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The Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths and Their Opposites

by Alex Wayman

The sixteen aspects of the four Noble Truths are not canonical and are not found in the Abhidhamma of Southern Buddhism.¹ They are a specification resulting from the version of the First Sermon of Buddhism, the Setting into Motion of the Wheel of the Dharma, which, after stating the four Noble Truths, adds a triple turning of the wheel with twelve aspects. This is the *triparivartam dvādaśākāraṃ* of the *Mahāvastu*.² The sixteen aspects were possibly represented by the aniconic symbol of the wheel of 16 spokes, four main ones and twelve intermediate spokes. A number of illustrations of these Dharmacakra are collected by Dhanit Yupho in a Bangkok publication.³ The sixteen aspects are treated in the Northern Abhidharma, as observed in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, Chap. VII, verse 13, where a number of theories are presented.⁴ Besides, Asaṅga discusses the 16 aspects in his *Śrāvaka-bhūmi*.⁵ I have found the list in a native Tibetan text, lectures by Tsong-kha-pa on Buddhist logic, where he presents a list of sixteen that are the opposites or adversaries of the sixteen aspects, agreeing in large part with one of the theories in the *Abhidharmakośa*. In short, the earliest specification of the sixteen aspects is in the Northern Abhidharma schools, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika. However, if the list of terms originated in these Abhidharma schools it is curious that there should remain some obscurity after their explanations.

Asaṅga's school contemplates the sixteen aspects in the category of *vipaśyanā* (discerning), i.e. discerning the truth (*satya*), after calming the mind (*śamatha*).⁷ This agrees with the *Abhidharmakośa*, which identifies the list with *prajñā* ('insight'),⁸ since the term *prajñā* is frequently equated with *vipaśyanā*.⁹ Tsong-kha-pa in those lectures refers to Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, Svārthānumāna chapter, verse 218 (Śastry's ed., but verse 217 in the autocommentary and Tibetan version):

“So as to determine the reality of rejecting and accepting together with the means, by virtue of non-deception regarding the chief aim, there is inference (*anumāna*) in terms of the beyond.”¹⁰ The autocommentary on this mentions the four Noble Truths, and the *Vṛtti* clarifies that the rejecting is of suffering and the source of suffering, that the accepting is of cessation and the path. The beyond means the *parokṣa* (what is beyond sight), namely, the chief aim, Nirvāṇa, which therefore has to be inferred. Tsong-kha-pa takes for granted that his audience knows that the sixteen terms and that they have opposites are referred to in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of *Pramānavārttika*, namely in the block of verses in Miyasaka’s edition 146–283.¹¹ But Tsong-kha-pa expands to sixteen terms using Abhidharma-type vocabulary, and this is reasonable, since Buddhist logic has an Abhidharma base.¹² The *Abhisamayālamkāra* summary of the *Prajñāpāramitā* includes the sixteen aspects of the four Truths as a concentration in the path of the Śrāvaka (as does Asaṅga), and a feature of this path is the identification of Nirvāṇa with the Truth of Cessation (*nirodha-satya*).¹³

While the list of sixteen was included, or generally alluded to, in a variety of texts as mentioned above, there is a question of how viable a classification it is, i.e. to what extent such terms help to explain this cardinal teaching of Buddhism—the four Noble Truths. We should note that not only does the Southern Abhidharma textual tradition not use the sixteen-term system,¹⁴ but also the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* of Hari-varman, completely devoted to the four truths, appears opposed to employing this organizational terminology.¹⁵ To arrive at a conclusion about these matters, it will be necessary to treat each of the sixteen separately, using the above works. The Buddhist dictionary *Mahāvvyutpatti* (nos. 1190–1205) gives the individual terms as follows: (Noble Truth of Suffering,) *duḥkham*, *anityam*, *śūnyam*, *anātmakam*. (Noble Truth of Source,) *samudayaḥ*, *prabhavaḥ*, *hetuḥ*, *pratyayaḥ*. (Noble Truth of Cessation,) *nirodhaḥ*, *śāntaḥ*, *prañītaḥ*, *niḥsaraṇaḥ*. (Noble Truth of Path,) *mārgaḥ*, *nyāyaḥ*, *pratipattiḥ*, *nairyaṇīkaḥ*.

