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Padma dKar-po on the Two *Satyas*

by Michael Broido

I. Introduction

The interests of the Oral Transmission traditions of Tibet—the bKa'-brgyud-pas—centred on the Vajrayāna, and their early representatives such as Mi-la-ras-pa (1040–1123) and sGam-po-pa bSod-nams Rin-chen (1079–1153) did not try to develop a unified philosophical view (*darśana*, *lta-ba*) systematically exposed in scholarly treatises (*śāstra*, *bstan-bcos*); nor did they contribute much to the development of such analytical subjects as Madhyamaka (*dbu-ma*) or *pramāṇa* (*tshad-ma*). They expressed their experiences in mystical songs (*vajragīti*, *rdo-rje'i mgur*), in stories which went into their song-books (*mgur-'bum*) or their hagiographies (*rnam-thar*), in collections of instructions (*zhal-gdams*, *man-ngag*) and of questions and answers (*zhus-lan*), in compilations of doctrinal and meditational observations for the *yogin* in retreat (*ri-chos*) and so forth. These works were on the whole written in an easy style and in popular language, making a direct connection between the experiences of ordinary people and those of *yogins* (*rnal-'byor-pa*) and *rtogs-ldan*; but one would be mistaken in supposing for those reasons that their authors were ignorant of Buddhist thought.¹

In spite of this, bKa'-brgyud doctrinal notions such as the *dgongs-pa gcig-pa* of the 'Bri-gung-pas² and the *dkar-po chig-thub*³ drew severe fire from Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga rGyal-mtshan (1182–1251) in his *sDom gsum rab-dbye*. Especially after the time of Tsong-kha-pa (1357–1419), the bKa'-brgyud-pas were often subject to charges of philosophical confusion and incoherence. They responded fairly slowly, but by the middle of the 16th century such writers as Karma-pa Mi-bskyod rDo-rje (1507–54), sGam-po-pa bKra-shis rNam-rgyal (1512–87) and 'Brug-pa

Padma dKar-po (1527–92) were reacting not only with defences of bKa'-brgyud positions and attitudes, but also with attacks on those of the Sa-skya, Jo-nang, dGe-lugs and other traditions. (The rNying-ma-pas do not seem to have been much involved in these exchanges.) Since the traditional concerns of the bKa'-brgyud-pas had been with meditative and religious practices grounded in the Vajrayāna, it is not surprising that these writers' views on analysis should have been coloured by their interest in Vajrayāna.

Padma dKar-po is one of the most interesting bKa'-brgyud writers, but his prose style is obscure, his treatment of most topics is very compressed, he rarely makes direct comparisons between his own views and those of others, and his writings are not "elementary." The other two writers mentioned are easier to read, and often discuss others' views at length. Perhaps for such reasons the attention of scholars has recently been drawn to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's very extensive commentary⁴ on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*. During the IABS conference at Oxford in 1982, Paul Williams presented a paper⁵ summarizing some of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticisms of Tsong-kha-pa, while I tried to place these and other writers on Madhyamaka in a typological framework based on their views on the two *satyas*.⁶ Recently, David Seyfard Ruegg has pointed out⁷ that the introduction to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's work contains interesting materials on the lineages through which the conception of Madhyamaka underlying the whole work descended to its author. In this paper I shall use this work, the *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta*, mainly as a source of background information.

bKa'-brgyud writings of all periods show a great interest in the relation between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna. The introduction to the *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta* is largely organized around this relation. Mi-bskyod rDo-rje gives his own view of it, that of various opposed schools and writers, and his refutations of their views. The result is a valuable general picture of the situation at the time he was writing.

In Padma dKar-po's main Madhyamaka work, the *dBu-ma'i gzhung-lugs-gsum gsal-bar byed-pa nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*, the connection between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna is built into the structure of Padma dKar-po's own exposition: he uses Vajrayāna terms (especially *zung-'jug*, *yuganaddha*) to characterize

and classify the main Madhyamaka categories, such as the ground, path and goal of Madhyamaka. Because of the importance of Vajrayāna notions for our authors, then, we will have to spend some time setting out their views on the relation between Madhyamaka and the tantras.

Unfortunately this is not a simple matter. Vajrayāna is a much more complex topic than Madhyamaka, and at the scholarly level we know relatively little about it. In this paper, the relation between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna will be dealt with in two sections. The first will be about the early bKa'-brgyud-pas, mainly sGam-po-pa, as he is authoritative for all the bKa'-brgyud traditions.⁸ The second will revolve about the Vajrayāna categories of *lta-ba*, *sgom-pa*, and *'bras-bu* (very roughly: point of view, practice and goal), as these were seen by Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje. (Here Madhyamaka as a philosophical system is connected mainly with the *lta-ba* part.)

The central topic of this paper is of course Padma dKar-po's view of the two *satyas*, and my discussion of it will be based in principle on the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*. However, this work involves special difficulties of its own. It is not possible to proceed simply by quoting and translating key passages. Padma dKar-po expresses his views mainly by giving strings of quotations (not usually acknowledged as such or marked off from his own comments). But quite apart from the propositional content of what is actually *said*, the choice and arrangement of the quoted materials is of the greatest possible importance. Here my discussion will begin with some remarks on the structure of the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*; this structure strongly reflects Padma dKar-po's view of the connection of Madhyamaka and the tantras. Then I will deal with some of the key passages from Candrakīrti which are quoted by Padma dKar-po, clarifying some of the presuppositions apparently carried by them (in Padma dKar-po's eyes). This section is called "Padma dKar-po as an interpreter of Candrakīrti." The remainder of the paper will examine these issues by using other (mainly Vajrayāna) works of Padma dKar-po.

The two *satyas* are rather general notions.⁹ For the bKa'-brgyud-pas, they provide a link between the general theoretical concepts of the Madhyamaka and the more specific, practice-oriented concepts of the tantras. Thus Padma dKar-po says:¹⁰

As regards their point, the sūtras and tantras have one intention; but there is a difference as regards the way their content is taken: the sūtras are brief, while the tantras are detailed.

Thus, in Madhyamaka there is a single theoretical scheme which is differently instantiated in the different kinds of tantra. For instance, the same passage gives the following correspondences:

TABLE 1

	father-tantra (e.g., <i>Guhyasamāja</i>)	mother-tantra (e.g., <i>Hevajra</i>)
<i>stong-pa</i>	'od-gsal (<i>prabhāsvara</i>)	<i>bde-ba chen-po</i> (<i>mahāsukha</i>)
<i>snying-rje</i>	<i>sgyu-lus</i> (<i>mayadeha</i>)	<i>stong-nyid rnam-par kun-ldan</i> ^{10a} (<i>sarvākāravāropetasūnyatā</i>)

Here, the entire first row corresponds (in Madhyamaka) to *prajñā* and *paramārtha*, while the entire second row corresponds to *upāya* and *saṃvṛti*. The causal relations which are said to hold in Madhyamaka between these sets of notions, are also said in Vajrayāna to hold between the items in each column. When the goal is reached, the items in each column are said to stand in the relation of *zung-'jug* (*yuganaddha*), and for Padma dKar-po this relation holds also between the *satyas* themselves, even in Madhyamaka. Finally, both Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje are very insistent that neither of the two *satyas* can be established (*grub*) by itself, even conventionally (*tha-snyad-du*). They always arise together (*sahaja*, *lhan-cig skyes-pa*), and may never be separated for the purposes of analysis. Our authors criticize their opponents vigorously on this score. Similarly, the pair 'od-gsal and *sgyu-lus* (the radiant light and the illusory body) and the pair *bde-ba chen-po* and *stong-nyid rnam-pa kun-ldan* arise together. Now both of the notions *yuganaddha* and *sahaja* originate in the tantras and not in the sūtra or Madhyamaka literature. One could hardly ask for a more dramatic demonstration that for these authors, the tantras influenced the fundamental character of the concepts they employed in Madhyamaka. Thus, Vajrayāna considerations will enter almost every aspect of our discussion. Especially in Padma dKar-po, one looks in vain for the kind of detailed analysis which is so common in the Madhyamaka works of the Sa-skya and dGe-lugs traditions.

Though Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's work is detailed and analytic in this way, it is also firmly grounded in the Vajrayāna notions just mentioned. I hope to give an account of his full and interesting exposition of the two *satyas* elsewhere.

Here, my main concern will be to exhibit general features of Padma dKar-po's thought. The evidence for what I say will be references and quotations (see especially the three Appendices). In choosing these I have to find appropriate illustrations of these general themes; and in interpreting them *as* such illustrations, I have had to give the context of each its due weight. This attention to the context is connected with our duty to make sense of what our authors write. The notion of "fidelity to the text" is a complex one, but it is not well served by writing nonsense in English. Somehow or other the sense must be reproduced, as well as the words. So I have kept to the surface form of the Tibetan sentence only where I could find a similar English form which, *as an English sentence*, reproduced what seemed to me to be the point of Padma dKar-po's words. I make no claim to incorrigibility. On the contrary, it is *certain* that what is done here can be improved (and will be).

Though this paper draws mainly on primary sources, it seems right to say something about the relation of my work with that of Prof. H.V. Guenther, whose books (e.g., Guenther 1963, 1972, 1977) make so much use of Padma dKar-po's writings. Nobody who has studied Padma dKar-po's works himself can fail to appreciate the importance of the problems to which Guenther has drawn Western attention for the first time. Though the importance for Padma dKar-po of *yuganaddha* (*zung-'jug*) leaps at us out of the texts and hardly needs discovery, and though I believe much of what Guenther says about it will have to be revised,¹¹ his priority must be acknowledged. The similar importance of *sahaja* (*lhan-skyes*) is far less obvious, and here I believe that the picture offered by Guenther, sketchy though it is, is basically right, and so is the translation by "co-emergent" (though I do not use this word because it is philosophically loaded in the wrong way). On the other hand, I see little basis for the existentialist slant of his writing on Padma dKar-po. In my view, to make use of Western philosophical notions in order to clarify what we are saying about an Eastern writer's views is one thing; to impute those notions to him is something different.

Guenther does not seem to have treated the role of *sahaja* in distinguishing the views of the bKa'-brgyud-pas from those of their opponents, and he has surely not given a systematic treatment of Padma dKar-po's views on the two *satyas*. But there will be other places where my treatment has been influenced by his writings, and since it is not easy to acknowledge every case individually, I should like to make this general acknowledgment here.

II. The Early bKa'-Brgyud-pas on the Difference Between Sūtra and Mantra

In his *Blue Annals* (*Deb-ther sngon-po*), 'Gos gZhon-nu-dpal (1392–1481) concludes his chapter on the bKa'-brgyud traditions (the longest in the book) with the remarks:¹²

Thus this famous Dwags-po bKa'-brgyud is not a lineage transmitting merely the words, it is a lineage transmitting the real point [of the Buddha's teaching], this point being a stainless understanding of *mahāmudrā*. It is said that the *bla-ma* from whom one obtains an understanding of *mahāmudrā* is the *rtsa-ba'i bla-ma*.¹³ Now at the time of Mar-pa and Mi-la-ras-pa this understanding of *mahāmudrā* was ascribed to the *sampannakrama*, for an awareness corresponding to the inner heat was produced first, and by virtue of this an understanding of *mahāmudrā* was produced later. Dwags-po Rin-po-che caused an understanding of *mahāmudrā* to arise also in those beginners who had not received *abhiṣeka*, and this is the *pāramitā*¹⁴ method. But he also said to Phag-mo Gru-pa: 'Our *mahāmudrā* text is the *Mahāyāna-ut-taratantra-sāstra* by the Jina Maitreya.' Phag-mo Gru-pa¹⁵ said the same to 'Bri-khung-pa¹⁶ and so in the tradition descending from him and his pupils there are many explanations of the *Ut-taratantra*. On this, though Chos-rje Sa-skya-pa¹⁷ said that the *pāramitā* method was not to be called *mahāmudrā*, since any awareness¹⁸ of *mahāmudrā* arises solely from *abhiṣeka*, [he was mistaken, and indeed] the ācārya Jñānakīrti says in his *Tattvāvātāra* that even at the stage of an ordinary person,¹⁹ one who has a sharp intellect²⁰ and who, in the *pāramitā* system, practices *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, since he can understand *mahāmudrā* properly and with certainty, can attain an irreversible understanding. However, in Sahajavajra's commentary on the *Tattvadaśaka* we find: 'The essence is the *pāramitās*, mantra is a later adjustment. This

is called *mahāmudrā* and is clearly explained as an awareness which understands suchness having three specific features.²¹ Accordingly, rGod-tshang-pa²² has explained that the pāramitā method of sGam-po-pa is just what was put forward²³ by Maitripa. However it is certain that sGam-po-pa taught his own personal pupils a *mahāmudrā* whose path is mantra.

The quotations in this passage show a slight divergence between Jñānakīrti and Sahajavajra. The first says that in the pāramitā method one can attain an irreversible understanding, but does not mention suchness or buddhahood, while the second mentions suchness but perhaps only associates it with the mantras. We will see later a similar difference between Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje. Now I want to show how such differences appear in the writings of sGam-po-pa himself. sGam-po-pa's general tendency was to insist that different people use words in different ways and so there can be no rigidly fixed definitions. In the *Phag-gru'i zhus-lan*, a collection of his answers to questions posed by Phag-mo Gru-pa, he is at pains to correct his pupil's demands for over-clear definitions and distinctions. Sometimes he seems ironic; sometimes he gives many different answers (e.g., on the *darśanamārga*, 5a4); often he refuses to say that things are the same or different (e.g., on *snang-ba* and *sems* and on *sems-nyid* and *chos-nyid*, 17a); sometimes he seems to treat the question as stupid (e.g., on whether *mahāmudrā* and *sahajayoga* are the same or not, 4b4). Other answers are quite straightforward. In this and in the similar *Dus-gsum mKhyen-pa'i zhus-lan* nothing seems to have been further from sGam-po-pa's mind than propagating a single unified theory about something.

Accordingly, we are not surprised to find different expressions of the relation between the sūtras and the mantras. For instance, on one occasion they appear to differ only in the path, and to be similar in cause (*rgyu*) and effect (*'bras-bu*):²⁴

In the pāramitās, the cause is *rig-pa* and *bodhicitta*, the path is the six pāramitās, and the effect is the three *buddhakāyas*. In the mantras, the cause is *rig-pa* and *bodhicitta*, the path is the *utpatti-* and *sampannakramas*, and the effect is the three *buddhakāyas*.

On another occasion, there appears to be a difference in the effect:²⁵ in the pāramitā case it is the dharmakāya and the

rūpakāya, while in the mantra case it is the *mahāsukhākāya*. Elsewhere,²⁶ sGam-po-pa says that even a *rim-gyis-pa*²⁷ of sharp or medium senses can attain an awareness which understands the essential after a good deal of *samatha* or one moment of clear *vipaśyanā*. These two versions are roughly parallel to the two opinions of Sahajavajra and Jñānakīrti quoted above by 'Gos.

'Gos, writing in the 15th century, only hints through his quotations that the early bKa'-brgyud-pas expressed various views on the relations between the sūtras and the mantras. But since sGam-po-pa himself was not wholly consistent on the matter, we will not be surprised to see clearer divergences among the more analytically minded bKa'-brgyud-pa writers of the 16th century. They also had a rather different way of expressing their views, to which I will now turn.

