indian commentators, and as explained, serves to quench the addictive craving (*trṣṇā*) generated by greed, hatred, and delusion that causes suffering.<sup>29</sup> Ethical behavior leads to liberation when understood as the elimination of greed, hatred, and especially delusion, mental states based on a cognitive misperception and subsequent attachment to that misperception.

Further, according to texts and ideas that, if his reputed academic pedigree is correct, were likely circulated in Guṇaprabha’s circle, namely the *Abhidharmakośa*, the *Bhāṣya*,<sup>30</sup> the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, and other texts, *niryāna* is one of the sixteen aspects (*ākāra*) of the Four Noble Truths. It is the sixteenth aspect, in the fourth truth, the path to enlightenment, and is causally related to aspect twelve, *niḥsaraṇa*, in the third truth, the cessation of suffering. These are included in the *Abhidharmakośa*, chapter seven, as knowledges (*jñāna*). Moreover, such matters are understood as *dharmas*, and as objects of knowledge. The *Kośa* relates further that *niryāna* and all of the sixteen aspects are objects of conventional knowledge (*saṃvṛtijñāna*) (*Abhidharmakośa* 7.7–8, 13), and they are further,

<sup>27</sup> *Prabhāvatī* (74b4–75a1): *nges par ’byung ba ste/ khams gsum las nges par phyin pa yin no/ de’i rgyu gyur pa’i tshul khrims ni nges par ’byung ba’i tshul khrims so.*

<sup>28</sup> The extended passage reads *shī la zhes pa de don bsgyur na tshul khrims zhes so/ shī la zhes pa de sgra bsgyur na bsil thob ces bya ste shī la zhes pa de la shi ta zhes sgra’i rkyen byin na bsil ba zhes so*, DTsh, 17. On the “coolness” of religious virtuosos, see Silber 1995: 36. For a discussion of how monks are “pleased” (*prasādita*) by ordination, see Lamotte 1988: 307.

<sup>29</sup> See Williams, Tribe & Wynne 2012: 35.

<sup>30</sup> See Mchims ’jam pa’i dbyangs (d. 1267), *Chos mngon mdzod kyi tshig le’ur byas pa’i ’grel pa mngon pa’i rgyan.*

objects of wisdom (*prajñā*).<sup>31</sup> It appears that there was a similar body of words, definitions, and even a version or versions of the *Vinayasūtra* itself available to Guṇaprabha, which served as foundations for his work.<sup>32</sup>

Guṇaprabha states in more detail that this *niryāna*, in the Tibetan translation of his text *nges par 'byung ba*, means “lead[ing] to liberation,” “obtaining” something (*prāpta*), a *dharma*, a factor of existence in Sarvāstivāda theory.<sup>33</sup> He gives the example “getting to the city,” “arriving at the city,” in his words, *grāmaṃ prāptaṃ*.<sup>34</sup> It is not simply “going;” instead *niryāna* is a positive attainment, in Tibetan *thob pa*. The author's intention appears to be that by taking monastic vows one might be rid of some things, but one can also acquire a new mental state.

Similarly, in his work on Bhāviveka, Eckel discusses the terms “approach” (*naya*) to reality and a “vehicle” (*yāna*, from the root *yā*, “to go,” “to understand”) as a method, or movement towards a goal.<sup>35</sup> These definitions can be applied to Guṇaprabha's “lead[ing] to liberation” (*niryāna*), a vehicle that leads to enlightenment, which is made clear in the *Vinayasūtra* commentaries and related texts. The *Vṛtti* and the *Vyākhyāna* include a literal rendering of the term *niryāna*, expressing the idea of movement (*theg pa*) on the Buddhist path. The opening remarks in the *Vṛtti* include the statements that the entire *Vinayasūtra* is concerned with ethics,

<sup>31</sup> See the annotations in de la Vallée Poussin 1925: VII.7–13. In contrast to this evidence, the *Mahāvīyūtpatti* however does not distinguish between *niryāna* and *niḥsaraṇa* for *nges par 'byung ba*, *Mahāvīyūtpatti* 1105, 1201 for *niḥsaraṇa* and 2543 for *niryāna*.

<sup>32</sup> Again, see Luo Hong's discussion on the transmissions and recensions of the *Vinayasūtra*, Luo Hong 2011: 175–180.

<sup>33</sup> T 60.8; BG 3.7, 3.9. See Bronkhorst 2009: 90–92, where it is explained that according to the Sarvāstivāda *prāpti* is a *dharma*, a factor of the material world. Bronkhorst refers us further to Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. See also Hwang 2006: 108–111.

<sup>34</sup> T 60.9; BG 3.8. See de la Vallée Poussin 1925: VII.13a, p. 33 n. 6.

<sup>35</sup> See Eckel 2008: 9–17; on the different Indian philosophical systems of the day, see pp. 30–36, 80–81. On the term “approach” (*naya*) to Buddhist practice, and the vehicle (*yāna*) to use in that approach, see pp. 36–37, 39–49.

and specifically the exercise of physical and verbal ethical actions. The *Vṛtti* also explains that the Sanskrit prefix *nir-* (*nges pa*) means “unmistaken accomplishment on the unexcelled vehicle” (*bla na med pa'i theg par gdon mi za bar 'grub*).<sup>36</sup> This too indicates a kind of movement, but more in the sense of progress, and not simply physical going from one place to another.

In the *Vyākhyāna*, Prajñākara remarks that the expression *niryāṇa*, also rendered in his text *nges par theg pa*, refers to the attainment of irreversible enlightenment with no remainder, and not to reversibility, like a worldly enlightenment, the movement of an elephant, and so on.<sup>37</sup> The probable early notes to the *Vinayasūtra* in Prajñākara's *Vyākhyāna* and those by the author of the *Vṛtti* include emphasis that the meaning of *niryāṇa* and the entire *Vinayasūtra* is concerned with progress on the path to enlightenment. This is understood not as physical movement from one place to another, but instead with development of human consciousness. These ideas are emphasized in detail in the other commentaries.

The translators of Guṇaprabha's *Autocommentary* and Dharmamitra's *Ṭīkā* however rendered the term *yāna* as *'byung ba*, articulating the sense of “accomplishment.” The result of “behavior that leads to liberation” is moreover not reversible, a decisive point of doctrine in this discussion. Guṇaprabha points out that the *nir* in *niryāṇa* indicates an irreversible (*apunarāvartana*)<sup>38</sup> attainment. This reflects an Abhidharma discussion of the term, which tells us that the departure from the three realms of existence (noted above in Śākyaprabha's *Prabhāvatī*), the Desire, Form, and Formless realms<sup>39</sup> by *anāgamins*, *arhats*, and *buddhas* is not reversible. This

<sup>36</sup> *Gtogs pa nges par theg pa'i tshul tel gtogs pa ni mdo 'og ma kun du'o'll nges par ni bla na med pa'i theg par gdon mi za bar 'grub pa'o'll tshul ni lus la gsum/ngag la bzhi ste tshul bdun po 'di'i nang du 'dul ba'i gzhung kun 'dus so'll* (DV 1a1–3).

<sup>37</sup> *De la nges par theg ces pa ni lhag ma ma lus pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa ldog mi srid par thob pa la bya'i 'jig rten gyi mya ngan las 'das pa lta bu slar ldog srid pa dang glang po la sogs pa'i theg pa la ni mi bya'o* (DP 2a5–2b1).

<sup>38</sup> *Apunarāvartana*. See the Appendix.