Of the sixteen aspects, the easiest are the four of the set going with the Truth of Suffering, mainly because the terms are so celebrated in Buddhist texts. Leaving out the ‘voidness’ (*śūnya*) term, the other three are the well-known set of three characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) which all constructed things (*saṃskāra*) have: impermanence (*anitya*), pain (*duḥkha*), and non-self (*anātman*). For canonical references, one may consult Nyanatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary*, under *Ti-lakkhaṇa*.¹⁶ Asaṅga in the

section mentioned writes mostly about this set.¹⁷ He introduces a group of ten aspects (*ākāra*) for treating the Truth of Suffering, namely, aspect of 1) transformation (*vipariṇāma*), 2) destruction (*vināśa*), 3) separation (*viśamyoga*), 4) closeness (*saṃnīhita*), 5) true nature (*dhārmata*), 6) fetters and bondage (*saṃyojanabandhana*), 7) the disagreeable (*aniṣṭa*), 8) no security (*ayogakṣema*), 9) non-apprehension (*anupalambha*), 10) non-independence (*asvātantrya*). He states that the aspect of impermanence is examined by five of these ten aspects, namely, of transformation, destruction, separation, closeness, and true nature. The aspect of pain is examined by three aspects, namely, of fetters and bondage, of the disagreeable, and of no security. The voidness aspect is examined by one aspect, namely, non-apprehension (of a certain object). The aspect of non-self is examined by one aspect, namely, non-independence.

The *Arthaviniścaya-ṭīkā* (author unknown, Tibetan Tanjur) briefly explains the four in a description of the *saṃskāra* personality aggregate (*skandha*):¹⁸

It is impermanent, because it perishes in each instant. It is painful, because possessing the nature (*dharma*) of birth, old age, and so on. It is void, because those *saṃskāras* are not the self imagined by the heretics. It is non-self because precisely those are not the self-existence (*svabhāva*) of self imagined by the heretics.

One should also notice that Harivarman's work attributes the list to an unnamed *sūtra* passage: "*dharmā anityā duḥkhāḥ śūnyā anātmāṇaḥ pratītyasamutpannā . . .*" but includes this passage and its discussion not under the first Truth, that of Suffering, but under the third one, that of Cessation!¹⁹ Harivarman stresses pursuant to this passage the voidness of *dharma*s, but also insists on voidness of self. Here there is a difficulty shared with the *Arthaviniścaya-ṭīkā*, as cited above, that in the list of four terms including both void (*śūnya*) and non-self (*anātmaka*), to interpret the term 'void' as denying a self should make one wonder why the term 'non-self' is included as a separate aspect. Asaṅga was apparently appreciative of this point, since for him the voidness aspect is examined just by the aspect of non-apprehension without further qualifying the non-apprehension.

Passing to the coverings or adversaries²⁰ of these four aspects in Tsong-kha-pa's list,²¹ that the covering of impermanence is permanence, of pain is pleasure, of non-self is self—is simple enough. However, the covering he gives for voidness (*śūnya*) is with a term

gcang, which I correct to *bcang*, “taking hold (of an object).” This agrees with Asaṅga’s “non-apprehension” for voidness in the present context. The various explanations in the *Abhidharmakośa* seem not to take account of a requirement to show some adversity for the terms listed under the Truth of Suffering, and in particular the term I render ‘voidness.’ Presumably the adversity is the sense of ‘voidness’ that it is here the absence of the thing one hunts and looks for, expects to find, leaving one in a kind of despair. Asaṅga’s ‘non-independence’ for non-self does indeed take account of the adversative intention. It might be for the reason which Vasubandhu gives as one tradition:²² *akāmakāritvād iti* “because there is no performance of what one wishes.” Harivarman’s placement of the list under the Truth of Cessation of course avoids the implication of adversative sense that placement under Truth of Suffering entails. In support of his placement, there is the set called the four ‘aphorisms of the Dharma’; cf. *Mahāyāna-Sūtrālamkāra*, SVIII, 80, and commentary: “All *saṃskāras* (constructions) are impermanent; all *saṃskāras* (motivations) are suffering;²³ all *dharma*s are non-self; Nirvāṇa is calm (*sānta*).” Observe that this set has an entry ‘Nirvāṇa’ in place of the term ‘void’ of the other list, and that Harivarman practically equates voidness (*sūnyatā*) with Nirvāṇa.²⁴