III. Madhyamaka-darśana and Mahāmudrā-darśana: Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje on lta-ba

Tibetan Vajrayāna thought is often organised around the quadruple *lta-ba*, *sgom-pa*, *spyod-pa*, and *'bras-bu*. Roughly speaking, *lta-ba* is the general attitude or outlook with which some system of Dharma is viewed or approached; while *sgom-pa* (*bhāvanā*) is the cultivation of this attitude or outlook by means of specific practices (often called *sgom-pa* too). *sPyod-pa* literally means "action:" in the Vajrayāna, often the performance of fearful rites (*drag-po'i las*, etc.). *'Bras-bu* (*phala*, lit., "effect") is the goal: buddhahood in some form, *yuganaddha*, etc.

It may be worth considering the correlation between Tibetan, Sanskrit and English as regards *lta-ba*. In English there exist various concepts expressing a mixture of theory and experience: dogma, theory, attitude, point of view, outlook, insight, etc. Both the Sanskrit words *darśana* and *dr̥ṣṭi* belong somewhere here; both words derive from *dr̥ś-*, to see, but both can be applied also to philosophical points of view, indeed to the same view depending on what one thinks of it. If one is orthodox, the view that there are ātmans is a *darśana*; for a Buddhist, it is a *dr̥ṣṭi*. Both are translated into Tibetan by *lta-ba*, and only the context will tell us whether we have a dogma or a viewpoint. However, when the component of insight predominates, *darśana* may be

translated otherwise, as in *darsanamārga*, *mthong-lam*. (This is relevant here, since it is contrasted with *bhāvanāmārga*, *sgom-lam*).

sGam-po-pa has summed up the *lta-ba/sgom-pa* distinction in an aphorism:²⁸

lta-ba ma-bcos-pa gnyug-ma'i shes-pa / sgom-pa mi-rtog-pa tha-mal-gyi shes-pa /

lta-ba is non-contingent,²⁹ resting cognition; *sgom-pa* is natural, non-discursive cognition.³⁰

Clearly, *lta-ba* here is not “theory,” indeed it is something more like the absence of any theory. No doubt this was why Madhyamaka appealed to sGam-po-pa (who would probably not have called himself a Mādhyamika):

Phag-mo Gru-pa asked: by what is the essential (*ngo-bo*) attained? sGam-po-pa replied: it is attained by the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the teacher, by one’s own interest and devotion, and by the power of practice, nothing else. It is not known to learned men and scholars, it is not understood by prajñā, it is not a matter for argument. It arises by itself and is beyond what is an object for the discursive mind.³¹ The essential is not to be postulated,³² as Nāgārjuna and other wise men have said.³³

The context makes it clear that this passage is intended to apply to the Vajrayāna as well as the Pāramitāyāna.

Padma dKar-po organises some of his most important works around the *lta-ba/sgom-pa/’bras-bu* distinction. Typical items which fall under these headings in the sūtra- and mantra-yānas are found in Table 2:

	lta-ba	TABLE 2 sgom-pa	’bras-bu
sūtra level (Madhyamaka) ³⁴	<i>bden-gnyis</i> <i>zung-’jug</i>	<i>thabs-shes zung-’jug</i> (6 pāramitās)	<i>sku-gnyis</i> <i>zung-’jug</i>
tantra level (<i>bsre-’pho</i>) ³⁵	<i>phyag-rgya</i> <i>chen-po</i>	<i>Nā-ro chos-drug</i> , etc.	<i>sku-gnyis</i> <i>zung-’jug</i>
lam-rim stage	<i>darsanamārga</i>	<i>bhāvanāmārga</i>	<i>asaikṣamārga</i>

Table 2 contains the first appearance of the two *satyas* in this paper, and the first row shows how Padma dKar-po saw them as the basis for the *lta-ba* of Madhyamaka as a complete system of theory and practice. With regard to the first column, one might think that the *lta-ba* in the sūtras and tantras was here indicated as different. This is a verbal trap. The term *mahāmudrā* is complex, and stands for different kinds of things, but as *lta-ba* it is identical with the *lta-ba* of the sūtras and of Madhyamaka.

Padma dKar-po's views on the relation between *lta-ba*, *sgom-pa* and *spyod-pa* are found (*inter alia*) in the introduction to the 'Khor-lo *sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad*. In the sūtras and mantras, the view (*lta-ba*), the content (*brjod-bya*), and the purpose (*don*) are said to be the same. We find such phrases as *don-gcig*,³⁶ *lta-ba don-gcig*,³⁷ *dgongs-pa-gcig*,³⁸ and *lta-ba'i sgo-nas khyad-med*.³⁹ The sūtra and mantra methods are said to differ mainly in speed (the mantras bringing quick results⁴⁰), in the character of the explanations (the mantras being more detailed⁴¹), and in the choice of methods available (richer in the mantras⁴²). Clearly, then, it is the path and the *sgom-pa* which differ. On the sameness of the content (*brjod-bya*), he says:⁴³

In the *Kālacakratāntra* it is said that to distinguish between the sūtras and the mantras in respect of their content is to commit the root-downfall of denigrating the Dharma.

Similarly on the *lta-ba*:⁴⁴

Mi-la-ras-pa has said: on *lta-ba* there is no distinction, but in the secret mantras there are special methods.

Table 2 already makes it clear that, like sGam-po-pa, Padma dKar-po held that the goal (*'bras-bu*) is the same for sūtras and mantras. In the *Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad* he confirms this, saying that it is the view of Nāropa.⁴⁵ He rejects a view of Maitripa, according to which the Pāramitāyāna is only a stage affording entry to the Mantrayāna.⁴⁶

The reader might now reasonably hope that I would spell out what particular view (*lta-ba*) Padma dKar-po himself held. But this will have to wait until the end of the paper, for the phrase *bden-gnyis zung-'jug (satya-dvaya-yuganaddha)* is his clearest

descriptive phrase for it, so we will have to say what the two *satyas* were, and what was the relation called *yuganaddha*. (On the latter point, only an outline will be possible here.)

In the introduction to his *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta*, Mi-bskyod rDo-rje treats the relation between the sūtras and the mantras at some length. He gives first his own views,⁴⁷ then those of a Jo-nang-pa,⁴⁸ of Śākya mChog-ldan (1428-1507),⁴⁹ of a Bo-dong-pa,⁵⁰ and of Tsong-kha-pa.⁵¹ These statements have recently been translated by Ruegg (1983).⁵² They are followed by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's attempts to refute the views of the other traditions.⁵³ As regards the path and its practice, the differences between Mi-bskyod rDo-rje and the others seem unimportant beside the obvious similarities: in the Vajrayāna there is *abhīṣeka* and the *upāya-mārga*, which are lacking in the Pāramitāyāna.

More interesting are the differences at the level of the ground (*gzhi*) and the general point of view (*lta-ba*, *darśana*). Of all the authors mentioned, only Mi-bskyod rDo-rje himself seems to hold that the *lta-ba* is different in sūtras and mantras. He says that in the mantras,⁵⁴ the *lta-ba* is that of a spontaneous and non-discursive *śūnyatā* endowed with all excellent qualities.⁵⁵ At the sūtra level this is not present,⁵⁶ though there is no difference on the side of non-discursiveness, in that when all attachment to opinions and discursiveness has been repudiated, there is no need to establish anything at all as having any (epistemic) status.⁵⁷ This last point, with which Padma dKarmo would certainly have agreed, is the source of all Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's main criticisms of the other authors. (By contrast the point about the difference of *lta-ba* is more a matter of nomenclature than of substance.) Jo-nang-pa's *lta-ba* is based on *śūnyatā* endowed with all excellent qualities both in sūtras and mantras. This *śūnyatā* is *paramārtha-satya* and is permanent and *asamskṛta*.⁵⁸ Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's main criticism is that this view entails eternalism.⁵⁹ Śākya mChog-ldan says that in both sūtras and tantras the *lta-ba* repudiates the origination of any dharma by any of the four alternatives of existence, non-existence etc.,⁶⁰ but then goes on to say that as applied to the sūtras, this becomes the *rnam-brdzum dbu-ma* set out in the later works of Maitreya;⁶¹ and here, one should not take the dharmadhātu to be mere negation, as do the *niḥsvabhāvavādins*, but rather as the radiant

light, the nature of mind, since our concern here is with *ye-shes*, the *paramārtha* aspect of mind, and not *rnam-shes*, the *saṃvṛti* aspect. This is criticised as a confusion between mere cognition (*shes-pa*) and awareness (*ye-shes*); for the arrogance of claiming to have established what is really *paramārtha* by making such verbal claims has been said by Mañjuśrī to be just the failure to understand *gnas-lugs*.⁶² (This is only one point in Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's long and detailed criticism of Śākya mChog-ldan.) Bodong-pa expresses a familiar negative *lta-ba* for both sūtras and mantras, but considers that it applies only to the person who analyses things thoroughly.⁶³ Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticism is directed mainly at the claims related to the lower levels of analysis, which he says show an incorrect understanding of the *satyas*, and will lead to a Sāṃkhya view of causation.⁶⁴

Tsong-kha-pa's *lta-ba* for both sūtras and mantras is based on a *sūnyatā* lacking in an object truly established in itself and imputed to be external by the discursive mind.⁶⁵ Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticism starts by claiming that here there is too much attachment to *satya*;⁶⁶ it is pointless to establish, in a conventional sense,⁶⁷ the status of something which is later to be refuted. The result would be that one would be stuck with entities whose existence was purely nominal, like the *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* of the Hindus. Here there could be no proper *sahaja*, but only a kind of *ātmadr̥ṣṭi-sahaja* which would be inconsistent with what one sees. Such a *sūnyatā* is not a suitable basis for *mokṣa*. (This last aspect of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's view of Tsong-kha-pa was already noticed by Williams (1983)).

IV. Padma dKar-po as an Interpreter of Candrakīrti

Like Tsong-kha-pa and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, Padma dKar-po was a Prāsaṅgika, and commented on the works of Candrakīrti. Unlike Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, Padma dKar-po was not an argumentative writer and rarely criticized the views of others; and unlike Tsong-kha-pa, he did not differentiate sharply between the Prāsaṅgika position which he mainly followed, and the views of the Svātantrikas, some of which he incorporated into his own work. Such differences show all three authors developing and adapting what they learnt from Indian Madhyamaka. In a sense,

they all did Indian philosophy, but each brought his own flavour to it.

Of Padma dKar-po's Madhyamaka works, the one containing the most philosophy is the *dBu-ma'i gzhung-lugs-gsum gsal-bar 'byed-pa nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*, "The vehicle which establishes *nītārtha*, clarifying the three sources of Madhyamaka." I shall use the ornamental part of this title, *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*, as an abbreviation for the whole.⁶⁸ The three sources are Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* and *Mahyamakāvātāra*, and Milaras-pa's *dBu-ma yang-dag-par brjod-pa*. The *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* is really a complete summary of Tibetan Buddhism at the sūtra level, containing brief accounts of the three turnings of the wheel of the Dharma, the different Hindu and Buddhist *siddhānta*, the *nītārtha/neyārtha* distinction and other matters (see the *sa-bcad* given as Appendix C). The Madhyamaka section reviews briefly the varieties of the Svātantrika "school" before moving onto the Prāsaṅgikas. The three divisions of this section (cf. table 2 as well as Appendix C), are really concerned with Madhyamaka as philosophy, with the path (the six pāramitās and the ten *bhūmis*), and with buddhahood. In this way, the connection of Madhyamaka thought with much of the rest of sūtra-level Buddhism is made very explicit. However the connection with the tantras still has to be supplied.

In another respect, the work is very inexplicit. It contains a large number of quotations, usually not acknowledged. It is not only that Padma dKar-po often does not make the point in his own words. Many important points are made in complete silence, by the organization of the subject-matter. Formally, the work is a commentary on the *dBu-ma yang-dag-par brjod-pa*, but each section of comment is very long and the sections are not organized around the order of topics of the other *gzhung* at all. On the contrary, passages of Candrakīrti are broken up and re-formed in a very complex way. For these reasons, it is almost impossible to use quotation from the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* to establish Padma dKar-po's views (as against those of other interpreters of Candrakīrti). Instead, I shall draw on the relationships between the two *satyas* and other concepts, relationships upon which attention is focussed by the arrangement of the work. This arrangement is summarized in Appendix C. Then I shall then make use of these relationships to illustrate

the functions of the two *satyas* in other areas of Padma dKar-po's thought. Thus, the meanings of the two *satyas* for Padma dKar-po will emerge indirectly and, as it were, structurally. I should stress that I use this indirect method because I find myself forced to, not on any philosophical grounds.

In Madhyamaka, the two *satyas* are neither items contained in a world external to the observer, nor purely subjective items dependent upon capriciously varying mental states. Since at the goal the *satyas* are related in a certain way,⁶⁹ they must vary systematically with the level of attainment of the subject. We can see roughly how this variation will go from Candrakīrti's own comment to MMV VI.23. This difficult and confusing passage has received numerous interpretations in Tibet, but Padma dKar-po typically does not give any explanation when quoting it.⁷⁰ In order to examine the use he made of it, it may be helpful to supply a very crude translation:

Thus the buddhas cognize (*mkhyen-pa*) without error the *svarūpa* (*rang-gi ngo-bo*) of the two *satyas*, pointing out (*nye-bar bstan-te*) that all inner and outer things such as saṃskāras and sprouts have these two *svarūpas*. They are these: *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*.

As for *paramārtha*, it is a self-nature (*bdag-gi ngo-bo*) grasped by the particular *yul* (*viśaya*) of those who have a properly cognizing awareness,⁷¹ but it is not established (*grub-pa*) by means of such a nature (*rang-gi bdag-nyid*). This is one nature (*ngo-bo*). As for the other, an ordinary person grasps (*rnyed-pa*) a self-existing thing (*bdag-gi yod-pa*) through the power of a vision covered with infinite films due to un-knowing. Now this *yul* of childish persons is also not established as a *svabhāva* (*rang-bzhin*) by means of a self-nature (*rang-gi ngo-bos*). Because of this, all things possess these two *svabhāvas*. Of these two, suchness⁷² is the real *yul* of seeing, and that is the point (*don*) of saying "this is *paramārtha-satya*." What the *svarūpa* of this is, remains to be explained. The *yul* of delusive seeing is *saṃvṛti-satya*. Thus, having set out the two *satyas*, we must further explain how for those whose vision is deceptive, there is a further duality of veridical and delusive in respect of the object to be grasped and of the knowing.

The Sanskrit word *satya* has been used as an ontological category ("reality"), as a property of statements or propositions ("true," "truth"), and perhaps as an axiological category

("genuine"). Here it is none of these. It obviously expresses some property or feature of sensory cognition. Both in the verse⁷³ and in the commentary it is opposed to *mṛṣa* (*brdzun-pa*) in relation to seeing (*drś-*, *mthong-ba*). Now *mṛṣa* (*brdzun-pa*) means "delusive"; the opposite of this is "veridical." It is only with a very great sense of strain that an English-speaker can say of a visual object or experience that it is true or false.⁷⁴ A good example is found in Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī*:⁷⁵

dr̥ṣṭaśrutādyam muninā na satyaṃ na mṛṣoditam /

The Muni did not say that visibles, audibles and so forth are either veridical or delusive.

It would be wholly pointless to say that they are neither true nor false. The Buddha was not trying to draw attention to an elementary category-error.