<sup>39</sup> De la Vallée Poussin 1925: VII.13a,c, pp. 33, 38.

*niryāṇa* is thus an irreversible attainment that leads to Buddhist enlightenment. In the words of Mtsho sna ba, “Who goes? The person who maintains ethics. From what does he go? From the three realms of *saṃsāra*. By what does he go? By ethics. Where does he go? To *nirvāṇa*. How does he go? Without going back.”<sup>40</sup>

Dharmamitra remarks that irreversibility of this attainment is very different from the mentally constructed goal of the Indian “heretics,”<sup>41</sup> who we can speculate seek an irreversible goal of fully transcendent and permanent release from the cycle of deaths and rebirths, a divine state different from the goal of the Buddhists referred to by Dharmamitra. The Tibetan commentator Mtsho sna ba accepts the meaning of *nir-* as irreversible, and as a causal factor for the attainment of *nirvāṇa* with no remainder (discussed below), but permanent only in a rhetorical sense.<sup>42</sup> Bu ston (1290–1364) likewise describes the meaning of *nir-*, and accepts that it is permanent, but not “permanent” in the way mentally constructed by “heretics.” That is, *nir-* does imply that one need not return to the cycle of births and deaths, but it does not suggest the permanence taught by other Indian religions.<sup>43</sup>

All commentaries agree that the issues associated with *niryāṇa* are relevant to progress on the path to enlightenment. Dharmamitra explains that Guṇaprabha shows that the Buddha taught ethics, and that the *Vinayasūtra* is his method. The text is the method, and ethics are the result, in a causal relationship. Dharmamitra goes further with a discussion of the intended results of ethical behavior,

<sup>40</sup> DTsh, 16–17: *de la gang 'byung na/ su tshul khrims bsrung ba de 'byung ngo/ gang nas 'byung na kham gsum 'khor ba nas so/ gang gis 'byung na tshul khrims kyis so/ gang du 'byung na mya ngan las 'das par rol ji ltar 'byung na phyir mi ldog par te.*

<sup>41</sup> DT 3b1: *mu stegs byed kyis kun nas brtags pa bzhin ni ma yin*; Peking 4a: *mu steg byed kyis kun nas brtags pa ...*

<sup>42</sup> DTsh, 17: *de'i don ni rtag pa dang the tshom mi za ba gnyis las 'dir ni rtag pa ste de ltar ma yin na nying dgos mya ngan las 'das pa ston pa'i ngag tu mi rung ba'i phyir ro.*

<sup>43</sup> BT 4a4–5: *nges pa ni gdon mi za ba dang rtag pa gnyis la 'jug pa las/ 'dir rtag pa gzung ste de thob na/ slar 'khor bar phyir mi ldog pas rtag pa yin gyi mu stegs pas brtags pa'i rtag pa ni ma yin no.* See Olivelle 1992: 58–81.

namely Buddhist enlightenment, linking the exercise of physical, verbal, and by extension mental activities to the development of mental states, even at one point noting that the path that leads to liberation (*niryāna*) is itself, or at least leads to the result (*nirvāna*). Dharmamitra explains in his *Ṭīkā*:

Some foolish people ask “What’s the use of fully understanding ethics? It’s completely purposeless, like analyzing the teeth of a crow.”

Therefore [in answer, Guṇaprabha] announced the purpose in purpose, taught by the mention of [behavior that leads to] liberation (*niryāna*).<sup>44</sup>

[Behavior that leads to] liberation is *nirvāna* (*nges par ’byung ba ni mya ngan las ’das pa ste*). Ethics in the Bhagavan’s teachings are taught as leading to liberation. Therefore, by perfect ethics one will perfectly attain *nirvāna*.

But, you argue, if the afflictions are overcome by wisdom, then how is *nirvāna* perfectly attained by ethics? This [objection] is correct, but still, by relying on ethics the afflictions of knowledge will be overcome. For as it is said in the scripture, “abiding in ethics, and depending on ethics one will see the four noble truths perfectly and correctly.”<sup>45</sup>

Dharmamitra shows that the primary purpose of the Vinaya is ethics, and the purpose of ethics is the attainment of *nirvāna*, and in particular *nirvāna* without remainder (discussed below). Here again he argues that there is a causal connection between ethical conduct and Buddhist enlightenment. This passage alludes to the afflictions of the passions (*kleśāvaraṇa*, i.e. *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *moha*) and knowables (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), and the general understanding that the antidotes for these afflictions are respectively ethical conduct and

<sup>44</sup> *De’i phyir dgos pa’i yang dgos pa brjod par bya ste/ de yang nges par ’byung ba zhes smos pas bstan to*, DT 2b3. *Dgos pa’i yang dgos pa*, Sanskrit, *prayojanaprayojana*. *Prayojana*, here “purpose,” has also been rendered “motive,” “aim,” “end,” et al. *Prayojanaprayojana*, here “purpose in purpose,” has also been rendered “secondary motive.” Put simply, Dharmamitra uses these terms to show that the purpose of the *Vinayasūtra* is to teach ethics, and the purpose of ethics is to attain enlightenment.

<sup>45</sup> DT 2b2–2b6; see BT 4b2–3.

penetrative insight.

However, the passage seems to conflate these two categories based on the fact that the afflictions of the passions result from misconceptions or misknowledges of the nature of the self and of external objects, which result in addictive desire, hatred, and delusion.<sup>46</sup> In the *Vyākhyāna*, Prajñākara concurs, noting that one will gradually attain *nirvāṇa* through the stages of hearing, thinking, and meditating about ethics.<sup>47</sup> Bu ston elaborates, saying in general that this statement of leading to liberation and all scriptures are for the purpose of leading disciples to *nirvāṇa*, the best actual object (*dn̄gos po*), understood as a mental state.

Specifically, this means that monks should control all faults of attachment to error generated by compounded obscurations.<sup>48</sup> Later, in his discussion of the subject matter of the *Vinayasūtra*, Bu ston remarks that perfecting the vow of ethics involves understanding each individual action of body, speech, and mind;<sup>49</sup> as above, monastic rules are not only an agenda for an austere lifestyle. Mtsho sna ba wrote<sup>50</sup> that it is wrong to argue that *nirvāṇa* is not a valid result of ethics because *nirvāṇa* is unconstructed, because here the point is that the process of attainment of *nirvāṇa* is constructed, and the goal is unconstructed. There is here a logical, causal connection between unconstructed enlightenment and the constructed methods for achieving it.<sup>51</sup> Bu ston remarked that “Moreover, by perfect ethics one will attain concentration (*ting nge 'dzin*) and from that attain a stainless wisdom of understanding

<sup>46</sup> For relevant discussion of *nirvāṇa*, see Strong 2001: 75.

<sup>47</sup> DP 2b3. See Vinītadeva's remarks on this, below.

<sup>48</sup> BT 2a4–6; *spong ba bdun 'khor dang bcas pa'i tshul khrim*, 4b3.

<sup>49</sup> BT 3b4–5.

<sup>50</sup> See DTsh, 12–13. Mtsho sna ba moreover takes great care to cast the entire *Vinayasūtra* in logical patterns, emphasizing the inferential proofs of the presuppositions of ethical theory, with reference to Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika, (e.g. p. 11) and other theories. The First Dalai Lama (1391–1475) also mentions Sautrāntika and other theories, DL 5, etc.