Before leaving the Truth of Suffering, it is well to mention even if briefly the theory of three kinds of *duḥkhatā* (misery). Asaṅga (*Viniśaya-saṃgrahaṇī* on *Cintāmayī bhūmi*)²⁵ identifies the three with the three standard kinds of feelings, painful, pleasurable, and neither painful nor pleasurable. The first *duḥkhatā* is the misery of suffering (*duḥkha*), and as the painful kind of feeling, it is the misery experienced and acknowledged in the world, since the pair ‘pain and pleasure’ (*duḥkha* and *sukha*) are among the eight worldly *dharma*s, of course comprehended by ordinary persons. The *Arthavinīśaya-ṭīkā* (Tibetan Tanjur)²⁸ describes this kind of *duḥkhatā* consistently with a detailed list that shows it covers the pains people can do something about, as well as those recognized to be outside of one’s control. The second *duḥkhatā* is the misery of change (*vipariṇāma*), and as the pleasurable kind of feeling, it is not recognized as misery by ordinary persons. So *Samyutta-Nikāya*, Part IV (*Salāyatana-Vagga*): / *yam pare sukhato āhu / tad ariyā ahu dukkhato* / “What others call ‘happiness’ that the noble ones call ‘suffering.’”²⁷ The third *duḥkhatā* is the misery of motivations (*saṃskāra*), and as the feeling that is neither painful nor pleasurable, it is also not recognized as misery by ordinary persons. Asaṅga explains:²⁸ “It was in connection with the misery of motivations that the Lord said: ‘In short, the five

grasping aggregates are suffering.' What is the misery of motivations? These and those bodies with motivations generated by *karma* and defilement (*kleśa*) arising, . . ." He also mentions that this misery is evidenced by the four waywardnesses (*viparyāsa*), i.e., regarding the impermanent as permanent, the painful as pleasurable, the unclean as clean, the non-self as self; and finally, that this misery is the trace (*anuśaya*) of nescience (*avidyā*).

It is clear that the *duḥkha* of the first Noble Truth has a wider scope than the ordinary person can understand, and has a metaphysical side that is comprehensible to the *ārya*, in the ancient use of this word. Some persons accordingly challenged the translation of *duḥkha* as 'suffering' or 'pain.' However, the present translator translates the term in those two ways to accord with the various contexts in which the term is found, sometimes in concrete senses to apply to old age, sickness, and death; and sometimes in a metaphorical way. And to leave the term untranslated, as has been recommended by at least one modern author, would entirely defeat any communication of metaphorical nuance.

As we pass to the remaining three Truths, it turns out that the coverings in the list of sixteen adversaries become of greater importance.

The second set going with "Noble Truth of Source (of Suffering)" has the requirement of providing cause or causes for the suffering without constituting suffering. Here there are the aspects cause (*hetu*), source (*samudaya*), production (*prabhava*), and condition (*pratyaya*). The trouble with the *Abhidharmakośa* explanations in the main is that they define these terms as various kinds of causes without thereby showing their natures as causes for suffering. Asaṅga is quite superior here because he faces up to the necessity that they not only be causes, but cause for suffering.²⁹ One of several variant explanations he furnishes is especially interesting since it relates these terms to Buddhist Dependent Origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*).³⁰ This particular solution takes the aspect of 'cause' to be craving (*trṣṇā*), 8th member of Dependent Origination, heading the five members which bring about new destiny. Asaṅga here says it is the cause of 'indulgence' (*upādāna*), and casts gestation and suffering. The aspect of 'source' is indulgence (*upādāna*), 9th member, which finalizes after the casting. The aspect of 'production' is gestation (*bhava*), 10th member, hence embryonic life, prior to the manifestation of suffering. The fourth aspect, of condition (*pratyaya*) is birth (*jāti*), the 11th member, which holds the seed of future suffering, and is the condition for old age, sickness, and death. Notice that in this

solution, 'birth,' 11th member of Dependent Origination, is counted as a cause of suffering and therefore not itself a suffering. The Mādhyamika tradition of the *Pratītya-samutpāda* commentary attributed to Nāgārjuna, and a passage in the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* along the same lines, disagrees because it counts 'birth' as one of the suffering members of Dependent Origination.³¹