For the ordinary ignorant person, the *prthagjana*, there is no *satya*.⁷⁶ For the Buddha there is no point in distinguishing between two *satyas*.⁷⁷ Accordingly, interest in a distinction between two *satyas* is mainly at the level of the *ārya* or the *bodhisattva*.⁷⁸

Now there is an important Mahāyanā tradition according to which *paramārtha-satya* is something unvarying, not changing with the individual who experiences it. This tradition is associated with the thought "whether *tathāgatas* appear in the world or not, the *dharmatā* of dharmas continues the same for ever." Variants on this theme are scattered profusely through the *sūtras* and *śāstras*.⁷⁹ It is illustrated in the *Laṅkāvatāra* by comparing the *dharmatā* of dharmas with a road leading out of a forest in which the seeker is wandering. "Now do you think, O Mahāmati, that the passage-way leading to that city. . . [was] constructed by that man?" "No, Blessed One."⁸⁰ (This theme deserves a study of its own.)

As a result, the burden of variation during the *bodhisattva*-stages is thrown upon *saṃvṛti-satya*. In this sense, while the characterization of *saṃvṛti-satya* in general may be a philosophical matter, the specification of what it consists of in particular cases is not a philosophical matter at all, but rather a soteriological one. Perhaps it is for this reason that Padma dKar-po indignantly repudiates any attempt to pin down the *Mādhyamika* to any general proposition specifying what *saṃvṛti-satya* is.⁸¹

In any case, the *satyas* have something to do with veridical sensory cognition. Now we can ask: are they concerned with two different *kinds* of veridical cognition, or only one? Do the *satyas* get their veridical character from the same source, or two different sources? Or ontologically: do we live in two different (perhaps interpenetrating) universes? There seems to have been a good deal of disagreement in Tibet over the answers to these questions. When we come to deal with the Vajrayāna aspects properly we will see that in Padma dKar-po's view there was only one source of *satya* and that the two *satyas* are so tightly bound together that they are in effect different facets of one thing. For now we may note that even in the Madhyamaka there are references to the idea that really (*vastutas*) there is only one *satya*, viz. *paramārtha*;⁸² but this seems to have got mixed up with the idea that ultimately (*don-dam-par*, *paramārthatas*) there is only one *satya*. And if there is sometimes only one *satya*, one may ask where the second comes from.

This brings us to the very difficult question of the word *yul* (*viśaya*) in the commentary to MMV VI.23. In many contexts this word is correctly translated by "object." But here this will not do, because in the definition of *paramārtha* the *yul* grasps something (*yul-nyid-kyis*. . . *rnyed-pa*⁸³). Evidently *paramārtha-satya* has something to do with the *subject* in cognition. We will see later that this is certainly Padma dKar-po's view, especially as regards the Vajrayāna.

A more fundamental difficulty affecting the word *yul* is that the notion of *paramārtha* is supposed to apply to buddhas and other advanced beings who possess a non-dualistic cognition. We therefore need a vocabulary general enough to embrace talk both of ordinary dualistic cognition and of non-dualistic cognition. Since here we are concerned especially with the non-duality of subject and object (*gzung-'dzin gnyis-med*) we want a word (or more precisely, an attitude towards some word or words) which generalizes the notions of subject and object and which reduces to one of them when language is being used in the ordinary dualistic way. The following proposal is motivated partly by Strawson's notion of a *feature-placing language*:⁸⁴ a level of language more primitive than our own, in which there are no reidentifiable particulars, indeed⁸⁵ no objective particulars at all. I suggest that we should think of the artificial word "*fea-

ture" as a word in a feature-placing language, which specialises to "subject" or "object" (or to "feature" without the asterisk, e.g., gold, snow, etc.) when we return to our normal (dualistic) use of language. Then in the context of MMV VI.23, *yul* (*viṣaya*) can be translated by "*feature" without doing violence either to our conceptual scheme (in English) or to Candrakīrti's text. (For some commentators on Candrakīrti, perhaps including Tsong-kha-pa, this device may be redundant. *But even if it is redundant, it does no harm.*)

In the Vajrayāna, its non-redundancy seems almost too obvious to need argument. There, "*paramārtha-satya*" describes things (!) such as the radiant light (*'od-gsal*), "mind-as-such" (*sems-nyid*), and great bliss (*bde-ba chen-po*, *mahāsukha*). Even viewed dualistically, it is obvious that these are not particulars but features, and that they belong to the subjective rather than the objective pole in cognition. Elsewhere I have given reasons for thinking that this is an important and general feature of Padma dKar-po's thought.⁸⁶

There does seem to be some evidence that Tsong-kha-pa took *paramārtha-satya* (i.e., for him, *śūnyatā*) in a somewhat more "objective" sense than do our bKa'-brgyud-pa authors.⁸⁷ If this is right, then it makes the critique by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje much easier to follow.⁸⁸ It also means that the translation of *yul* uniformly by "object" will be easier to maintain in connection with Tsong-kha-pa than with Mi-bskyod rDo-rje or Padma dKar-po. There should be nothing especially surprising about this unless one believes that the Tibetans did nothing but reproduce what they inherited from India.

In the commentary to MMV VI.23, the word *ngo-bo*⁸⁹ and its many relatives give rise to difficult problems to which I offer no systematic solution. My impression is that Candrakīrti was confused in the use of these words. Tsong-kha-pa,⁹⁰ Mi-bskyod rDo-rje⁹¹ and Padma dKar-po⁹² all seem to have found the matter frustrating.

Still on MMV VI.23, Candrakīrti says that the two *satyas* pertain to everything; they are *svarūpas* connected with everything. Yet the capacity to be aware of the two *satyas* is not the same for all individuals, as we have noticed already. We might say that it is fully active only in a buddha; in a bodhisattva it is partially activated; in a *prthagjana* it is merely *latent*. (We need

some such language as this to distinguish between the non-contingency of the relationship between the *satyas*, as *svarūpas* or *svabhāvas*, and the things of which they are the *svarūpas*, in contrast to the contingency of their relationship with persons. In this language the tathāgatagarbha theory becomes the claim that all beings possess a latent disposition to become aware of the two *satyas*.)

The picture is filled in a bit more in those passages where Candrakīrti deals with the causal connection between the two *satyas*. Here the *locus classicus* is MMV VI.80. The verse contrasts *vyavahāra/paramārtha* as *upāya/upeya*, i.e., as means and what results from the means. This is clarified in the commentary, which says that here *upeyabhūtam* (*thabs-las byung-bar gyur-pa*) is the effect (*'bras-bu*), or what is to be attained (*thob-par bya-ba*) or what is to be understood (*rtogs-par bya-ba*). It is obvious that these passages are not solely about objects and *their* dispositions to be cognised; they are about actual episodes of cognition on the part of cognising subjects, governed by the contingency just mentioned. We will soon see this tension between the two verses reflected in Vajrayāna usage.

V. The Two Satyas in Vajrayāna

Both in the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* and in his more advanced Vajrayāna works (see Table 1 and its footnotes), Padma dKar-po seems to be working with a concept of causation which includes the one just mentioned in connection with MMV VI.80, but is richer. Guenther⁹³ has called this “circular causation.” The ground and the goal mutually reinforce each other; each acts as the cause of the other, so to speak. This conception goes back at least to the *Guhyasamājatantra*.⁹⁴

We already mentioned in the Introduction that, according to Padma dKar-po, the Vajrayāna provides us with particular instances of what is discussed in general terms in Madhyamaka. Let us see how this applies to the two *satyas*, first individually and then in relation to each other. *Paramārtha-satya* is relatively straightforward: it is great bliss (*mahāsukha*), it is the radiant light, it is *gnas-lugs*.⁹⁵ All these are feature-universals.

“*Samvṛti-satya*” applies mainly to *items*: the items which fall

under *dn̄gos-po'i gn̄as-lugs*. It especially includes such things as the illusory body⁹⁶ and the *vajra*-body⁹⁷ together with the maṇḍalas which surround them. Now, most of these specific terms are familiar mainly from the meditation practices of the Vajrayāna; for instance “illusory body” is the name of one of the six topics of Nāropa. Here, however, we are not talking of the practices themselves, but of the clarified (*dwangs*) appearances which form the basis for the practices. Indeed, *dwangs-ma* is often used as a sort of universal to refer to specific appearances which partake of *saṃvṛti-satya*, while the feature-universal *dwangs* is closely related to *gdangs*, a word whose use in connection with *saṃvṛti-satya* has already been noted by Guenther⁹⁸ and will be further discussed in a moment.

Now, the relationship between the two *satyas*. The *dwangs-ma* partake of *saṃvṛti-satya* in any case; and it is *because* they are non-delusive that they partake also of *paramārtha-satya*.⁹⁹ This relationship between the two *satyas* is the basis of their *yuganaddha*. At first sight the connection seems to be non-contingent. This non-contingency is related to the tension observed at the end of the last section, between the *Madhyamakāvātāra* verses VI.23 and VI.80, and in order to understand it better we need to return to those verses in more detail, keeping in mind the application to clarified appearances.

In connection with VI.23, we saw the *satyas* described as *svabhāvas* or *svarūpas*; and these are defined (say, at MK. XV 2–3, and PSP on it) as belonging non-contingently (*akṛtrima, ma-bcos*, etc.) to the things to which they pertain. Yet it is obviously a contingent matter whether any particular *person* cognises things in either of the *satya*-modes. It is for this reason that VI.23, if construed as a claim about dispositions of persons, cannot be more than a claim about latent dispositions. VI.23 tells us nothing about episodes of cognition; they are rather the province of VI.80, which, it seems, has to be construed as saying that one or more *episodes* of *saṃvṛti-satya* cause or bring about one or more episodes of *paramārtha-satya*. We may say that in VI.80, the extent to which the latent dispositions of VI.23 have been actualised is not specified, but that there is a presupposition that they have been actualised to some extent. In this rather special sense, then, VI.23 is concerned with dispositions, while VI.80 is concerned with episodes.

In his Vajrayāna works, Padma dKar-po very often uses the phrases *kun-rdzob thabs sa'am rgyu*, and *don-dam thabs-byung nga'am 'bras-bu*, etc.; this is the language of VI.80 and is concerned with episodes. By contrast, the terms *gshis* and *gdangs* are used for the corresponding dispositions of objects, e.g., at *phyag-chen gan-mdzod* (see note 10a) we have the two *satyas*, described exactly in this language of VI.80, manifesting by the power of *gshis* and *gdangs*. The contrast is even clearer in Appendix A, where it is said that the *gshis* is lacking in *satya*. Of course *don-dam* is the very epitome of *satya*, of the veridical; but the disposition of things to be seen in *don-dam* is neither veridical nor delusive. The availability of the *gshis/gdangs* language perhaps explains the rarity of references, in Padma dKar-po's Vajrayāna works, to VI.23, in contrast to the frequency of reference to VI.80. And if *gshis* and *gdangs* literally were the two *satyas*, then one would expect to see the phrase *gshis-gdangs zung-'jug*, in parallel with *bden-gnyis zung-'jug*. The former is not found; and if my analysis is right, it would be illogical, for *zung-'jug* is a form of *samādhi* in which the *satyas* actually occur; it has nothing to do with the mere disposition towards them.

Roughly speaking, *yuganaddha* (*zung-'jug*) describes two things which are united or closely bound together. The most important Indian source for this word is the last *krama* of the (tantric) Nāgārjuna's *Pañcakrama*, called *Yuganaddhakrama*.¹⁰⁰ Padma dKar-po's conception of *yuganaddha* is complex, and here I will give a sketch only. Earlier, we mentioned the illusory body as a standard example of *dwangs-ma*. Here the illusory body is the topic of the *svādhiṣṭhānakrama*, while the radiant light is the topic of the *abhisambodhikrama*. The purification of the illusory body takes place in the *svādhiṣṭhānakrama*, and the agent of this purification is the radiant light.¹⁰¹ Thus, it is the presence of the radiant light which gives the illusory body its *satya*-quality. Padma dKar-po simply says that the illusory body is self-purified;¹⁰² this further illustrates not only the inseparability of the two *satyas*, but what looks like the non-contingency of that inseparability. These are further illustrated in the course of his criticism¹⁰³ of Tsong-kha-pa's view of *yuganaddha*. If in the *svādhiṣṭhānakrama* there is no radiant light and in the *abhisambodhikrama* there is no illusory body, then the two can have no causal connection, and in the *yuganaddhakrama* they are merely

placed together like the two horns of an ox;¹⁰⁴ surely this cannot be *yuganaddha*.

Since this line of argument is so central to bKa'-brgyud-pa thought, it may be worth clarifying the notion of non-contingency in use. I have chosen the word "non-contingent" because it is close to the Sanskrit *akṛtrima*, which is important in Madhyamaka texts, and because it expresses the logical structure of the connection better than such words as "inseparable" (*dbyer-med*, much more common in Vajrayāna texts). The point is that the illusory body depends on the radiant light *for its identity as the illusory body*; were the radiant light absent (says Padma dKar-pa) there would be an appearance but it would not qualify as the illusory body. More generally, nothing qualifies as *saṃvṛti-satya* at all unless accompanied by *paramārtha-satya*; it is so to speak *paramārtha-satya* which gives it its identity as (*saṃvṛti*)-*satya*. And now we are back once more with the old idea that really there is only one *satya*, one source of the veridical.

In a sense, the non-contingency is just a fact about language, about the *meaning* of "*saṃvṛti-satya*" and the cognate terms; yet in another sense, it is also a fact about the world, in that *paramārtha-satya* and its cognates are not just logical constructs, but are features of experience.

Padma dKar-po's favoured method of developing these distinctions rests on two different descriptions (not conceptions) of *mahāmudrā*: *gnas-lugs phyag-chen* and *'khrul-lugs phyag-chen*. The first corresponds roughly to a feature-placing use of language (as sketched in the preceding section). The two *satyas* become one identical *feature. *gNas-lugs phyag-chen* is often described by a stream of metaphors, as by rGyal-dbang-rje:¹⁰⁵

Thus all the dharmas of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are nothing more than the suchness of mind, which has always been pure, which is self-created since no-one has made it, which contains no differences since it is inseparable from everything, and which is not defiled by postulating or negating existence or non-existence; it is unstained by subject and object, it is not a *feature of any action of the mind such as proof or refutation, it is beyond all thought or speech of the eternal or the momentary, it is the essential abode of all the teachings expressing the intentions of the buddhas; it is called *sahajajñāna* or dharmakāya but is not obscured by these good names; it is a resting cognition, an ever-

lasting cognition, a natural cognition, an original cognition; and it is the content of all the older scriptures explaining *mahāmudrā*. Since in it appearances are incessant it is the foundation of dependent origination, since nothing has to be established it is the foundation of voidness, since it is not the abode of differences it is the foundation of *yuganaddha*, and since it is impartial it is the foundation of that which embraces everything.

'*Khrul-lugs phyag-chen* describes the same state of affairs, where however one "wanders" or "strays" (*'khrul-ba*) into dualistic distinctions (i.e., one uses language normally). Yet it does not *have* to be mistaken. Padma dKar-po says of '*khrul-lugs phyag-chen*:¹⁰⁶

On the objective side there are changing shapes which are ascribed to *lus-kyi gnas-lugs* and to *samvṛti-satya*, while on the side of unchanging seeing there is *sems-kyi gnas-lugs* which is ascribed to *paramārtha-satya*. The ground may acquire changing shapes, but that is not bad; and at the time of understanding it may become unchanging, but that is not good. Because this remains itself there is no need to separate the two *satyas*, and so they are said to be inseparable.