<sup>51</sup> DTsh, 13–14.

the four noble truths.”<sup>52</sup> Guṇaprabha’s texts and the commentaries present an interactive program of physical, verbal, and mental activity. While consistent with Dharmamitra, Bu ston’s and the other commentators clearly expand the range of ethics to epistemology. All argue that the motive of the *Vinayasūtra* is “to understand and purify ethics in order to generate higher mindedness (*lhag pa’i sems, adhicitta*) and wisdom, and through that attain *nirvāṇa*.”<sup>53</sup>

Later in the *Vinayasūtra*, in *sūtras* eighty-four through ninety-four, Guṇaprabha stresses the relationship between *adhicitta* “higher mindedness,” *adhiprajñā*, “higher wisdom,” and *adhiśīla*, “higher ethics.” George Bond noted that even in earlier forms of Buddhism, though intended to be different from *adhicitta* and *adhipañña*, *adhiśīla* was thought to encompass much of human behavior, “. . . all aspects of life, from the ordinary precepts governing relationships with people to the virtues of nonattachment, extreme simplicity in life-style and control over one’s senses.”<sup>54</sup>

### ***Nirvāṇa* with and without remainder**

Above, in comment on the first aphorism of the *Vinayasūtra*, Guṇaprabha and his followers argued for a connection between ethical behavior and liberation, a link between constructed activity and unconstructed wisdom. They go further, asserting that the irreversible state intended by the term *niryāṇa*, the result of monastic ethical behavior leads to *nirvāṇa* with no remainder of the aggregates (Sanskrit, *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*; Pali, *nirupādisesa-/anupādisesanibbāna*; in Tibetan, *phung po lhag ma med pa’i mya ngan las ’das pa*).<sup>55</sup> What exactly *nirvāṇa* with and without

<sup>52</sup> BT 4a2–3, *zag med kyi shes rab thob*; DL 6.25, *ting nge la brten nas ye shes skye la des nyon mongs spong ba’i phyir ro*.

<sup>53</sup> BT 2b6.

<sup>54</sup> Bond 1984: 229. See also the discussion of the *brjod bya*, the *dgos pa*, and *nying dgos* in the commentary by the First Dalai Lama (1391–1475), where an opponent argues that the exercise of ethics stipulated in the *Vinayasūtra* does not lead to the highest moral states, namely *adhiśīla*, “higher ethics,” which the objector associates with the “bodhisattva vow and the tantric vow,” DL 8.

<sup>55</sup> *Nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇasamprāpter uktiḥ*, T 60.11; *nirūpadhiśeṣanirvā-*

remainder are, and when and how they occur are key concerns for Guṇaprabha, and relevant to ethical behavior.

Guṇaprabha states that *nirvāṇa* with no remainder is the goal of monastic behavior. Given that monastic behavior is exercised by monks, the text implicitly raises the questions whether living monks can attain *nirvāṇa* with no remainder, if this attainment will come after death, or in a succeeding lifetime.<sup>56</sup> In the *Autocommentary* Guṇaprabha explains further of *niryāṇa* that

This is a statement of the attainment of *nirvāṇa* without remainder, since that is an irreversible attainment.

Well, you object with the question “Why isn’t the expression ‘that liberation is liberating’ understood here as ‘expressing the full attainment of *nirvāṇa* with remainder’ or [why isn’t] the statement ‘this is liberating’ an elucidation of the path?”

[Answer:] The prefix *nir-* is not related to a sense of commencement nor to a sense of finality, but it could be an expression of the perfect attainment of *nirvāṇa* with remainder. Therefore, it is not related to ‘attaining liberation (*yānaṃ niryānaṃ*) because of commencement of engagement in *saṃsāra* nor to going to the end of activity in *saṃsāra*.’

To the contrary (*kiṃ tarhi*), it is clear that the prefix *nir-* means irreversible. This is because it does not express anything but irreversible attainment. And therefore, one who enters the path of equipoise attains *nirvāṇa* with remainder perfectly in the aftermath of Vajra-like [concentration], [but] getting up from one path and going to another is not irreversibility. [Irreversibility is when] there is no decline of the states of Arhat, etc.<sup>57</sup>

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*ṇaprāpter ukṭiḥ* [sic], BG 3.9; *phung po lhag ma med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa yang dag par thob pa brjod pa ste*, D 2a1. See the Appendix.

<sup>56</sup> Both types of *nirvāṇa* are accessible to living persons, but the precise definition of the two types, and whether this occurs in a single or multiple lifetimes, especially according to Guṇaprabha, requires more research. See note 59.

<sup>57</sup> Translation of the *Autocommentary* T 60.13–61.10; BG 3.10–3.18; D 2a1–2b2. See the Appendix for a full translation of the comments on the first aphorism in the *Autocommentary* T 60.1–62.4; BG 3.1–3.23; D 1a2–2b7, detailed lexical comments, and references to the related Indian and Tibetan commentaries.

Irreversibility is clearly a key concern. Further, the point of these comments is to link the exercise of monastic behavior with the irreversibility of *nirvāṇa* with no remainder. Guṇaprabha's entire *Vinayasūtra* and these remarks are intended for monks, whom, he explains, can attain both *nirvāṇa* with and without remainder, as understood in Guṇaprabha's diverse intellectual environment. Here, the texts clearly link monastic ethical behavior to enlightenment with no remainder, but it is again not clear when this enlightenment will take place, in the lifetimes of the monks who engage in such behavior, after such monks pass away, or as a monk in a future life.

The commentaries emphasize this point; for example, in his comment on *niryāṇa* (*nges par theg pa*) – which again includes the entire content of the *Vinayasūtra* – Prajñākara states that the term *niryāṇa* means the irreversible attainment of *nirvāṇa* with no remainder (*lhag pa ma lus pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa ldog mi srid par thob pa*).<sup>58</sup> The distinction between the two types of enlightenment was a point of controversy in the Buddhist communities of the day.

On one hand,<sup>59</sup> *nirvāṇa* with remainder (*sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) is

<sup>58</sup> *Lhag ma ma lus pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa ...* DP 2a5–6. The translators of Dharmamitra's text give the slightly different *lhag ma med pa* for *anupādhiśeṣa-*, D 2a1; Dharmamitra, DT 3a5, 4a1.

<sup>59</sup> Among the many scholars who explain *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* at death and *sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* while living, see the detailed study in Harvey 1995: 180–197; see also Norman 1994: 213–215; Collins 2010: 39–42; Makransky 1997: 28, 319–323; Williams, Tribe, & Wynne 2012: 34–36; Gethin 1998: 74–79; Prebish & Keown 2010: 49–51. See also Sharma 1978; de la Vallée Poussin 1930: 39–45. The problem is even more complicated, and the meaning of *nirvāṇa* with and without remainder further nuanced by definitions found, for one example in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, a text likely written well before Guṇaprabha's lifetime. In this text *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* is not the *nirvāṇa* of bodhisattvas, but of śrāvakas. The issue is not one of living or deceased persons, but of motivation and commitment to others; both are accessible to living persons. See Lamotte 1940, chapter VIII.21–22, pp. 79–80. On p. 80 the Tibetan clearly states that a bodhisattva will not stay in *nirvāṇa* with no remainder, as doing so would be in disregard of the ends of living beings (*sems can gyi don la mi lta ba phuṅ poḥi lhag ma med paḥi mya ṅan las ḥdas paḥi dbyiṅs kyī gnas yoṅs su spoṅ baḥi phyir ro ... mya ṅan las ḥdas*

very often understood as enlightenment while still alive, which is attained by getting rid of the afflictions (*kleśa*). In this view many scholars argue that *nirvāṇa* without remainder is the experience at the point of death, and in post-death experiences, when one loses the karmically afflicted body, or the material aggregates (*skandha*), apprehended (*upādāna*) as the basis for a real self. This is a widely accepted theory in early texts and in modern Buddhist studies.