Tsong-kha-pa's list of coverings or adversaries of these four seems to amount to non-Buddhist positions.³² Thus, for the aspect of 'cause,' from his list, positing that there is no cause of suffering amounts to the position of the ancient materialistic Cārvakas, the position called *ahetuka* ('having no cause'), which Buddhism always denounced. For the aspect of 'source,' positing the unaffiliated as the cause, or positing only a single cause, might be equivalent to the fourth account in the *Abhidharmakośa*³³ mentioning at this place a Lord (*Īśvara*), or *pradhāna*, since the Lord could be considered unaffiliated to the effect, and *pradhāna* as the Sāṃkhya prakṛti could be considered a single cause. For the aspect of 'production,' positing (suffering) as created by the evolution of the Śabdabrahman, would be a Vaiṣṇava theory according to S. Dasgupta;³⁴ while the *Abhidharmakośa* here mentions the evolutionary theory of the Sāṃkhya called *pariṇāma*, in which the effect is pre-existent in the cause. For the fourth aspect of 'condition,' positing (suffering) as created by a former *Īśvara-buddhi* (cognition of a Lord), is the same as given in the *Abhidharmakośa*.

When coming to the treatment of the third set under "Noble Truth of Cessation (of Suffering)" and of the fourth set under "Noble Truth of Path (leading to the Cessation)," Asaṅga contents himself with a few neutral remarks, perhaps reluctant to enter into the controversies involved in a longer treatment. Let us pass first to the coverings in Tsong-kha-pa's list,³⁵ namely, for the third set, cessation (*nirodha*), calm (*śānta*), the excellent (*praṇīta*), exit (*niḥsaraṇa*); and for the fourth set, path (*mārga*), principle (*nyāya*), accomplishment (*pratipatti*), way of deliverance (*nairyaṇika*).

For the aspect of 'cessation,' the covering is the positing by one gone astray that there is no liberation; for the aspect of 'calm,' positing that there is a special liberation attended with flux of uncalmed defilements; for the aspect of 'the excellent' (usually explained as *anuttara*, 'the best'), positing that there is a higher liberation than stopping suffering; for the aspect of 'exit,' positing a temporary liberation and that there is no final liberation.

For the aspect of 'path,' the covering is the positing that there is no

final path of liberation; for the aspect of 'principle' (= method), positing that the insight comprehending non-self is not a path of liberation; for the aspect of 'accomplishment,' positing the situation of the object-scope while having gone astray; for the aspect, 'way of deliverance,' positing that thereby there is no ability to put a final end to suffering.

The 'coverings' in Tsong-kha-pa's list for the third and fourth sets amount to a paraphrase of the fourth *Abhidharmakośa* explanation. The adversary views do help to bring out the meaning of the aspect terms for these two sets.

Now, a striking feature of the aspects given under "Noble Truth of Path" is that they are not obviously related to the usual statement of the Path, namely, the eightfold members, frequently listed under the three instructions which form the organization of Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*. These three are the Instruction of Morality, the Instruction of Mental Training of *samādhi*, and the Instruction of Insight. Even though Asaṅga does not organize his *Yogācārabhūmi* along the specific lines of the well-known three instructions (*adhiśikṣā*), these categories are basic for much of his writing. Examining the statements of Tsong-kha-pa's adversaries for the four of this path group in comparison with the four of the cessation set, a suggestive parallel emerges, which may provide an opening for relating the three instructions. By this I mean to call attention to the covering of 'cessation' claiming that in fact there is no liberation, while the covering of 'path' is the claim that there is no final path of liberation; then, for the aspect of 'exit' claiming that there is no final path of liberation, while the covering of 'way of deliverance' is the claim that one cannot put a final end to suffering. These seeming affiliations of statement gave me the idea that the two sets of four terms might be correlated in their given order. Following this suggestion, I may propose that the aspect of path (*mārga*) leads to the aspect of cessation (*nirodha*); that the aspect of principle (= method) (*nyāya*) leads to the aspect of calm (*śānta*); that the aspect of accomplishment (*pratipatti*) leads to the aspect of the excellent (*praṇīta*); finally, that the aspect 'way of deliverance' (*nairyaṇika*) leads to the aspect 'exit' (*niḥsaraṇa*). Then the way of relating the three instructions follows readily, namely, that the instruction of mind training is the principle or method that leads to calm, since *samādhi* is the standard procedure for calming the mind; that the instruction of morality is the accomplishment that leads to the excellent, which is consistent with ancient Buddhism's great stress on morality and extolling of its merit; that the instruction of insight (*prajñā*) is the way of deliverance that leads to the 'exit' or 'escape' from

phenomenal life, constituting the Arhat ideal of early Buddhism.³⁶ Such a correlation would leave the main terms of 'cessation' and 'path' as headings under which are ranged the respective three aspects that go with the three instructions. This is consistent with the early tradition that takes 'cessation' as equal to Nirvāṇa, and with the Tibetan translation of this term as 'beyond suffering' (*mya ngan las 'das pa*). This is because the thrust of these Abhidharma-type explanations of the four Noble Truths is that liberation amounts to the cessation of suffering (*duḥkha*).