More technically but perhaps more clearly, we have:¹⁰⁷

dNgos-po'i gnas-lugs is divided into two: *lus* and *sems dngos-po'i gnas-lugs*. *Lus-kyi gnas-lugs* is ascribed to the errant side, for it has adventitious defilements, while *sems-kyi gnas-lugs* is pure from the beginning, is purity; often it is said to be pure by nature. Now "adventitious" means that these defilements are not established as *gshis* or *gdangs*, but they are said to appear as *gshis* or *gdangs*, as on a *thang-ka* small hard bumps of paint appear to stick out, or as a white conch-shell appears yellow to a man with jaundice. This yellow is not established as the *gshis* or *gdangs* of the shell, but for the man with jaundice it arises as appearance; this is consistent with the illness gradually wearing off and the yellow colour disappearing. It would be unintelligible to ascribe yellow to the *gshis* or *gdangs* of the shell, since then healthy people would see it.¹⁰⁸ Their not seeing it may not be understood by the sick person, in which case we have a delusion (*'khrul-srang*), or he may understand, in which case it rises as dharmakāya.

Thus according to Padma dKar-po, *'khrul-lugs phyag-chen* as it were contains appearances and (dualistic) distinctions, but if these are understood for what they are, there is no harm in them; they “rise as dharmakāya.” But if they are not understood and if one begins to accept and reject them, there is a fall away from *paramārtha-satya* or from the radiant light. This is the beginning of the process which culminates in rebirth.¹⁰⁹ In this sense *'khrul-lugs phyag-chen* may be said to be the source of *saṃsāra*; here some authors have even spoken of *lhan-cig skyes-pa'i ma-rig-pa*.¹¹⁰ But for Padma dKar-po, this is not an essential feature of *'khrul-lugs phyag-chen*, which does not have to be something wrong or mistaken.

At the doctrinal level, an absolutely capital point for Padma dKar-po is that one should regard *gnas-lugs phyag-chen* and *'khrul-lugs phyag-chen* as expressions of one and the same state of affairs. Especially, one should resist the natural temptation to associate *gnas-lugs phyag-chen* with *paramārtha-satya* and *'khrul-lugs phyag-chen* with *saṃvṛti-satya*. He seems to have thought that this mistake was made by both the Jo-nang-pas (rather grossly) and by the dGe-lugs-pas (more subtly). In both cases his argument has the following shape. In *gnas-lugs phyag-chen* the question of a distinction between the two *satyas* does not really arise. In *'khrul-lugs phyag-chen* if either *satya* has a status or is established (*grub*), independently of the other, there is not and never can be *sahaja* or *yuganaddha* because the relation between the *satyas* is merely contingent (*bcos-pa*) in the sense sketched above.

In a long summary of the Jo-nang-pa position on matters related to this line of thought,¹¹¹ we find such observations as:¹¹²

The great *parinirvāṇa* is an uninterrupted *anāsrava-mahāsukha*¹¹³ which has really transcended all *duḥkha* and its associated causes. *Vijñāna* is dark, like thick black darkness, and is to be given up; it is *saṃvṛti* and *rang-stong*; while spontaneous *jñāna* (*rang-byung ye-shes*) is light with the quality of voidness or like nectar, not to be renounced; it is *paramārtha* and *gzhan-stong*.

Padma dKar-po's objection to this is that it rejects *'khrul-lugs phyag-chen* as something intrinsically bad, thus destroying the non-contingent relationship of the *satyas*. Specifically, it is unac-

ceptable that *paramārtha-satya* is no longer impartial, becoming a form of eternalism, while at the same time *saṃvṛti-satya* becomes a form of nihilism.¹¹⁴ The difficulties of constructing a coherent notion of *yuganaddha* on the Jo-nang-pa view are so obvious that Padma dKar-po has not mentioned them specifically.

One argument against the dGe-lugs-pas has been mentioned already. Another related argument concerns what Padma dKar-po seems to consider to be the dGe-lugs-pas' incorrect conception of *sahaja*:¹¹⁵

According to dGe-lan-pa, if there were no *rang-bzhin*, then at the *paramārtha* level it would be like the barren woman's son, while at the *saṃvṛti* level existing things could never go out of existence. Because of this, by appearance one is freed from the extreme of non-existence, and by voidness one is freed from the extreme of existence. [Padma dKar-po replies:] But to say this is to fall into eternalism and nihilism: *paramārtha* becomes nihilism and *saṃvṛti* becomes eternalism, because unless the two *satyas* are based on a single foundation they can never free anybody from partiality.

This exchange occurs in the middle of a passage about the notion of *sahaja* (*lhan-skyes*) and its connection with *yuganaddha* (*zung-'jug*); see Appendix A. Padma dKar-po quotes¹¹⁶ a verse from the *Hevajra-tantra*, which says (*inter alia*) that the self-nature (*svabhāva*, *rang-bzhin*) is to be born together (*sahaja*), and he then begins his explanation by saying that the *nītārtha* of this has been variously expressed by such phrases as *snang-stong lhan-skyes*, etc. The exchange quoted above then follows. Later on Padma dKar-po says:¹¹⁷

A mountain of evils is dispersed by the *Pañcakrama* verses:¹¹⁸ "When one renounces the notions of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, and they become a single thing, this is said to be *yuganaddha*," and "When the separate aspects of *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* are cognised and they are then thoroughly mixed together, this is said to be *yuganaddha*." On the whole, the Sa-skye and dKar-brgyud traditions say that *gshis* is not veridical, while *gdangs* is not delusive; and when the two *satyas* are inseparable like ice and water, voidness is like appearance and appearance is like voidness and there is *snang-stong zung-'jug*.

The passage in Appendix A gives us that part of Padma dKar-po's conception of *yuganaddha* needed for our present purposes. To summarize his full conception: first, it is a samādhi (in the usual sense and perhaps in the sense of the *śaḍaṅgayoga*); second, it is divided into ground, path and goal, following Nāropa; third, it has a sūtra and a mantra aspect, as in the general treatment of this distinction above; and fourth, it has a logical aspect, uniting the two *satyas* and other pairs. It is this fourth, logical aspect which is so closely related to *sahaja*. This word, literally "born together," means that the two items never appear singly, always together; we have here the causal aspect of the connection which we called "non-contingent." *Sahaja* is a term of the mother-tantras, and indicates a stronger degree of connection than the terms "mixing" or "inseparable" typically used in the Guhyasamāja literature (e.g., in the *Pañcakrama*, as we just saw). Because of the importance of the full notion of *sahaja* and the associated non-contingency for the bKa'-brgyud-pas, Padma dKar-po says that a father-tantra explanation of *yuganaddha* is inadequate.¹¹⁹ This point is closely related to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticisms of Tsong-kha-pa, both those briefly reviewed above and those to be mentioned below.

Thus, both Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje thought that Tsong-kha-pa's conception of the two *satyas* was insufficient, *inter alia*, because their connection was not *akṛtrima* in the right way, did not have the right *sahaja*. But of course to say this is merely to state a problem, not to solve one; we want to know why these bKa'-brgyud-pa writers held the view that they did. Paul Williams (1983, p. 134) notes that according to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje:

. . . the emptiness of Tsong kha pa is different from, not as spiritually mature as, whatever notion of madhyamaka emptiness the Karmapa is operating with.

Williams goes on to defend Tsong-kha-pa against some of the specific attacks of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, and I do not want to comment on this defence; for it seems to me that he has missed both the main point of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's attack, and one of the most important lines of defence available to Tsong-kha-pa.

It may make it easier to see the point of the attack if we

consider two imaginary writers, say *Tsong-kha-pa and *Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, with views simpler than those of the real writers. For both our fictitious authors, the gist of the notion of *śūnyatā* is *svabhāva-śūnyatā*, the absence of self-essences; but they differ in the status of that which lacks such an essence. *Tsong-kha-pa thinks that the objects of ordinary cognition must have some status at the conventional level, must indeed be established conventionally (*tha-snyad-du*). Objects thus established can be seen to be lacking in self-essence, and *as* thus seen, they are (or possess) *samvṛti-satya*. *Paramārtha-satya* is the lack of the self-essences (or the apprehension of this lack). According to *Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, this gets the whole thing upside-down. The point is to get away from (attachment to) the idea of anything having a status. *Paramārtha-satya* (or the radiant light, etc.) is just seeing objects without a status or a foundation of some kind. Objects thus seen (or purified appearances, *dwangs-ma*) are *samvṛti-satya*; but this must not be taken as another status of some kind, raising again the epistemic question of how it is to be established (*grub-pa*).

Now the self-essences are linguistic entities and their absence is a linguistic fact. But *Tsong-kha-pa stresses the *psychological* importance of this absence. Without them, the world *seems* quite different; so different that it is not clear that we can speak of the same world at all, and in the absence of such a world, the distinction between linguistic facts and facts about the world becomes quite hazy. So for *Tsong-kha-pa, there is no contradiction in saying that one can *see paramārtha-satya* or in taking the connection between the two *satyas* as contingent, in spite of the apparently linguistic character of *paramārtha-satya*.

*Mi-bskyod rDo-rje does not attach the same importance to *śūnyatā* as does *Tsong-kha-pa. However, he is much more inclined to accept a world (without ontological status, of course) and with it the distinction (not pressed too far) between linguistic and non-linguistic facts. For him, it is a *contingent* fact that there is *paramārtha-satya* at all (Buddhas might not have appeared in the world, there might not be *nirodha-satya*, etc.). It is also a contingent fact that *paramārtha-satya* is experienced in the way it is (as the radiant light, etc.). This makes the connection between the two *satyas* rather complex. As far as the *senses* of the two terms are concerned, it is a mere fact of language that the

two appear together (*sahaja*). However, it is contingent that the two *satyas* appear together *taking the forms they do take*, i.e., that their referents appear together.

The writings of the actual Mi-bskyod rDo-rje give the impression of a perhaps somewhat Kantian striving after a fact about the two *satyas* which is a fact about the world and not merely one about language, but is non-contingent in the sense of not depending on any other particular fact about the world. They become easier to follow if one thinks of the sense/reference distinction and drops the notion of contingency (but it seems unlikely that he attained this perspective himself). Seen in the forms it actually takes, *paramārtha-satya* is called the radiant light or great bliss (cf. Table 1); *śūnyatā*, which had dropped out of the picture, comes back as just one more *feature in cognition, *śūnyatā*-endowed-with-all-good-qualities (*stong-nyid rnam-pa kun-ldan*, Table 1). This *śūnyatā* is connected with the *svabhāva-śūnyatā* of the Madhyamaka, but plays a different role in the structure; Mi-bskyod rDo-rje can tolerate this tension because for him, *śūnyatā* does not have the logically fundamental character which it has for Tsong-kha-pa.

This discussion is of course simplified, but any comparison of our two authors' views in this area leads straight to the two *satyas*; we need to say something about the function of the notion of *śūnyatā*, and the *satyas* provide us with the concepts which we need for this. Here, unfortunately, Williams has misunderstood Mi-bskyod rDo-rje (1981, p. 7):

For Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, Candrakīrti's conventional truth is simply, and only, what is held to be in pre-critical, non-philosophical worldly commerce.

In fact, his view was quite different from this (*Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta*, 137a3 ff.). The *prthagjana* sees *saṃvṛti-mātra* (mere *saṃvṛti*), while strictly speaking the *ārya* sees only *paramārtha-satya*; however, conventionally (*tha-snyad-du*) one speaks of two *satyas* for him. At first glance it is easy to misunderstand Mi-bskyod rDo-rje on this point, partly because of Candrakīrti's own equivocation in VI.23 (say, in relation to VI.24–8). As we have seen with Padma dKar-po, the point is easier to understand in Vajrayāna: the *ārya* sees the illusory

body and the radiant light arising together (*sahaja*), and only conventionally can one speak of them separately; and this was just the foundation of Padma dKar-po's own criticism of Tsong-kha-pa.

Returning to the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, recall that the verse VI.23 (see note 73) says that a certain delusive cognition is called *saṃvṛti-satya*. When giving his own views (139b-145a), which he claims were shared by the earlier bKa'-gdams-pas, Mi-bskyod rDo-rje treats the distinction introduced by Candrakīrti at VI.23 as the distinction between *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*, with only secondary concern for whether they are *satyas* or not. Here he often uses the phrase *don-dam bden-pa* (so taking it for granted that *paramārtha* is *satya*) but it is hard to find an instance of *kun-rdzob* qualified as *bden-pa* (*satya*):¹²⁰

A thing such as a pot is just one thing, but fools speak of a *ngo-bo-nyid* and specifically ascribe various features which are attained and [all this is] *kun-rdzob*; while the āryas do not see this at all, and, seeing as though not seeing, it is said that they see *don-dam*. Only conventionally are there two *satyas*, for there is no difference of reference [i.e., one pot!], the difference is whether it is seen by an errant or a non-errant mind. . . . the āryas do not see the two *satyas* as two.

Throughout this discussion, Mi-bskyod rDo-rje insists on the importance of a cognition which is *spros-bral* (*niṣprapañca*), and we shall have much to say about this term later. We have seen also that Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje both held that *saṃvṛti-satya* (as distinct from mere *saṃvṛti*) is a matter mainly for the ārya. Our bKa'-bryud writers were not in dispute with Tsong-kha-pa on *these* points. The difference was over what was happening when the ārya had a moment of *niṣprapañca* or of *saṃvṛti-satya*. It will be easier to understand these differences and the reasons for them from a certain theoretical perspective which was carefully developed by Padma dKar-po, but which (if I have not missed something) Mi-bskyod rDo-rje only hints at now and then, while Tsong-kha-pa seems to have ignored it. I will develop this perspective with some care, since it enables us to focus on the critical point at which the *prthagjana* becomes an ārya, of which so much is made in some forms of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. In terms of the *lam-rim*, we are con-

cerned with the transition from the *prayoga-mārga* to the *darśana-mārga*. Since we are to speak of the arising of (non-discursive) understanding, some Tibetan texts label this topic *rtogs-pa'i 'char-tshul*; but Padma dKar-po treats it in a much broader perspective and does not use this phrase.

VI. Padma dKar-po on the Four Yogas and on Niṣprapañca

The 'Brug-pa bKa'-brgyud tradition makes much of a distinction according to which different people move along the path at different speeds. Roughly, the *cig-car-ba* is the "sudden" and the *rim-gyis-pa* the "gradual" type of person familiar from other forms of Buddhism. For certain purposes they also recognised an intermediate type, the *thod-rgal-ba*, for whom there was a certain structuring of *mahāmudrā* practice (or more exactly, of *rtogs-pa'i 'char-rshul*) called the "four yogas" (*rnal-'byor bzhi*). One of these four yogas is called precisely *spros-bral* (*niṣprapañca*). Since this word is used also for the goal in Madhyamaka, we might hope that Padma dKar-po's treatment of the four yogas would throw some light on our present concerns. This hope is indeed rewarded; but in order to make it clear what Padma dKar-po is talking about, a certain number of historical and doctrinal preliminaries must be disposed of. These are somewhat complex because the bKa'-brgyud-pas worked with two different conceptions of the relation between *mahāmudrā* and the *upāya-mārga*, to which we will now turn.