In contrast, an alternative interpretation from the *Ekottarāgama*, the *Itivuttaka*, the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, other early texts, and more explicitly from the works of later Indian and Tibetan writers including Guṇaprabha, Śākyaprabha, and Vinītadeva, *nirvāṇa* with and without remainder are not explained as above, *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* at death and *sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* while living. Instead, as implied in the *Autocommentary*, and here briefly, the two types of *nirvāṇa* are accessible to monks. Though clearly suggestive, it is not literally stated that Guṇaprabha is asserting enlightenment with no remainder in a single lifetime.

Jungnok Park, referring to the *Ekottarāgama*, explains that: “[a]lternatively, the *nirvāṇa* with residue is the soteriological achievement of an *anāgāmin* (non-returner), whereas the *nirvāṇa* without residue is that of an *arhat*.”<sup>60</sup> He continues that the *Ekottarāgama* states that *nirvāṇa* with no remainder, which Guṇaprabha identifies as a result of ethical behavior, is, following Park’s rendering of the text:

... a state where a monk extinguishes [corrupted] flows (*āsrava*), achieves freedom from [corrupted] flows (*anāsrava*), attains mind-liberation (*ceto-vimukti*) and wisdom-liberation (*prajñā-vimukti*), ... exhausts all birth and death, completes all pure practices (*brahmacarya*), receives no more existence, and knows things as they are. This is called the state of *nirvāṇa* without residue.<sup>61</sup>

*paḥi dbyiṅs su zad par mi ḥgyur* ...). Instead, it is implied that the bodhisattva stays in *nirvāṇa* with remainder. The issue of *nirvāṇa* in life or death seems secondary here. See also Collins 1998.

<sup>60</sup> Park 2012: 99. This however is slightly different from Guṇaprabha’s statement above, in the discussion of *nir-*, irreversibility.

<sup>61</sup> Park 2012: 99 n. 58, translating the *Ekottarāgama*, 火滅品第十六 in the

This is suggestive of enlightenment in a single lifetime, but it could be a description of things to come in a later lifetime. However, it is – here and in Guṇaprabha’s texts – literally intended to be experienced by monks. Monks are also referred to in the *Āṅguttara Nikāya*, where *nirvāṇa* with and without remainder are listed as goals.<sup>62</sup>

Guṇaprabha’s contemporaries and his commentators are emphatic about the relationship between ethical behavior and enlightenment, for monks and we might include for any person, ordained or not. Śākyaprabha, after his above statement that ethical behavior as described in the Vinaya leads to liberation, goes on to link ethical behavior to *nirvāṇa* with no remainder. He comments on his own *\*Āryamūlasarvāstivādaśrāmaṇerakārikā*, in his *\*Prabhāvātī*:

This [ethics which lead to liberation] is taught as an actual cause of the highest good (*ngeṣ par legs pa; naiḥśreyasaḥ*). There are however two kinds of highest good, one with a remainder of the aggregates and by contrast, one without a remainder of the aggregates.

In regard to that, ethics which are used to eliminate the suffering of a self nature (*bdag nyid*) [based on] the five aggregates is called the “elimination of suffering.” This is taught as an actual cause of *nirvāṇa*

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description of what a monk experiences in *nirvāṇa* with no remainder: 彼云何名為無餘涅槃界。如是。比丘盡有漏成無漏。意解脫。智慧解脫。自身作證而自遊戲。生死已盡。梵行已立。更不受有。如實知之。是謂為無餘涅槃界。 Park translates the relevant passages, but not自身作證而自遊戲。 The phrase 如實知之, according to Park, “and knows things as they are” might be translated differently, as the “monk’s knowledge of the status he achieved.” Further, the relevant passage in the *Itivuttaka* is perhaps the most common source for *nirvāṇa* with no remainder while still alive. See *Itivuttaka* 44, *Nibbānadhātu suttam* and in Chinese本事經, here the provocative verses at the end: 漏盡心解脫 任持最後身 名有餘涅槃 諸行猶相續 諸所受皆滅 寂靜永清涼 名無餘涅槃 眾戲論皆息 此二涅槃界 最上無等倫 謂現法當來 寂靜常安樂, p. 0678a. See also the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (成唯識論), and others. I am grateful for assistance from Ven. Jin Ho 釋常純.

<sup>62</sup> See *nirvāṇa* with and without remainder described as goals for monks in the *Tissa Brahma Suttam* (AN IV 75–78) and in the *Sutavāparibbājaka* (AN IV 379–81). Different types of enlightenment are mentioned in Bronkhorst 1986: 93–96; 105 n. 11; two types of *nirvāṇa* are mentioned briefly in Berkwitz 2010: 21. See also the same in Hwang 2006: 14–35.

with no remainder of the five aggregates.

The realist view (*'jig tshogs la lta ba nyid*) is a demon because it is difficult to cure. [Ethical behavior] destroys the root of that, the seed, so it destroys the harmful root of realist views, a demon. This shows the cause of *nirvāṇa* with remainder of the aggregates.

The expression “elevated status” (*dpal 'byor sa*)<sup>63</sup> is the foundation; [this] also shows that [ethical behavior] is a cause of ascendance (*mngon par mtho ba; abhyudaya*) [in *saṃsāra*]. The god of love is the divinity of desire; because [ethical behavior] is a cause for destroying that, it destroys the god of love, [and] it is an equivalent expression for the cause of the complete conquest of Māra (*devaputramāra, lha'i bu'i bdud*). This also teaches ascendance [in *saṃsāra*].<sup>64</sup>

Here, Śākyaprabha provides a definition of two types of Buddhist *nirvāṇa*, both referred to as the “highest good” (*naiḥśreyasaḥ*). One involves elimination of an imputed real self (*bdag nyid*) based on the aggregates, here not the aggregates themselves. This type of *nirvāṇa* is described as without remainder. The other *nirvāṇa*,

<sup>63</sup> Vinītadeva 163a6 explains that “‘byor ba is a way of explaining abundance.” *'byor ba ni phun sum tshogs pa ston par byed pa yin no*. Vinītadeva (163a6–7) goes on to explain that this “elevated status” (*dpal 'byor*) teaches the cause of things (*chos*) which have the characteristics of ascendance, Brahma, and so on. *'dis ni 'dir tshangs pa la sogs pa mngon par mtho ba'i mtshan nyid kyi rgyu yin no zhes bstan par 'gyur ro*.