Besides, a feature of the first sermon, Setting into Motion the Wheel of Dharma, in various versions, is to take the four Noble Truths as objects. Thus, the statement is made: "Suffering, a Noble Truth, is to be fully known (*parijñeyam*)." Again, "The Source of Suffering is to be eliminated (*prahātavyaḥ*)." "The Cessation of Suffering is to be realized directly (*sākṣāt kartavyaḥ*)." "The Path leading to the Cessation of Suffering is to be cultivated (*duḥkhanirodhagāminī pratipad bhāvayitavyā*)." ³⁷ This promptly raises a question: If cessation is to be realized directly, i.e., *sākṣāt*, as though before the eyes, then how could this cessation be equated to Nirvāṇa, if Nirvāṇa be taken in Dharmakīrti's sense as something to be inferred rather than seen in direct vision? The resolution here would be to take Nirvāṇa in such usage not to be identified with cessation (*nirodha*). And we note that Dharmakīrti is writing in the mature Mahāyāna Buddhism period, when a Nirvāṇa of no fixed abode (*apraṭiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*) had come to the fore.

Thus, a consideration of the sixteen aspects of the four Noble Truths, and their sixteen 'coverings' or adversaries, does appear to bring out important features of the four Truths, and to make salient certain striking differences of the traditions. The investigation attests to the teaching of the four Noble Truths as basic to the earliest Buddhism, and to later disputes of what to place under each of the four. Thus, one strong current of interpretation took the sixteen aspects as a guide, while another was either oblivious of, or uncomfortable with the neat list.

NOTES

1. Confer Louis de La Vallée Poussin, tr. *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, Septième . . . (Paris, 1925), p. 30, note.

2. Confer Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Reader* (New Haven, 1953), p. 17, introductory note about the two original parts of the *Dharmacakrapravartana-sūtra*; and p. 19, triple turning of the wheel in the second part, namely in the *Mahāvastu* version.

3. Dhanit Yupho, *Dharmacakra or The Wheel of the Law* (The Fine Arts Department, Bangkok, Thailand, B.E. 2511; third edition, 1968). Among the illustrations, the twelve-spoked wheel presumably or possibly symbolizes the twelve-membered dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*); the sixteen-spoked one, the sixteen aspects of the four Noble Truths; the thirty-two spoked one, the Buddha himself with thirty-two characteristics.

4. La Vallée Poussin, *op. cit.*, Septième, pp. 30–39.

5. The lengthy treatment begins with Lokottaramārga and then the exposition of the *viparināma* kind of impermanence (*anityatā*), *Śrāvakabhūmi*, K. Shukla, ed. (Patna, 1973), p. 470, where the sixteen aspects are named.

6. Tsong-kha-pa, collected works (Tashilunpo edition), Vol. Pha, *Tshad ma'i brjed byang chen mo* (Rgyal-tshab-rje's notes on Tsong-kha-pa's lectures), f. 13b, and following. For the comparable *Abhidharmakośa* theory, confer La Vallée Poussin, *op. cit.*, Septième, p. 38, referred to simply as the 'fourth explanation,' which was appealed to by Samghabhadra to demonstrate that the aspects are indeed sixteen.

7. Confer Alex Wayman, *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript* (Berkeley, 1961), pp. 130–131, for the exposition, in particular, examination of the Noble Truth of Suffering with the kind of discerning (*vipasyanā*) called 'special knowledge' (*pratisamvid*) of the characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*).

8. La Vallée Poussin, *op. cit.*, Septième, p. 39.

9. Confer Alex Wayman, tr., *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real* (New York, 1978), p. 28.

10. / *heyopadeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitāḥ / pradhānārthāvisamvādād anumānam paratra vā* //. By 'auto-commentary' is meant Dharmakīrti's *Svārthānumāna-pariccheda*, edited independently by Raniero Gnoli and by Dalsukhbhai Malvaniya; and 'vṛtti' means the one by Manorathanandin.

11. This is the edition published in *Acta Indologica* II (Naritasan Shinshoji, Japan, 1971/72).

12. At least this is the case in Tibetan tradition, since according to my observation the chief Tibetan commentators on Buddhist logic also wrote commentaries on either Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* or Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya*.