As a teacher, Mi-la-ras-pa used mainly the methods of the *upāya-mārga*. People who were not mature enough to receive *abhiṣeka* did not practice meditation with him. So in the tradition descending from his pupil Ras-chung rDo-rje-grags (1083–1161), the entire path of practice is structured according to the stages of the *upāya-mārga*. Here, the word *mahāmudrā* is used mainly for the goal (*phala*, 'bras-bu). The word *Ras-chung snyan-brgyud* is used both of the practices as thus structured, and of the lineage which propagated them. They came into the 'Brug-pa tradition quite early, because Gling-ras, before going to Phag-mo Gru-pa, was a pupil of Lo and Sum-pa, who had learnt the *snyan-brgyud* from Ras-chung's pupil Khyung-tshang Ras-pa.¹²¹

In contrast with this, Mi-la-ras-pa's other famous pupil,

sGam-po-pa, had practiced Madhyamaka to a high level with his bKa'-gdams-pa teachers before meeting Mi-la-ras-pa, from whom he therefore learnt only the advanced stages of the *upāya-mārga*. We have already seen how sGam-po-pa was willing to teach a sūtra- or pāramitā-based *mahāmudrā* to beginners, while reserving the *upāya-mārga* for the most advanced. So here the path is structured according to the different stages of *mahāmudrā* attainment, with the *upāya-mārga* coming in only at the end or for the very gifted. The structuring of the *upāya-mārga* suitable for such people is found in the *bsre-'pho* works of Padma dKar-po. Here the *upāya-mārga* is *sgom-pa*, the corresponding *lta-ba* being ground-*mahāmudra*, especially the method of *sahaja-yoga* (*lhan-cig skyes-sbyor*).¹²² Thus, the main Dwags-po bKa'-brgyud used a functional relationship between *mahāmudrā* and the *upāya-mārga* almost the opposite of that used in the Ras-chung snyan-brgyud.

In connection with the *upāya-mārga*, Padma dKar-po worked mainly with the two-fold distinction of *cig-car-ba* and *rim-gyis-pa*, the corresponding structures being given in the *bsre-'pho* cycle and in the *yid-bzhin nor-bu skor-gsum* of the *snyan-brgyud*.¹²³ But where the structuring relates to the level of *mahāmudrā* practice, three different kinds of person appear: *cig-car-ba*, *thod-rgal-ba*, and *rim-gyis-pa*. These are not correlated with the *yid-bzhin nor-bu skor-gsum* at all,¹²⁴ and their *mahāmudrā* practices are respectively *sahajayoga*, the “four yogas,” and the pāramitā methods of the *lam-rim*.

Padma dKar-po's criticisms of Tsong-kha-pa relate mainly to the most advanced stages of the path,¹²⁵ and so to the two higher types; he had no doubt that such people occur.¹²⁶ If Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, when stressing the need for *sahaja*, is speaking of the *cig-car-ba* then no doubt he is right; but then in criticising Tsong-kha-pa he may well be beating the air, since it is not clear that Tsong-kha-pa wrote for such persons or believed that there are any.

From a bKa'-brgyud-pa point of view, it seems more reasonable to suppose that Tsong-kha-pa was writing mainly for the *rim-gyis-pa*. After all, this type takes the path in graded stages not unlike those of the *lam-rim* and *sngags-rim*. The bKa'-brgyud-pas too have a *lam-rim*, based on the *Dwags-po chos-bzhi*;¹²⁷ in the end both types of *lam-rim* go back to Atiśa, of course. Now

it is not clear that Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticisms are relevant to this level; the *rim-gyis-pa* on the *sambhāra-mārga* or the *prayoga-mārga* cannot be expected to experience *sahaja*. Of course when the bKa'-brgyud-pas teach *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* to beginners they are taught separately; and it is not in respect of these methods that Mi-bskyod rDo-rje claims that Tsong-kha-pa's concept of *sūnyatā* is inadequate as a basis for *mokṣa*.¹²⁸ So we must look at the *darśana-mārga*, or rather at what happens or what changes on passage from the *prayoga-mārga* to the *darśana-mārga*. In focussing on this particular point, the *cig-car-ba* is of little interest, since with him "everything happens at once," while the divisions for the *rim-gyis-pa* seem pointlessly detailed and scholastic. The interesting case is the intermediate one, the *thod-rgal-ba*. His practices are structured according to the "four yogas," viz. *rtse-gcig* (*ekāgrata*), *spros-bral* (*niṣprapañca*), *ro-gcig* (*ekarasa*) and *sgom-med*. What is characteristic of the *thod-rgal-ba* is just the division into four; the *cig-car-ba* takes them all together, while the *rim-gyis-pa* divides them more finely.¹²⁹ The four yogas have a complex history and have been traced back to such Indian works as the *Vimalaprabhā* (by Padma dKar-po) and Nāropa's *Phyag-chen tshig-bsdus* (by Si-tu bsTan-pa'i Nyin-byed). I am not clear that as a single recognisable genre in *mahāmudrā* they go back beyond gTsang-pa rGya-ras, though quotations on the individual "yogas" are often attributed to earlier writers such as sGam-po-pa, sGom-chung, Zhang 'Tshal-pa, Phag-mo Gru-pa and others. The individual yogas (*rnal-'byor*) are not themselves particular methods of practice, in spite of the name, but rather aspects of the experiences associated with a range of practices at certain levels; the practices themselves may be taken either from the sūtras or the tantras, though sometimes the first two yogas are more associated with the sūtras and the last two with the tantras.

The *thod-rgal-ba* who practices the four yogas is assumed to have completed the *sambhāra-mārga*. Roughly speaking, *rtse-gcig* corresponds to the (end of the) *prayoga-mārga*, *spros-bral* to the *darśana-mārga*, *ro-gcig* to the *bhūvanā-mārga*, and *sgom-med* to the *aśaikṣa-mārga*.¹³⁰ There is also a correlation with the *bodhisattva-bhūmis*.¹³³ The *spros-bral* stage is of especial interest since this word is a name of the goal in Madhyamaka,¹³² but in a sense *ro-gcig* is simply the stabilizing of what has been reached for the

first time in *spros-bral* (just as suggested by the names of the *mārgas*, *darśana-* and *bhāvanā-*). Thus, some of Padma dKar-po's most interesting remarks on *spros-bral* will be found under the heading of *ro-gcig*.

Williams (1980) has rightly remarked that in Madhyamaka there is a close relation between *vikalpa* (*rnam-par rtog-pa*) and *prapañca* (*spros-pa*). Padma dKar-po does not seem to distinguish clearly between these two terms, which is why I have tended to render both by "discursiveness." Though Williams' observations are based on a wide range of Indian sources and not all are congenial to Padma dKar-po, the following seems helpful (p. 30):

... *prapañca* ... creates its own referent and thereby introduces the distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate referents. All *prapañcas* require referents, but necessarily the referents cannot be ultimate. It follows from this distinction that, regardless of the Madhyamaka position as stated in its texts, the absence of ultimate referents is not *in itself* sufficient to destroy *prapañcas*. What it does do is show the absurdity, the arbitrariness of being caught in a net which creates its own possibilities and which lacks any ultimate foundation. It is this absurdity which creates the tension leading to soteriological rather than discursive intellectual activity and which thereby requires the cessation of *prapañcas*.

Here, the word "referent" must not be taken too objectively, as Williams recognises later in the same passage by the use of the word "craving" (for *mngon-par zhen-pa*, a word also used by Padma dKar-po in this connection). Indeed one might say: it is *because* of this craving that the mere absence of the referents is not enough: one can perfectly well crave for something non-existent. The phrase "net of *prapañcas*" (*prapañcajālam*) is used by Candrakīrti,¹³³ and we will see Padma dKar-po similarly speaking of a "net of *kalpana*" (*rtog-pa'i dra-ba*), and of the lack of foundation (*gzhi*) or root (*rtsa-ba*) of the errancy (*'khrul-pa*) associated with such *kalpana*.

Padma dKar-po's *rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs* gives a very traditional view of the "four yogas" and is written for persons of "low intelligence."¹³⁴ It associates *rtse-gcig* with *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*; one can see from the *Phyag-chen zin-bris*, a much more sophisticated work, that he had qualms about this because of

the obvious link between *vipaśyanā* and *niṣprapañca*, but I cannot go into all this here. I shall give his summaries of the four yogas and extracts on *spros-bral*. Letters A, B . . . , a, b . . . in the margin facilitate reference to the Tibetan transcribed in Appendix B.

- A: Though *nges-don* (*nītārtha*) is experience and is impoverished by mere words, these words must now be spoken.¹³⁵
- B: The fleeting is truly known in the stationary; and if the stationary is firmly rooted in the fleeting, it is called falling into the gap between the stationary and the fleeting, and this is the true explanation of *rtse-gcig*.
- C: Confidence in freedom is attained in errancy; and if in freedom the evil hidden in errancy is recognised, it is called falling into the gap between errancy and freedom, and this is the true explanation of *spros-bral*.
- D: The presence of mind is recognised in appearance; and if in mind the arising of appearance is recognised, it is called falling into the gap between mind and appearance, and this is the true explanation of *ro-gcig*.
- E: *Prṣṭhalabdha* does not move away from the sphere (*ngang*) of *dharmatā*; and if in *samāhita* the relaxation of compassion appears, it is called falling into the gap between *samāhita* and *prṣṭhalabdha*; and this is the true explanation of *sgom-med*.

In these passages, “true” and “truly” translate *rang ngo* five times; “errancy” translates *’khrul-ba*, “recognise” translates *rig-pa*, and “fleeting” (for *’gyu-ba*) and “stationary” (for *gnas-pa*) are borrowed from Guenther.¹³⁶ The phrase *bar-lag ’gyel-ba* occurring in each of B–E does seem to mean literally, “to fall into the gap,” though Guenther has twice¹³⁷ rendered *’gyel-ba* in B by “to bridge.” Be that as it may, the phrase *bar-lag ’gyel-ba* is here surely a metaphor, and the doctrinal point is surely that *rtse-gcig* is something *between* or *connecting* the stationary and the fleeting; similarly for the other definitions. Now, some of Padma dKar-po’s remarks on *spros-bral*:¹³⁸

- a: Second, *spros-bral*: confidence of freedom is attained in errancy; and if in freedom the evil hidden in errancy is recognised, it is called falling into the gap between er-

rancy and freedom, and this is the true explanation of *spros-bral*.¹³⁹

- b: Whatever errancy arises, is cognised as lacking any root or foundation, and so one says that confidence of freedom is attained in errancy. Now an errant thing, different from what is cognised as lacking any root or foundation, is not attained, and so one says that in freedom the evil hidden in errancy is recognised.
- c: When one intuitively understands the *gnas-lugs* of everything, all understanding by mere *entia rationis*¹⁴⁰ and all doubts have been destroyed where they stand; and so one says that all imputations have been cut off from within.
- d: Further, in all the defiled things of errancy there is no experience of something existing; then understanding that errancy has no foundation is called understanding the *gnas-lugs* of errancy.
- e: Now if there is no errancy, there is no reason to free anybody from it, and so there is no attainment of nirvāṇa; and thus there is nothing called errancy and freedom or saṃsāra and nirvāṇa to be analysed, nor any analysis.
- f: Thus, since the *gnas-lugs* of all things from *rūpa* to *sarvajñā* is not established by means of a self-nature, they are not non-void; so analysing from the point of view of the non-void [the *Satyadvayāvatāra* says that] voidness is not established even a little by the failure to establish non-voidness. Accordingly it is impossible to give an analysis into anything, and this point of view (*lta-ba*) is said not to postulate anything.
- g: The explanation of *tha-mal-gyi shes-pa* is this: nowadays, through many failures of understanding, people think that *tha-mal-gyi shes-pa* turns the mind to evil or to suffering or to the destruction of suffering. This is a great fault which would be avoided merely by paying attention to the science of grammar.
- h: [For the Sanskrit] word *prākṛta* becomes *rang-bzhin* or *tha-mal* [and so *tha-mal-gyi shes-pa*] is equivalent to *rang-bzhin-gyi shes-pa* [i.e., “natural cognition”].
- j: This natural cognition has been given many names, such as *prakṛti-prabhāsvara* and “ground-*mahāmudrā*”; and in works on the tantras it is known as *svabhāva-sahaja* [cf. Appendix A].

- k: Some people explain this by saying that [this natural cognition] has *sūnyatā* for its object and *prakṛti-prabhāsvara* for the owner of the object and that these two rise together (*sahaja*). But in the language of experience [which I prefer, natural cognition is] a free-rising awareness (*thol-skyes-kyi rig-pa*) which just cognises clearly without interrupting the understanding. If this in turn is misunderstood (*ngo ma-shes-pa*) there is *saṃsāra*, while if it is understood there is *nirvāṇa*; but in itself it is quite impartial. Its basis (*ngo-bo*) is *mahāsukha*, while the owner of the object is *sarvākāravāropetaśūnyatā*, these two being [related in] *yuganaddha*.
- l: Thus [natural cognition] becomes the foundation of both *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. The *Hevajra-tantra* says [II.iv. 32,34] “This is *saṃsāra*, this is *nirvāṇa*,” and “. . . it has the form of *saṃsāra* since it is obscured, but without obscuration *saṃsāra* is purified.”
- m: So this [natural cognition] is what is explained to be the common referent (*mtshan-gzhi*) of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*.
- n: But might it not be thought to be wrong to explain natural cognition (*tha-mal-gyi shes-pa*) in terms of a free-rising awareness (*thol-skyes-kyi rig-pa*)?
- p: This free-rising awareness is not something which arises (*byung-ba*) newly [on each occasion]. The previous *kalpana* (*rtog-pa*) has subsided, and before the next one arises (*skyes-pa*), this awareness can rise (*shar-ba*) and that is why it is called a [free-rising awareness]. It rises continuously (*shar shar-ba*) at all times, but generally it is not manifest because it is obscured by the net of *kalpana*.
- This important passage offers considerable difficulties in translation. The last phrase reads *rtogs-pa'i dra-bas* in all editions, which needs amendment to *rtog-pa'i dra-bas* in order to make sense. I have translated the causal terms *skye-ba* and *byung-ba* by “arise,” but *shar-ba* literally by “rise,” except that in *thol-skyes-kyi rig-pa* I have taken Padma dKar-po’s explanation into account, following Guenther, in translating *skyes* by “rising.”
- q: Before *gnas-lugs* is understood, the mind (*blo, mati*) affects everything and there is no firmness. When *gnas-lugs* has been understood, the point (*don*) is not inconsistent

with the bare words. If it is claimed that now the view (*lta-ba*) has been established in accordance with things as they are (*ji-lta-ba bzhin*), it may be replied that there should be an intuitive (*mngon-sum*) understanding, with view and understanding [appropriately] connected.

- r: But the really important point is that the view should be understood without reference to any scripture or logic; for it is said specifically to rise (*shar-ba*) from within.

The last of these remarks by Padma-dKar-po explains why he pays so little attention to the status of the obscurations and why he calls them (more or less indifferently, it seems) *rtog-pa* (*kalpana*), *nam-par rtog-pa* (*vikalpa*) and sometimes *spros-pa* (*prapañca*). He is concerned with the epistemic status only in that they *lack* any root or foundation [b]; so it would be a step backwards to give them a status of some kind, even provisionally (*drang-don-du*) or conventionally (*tha-snyad-du*), which establishes them as *being* something or other [cf. r]. On this model the ārya is a person who can see through the gaps between the obscurations (Padma dKar-po frequently¹⁴¹ uses the analogy of the sun shining through gaps in the clouds). The *prthagjana* has so many obscurations that he cannot see through them at all. On this model it is easy to see why the first moment of insight (*darśana*) is so important for various traditions of Buddhism.