<sup>64</sup> From the *Prabhāvatī* (74b4–75a1): 74b4: *'dis ni nges par legs pa'i rgyu nyid yin par bstan to/ nges par legs pa yang rnam pa gnyis tel/ phung pol hag ma dang bcas pa dang phung pol hag ma med pa tha dad bas so// de la tshul khrims gang gis phung po lnga'i bdag nyid kyi sdug bsngal spong bar byed pa ni sdug bsngal spong byed ces bya ba ste 'dis ni phung po lhag ma med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa'i rgyu nyid yin par bstan to/ 'jig tshogs la lta ba nyid gdon yin tell/ gso bar dka' ba nyid yin pa'i phyir roll/ de'i rtsa ba stell/ sa bon 'joms par byed pa yin pas 'jig tshogs lta ba'i gdon gyi rtsa ba 'joms byed de/ 'dis ni phung po lhag ma dang bcas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa'i rgyu nyid yin par ston tel/ dpal 'byor sa zhes bya ba ni rten yin tel/ mngon par mtho ba'i rgyu yin par yang bstan to// me tog gi mda' can 'dod pa'i lha stell/ de 'joms pa'i rgyur gyur pa yin pa'i phyir me tog mnga' can 'joms pa stell/ lha'i bu'i bdud las rnam par rgyal bar byed pa'i rgyu yin no// zhes bya ba'i tha tshig goll/ 'dis ni mngon par mthong yang bstan to*. Note the discrepancy between *mngon par mtho ba*, 74b7 and *mngon par mthong ba*, 75a1. I take the latter, *mngon par mthong ba*, as a misspelling of *mngon par mtho ba, abhyudaya*.

with a remainder of the aggregates, is a result of the elimination of realist views (*'jig tshogs lta ba*) of material objects in the world, which results in ascendance. Both types of *nirvāṇa* involve cognitive functions, and both involve the exercise of ethical behavior.

Vinītadeva, commenting on Guṇaprabha and Śākyaprabha explains (with no mention of the problem of the reality or unreality of objects) that ethical behavior that leads to liberation is an attainment, the establishment of an actual object (*dn̄gos po sgrub par byed*), *nirvāṇa* with no remainder. This is moreover irreversible and has the characteristic of going beyond the three realms.<sup>65</sup> Vinītadeva wrote in his *Three Hundred*:

Therefore, this teaches the perfect attainment of the realm of *nirvāṇa* with no remainder of the aggregates. Ethics, the meaning, cause, or way of attaining that is liberating behavior (*nges 'byung tshul*). This explains the meaning [of the text] up to the statement “attainment of the realm of *nirvāṇa* with no remainder of the aggregates.”<sup>66</sup>

...

The statement that “those [ascendance (*mngon par mtho ba*), Brahma, and so on] are attained by ethics” [means] those ethics in particular. Those ethics by which one abandons, gets rid of, and eliminates the suffering self nature of the five aggregates eliminate suffering.<sup>67</sup>

In this passage Vinītadeva explains that getting rid of the idea of a self nature based on the aggregates results in, or literally, is a cause of *nirvāṇa* with no remainder. By contrast, he explains that eliminating the view of the reality of objects (*'jig tshogs lta ba*), which includes the aggregates understood as real things, the ideas of “I” and “mine,” and the root of the demon of attachment to realist views of *saṃsāra*, results in *nirvāṇa* with remainder.<sup>68</sup>

Vinītadeva states the position of the *Vinayasūtra* emphatically, showing the link between human ethical behavior and the goal of Buddhism:

<sup>65</sup> *Sum brgya pa*, 163a1–2.

<sup>66</sup> *Sum brgya pa*, 163a2–3.

<sup>67</sup> *Sum brgya pa*, 163a7–163b1.

<sup>68</sup> *Sum brgya pa*, 163b5–6.

Since addictions are produced from realist views, all addictions will be abandoned by getting rid of [those realist views]. Further, as soon as one has abandoned those [realist views], at the same time the several other [addictions,] craving, and so on will gradually be abandoned. Therefore, it is certain that this is a cause of *nirvāṇa*. If someone objects that “if one attains [*nirvāṇa*] by the teaching of selflessness, how will he attain liberation by monastic (*dge sbyong*, *śrāmaṇera*) ethics?”

[Answer:] There is no problem here.

Since one who maintains ethics and applies them in study, contemplation, and meditation will gradually generate wisdom, the cause of the two *nirvāṇas* will arise. This shows triumph over the demon of the aggregates and secondly, triumph over the demon of the addictions.<sup>69</sup>

Here Vinītadeva explains that there are again two types of *nirvāṇa*, one dealing with an invented sense of self nature in humans based on the five aggregates. Once again, the elimination of this sense of self nature – not the aggregates themselves – results in *nirvāṇa* with no remainder, that is, no remainder of attachment to a falsely imputed self nature. The other type of *nirvāṇa* involves the elimination of a real status of addiction-defined objects in the world, including the supposed reality of the human body and the aggregates. This results in *nirvāṇa* with a remainder. Both types of *nirvāṇa* can be attained through the exercise of ethics, because ethics involves eliminating both addictive craving, anger, and delusion, which are themselves brought about by mistakes in knowledge.

<sup>69</sup> *Sum brgya pa*, 163b6–164a2. In this passage Vinītadeva states the connection between human ethical behavior and Buddhist enlightenment explicitly: *Gang gi phyir tshul khriṃs la gnas nas thos pa dang bsam pa dang ldan pa bsgom pa la rab tu sbyor ba de las rim gyis ye shes skyes bar 'gyur pa'i phyir brgyud pas mya ngan las 'das pa gnyis kyi rgyur 'gyur tel phung po'i bdud las rgyal ba dang gnyis pas nyon mongs pa'i bdud las rgyal ba bstan pa yin no*, *Sum brgya pa*, 164a1–2. The passage goes on to describe how a Buddha conquers the demons of love, and is unlike a human. Vinītadeva (164a4–7) explains that there are two kinds of elevated status (*dpal 'byor*), one characterized by merit and one by wisdom, both of which a *buddha bhagavān* has perfected. Further, a *bhagavān* has immanent and transcendent (*'jig rten dang 'jig rten las 'das pa*) ascendance. See the further qualities of a buddha, 164a7–164b7.

These ideas are consistent with the theories of much later Tibetan writers, including the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, who wrote that

“Without remainder” means that there is no remainder of mental and physical aggregates wrought by contaminated actions and afflictions, but the continuum of consciousness and the continuum of uncontaminated mental and physical aggregates still exist.<sup>70</sup>

The issue is one of contaminated mental and physical aggregates, and the status of the aggregates in different enlightenment states before, and after death. In this theory again *nirvāṇa* with and without remainder are accessible to living persons. The key point here again is that *nirvāṇa* involves the elimination of “contaminated actions and afflictions.” Guṇaprabha wrote that it is possible for a person to experience *nirvāṇa* with remainder, for, “one who enters the path of equipoise attains *nirvāṇa* with remainder perfectly in the aftermath of Vajra-like [concentration].” However, Guṇaprabha’s text corpus also emphasizes that “leading to liberation” (*niryāṇa*) also leads to an irreversible state of *nirvāṇa* with no remainder (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*).

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<sup>70</sup> See the Dalai Lama: “Cyclic existence means bondage, and liberation means freedom from this bondage... [T]he causes of cyclic existence are contaminated actions and afflictions. If the roots of the afflictions are eliminated and if new actions are not ‘accumulated,’ since there are no afflictions to activate the predispositions of contaminated actions persisting from the past, the causes of cyclic existence have been eliminated. Then there is freedom from bondage. Some say that as long as one still has mental and physical aggregates wrought by former contaminated actions and afflictions, one has a *nirvāṇa* with remainder. When these no longer remain, there is a *nirvāṇa* without remainder. ‘Without remainder’ means that there is no remainder of mental and physical aggregates wrought by contaminated actions and afflictions, but the continuum of consciousness and the continuum of uncontaminated mental and physical aggregates still exist.” The Dalai Lama 1987: 27. For further comments on *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* see Masefield 1979: 215–230 (Masefield’s theory, especially his reading of the *Itivuttaka* is challenged in Harvey 1995: 180–197); Cozort & Preston 2003: 77–78; Cabezón 1992: 239–247. See the *Ekottarāgama* in Chinese, 增壹阿含經 and other references in Park 2012: 99 n. 58.