13. Confer E. Obermiller, "The Doctrine of Prajñā-pāramitā as exposed in the *Abhisamayālamkāra* of Maitreya," *Acta Orientalia*, Vol. XI (1932), pp. 18–19.

14. The well-known Pāli exegetical work, the *Netti-pakaraṇa* (translated under the title *The Guide*) applies six terms to the four Noble Truths (E. Hardy's edition, p. 8): *Ādinavo phalaṇ ce dukkhaṃ, assādo samudayo, nissaraṇaṃ nirodho, upāyo ānatti ca maggo*. "Trouble and fruit are suffering; gratification is the source; exit is cessation; means and command are the path." Here, 'means' and 'command' might be equivalent to the two kinds of Pātimokkha, by exhortation (*ovāda*) and by command (*āṇā*); cf. C. S. Upasak, *Dictionary of Early Buddhist Monastic Terms* (Varanasi, 1975), p. 152; and A. Wayman, "Ancient Buddhist Monasticism," *Studia Missionaria*, Vol. 28, 1979, p. 199.

15. N. Aiyaswami Śāstri has reconstructed from Chinese to Sanskrit of the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* (Baroda, 1975), and has translated it into English (Baroda, 1978).

16. Nyanatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary* (Colombo, 1950), 155–6). The late Edward Conze gave his views on the three, calling them 'marks' in his *Buddhist Thought in India* (London, 1962), Part I, chapter 3.

17. See the references in notes 5 and 7, above.

18. Photo edition of Peking Tanjur (PTT), Vol. 145, p. 162–1,2.
19. Aiyaswami Śāstri, *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, Sanskrit, p. 354.
20. The 'coverings' are indicated by the word *āropya* in *Pramāṇvārttika*, *Pramāṇa-siddhi* chapter, verse 271: *ṣoḍaśākārān āropya*.
21. See the reference in note 6, above.
22. La Vallée Poussin, *op. cit.*, Septième, p. 32.
23. I translate the word *saṃskāra* differently in the first two aphorisms, because when *saṃskāra* is identified with suffering (*duḥkha*) it is variously said to be the five personality aggregates (*skandha*) or to be 'with flux' (*sāsrava*). On the other hand, the *saṃskāra* said to be impermanent means all of the 'constructed natures' (*saṃskṛta-dharma*).
24. See N. Aiyaswami Śāstri, *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, Eng. tr., pp. 358–359.
25. Asaṅga, *Yogācārabhūmi*, PTT, Vol. 111, p. 28–3,4.
26. See n. 18, above, *op. cit.*, p. 209–2,3.
27. In the edition of Bhikkhu J. Kashyap, *The Samyutta Nikāya*, 4. Saḷāyatanavagga, p. 116.16.
28. See no. 25, above, p. 28–3,4.
29. See n. 5, above, *op. cit.*, p. 493, where Shukla wrongly edits *duḥkhakṣema-* for *hetu*; read instead: *trṣṇāyā duḥkhākṣepakatvād dhetutah*. "By cause (*hetu*) through craving (*trṣṇā*) which casts suffering." The other three aspects are also explained as sources for suffering.
30. Since there is further confusion in Shukla's edition (p. 493) at this point, I have consulted the Tibetan translation, PTT, Vol. 110, p. 126–5-4,5,6.
31. *Daśabhūmikaśāstra* is cited in Śāntideva's *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (Vaidya ed., p. 123.21-22), happening to be in agreement with the *Pratītyasamutpāda* commentary, that of the members of dependent origination, *avidyā*, *trṣṇā*, and *upādāna* are defilement (*kṛleṣa*); *saṃskāra*-s and *bhava* are 'action' (*karma*); and the rest are suffering (*duḥkha*). Hence, 'birth' (*jāti*) is counted as a 'suffering.'
32. See n. 6, above, f. 13b-6 to 14a-1.
33. La Vallée Poussin, *op. cit.*, Septième, p. 38.
34. Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1940), Vol. III, p. 58.
35. See no. 6, above, f. 14a-1 to 14a-4.
36. Tsong-kha-pa, *brjed byang*, n. 6, above, f. 13a-5, states: "The *ācārya* (i.e. *Dharmakīrti*) . . . took the *prajñā* that comprehends non-self to be the chief (thing) of the path to liberation from phenomenal life, and the others to be ancillary."
37. So in the *Lalitavistara*, as presented in Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Reader* (n. 2, above), pp. 22–23.