Following *spros-bral*, the next stage of the “four yogas” is *ro-gcig*, defined in passage D above. This stage stabilises the experience of *spros-bral* as just discussed.¹⁴² A quick glimpse at the *ro-gcig* stage will enable us connect the “four yogas” more firmly with the main topics of this paper. Padma dKar-po says:¹⁴³

How does one practice *ro-gcig*? At the time of *spros-bral*, all appearances either were or were not understood as mind-as-such.¹⁴⁴ If they were so understood, then there is no difference between *ro-gcig* and this practice of *spros-bral*. . . . At the time of *ro-gcig*, appearance . . . and mind both have the same taste (*ro*), or one says that appearance has risen in meditation. However, this mixing of mind and appearance is not like the dissolution of salt in water . . . Further, at the time of mere appearance nothing is established, and whatever is not established rises as mere appearance. This is *snang-stong zung-'jug* or *snang-stong lhan-skyes* [cf. Appendix A] . . . *gdangs* or *rtsal* or what has attained the status

of the illusory body is *saṃvṛti-satya*, while not moving away from *gshis* or *prakṛti-prabhāsvāra* is *paramārtha-satya*. The point of *zung-'jug* (*yuganaddha*) is that these two can never be cognised separately. This is the *zung-'jug* or the inseparability of the two *satyas*, while teaching the “white” Dharma of charity and so forth out of the sphere (*ngang*) of *sūnyatā* or *animitta* is called *thabs-shes zung-'jug*.

While it is easy to understand Padma dKar-po's discussion of *spros-bral* without dependence on Vajrayāna terms, that is not possible with this passage. In this sense, the topic of *spros-bral* can be seen as a bridge between Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna or between the more theoretical or philosophical and the more practical or meditational or strictly religious. The further pursuit of this connection will demand a more careful analysis of the Vajrayāna terms for their own sake than is possible here. This paper will have achieved one of its main aims if the reader is now persuaded that in Tibet, Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna go together. The exact way in which they do so varies among the different schools; what is presented here, of course, is mainly the point of view of the bKa'-brgyud-pas,¹⁴⁵ and the way the bKa'-brgyud-pas saw their opponents. The detailed views of the other schools themselves must be pursued elsewhere.

APPENDIX A

The following passage is found in the *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, 49b4–50b6:

- b4 /de'i phyir snang-sems gnyis-su 'byed mi-shes-pa snang-sems dbyer-med-kyi don-
 no/ /gnas 'di-la dgongs-nas brtag-gnyis-su/ (HT I.x.41–2)
 lhan-cig skyes-pa gang skyes-pa//lhan-cig skyes-pa de brjod-byal
 /rang-bzhin lhan-cig skyes zhes brjod//rnam-pa thams-cad sdom-pa gcig/
 /phyag-rgya rgyu dang bral-ba-las//yo-gi snying-rje thabs-su 'gyur/
 /zhes gsungs-pa'i rkaṅ-pa dang-po gnyis-kyi don ni ji-ltar sna-tshogs-su smras-
 pa'i nges-don/ snang (50a) stong/ gsal-stong/ bde-stong/ rig-stong sogs-te snang-
 ba dang stong-pa lhan-cig-tu skyes-pa'i phyir snang-stong lhan-skyes-sogs-su
 bzhag-pa'ol /'di'i don-la zhib-mor dpyad-pa gnad-du che'ol
- a2 /de yang dge-ldan-pa/ rang-bzhin-med-pa'i don-gyis don-dam-par cang med mo
 gsham-gyi bu lta-bu dang/ rang-bzhin-med-pa'i don-gyis kun-rdzob-tu dngos-po
 thams-cad med-par nam yang mi-'gyur-ba zhiḡ stel/ de'i rgyu-mtshan gyis snang-
 bas yod-mtha dang/ stong-pas med-mtha sel-lo zhes-zer-rol /'di ni rtag-chad gnyis-

ka'i phyogs-su lhung-ba ste/ don-dam chad-pa dang/ kun-rdzob rtag-ltar song zhing phyogs gnyis-su gzung rung bsdad-pas gzhi gcig-gi steng-du phyogs-lhung sel ma-shes-sol

- a4 */de-tsam legs-ldan chen-po tshangs-pa'i glu-las kyang byung ste/ dngos-pos bden-pa yod ma-yin/ mi-bden dngos-por med ma-yin/ de-dag gnyis-kyi mtha mthong-bal/ de ni nga-nyid mthong-ba'o/ lzhes dang/ gzhi tha-dad-pa'i rtag-chad sel-ba ni 'jig-rten-pa'i yang-dag-pa'i lta-ba-la yang yod ste/ las-bras yod-par bllas-pas rgyung-'phen-la-sogs-pa'i phyogs bsal-bal' (50b) bdag rtag-pa shes rig sogs-su mi-smra-bas rtag-pa'i phyogs bsal-ba yin-nol/ phyi-ma nil 'jug-par/ (MMV VI.25) mi-shes gnyid-kyis rab-bskyod mu-stegs-can/ rnam-s-kyis bdag-nyid ji-bzhin btags-pa dang/ lsgyu-ma smig-sgyu-sogs-la btags-pa gang/ de-dag 'jig-rten-las kyang yod min nyid/ lces-pas-sol*
- b2 */de'i phyir de-tsam dbu-mar mi-'gyur-lal de'i bden-pa gnyis-su'ang rang-bzhin med-pa'i phyir/ de-dag rtag-pa ma-yin chad-pa min/ lzhes dang/ rim-lnga'i/ (PK VI.2 and VI.13) 'khor-ba dang ni mya-ngan-'das/ rtag-pa gnyis-po spangs-nas ni/ lgang-du dngos-po gcig gyur-lal/ zung-du 'jug ces de-la bshad/ lces dang/ kun-rdzob dang ni don-dam-dag/ so-so'i chu ni shes gyur-nas/ lgang-du yang-dag 'dres gyur-pal/ zung-du 'jug ces de-la bshad/ lces gnod-pa'i ri bsnyil-lol*
- b5 */sa dkar phal-mo-chel/ gshis bden-pa dang bral-zhing/ gdangs rdzum-pa dang bral-bas bden-gnyis dbyer-med dang/ khyag-rom dang chu bzhin snang bzhin-du stong stong bzhin-du snang-bas snang-stong zung-'jug zer-rol*

APPENDIX B

The following passages are taken from the *rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs*. Passages A-E open the work; passages a-r are taken from the *spros-bral* section.

- A: */nges-pa'i don nyams-su myong yang/ l'tshig-tsam-gyis phongs-pa de-dag-la 'di-skad-du smra-bar bya'o/ (1b1)*
- B: */gnas-thog-tu 'gyu-ba'i rang ngo shes/ l'gyu-thog-tu gnas-pa'i rang so tshugs-na, gnas-'gyu'i bar-lag 'gyel-ba zhes-bya ste/ rtse-gcig-gi rang ngo-'phrod-pa yin-nol/ (1b2)*
- C: */khrul-thog-tu grol-ba'i gdengs rnyed/ l'grol-thog-tu 'khrul-pa'i mtshang rig-na, 'khrul-grol-gyi bar-lag 'gyel-ba zhes-bya ste/ spros-bral-gi rang ngo-'phrod-pa yin-nol/ (1b3)*
- D: */snang-thog-tu sems-kyi 'dug-tshul rig/ l'sems-thog-tu snang-ba'i 'char-tshul rtogs-na, snang-sems-kyi bar-lag 'gyel-ba zhes-bya ste/ ro-gcig-gi rang ngo-'phrod-pa yin-nol/ (1b4)*
- E: */rjes-thob chos-nyid-kyi ngang-las mi-g.yol/ l'mnyam-gzhag-tu thugs-rje'i klong brdol-na/ mnyam-rjes-kyi bar-lag 'gyel-ba zhes-bya ste/ sgom-med-kyi rang ngo-'phrod-pa yin-nol/ (1b5)*

- a: /gnyis-pa 'khrul-thog-tu grol-ba'i gdengs rnyed/ etc. as in C. (9a3-4)
- b: /'khrul-pa gang shar-gyi thog-tu de-nyid gzhi-med rtsa-bral-du shes-pas/ 'khrul-thog-tu grol-ba'i gdengs rnyed-pa zhes-byal gzhi-med rtsa-bral-du shes-pa de-las phyin-chad 'khrul-pa'i chos gtan mi-rnyed-pa ni, grol-thog-tu 'khrul-pa'i mtshang rig-pa zhes-bya'o/ (9a4-5)
- c: /chos thams-cad-kyi gnas-lugs mngon-sum-du rtogs-pas/ don-spyi-tsam-gyis go-ba dang/ the-tshom thams-cad rang-sar zhi-g-pas sgro-'dogs nang-nas chod-pa zhes-bya'o/ (10a4-5)
- d: /gzhan yang 'khrul-pa kun-nas nyon-mongs-kyi chos thams-cad 'ga yang yod ma myong-bas 'khrul-pa gzhi-med-du rtogs-pa-la 'khrul-pa'i gnas-lugs rtogs-pa zhes-bya/ (10a6)
- e: 'khrul-pa med-na de-las grol rgyu ci yod-del/ med-pas mya-ngan-las-'das-pa'i chos ci yang mi-rnyed/ de-nas 'khrul-pa dang grol-ba'am/ 'khor-ba dang mya-ngan-las-'das-pa zhes bzhag-bya 'jog-byed dang bral-ba de yin-nol/ (10b1)
- f: /de-ltar gzugs-nas rnam-pa-thams-cad-mkhyen-pa'i bar-gyi chos thams-cad-kyi gnas-lugs rang-bzhin-gyis ma-grub-pa'i phyir mi-stong-pa ma-yin/ stong-pa yang stong-pa-ma-yin-pa-la bltos-nas bzhag-pa'i phyir/ mi-stong-pa cung-zad ma-grub-pas/ stong-pa-nyid ces-bya-ba cung-zad ma-grub/ de-bas-na gang-du yang 'jog ma-nus-pa de-la lta-ba khas-len dang bral-ba zhes btags-pa yin-nol/ (10b4-6)
- g: /lha-mal-gyi shes-pa zhes-bya-ba-la/ deng-sang ma-go-ba mang-pos ngan-pa sdug sdug-zhig-la blo gtod-kyi 'dug stel de-'dra sgra rig-pa'i phyogs-tsam-la yang ma-phyin-pa'i skyon chen-po yin-tel/ (11a3-4)
- h: /prākṛta zhes-pa rang-bzhin na'am tha-mal-la 'jug-pas/ rang-bzhin-gyi shes-pa zhes-bya-ba yin-nol/ (11a4-5)
- j: /tha-mal shes-pa de-la 'ga'-zhig-tu rang-bzhin 'od-gsal/ la-lar gzhi phyag-rgya chen-po-sogs ming mtha-yas mod/ de-nyid sngags-gzhuung-du rang-bzhin lhan-skyes zhes-bya-bar grags-so/ (11a6-b1)
- k: /de ni yul stong-nyid dang/ yul-can rang-bzhin 'od-gsal lhan-cig skyes-pa-la bshad kyand/ myong-ba'i skad-na/ shes-pa gsal-la go-ma-'gags-tsam-gyi thol-skyes-kyi rig-pa 'di-nyid yin-lal/ de ngo ma-shes-pa 'khor-bal/ shes-pa myang-'das/ kho-rang ni gang-gi phyogs-su yang-ma-chad/ ngo-bo bde-ba chen-po/ yul-can rnam-pa-kun-gyi mchog dang ldan-pa'i stong-pa-nyid dang zung-du 'jug-pa yin-nol/ de-tsam-las tshig-tu brjod mi-nus-te/ (11b1-3)
- l: /de-bas-na 'di ni 'khor-'das gnyis-ka'i gzhir gyur-par/ brtag-gnyis-las/ (HT II.iv.32, 34)
'di-nyid 'khor-ba zhes-bya stel/ 'di-nyid mya-ngan-'das-pa-yin/ lzhes dang/ rmongs-phyir 'khor-ba'i gzugs-can-te/ rmongs-med 'khor-ba dag-pa yin/ (11b4-5)
- m: /des 'khor-'das mtshan-gzhi gcig-tu bshad-pa'i mtshan-gzhi de ni 'di yin-nol/ (11b5)
- n: /o-na rang-bzhin-gyi shes-pa de-la thol-skyes-kyi rig-par bshad-pa rigs-pa ma-yin-no, snyam-nal/ (11b5-6)
- p: /thol-skyes zhes gsar-du byung-ba ma-yin kyang/ rtog-pa snga-ma 'gags/ phyi-ma ma-skyes-pa'i bar-du sgrub-med-du shar-bas de skad-du brjod-cing/ de-nyid dus thams-cad-du shar shar-ba yin kyang/ phal-cher rtogs (read: rtog) pa'i dra-bas bsgrigs-pas ma mngon-pa stel/ (11b6-12a1)

- q: *gnas-lugs ma-rtogs bar-du ni thams-cad blos byas 'ba'-zhig yin-pas glad mi-thub/ gnas-lugs rtogs-na ni tshig-tsam-las don-la mi-mthun-pa mi-srid/ lta-ba ji-lta-ba bzhin gtan-la phebs-par 'dod-na ni/ mngon-sum-du rtogs dgos-pas lta-ba dang rtogs-pa 'brel-ba zhes-zer-ba dang/ (12b4–5)*
- r: *lta-ba lung rigs-la ma-bltos-par rtogs-pa nang-nas shar-ba'i khyad-par zhes gsungs-pa shin-tu gnad che-ba yin-no/ (12b5–6)*

APPENDIX C

STRUCTURE OF THE NGES-DON GRUB-PA'I SHING-RTA (principal headings only)

(gzung-'dzin gnyis-su med-pa) rang-lugs bzhag-pa-la bzhi

- dam-pa'i chos-kyi 'khor-lo ngos-gzung, 6b6*
de spyod-pa'i gnyen-por bskor-ba'i tshul bstan-pa-la-gsum
drang-don-du drang-nges thams-cad-du gsungs-tshul, 7b4
nges-don-du ci yang ma-gsungs-pa'i tshul, 11b3
yang-dag-par na de gnyis mi-'gal-bar bstan-pa, 12b1
bskor-ba yang theg-pa gsum dang gnas-pa bzhir phye-ba-la gnyis
theg-pa gsum, 13a6
gnas-pa bzhi
bye-brag-tu smra-ba, 16a6
mdo-sde-pa, 17b3
sems-tsam-pa, 19b5
dbu-ma-pa-la gnyis
sgyu-ma lta-bu, 21b5
rab-tu mi-gnas-pa-la gnyis
rang-rgyud-pa, 23a6
thal-'gyur-pa, 25a6
- de-las skabs-kyi bshad-bya dbu-ma gtan-la phab-pa-la gsum*
GZHI DBU-MA BDEN-GNYIS ZUNG-'JUG-TU THAG-BCAD la gsum
gzhi bden-pa gnyis-su gnas-pa'i tshul, 29b5
gnas-pa ltar gnyis-su phye-ba'i dgos-pa, 33a6
dgos-pa-can-gyi bden-pa gnyis so-sor gtan-la phab-pa-la gsum
kun-rdzob-kyi bden-pa, 35b6
don-dam-pa'i bden-pa, 41b1 (not divided)
de gnyis zung-'jug-tu gtan-la phab-pa, 66a6
- LAM DBU-MA THABS-SHES ZUNG-'JUG-TU NYAMS-SU BLANG-BA-la gsum*
rten-cing 'brel-bar 'byung-ba dbu-ma'i lam-du bstan, 68a3
de yang-dag-pa'i gdams-ngag-gi nyams-su bstan-tshul, 69a3
des mngon-par rtogs-pa'i sa nmam-par phye-ba, 75b6
- 'BRAS-BU DBU-MA SKU-GNYIS ZUNG-'JUG MNGON-DU BYA-BA, 99a4*

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 HT: *Hevajatantra*, ed. and trans. Snellgrove
 KT: *Kālacakratāntra*, Skt. and Tib. ed. Lokesh Chandra
 Lank.: *Lañkāvatārasūtra*, ed. Vaidya
 MK: *Madhyamakakārikās*, in PSP
 MMV: *Madhyamakāvātāra*, sDe-dge
 PK: *Pañcakrama*: Skt. ed. Poussin, Tib. Peking
 PSP: *Prasannapadā*, ed. Poussin
 PSPT, Tib. of PSP, sDe-dge

Tibetan Works

Each entry is introduced by the Tibetan phrase, *in italics*, by means of which it is identified in the body of the paper. The name of the author is then given, followed by the full title (if necessary), and some indication of the edition used, if there are several.