This interpretation of *nirvāṇa* with and without remainder as a matter of elimination of *kleśa*- and *jñeya*-driven attachment to reality, is based on the fact that if *nirvāṇa* with no remainder means that there is fully no remainder, understood as no aggregates at all after death, there would be no continuity of consciousness after physical death, enlightened or otherwise. This is criticized as a form of extreme negation. The point is rather that *nirvāṇa* with no remainder means that the mental and physical aggregates are completely freed from the imputed self nature of a person and the afflictions at the point of enlightenment, and that this does not preclude the continuity of uncontaminated mental and physical aggregates, whether one is alive or dead, in a deep trance state, or fully enlightened. The crucial difference here is between understanding *nirvāṇa* with and without remainder as referring to the physical body or the aggregates (*skandha*) themselves, or alternatively as referring to *kleśa*-driven clinging to the false appearance of reality in the physical-mental body, the five addictively grasped aggregates (Sanskrit, *upādānaskandha*; Tibetan: *nye bar len pa'i phung po*).<sup>71</sup> Guṇaprabha and others teach a *nirvāṇa* with and without remainder for monks who have eliminated craving for a self and for reality in things. Put simply, the point is to eliminate the addictive grasping (*upādāna*) to perceived reality in persons and things.

### Conclusion

Guṇaprabha's *Vinayasūtra* and *Autocommentary* were selected as core documents (*po ti lnga*) for the Tibetan monastic curriculum. The issues raised in the texts, and Guṇaprabha's association of ethical conduct with cognitive states might be a reason for the Tibetans' choice of core documents. This too requires further research.

The passage under study here – all in comment on the first *sūtra* of the *Vinayasūtra* – includes issues raised in early Buddhist scriptures including the *Itivuttaka*, the *Ekottarāgama*, the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, and the Abhidharma literature. The text itself is identified

<sup>71</sup> See Masefield 1979: 220, passim; see the brief mention in Eckel 2008: 79–80. See Hwang 2006: 14–35.

as *Mūlasarvāstivādin*, but the specific sectarian definitions in late Indian Buddhism remain unclear.

Monastic and more centrally ethical behavior is stated to be a reliable method that leads to liberation (*niryāṇa*), Buddhist enlightenment (*nirvāṇa*). This is an assertion of a link between constructed ethical physical, verbal, and mental human action and unconstructed, non-material mental states. The attainment is described as irreversible, and constitutes the ultimate goal of Buddhism.

Drawing on sources circulated in Guṇaprabha's intellectual environment, the passage includes mention of two kinds of Buddhist *nirvāṇa*, both available to living monks, presumably in a single, or possibly more than one lifetime. The interpretation that allows for *nirvāṇa* with and without remainder for living monks is different from the theory that asserts two types of *nirvāṇa* otherwise, one with remainder of a human body in human life and the other without a body after life. This discrepancy has drawn the attention of scholars, but it remains understudied. It was perhaps a point of sectarian dispute, with no pan-Buddhist consensus.

*Nirvāṇa* with no remainder is an irreversible state in which one has abandoned the misery of defining one's supposed real self as based on the aggregates. Ethical behavior leads to the acquisition of this state. The texts indicate that the problem is the self habit, not the aggregates themselves, elimination of which allows for enlightenment with no remainder. *Nirvāṇa* with a remainder is reversible, because of the tendency to regard inner and outer objects as real things. This tendency can however also be eliminated by the exercise of ethical behavior. Irreversible enlightenment seems to be a more valued goal.

These definitions appear to be among a field of different views on the matter, in terms of doctrines and over time, some of which define the terms and goals differently, as noted above. Guṇaprabha's views were clearly highly regarded enough to be commented on by a well-known group of scholars, and convincing enough to be adopted by key Indians and Tibetans as the most accurate description of the Buddhist path.

## Appendix

Guṇaprabha's comments on the first *sūtra*, from the *Autocommentary* on Guṇaprabha's *Vinayasūtra*:

*Svavyākhyānābhīdhānavinayasūtravṛtti*<sup>72</sup>

*An Exposition of the Vinayasūtra: An Explanatory Autocommentary*

Homage to the Omniscient One!

This is called the exposition of the Vinaya aphorisms which the Bodhisattva Guṇaprabha composed, in order to summarize [them].<sup>73</sup>

Of those, the first aphorism is:

(1) "This [book] is about behavior that leads to liberation."<sup>74</sup>

<sup>72</sup> *Vinayasūtravṛttyabhīdhānavinayasūtravṛtti*, BG i; *Svavyākhyānābhīdhānavinayasūtravṛtti*, D 1a1. The translation includes the comments on the first aphorism of the *Vinayasūtra*. This translation follows the Tentative Edition (T) prepared by Yonezawa, with reference to his Transliteration and to the photographed Facsimile, with reference to the edition published by Bapat and Gokhale (BG), and with reference to the Tibetan translations. When I cite these texts I do not correct the Sanskrit sandhi or punctuation, instead follow the published texts. The comments on the first *sūtra* include a list of the seventeen topics of the entire Vinaya, which shows that the first aphorism is descriptive of the entire Vinaya. The list is not included here. Guṇaprabha's list has been studied in detail in Yonezawa et al. 2001: 15–16, 20 ff., including analysis of the list in the *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, and references to other works.

<sup>73</sup> *Samgrahāyākarod yāni bodhisattvo guṇaprabhaḥ sūtrāṇi vinayasyeṣāṃ vṛttis teṣāṃ nigadyate*, T 60.2–3; cf. BG 3.5: [*saṃgrahārtham bodhisattva*] ścakārāsau guṇaprabhaḥ sūtrāṇi vinayasyeṣāṃ vṛttis teṣāṃ nigadyate; the Tibetan includes *rang gis de nyid rnam bshad bya*, D 1a2–3.

<sup>74</sup> *Atha niryāṇavṛttam*, T 60.5; BG 3.6, 3.7, 3.19–20; *de nas nges bar 'byung ba'i tshul 'khrims kyi dbang du byas te*, D 1a3. *Atha*, DT 3b3 ff. elaborates that of the meanings of the Sanskrit word *atha* – salutation, conjunction, subsequence, and inclusion – the meaning of *atha* here is inclusion. Also see the First Dalai Lama's comments on the meaning of *dbang du bya ba*, DL 6b5, where he also defines the term *atha*. "The Tibetan construction *de nas ... dbang du bya ba* is used to convey the sense of *atha*, meaning 'to be concerned with x'."

The word *atha* means “concerning the topic.”<sup>75</sup> It should be understood that [behavior] that leads to liberation is the topic from the beginning to the end of the aphorisms.

Here *-yāna*<sup>76</sup> means “attaining,” not “going.” In this way, it is said “Attaining leads to attainment.”<sup>77</sup> For example, it is like saying “One gets to a village.” It is well known that the meaning of *nir-* is irreversible.<sup>78</sup> That is to say,<sup>79</sup> “leading to liberation” is an irreversible attainment. This<sup>80</sup> is a statement of the attainment of *nirvāṇa* without remainder,<sup>81</sup> since that<sup>82</sup> is an irreversible attainment.

Well, you object with the question “Why isn’t the expression ‘that liberation is liberating’<sup>83</sup> understood here as ‘expressing the full attainment<sup>84</sup> of *nirvāṇa* with remainder’ or [why isn’t] the

<sup>75</sup> *Adhikāra*, BG 3.6; T 60.6; *dbang du byed pa* D 1a3; subject, topic, chapter heading, rule, etc.

<sup>76</sup> *Prāptir atra yānaṃ na gamanaṃ*, T 60.7; *’dir ’byung ba ni thob pa yin te ’gro ba ni ma yin no*, D 2b2. Here it is clearly stated that the *yāna* in *niryāṇa* means *prāpti*, attainment, or acquisition; in Tibetan *’byung ba*, D 2b2.

<sup>77</sup> *Yātir yānaṃ nayati aneneti*, T 60.8; *niryānaṃ yāti niryānaṃ niryāti*, BG 3.7–8. See D 1a4–5: *nges par ’byung bas na nges par ’byung ba*. The Taishō version seems the most consistent with the previous remark, and with what follows.

<sup>78</sup> *Apunarāvṛtti*, T 60.9; *Apunarāvartana*, BG 3.8.

<sup>79</sup> *Iti śeṣaḥ*. T 60.10, *saṃprāpter*, BG 3.9 *prāpter*.

<sup>80</sup> *De ltar na ’dis*, D 2a1 is absent in the Sanskrit.

<sup>81</sup> *Nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*, T 60.11; *nirūpadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* [sic], BG 3.9; *phung po lhag ma med pa’i mya ngan las ’das pa*, D 2a1. The First Dalai Lama attests: *mya ngan las ’das pa ’thob pa’i thabs tshul khrim s rtogs par bya ba’i phyir du mdo ’di bstan pa . . .*, DL 3b3.

<sup>82</sup> *Tadvā*, BG 3.10; *tad*, T 60.11 is here translated in Tibetan *gang gi phyir de ni*, D 2a1. The editors of the Sanskrit BG edition supply a question mark for the Sanskrit *vā*. In footnote number four to the Sanskrit edition, the BG editors note the discrepancy in the Tibetan, translating it as *kasmāt tat*.

<sup>83</sup> *Niryānti*, BG 3.10.

<sup>84</sup> T 60.14, *saṃprāpter*, BG 3.11, *prāpter*.

statement ‘this is liberating’<sup>85</sup> an elucidation of the path?’<sup>86</sup>

[Answer:] The prefix *nir-* is not related to a sense of commencement nor to a sense of finality, but it could be an expression of the perfect attainment of *nirvāṇa* with remainder. Therefore, it is not related to “attaining liberation (*yānaṃ niryānaṃ*) because of commencement of engagement in *saṃsāra* nor to going to the end of activity in *saṃsāra*.”<sup>87</sup>

To the contrary (*kiṃ tarhi*), it is clear<sup>88</sup> that the prefix *nir-* means irreversible. This is because it does not express anything but irreversible attainment.<sup>89</sup> And therefore, one who enters the path of equipoise<sup>90</sup> attains *nirvāṇa* with remainder perfectly<sup>91</sup> in the aftermath of Vajra-like [concentration], [but] getting up from one path

<sup>85</sup> *Niryāti anena*, BG 3.11; ‘dis nges par ’byung bas na nges par ’byung ba zhes bya bas, D 2a2.

<sup>86</sup> BG 3.12 adds *cet*; absent in T.

<sup>87</sup> *Yasmān na niḥśabdo ’pakramaṇārtha āśrayato nāpi paryavasānārthaḥ etad āśrayeṇa tu syāt sopadhiṣeṣanirvāṇasaṃprāptiḥ*, T 60.15–61.2; *yasmān na niḥśabdo upakramaṇārthamāgataḥ [nāpi paryantārtham etadāśritya sopadhiṣeṣanirvāṇo]ktiḥ*, BG 3.12–13; *gang gi phyir nges pa’i sgra ni rtsom pa’i don can bsten pa ma yin la tha ma’i don can yang ma yin noll ’di bsten pas phung po lhas ma dang bcas pa’i mya ngan las ’das pa yang dag par brjod par ’gyur ba yin te*, D 2a3–4. The Sanskrit *āśrayato/āgataḥ* corresponds to *bsten pa ma yin* in Tibetan. The expressions *apakramaṇārtha āśrayato*, T 60.15 and *apakramabhūtam*, T 61.2–3 are different from *upakramaṇārthamāgataḥ*, BG 3.12 and *upakramabhūtaṃ*, BG 3.13. These passages do not follow correct sandhi rules. The translation follows the BG terms *upakramaṇa/upakrama*.

<sup>88</sup> *Abhīṣṭaḥ*, T 61.5; *abhīṣṭaḥ*, BG 3.15; *mngon par ’dod pa*, D 2a5. Cf. T 61n8. BG 3.15 includes *atra*, *niḥśabdo ’tra abhīṣṭaḥ*, but does not observe formal sandhi.

<sup>89</sup> *Tena yadevāpunarāvarttakaṃ yānaṃ tasyaivānenoktiḥ nānyasya*, BG 3.15; almost identical in T 61.5–6.

<sup>90</sup> *Samāpattikakṣā*, T 61.7–8; BG 3.16. The Tibetan translates *kakṣā* with *lam*, D 2b1.

<sup>91</sup> *Samprāptir*, T 61.2, 61.8; BG 3.11, 3.17; *yang dag par thob pao*, D 2a2, 2b1. *Samprāptir* is more emphatic than *prāptir*, BG 3.11 above, however both are translated *yang dag par thob pa*.

and going to another is not irreversibility.<sup>92</sup> [Irreversibility is when] there is no decline of the states of Arhat, etc.<sup>93</sup>

Again,<sup>94</sup> here “attaining” (*yānaṃ*) is attainment on the path; it is not “going” Also, there is no consequence of actual attainment because it is not related to a perfected meaning of “going”<sup>95</sup> [Ethical] behavior that leads to liberation is behavior that goes to liberation.<sup>96</sup> Here again, this ethical behavior of all the teachings<sup>97</sup> should be

<sup>92</sup> *Tatkakṣāto yad vyutthena kakṣāntare gamanaṃ na sā na punarāvṛttiḥ*, BG 3.17; slight differences in T 61.8–9. Literally, “It is not getting up from a path and going to another path; it is not reversibility.” The Tibetan translates *apunarāvartana*, *phyir mi ldog*.

<sup>93</sup> *Arhatvādīyāparihāṇiḥ sāsyaṅtardhānam eva*, T 61.9–10; *arhatvādītaḥ parihāṇiḥ sā antardhānameva*, BG 3.18; *dgra bcom pa nyid la sogs pa las ma nyams pa* [Sanskrit: *aparihāṇiḥ*] *de ni 'di'i ming du snang ba nyid do*, D 2b1–2. In note #8 BG translates the Tibetan into the Sanskrit *nāmābhāsa* to agree with *ming du snang ba*. However, the *Mahāvīyutpatti* gives *mi snang ba* as an equivalent of the Sanskrit *antardhāna*. Substituting the *Mahāvīyutpatti* equivalent *mi snang ba* and changing the D Tibetan *ma nyams pa* to agree with the BG 3.18 *parihāṇiḥ*, the T 61.9 *āparihāṇiḥ*, and the P Tibetan *nyams pa* (P 2a7) provides a clear reading of the Sanskrit both in Tibetan and in English: “the decline of *Arhats*, etc. ceases (*antardhāna*; *mi snang ba*),” meaning that once a practitioner reaches the stage of *Arhat*, there is no chance of losing or falling back from that attainment.