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- gZhung-'grel* by Padma dKar-po: *Jo-bo Nā-ro-pa'i khyad-chos bsre-'pho'i gzhung-'grel rdo-rje-chang gi dgongs-pa gsal-bar byed-pa*, rTsi-bri ed.
- Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho* by Dol-po-pa Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan
- Lam-bsdu* by Padma dKar-po: collection of short works on *bsre-'pho* topics, of which the first is called *bsre-'pho lam dbye-bsdu*; rTsi-bri ed.
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NOTES

1. For example, Mi-la-ras-pa is a writer of more philosophical interest and acuity than is sometimes thought. After all, philosophy is not only analysis. As a stylist, he is both a good and a popular writer, and even his most informal writings show a nice grasp of technical Buddhist terms. It is not surprising that Padma dKar-po used one of his works as a *gzhung* for the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rua*. The interaction between philosophy and popular culture is something which we do not yet understand well, even in the Western case. If such questions are ever studied in the Tibetan context, Mi-la-ras-pa is likely to be an interesting subject.

2. The main root-text of the *dgongs-gcig yig-cha* cycle is the *rTsa-tshig rdo-rje'i gsung brgya lnga-bcu-pa*, essentially by 'Jig-rten mGon-po. Together with a number of other short root-texts, it is found both in the *gDams-ngag-mdzod* (vol. 9) and in the *yig-cha* itself (reprinted, e.g., Bir 1975, tracing from the 16th Cent. 'Bri-gung blockprints). According to BA 604-7, the main commentatorial part of the *yig-cha* and the reduction of 'Jig-rten mGon-po's original 190 aphorisms to 150 are the work of his pupil (not nephew) dBon Shes-rab 'byung-gnas (1187–1241) who was abbot of 'Bri-gung in 1222–34; the texts were written down in 1226.

3. The standard source of the *dKar-po chig-thub* idea in *mahāmudrā* is no doubt the *Phyag-chen lam-mchog mihar-thug* of Zhang brTson-'grus Darma-grags (1123–93), reprinted in both the rTsi-bri Par-ma and in the *gDams-ngag-mdzod*, vol. 8. Padma dKar-po shows how the *dKar-po chig-thub* rests on Indian sources, at the same time refuting Sa-skya Paṇḍita, in *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 40b3 ff.

4. Full and abbreviated titles of Tibetan works mentioned frequently in the text may be found in the bibliography.

5. Williams (1983).

6. This was an ancestor of the present paper.

7. Ruegg (1983).

8. This remark is meant to be tautologous. I am using "bKa'-brgyud" to mean just "Dwags-po bKa'-brgyud."

9. This is so even for Candrakīrti. It is hard to find specific instances of *saṃvṛti-satya* in the *Prasannapādā*, and though *paramārtha-satya* is there closely related to *sūnyatā* and to *pratītyasamutpāda*, these are themselves very general notions.

10. 'Khor-lo *sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad*, 5b5: *don mdo-sngags dgongs-pa grig/ dngos zin-la khyad yod-de, mdir-bstan rgyas-bshad lta-bu/*.

10a. In Table 1 and the remarks following it, we see that in the mother-tantras great bliss (*mahāsukha*) is taken as *paramārtha-satya*, while voidness endowed with all qualities (*sarvākāravāropeta-sūnyatā*) is taken as *saṃvṛti-satya*, according to Padma dKar-po. There can be no doubt at all that this was his view, e.g., (*Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 47b): *des-na gshis-kyi dbang-du byas-nas 'gyur-ba-med-pa'i bde-ba-chen-po bzhag/ lgdangs-kyi dbang-du byas-nas rnam-pa'i mchog thams-cad-dang-ldan-pa'i stong-pa-nyid bzhag/ ldang-po don-dam/ gnyis-pa kun-rdzob/ des-na kun-rdzob rgyu'am thabs/ don-dam 'bras-bu'am thabs-byung/* . . . That Padma dKar-po held this view has been correctly pointed out at least twice by Guenther, in his essays "The Concept of Mind in Buddhist Tantrism" and "The Levels of Understanding in Buddhism" [see Guenther (1977) pp. 57 and 66], in both cases on the basis of this very passage. See also *Lam-bdus* 97b6, 101a2. The idea is fundamental in Padma dKar-po's thought, and is entwined with his views on the role of the two *satyas* in the *Kālacakra-tantra*. See his *mChog-gi dang-po'i sangs-rgyas rnam-par phye-ba gsang-ba thams-cad bshad-pa'i mdzod*, especially 145b–155a.

11. Since this paper does not offer a full account of *yuganaddha* (or even of Padma dKar-po's view of it), it would be vexatious to go into the details of Guenther's account. He has tried to explain *yuganaddha* independ-

ently of Madhyamaka notions. I have found this impossible, and I believe the matters dealt with in this paper are an essential preliminary to a full treatment of Padma dKar-po's conception of *yuganaddha*, which I will give elsewhere (see Broido (1984)).

12. *Deb-ther sngon-po* 141b3, quoted up to here by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rtal/763/de-ltar dpal dwags-po bka-brgyud ces grags-pa 'di ni tshig-gi brgyud-pa ma-yin-gyi, don-gyi brgyud-pa yin-lal donyang phyag-rgya chen-po dri-ma-med-pa'i rtogs-pa'i brgyud-pa yin-tel bla-ma gang-las phyag-rgya chen-po'i rtogs-pa thob-pa de-la rtsa-ba'i bla-ma'o zhes rnam-par 'jog go!* Most of the topics mentioned by 'Gos gZhon-nu-dpal in the remainder of this passage are also taken up by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, but with some important changes. Roerich's translation (BA 724–5) is adequate (apart from the misidentification of the *Theg-pa chen-po rgyud bla-ma'i bstan-bcos* as a tantra).

13. *rtsa-ba'i bla-ma, mūlaguru, root-guru.*

14. *pha-rol-tu-phyin-pa'i lugs.*

15. Phag-mo Gru-pa rDo-rje rGyal-po (1110–1170) was the principal disciple of sGam-po-pa.

16. 'Bri-gung sKyob-pa 'Jig-rten mGon-po (1143–1217), the founder of the 'Bri-gung tradition of the bKa'-brgyud, was among Phag-mo Gru-pa's principal disciples.

17. The reference is probably to Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga' rGyal-mtshan (1182–1251).

18. *ye-shes.*

19. *so-so'i skye-bo, prthagjana.*

20. *dbang-po rab*: the text frequently distinguishes among sharp, average and poor (*rab, 'bring, tha-ma*) intellect or senses.

21. *khyad-par gsum-dang-ldan-pa'i de-bzhin-nyid.* The three features are probably *bde-ba* (happiness), *gsal-ba* (clarity), and *mi-rtog-pa* (absence of discursiveness).

22. See note 7.

23. *bzhed-pa.*

24. *Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan, 81a4.*

25. *Ibid., 31b–32a.*

26. *Phag-gru'i zhus-lan, 3b2.*

27. sGam-po-pa's view of the *cig-car-bal/rim-gyis-pa* distinction is based on differences in the degree of purification (*Phag-gru'i zhus-lan, 3a3*); see also Broido (1979).

28. *Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan, 82a4.* sGam-po-pa's very interesting views on the *lta-bal/sgom-pa* distinction are developed at more length at 77b1 ff.

29. Part of the point of *ma-bcos-pa* goes beyond "non-contingent"; cf. *Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan, 77b6: bcos-na rtog-pa yin-pas, ma-bcos-pa gal-chel/de'i ngang-las rtog-pa hyung-na mi-spangl.*

30. Cognition (*shes-pa*) is contrasted with awareness (*ye-shes*); the Skt. for both is *jñāna*. These English equivalents are quite rough and pre-analytical.

31. *blo'i yul-las 'das-pa* (cf. BCA IX.2).

32. *khas-len-dang-bral-ba* (from the verb *khas-len-pa*, Skt. *abhyupagam-*).

33. *Phag-gru'i zhus-lan, 4a2 ff., extracts.* The passage also quotes HT

I.viii.36 and I.v.11. Cf. *rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs*, 10b4 (passage f of Appendix B).

34. This row gives the main divisions of the Prāsaṅgika section of the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* (cf. Appendix C).

35. This row gives the main divisions of the *cig-car-ba* section of the *gzhung-'grel*.

36. *Khor-lo sdom-pa'i rnam-bshad*, 5b4 and 8a3 (lit. "one artha").

37. Ibid. 5b4 (lit. "a view with one artha").

38. Ibid. 5b5 and 8a4 (lit. "one intention"; here more comparable with Skt. *prayojana* than say *abhiprāya*; cf. Broido (1983)).

39. Ibid. 6a3.

40. Ibid. 6a1.

41. Ibid. 5b5.

42. Ibid. 5b4.

43. Ibid. 8b1; cf. *Kālacakratāntra* III.100 ff.

44. Ibid. 6a3.

45. Ibid. 5b3, 6a3.

46. Ibid. 5a5, 6a3. However Mi-bskyod rDo-rje appears to accept what Padma dKar-po rejects, even quoting the same verse by Maitripa (*Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta*, 5ab). This appearance of disagreement is another trap; Padma dKar-po is here concerned with the claim that the *bla-ma*'s instruction (really: the Vajrayāna) is essential, while Mi-bskyod rDo-rje wishes to uphold the *amanasikāra* writings of Maitripa. For Padma dKar-po on these writings, see *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 16a3 ff. where they are also listed and classified. However, Mi-bskyod rDo-rje does not seem to say clearly that the goal-conception is the same in sūtras and mantras or that one does in fact reach the same goal.

47. *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta*, 9b5.

48. Ibid. 10a3; probably Dol-po-pa Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan (1292–1361).

49. Ibid. 10a6.

50. Ibid. 11a1: Bo-dong-pa chen-po (Rin-chen rTse-mo? Phyogs-las rNam-rgyal?).

51. Ibid. 11a4.

52. Seyfort Ruegg's interesting paper (Ruegg 1983) concentrates mainly on the lineages, and is less concerned with Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's doctrinal summary or with his attempts to refute the competing views of the sūtra/mantra relation in the introduction to the *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta*.

53. Refutation of Jo-nang-pa, *ibid.* 11b2–13b3; of Śākya mchog-ldan, 13b3–27b4; of Bo-dong-pa 27b4–30b6; of Tsong-kha-pa, 30b6–32b5.

54. Strictly speaking, this should apply in the mother-tantras.

55. Ibid. 9b6: *rang-byung-du spros-bral rnam-kun-mchog-ldan-gyi stong-nyid-kyi lta-ba*.

56. Ibid. 9b4–6.

57. Ibid. 9b5: *mtha'-'dzin dang spros-'dzin-gyi dgag-bya bkag-nas, bsgrub-bya ci yang mi-sgrub-pa'i spros-bral-gyi cha-nas khyad-par-med*.

58. These words are scattered through *ibid.* 10a3–6, but the position

is well-known from other quotations and from the *Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho*.

59. *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta*, 11b4.

60. Ibid. 10a6.

61. Ibid. 10b2.

62. Cf. ibid. 16b5; *gzung-'dzin-gyi don-gyi ngo khyad 'dzin-pa-med-pas, mam-shes sa'am rig-pa'i don-la zhugs-pas shes-tsam de-la ye-shes-su btags-nas, de don-dam bden-grub-tu rlom-pa des 'Jam-dpal-te gnas-lugs-kyi don ma-rtogs-pa-nyid-du gsungs-sol*.

63. Ibid. 11a1.

64. Ibid. 29b2 and b6.

65. Ibid. 11a4: *blo rtog-pas phar bzhaq-min-pa'i yul rang ngo-nas grub-pa'i bden-grub-kyis stong-pa'i stong-nyid-la mdo-sngags-kyi dbu-ma'i lta-ba*.

66. Ibid. 31a1.

67. *tha-snyad tshad-grub*, ibid.

68. In "*Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*," "*nges-don*" may be a comment on the title of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's work (*Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta*).

69. *yuganaddha* (*zung-'jug*) has been differently interpreted. See below.

70. *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*, 30b5.

71. *don-dam-pa ni yang-dag-par gzigs-pa-rnams-kyi ye-shes-kyi khyad-par-gyi yul-nyid-kyis bdag-gi ngo-bo rnyed-par yin-gyi* . . . Exactly this form is found in the sDe-dge ed. of MMV (34a6); in Poussin's ed. (p. 102); and in the *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* (for once expressly signalled as a quotation, 33a5). In Tsong-kha-pa's *Rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho* the corresponding passage is again expressly signalled as a quotation, and differs only by the phrase *rang-gi bdag-gi ngo-bo* for *bdag-gi ngo-bo* (242a4).

72. *de-nyid* (*tattva* in the verse).

73. The Sanskrit of MMV VI.23 is quoted in BCAP (174):

*samyagmrśādarśanalabdhabhāvam
rūpadvayam bibhrati sarvabhāvāḥ |
samyagdrśām yo viśayaḥ sa tattvam
mrśādrśām samvrtisatyam uktam ||*

74. J.R. Searle, *Intentionality*, (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1983), p. 43.

75. *Ratnavālī* II.4a, quoted and discussed in Ruegg (1981).

76. MMV VI.28 and *bhāṣya* on it, quoted at length in *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*, 36b6 ff. As Williams (1979) has pointed out, this absence of *satya* in the case of the *prthagjana* has been emphasized by Tsong-kha-pa; but it holds equally good for the bKa'-brgyud-pas.

77. MK XXIV.8 and PSP on it, quoted *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta* 30b2. Padma dKar-po (ibid.) emphasizes that Mi-la-ras-pa makes the same point (op. cit. 3a3 ff.).