<sup>94</sup> *Punar*, T 61.11; BG 3.18; absent in the Tibetan translation.

<sup>95</sup> *-tva*; *nyid*, from the expression *gamanārthāsaṃśrayād api niryāṇatvāprasaṅgaḥ* (BG, *prasaṅgaḥ*), T 61.12; BG 3.19; *'gro ba'i don la yang dag par ma bsten pas kyang nges pa 'byung ba nyid du thal ba ma yin no*, D 2b2.

<sup>96</sup> *Niryāṇagāmivṛttaṃ niryāṇavṛttaṃ*, T 61.13; BG 3.19–20; *nges par 'byung ba la 'gro ba'i tshul khrims ni nges par 'byung ba'i tshul khrims so*, D 2b2.

<sup>97</sup> *Vṛttaṃ punar atredaṃ dharmakāṇāṃ yat śīlaṃ sakalena vinayenoktaṃ tan mantavyam/ ataś cātra pravrajyā ...*, T 61.13–14; *Vṛttaṃ punar atredaṃ dharmakāṇāṃ* [*mudra yatvṛttaṃ tadaśeṣataḥ vinayena proktaṃ veditavyam. tato 'tra pravrajyā ...*, BG 3.20; *de yang 'dir chos kyi rgyu mtshan gang zhig tshul khrims de ni ma lus pa'i 'dul bas gsungs par shes par bya'ol de bas na 'dir rab tu byung ba'i gzhi dang ...*, D 2b2–3. The Tibetan translation includes the word “cause,” or “causal factor” (*rgyu mtshan*), of all of the teachings.

thought of as what is taught in the entire Vinaya.<sup>98</sup> Therefore, this sequence of topics ... engages all<sup>99</sup> of the Vinaya procedures.<sup>100</sup>

### Abbreviations

- AN *The Aṅguttara-Nikāya*. 5 vols. Edited by R. Morris & E. Hardy. London: The Pali Text Society, 1885–1900.
- BG Guṇaprabha. *Vinayasūtra and Autocommentary on the Same by Guṇaprabha*. Edited by P.V. Bapat & V.V. Gokhale. Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1982.
- BT Bu ston rin chen grub. *'Dul ba mdo'i rnam par 'byed pa: 'dul ba rgya mtsho'i snying po rab tu gsal bar byed pa. The Collected Works of Bu ston 21 (zha)*. Edited by Lokesh Chandra. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1971.
- D Guṇaprabha. *'Dul ba'i mdo'i 'grel pa mngon par brjod pa rang gi rnam par bshad pa, \*Vinayasūtravṛṭṭyabhidhānasvavyākhyānam*, in *sDe dGe bsTan 'Gyur Series*, vol. 161, #12, New Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey, 1986, Zhu.
- DL Dge 'dun grub pa, The First Dalai Lama. *Legs par gsungs pa'i dam pa'i chos 'dul ba mtha' dag gi snying po'i don legs par bshad pa rin po che 'phreng ba. The Collected Works of the First Dalai Lama dge 'dun grup pa*, vol. 1, Gangtok: Dodrup Lama Sangye, Deorali Chorten, 1981.
- DP Prajñākara. *'Dul ba mdo'i rnam par bshad pa, \*Vinayasūtra-vyākhyāna*, in *sDe dGe bsTan 'Gyur Series*, vol. 164, #15, New Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey, 1986, Ru.
- DT Dharmamitra. *'Dul ba'i mdo'i rgya cher 'grel pa, \*Vinayasūtra-tīkā*, in *sDe dGe bsTan 'Gyur Series*, vol. 162, #13, New Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey, 1986, 'U.
- DTsh Mtsho sna ba shes rab bzang po. *'Dul tīk nyi ma'i 'od zer legs bshad lung gi rgya mtsho*. Edited by rDo rje rgyal po. Xining,

<sup>98</sup> *Bstan bcos 'di la brten nas lhag pa tshul khriims kyi bslab pa 'byung/ de rtogs nas nyams su blangs pa las mya ngan las 'das pa 'thob pa'i phyir ro*, DL 3b3–4. The First Dalai Lama also states that the goal of the *Vinayasūtra* is ethical conduct. He states (quoting the *Tīkā*, DT 2b2): *'dul ba'i mdo dang dgos pa gnyis ni thabs dang thabs las byung ba'i mtshan nyid kyi 'brel ba yin te rgyu dang 'bras bu'i mtshan nyid ces*.

<sup>99</sup> *Kṛtsna*, T 62.4; BG 3.23; *ma lus pa* D 2b3; cf. the above *aśeṣataḥ*, BG 3.20.

<sup>100</sup> *Vidhi*, T 62.4; BG 3.23; *cho ga*, D 2b5.

- Qinghai: China Tibetan Studies Publishing House, 1993.
- DV Guṇaprabha. *'Dul ba'i mdo'i 'grel pa*, \**Vinayasūtravṛtti*, in *sDe dGe bsTan 'Gyur Series*, vol. 165, #16, New Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey, 1986, Lu.
- P Guṇaprabha. *'Dul ba'i mdo'i 'grel pa mngon par brjod pa rang gi rnam par bshad pa*, \**Vinayasūtravṛtyabhīdhānasvavyākhyānam*, in Suzuki (ed.) 1955, vol. 'U, no. 5621.
- Prabhāvātī Śākyaprabha*. \**Āryamūlasarvāstivādaśrāmaṇerakārikāvṛtti-prabhāvātī*, *'Phags pa gzhi thams cad yod par smra ba'i dge tshul kyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa 'od ldan*, in *sDe dGe sTan 'Gyur Series*, vol. 167, New Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey, 1986, Shu, 74a5–162b2.
- T Guṇaprabha. *Svavyākhyānābhīdhānavinayasūtravṛtti*. See Yonezawa 2002–2013, vol. 25.

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- Bu ston rin chen grub. *'Dul ba spyi'i rnam par gzhag pa 'dul ba rin po che'i mdzes rgyan sogs chos mtshan khag cig*. Reproduced from the Lha sa zhol gsar print (Cazadero, CA: Ye shes sde'i chos 'khor 'phrul par khang, 2002). TBRC W1KG3641, <http://www.tbrc.org>, accessed July 2013.
- Bu ston rin chen grub. *'Dul ba mdo'i rnam par 'byed pa: 'dul ba rgya mtsho'i snying po rab tu gsal bar byed pa*. See BT.
- Dge 'dun grub pa, The First Dalai Lama. *Legs par gsungs pa'i dam pa'i chos 'dul ba mtha' dag gi snying po'i don legs par bshad pa rin po che 'phreng ba*. See DL
- Dharmamitra. *'Dul ba'i mdo'i rgya cher 'grel pa*, \**Vinayasūtraṭīkā*. See DT.
- Guṇaprabha. *'Dul ba'i mdo'i 'grel pa mngon par brjod pa rang gi rnam par bshad pa*, \**Vinayasūtravṛtyabhīdhānasvavyākhyānam*. See P.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *'Dul ba'i mdo'i 'grel pa*, \**Vinayasūtravṛtti*. See DV.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *'Dul ba'i mdo'i 'grel pa mngon par brjod pa rang gi rnam par bshad pa*, \**Vinayasūtravṛtyabhīdhānasvavyākhyānam*. See D.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Byang chub sems pa'i sa'i 'grel pa*, \**Bodhisattvabhūmivṛtti*, in Suzuki (ed.) 1955, vol. 112.
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