78. Compare Table 2, which relates to the *darśana-mārga* and levels above it.

79. Candrakīrti on MMV VI.181–2 quotes a sūtra thus: *gang-gi dbang-du mdzad-nas bcom-ldan 'das-kyis de-bzhin-gshegs-pa-rnams byung yang rung/ ma-byung yang rung/ chos-rnams-kyi chos-nyid 'di ni gnas-pa-nyid-do zhes rgyas-par gsungs-pa chos-nyid ces-bya-ba ni yod-dol* Cf. Lañk. 58.26: *utpādād vā tathāgatānām unuṭpādād*

vā tathāgatānām sthitaivaiśāṃ dharmānām dharmatā dharmasthititā dharmaniyāmatā/

80. Lañk., *ibid.* What is important in all these passages is the insistence that certain features of experience persist through the changing states of the experiencing subject. Later we will see that the bKa'-brgyud-pas held that a similar kind of persistence can hold for the *objects* of experience (such as a pot). Now in a general sort of way it is this kind of persistence which is the necessary ground for a distinction between facts of experience or facts about the world, and other kinds of facts (say facts of language). We will see that a distinction of this type, even though expressed unclearly and in quite unfamiliar language, is an important feature of bKa'-brgyud-pa thought.

81. *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*, 42b3. The repudiation of these claims is there said to be found in MMV, but I do not know where.

82. BCAP 175.21: *vastutastu paramārtha eva ekam satyam . . .* (and, quoting a sūtra:) *ekameva bhikṣavaḥ paramaṃ satyam yaduta apramośadharmā nirvāṇam, etc.* (*This is not quite the same as the passage at PSP 41.4.*) *In the same vein, Padma dKar-po says that ultimately (paramārthatas) there are not two satyas (don-dam-par bden-pa gnyis yod-pa ma-yin-te, etc.: Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rta*, 34a1; he ascribes this to PSP too).

83. See note 71. This passage appears in note 17 of Williams (1981) and there seems to be ascribed to Tsong-kha-pa. This does not matter very much, since in the *dGongs-pa rab-gsal* on MMV VI.23 we find (107b3): . . . *don-dam ni/ yang-dag-pa'i don mngon-sum-du mthong-ba-rnams-kyi ye-shes-kyi khyad-par-gyi yul-nyid-kyis bdag-gi rang-gi ngo-bo myed-pa yin-gyi/ . . .* This is Tsong-kha-pa's own observation and not a quotation. What is important is that in all four versions of the quotation from Candrakīrti (see note 71) and *even in Tsong-kha-pa's own adaptation of the quotation*, the instrumental *yul-nyid-kyis* persists. See note 87.

84. P.F. Strawson, *Individuals* (London: Methuen, 1964), ch. 7.

85. *Ibid.* ch. 3; also pp. 207–8. It seems possible that the notion of a feature-placing language might enable us to describe intelligibly a number of puzzling features of Buddhist thought. Whereas our ordinary conceptual framework *commits* us to objective particulars, the retreat to a feature-placing language removes this commitment. Yet the feature-placing language does not commit us to the absence of objective particulars either, since it contains the basis for their (re-)introduction (p. 207).

86. Brodard (1979), pp. 63–4.

87. See the opening pages of Williams (1981). (However he translates *yul* by “sphere”). Though Williams quotes the critical passage with the instrumental particle (*yul-nyid-kyis*, see notes 71 and 83), that instrumental has disappeared in his translation (p. 69, middle). In the same passage he translates *chos-can* (i.e., *dharmān*, the mind or cognition which owns dharmas [e.g., *Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan*, 55b5]) by *dharma* (i.e., roughly *yul*, as sGam-po-pa himself points out [*Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan*, *ibid.*]). The general effect of these changes made by Williams is to make Tsong-kha-pa's text seem more “objective” than would otherwise be the case. I have not studied Tsong-kha-pa much and if experts say so, I am prepared to accept that the general slant of his thought supports this “objective” interpretation; *but this interpretation is not*

supported by these particular passages. This is a very complex problem and probably demands detailed study comparing the works of several writers of different schools.

88. See the end of the previous section. Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's continual references to *sahaja* (*lhan-skyes*), e.g., *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rtā* 31a1, a2 (twice), a4, a5, a6, b1 (twice), b2, b4 (twice) etc. . . . always refer back to sGam-po-pa's famous lines (e.g., *Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan* 81b4):

*sems-nyid lhan-cig skyes-pa chos-kyi sku/
/snang-ba lhan-cig skyes-pa chos-sku'i 'od/*

which are the traditional starting-point (*gzhung*) for almost every bKa'-brgyud-pa account of *sahajayoga-mahāmudra* (*phyag-rgya chen-po lhan-cig skyes-sbyor*) and of which Guenther has rightly made so much (e.g., Guenther 1972, pp. 17, 24, etc.). Mind and appearance are here taken to be inseparable, like sandalwood and its smell, or the sun and its light (sGam-po-pa, *ibid.*). Here *sems-nyid* (corresponding to *paramātha-satya*) is not the *object* of anything, but is the nature of mind (sGam-po-pa, *ibid.*) or is awareness (*ye-shes*, *ibid.* 55b4); while *snang-ba*, appearance, is also not an object but is the *vikalpa* which arises from mind (*ibid.* 81b5) and corresponds to *saṃvṛti-satya*. Since they arise together, *neither can be established (grub-pa)* as a basis for the other (cf. *bhāṣya* on MMV VI.23). MMV VI.80, discussed below, treats *saṃvṛti* as the cause of *paramārtha*. One may wonder how *vikalpa* can be the cause of the dharmakāya; Padma dKar-po's description of this process will be dealt with later in this paper, while sGam-po-pa treats it at *Dus-gsum mkhyen-pa'i zhus-lan* 78b1.

89. The Sanskrit for *ngo-bo* here is *rūpa* (see note 73). In the *bhāṣya*, the Sanskrit for *rang-gi ngo-bo* was perhaps *svarūpa*.

90. In the *dGongs-pa rab-gsal* on MMV VI.23 (cf. note 83), Tsong-kha-pa repeats Candrakīrti's point that the two *satyas* are two *ngo-bo*'s, but later says that they have a single *ngo-bo*: *ngo-bo gcig-la ldog-pa tha-dad-pa byas-pa dang mi-rtag-pa lta-bu-stel*, etc. In his valuable "Identity and referential opacity in Tibetan Buddhist Logic" (presented at the IABS conference in Oxford, 1982), Dr. T. Tillemans points out that the phrase *ngo-bo gcig ldog-pa tha-dad* is a technical term found in dGe-lugs works on *pramāna*. He also pointed out to me its appearance in the *dGongs-pa rab-gsal*.

91. Mi-bskyod rDo-rje claims that it is futile to speculate about whether the two *satyas* have one *ngo-bo* or two: *bden-gnyis ngo-bo gcig dang tha-dad gang-du'ang rtog-pa ga-la byed*, *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rtā* on MMV VI.23, 144b1. He attributes to Tsong-kha-pa the view that they have only one *ngo-bo* (*ibid.* 143a1), and criticizes this view at some length.

92. Padma dKar-po's *Nges-don grub-pa'i shing-rtā* contains a long section on the sense in which the *satyas*, as foundation (*gzhi*) are two: *gzhi bden-pa gnyis-su gnas-pa'i tshul*, 30a6 ff. (cf. Appendix C). He discusses their *ngo-bo* at some length (based, e.g., on the classical sources MK XV 2–3 and PSP on them), without committing himself to any view on whether there are one or two *ngo-bo*'s. He probably thought, like Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, that the question has no clear answer.

93. Guenther (1963), p. 189; cf. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, 36a6 ff.

94. In spite of its title, Nāropa's *Sekoddeśatīkā* is a commentary not on the *Sekoddeśa*, but on the *abhīṣekapatṭa* of the *Kālacakrantra*. Even so, the verse quoted by Guenther from the *Sekoddeśatīkā* (see note 93) is found in the *Sekoddeśa* (49.7 in the Lokesh Chandra ed.), but originated in the *Guhyasamājantra* (XVIII.78).

95. *gZhung-'grel* 14b1, *Khrīd-yig* 7a6. Here, *gnas-lugs* as *paramārtha-satya* is to be distinguished from *dnagos-po'i gnas-lugs* which includes both *satyas*; see below and Broido (1979).

96. *māyādeha*, *sgyu-lus*.

97. *vajrakāya*, *rdo-rje'i lus*, especially regarded as containing the system of *nādi's* through which move *vāyu* and *bindu*.

98. Guenther (1977), p. 67. Here he is right in correlating *gshis* and *gdangs* with the two *satyas*. I find his use of the words "being," "reality," "true," "false," "refer," "item," "thing," etc., in this and similar contexts totally confusing.

99. E.g., *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 66b5: *lyang-dag-pa'i kun-rdzob nil gnyug-ma lhan-cig skyes-pa 'gro-ba-thams-cad-kyi rgyud-la rang-chas-su gnas-pa yin-te/ de yang 'gro-ba kun-gyi lus-la gzung-'dzin-gyi 'khrul-pa mi-'char-zhing/ mi-rtog-pa rang-babs-su gnas-pa'i rtsa dbu-ma zhes-pal dwangs-shing thogs-pa-med-pa'i 'od-kyi rang-bzhin-du gyur-pa'i rtsa rkyen gang-gis kyang gzhom-du-med-pal gtso-bor spyi gtsug-nas gsang-gnas-kyi bar-du khyab-cing/*, etc. "*samyaksamvṛti*: in itself it is at rest, it is *sahaja*, it abides in the *santāna* of all beings; then in the body of all beings the straying into subject and object does not rise, and this is called the central channel which abides in non-discursiveness and letting go (lit. falling by itself, *rang-babs*). This channel which is clear and which has the nature of unimpeded light and is not conquered by any *pratyāya*, penetrates right from the top of the head to the secret place, etc." Later in the same passage: "these three *dwangs-ma* are called 'the middle' or 'at rest' because they have not fallen into the extremes of nihilism or eternalism or of subject and object, and because in the end they are non-deceptive they are called *samyag* or *paramārtha*." In the oral tradition I have heard this *samyaksamvṛti* explained as an obscured *paramārtha* (*bsgribs-pa'i don-dam*).

100. The notion of *yuganaddha* in the tantras derives from the *Guhyasamāja* cycle; though it does not seem to appear in the main tantra or its *uttaratantra*, it is common in the *ākhyā-tantras* such as the *Jñānavajrasamuccaya* and the *Vajramālā*. As Wayman points out in his *Yoga of the Guhyasamājantra*, the *Vajramālā* is probably the original source for the five *kramas* whose theory is systematized in Nāgārjuna's *Pañcakrama*; they are *vajrajāpa*, *cittaviśuddhi*, *svādhiṣṭhāna*, *abhisambodhi*, and *yuganaddha*. (Poussin has confused matters by starting his ed. of the *Pañcakrama* with the *piṇḍīkṛtasādhana*, which is a separate work.) Various Indian views on the naming and numbering of the *kramas* are reviewed in detail in Tsong-kha-pa's *Rim-lnga rab-gsal sgron-me* (79a2) and briefly in Padma dKar-po's *gSang-ba 'dus-pa'i rgyan* (16a3).

101. *Pañcakrama* II.5–6, V.20, 26, all quoted *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 157a6 ff. Here *bhūtakoti* (*yang-dag-mtha*) stands for the radiant light.

102. *Ibid.* 157b6.

103. Ibid. 155a5 ff.

104. Cf. ibid. 156b2: *glang-la rwa-co lta-bu ya gnyis 'dus-pas zung-'jug-gol /de yang kun-rdzob bden-pa-la slob-pa-nas ya dang-po byung-ste phyi-ma med/ mngon-byang-gi dus gnyis-pa byung ste dang-po med/ zung-'jug-gi dus gnyis-po rong lang-pas/ de gnyis gcig-tu bshad kyang don tha-dad-par lus-so/* Contrast this with rGyal-dbang-rje's remark (see note 105): *tha-dad-du mi-gnas zung-'jug-gi gzhi/*

105. Padma dKar-po quotes this passage at *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 84a6 and says himself that it is on *gnas-lugs phyag-chen*.

106. Ibid. 93a4.

107. Ibid. 92a5.

108. Guenther seems to have had this passage in mind when discussing the *gshis* and *gdangs* of a conch-shell (1977, p. 69 and fnn.). Unfortunately, his explanation operates with a very confused notion of *sensa*.

109. *gZhung-'grel*, 24a5 ff. But even here it is important not to give "appearance" and "rebirth" any ontological status. A person who, in the *bar-do* between death and rebirth, cannot rise straight into the dharmakāya (ibid. 284a4) or less directly into the sambhogakāya (ibid. 287b6) but who is still capable of recognising appearances for what they are, can pass through the rebirth process without getting tangled up in it and can be reborn in the nirmānakāya (*sprul-sku*) state (ibid. 288b4). These observations of Padma dKar-po are perhaps the doctrinal foundation for Guenther's apparently bizarre translation of nirmānakāya by "authentic being-in-the-world" (e.g., 1963, p. 47 n.5). One might put it this way: the three *buddhakāya*'s are associated with the two *satyas* in the way described by Padma-dKar-po, and the latter have an *axiological* component which I think is evident to many Buddhologists, though it does not seem clear how to "get it out of the texts." There is something "genuine" or "authentic" about the *satyas*. (I am indebted to David Seyfort Ruegg for a conversation on this important but rather confusing topic.)

110. Yang-dgon-pa, *Ri-chos yon-tan kun-'byung*, sec. *sha, sa*. Now at *lam-bsdu* 101a3, Padma dKar-po attributes the distinction between *gnas-lugs phyag-chen* and *'khrul-lugs phyag-chen* to Yang dgon-pa, and Guenther, in reference to this passage, translates these phrases by "authentic" and "inauthentic" *mahāmudrā*. From the *Ri-chos yon-tan kun-'byung* one can see that these translations are not wrong for Yang-dgon-pa himself, but they miss the point of the distinction as made by Padma dKar-po. Roughly speaking, while Yang-dgon-pa concentrates on the "errant" aspect of *'khrul-lugs phyag-chen*, Padma dKar-po recognises it as the source of both authenticity and inauthenticity (in Guenther's terms). This point is quite clear in the *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, but it is possible to miss it in the *lam-bsdu*, especially if one does not have Yang-dgon-pa's own account to hand. Thus in Broido (1979, p. 62 and fnn. 6.2, 6.3), while realising that Guenther's translation is not consistent with the *gan-mdzod* account, I offered a version which was still confused by the failure to distinguish properly between Padma dKar-po's view and that of Yang-dgon-pa.

111. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, 84b6–91a1.

112. Ibid. 85a4.

113. *zag-pa med-pa'i bde-ba chen-po*. Here “*zag-pa med-pa*” (*anāsrava*) begs just the question which concerns Padma dKar-po.

114. *Ibid.* 91b2–3.

115. *Ibid.* 50a1 (see Appendix A: *lde yang dge-ldan-pa/ . . .*).

116. *Ibid.* 49b5 (see Appendix A: *. . . brtag-gnyis-sul . . .*).

117. *Ibid.* 50b3 (see Appendix A, *rim-lnga'il . . .*)

118. PK VI.2 and 13. With minor variations these verses appear also in the *bKa' yang-dag-pa'i tshad-ma* and so receive considerable commentary in the *gZhung-'grel*, 370b4 and 375a3.

119. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, 156b2. The connection between *sahaja* and *akṛtma* was appreciated by the early dGe-lugs-pas, as one can see from extracts from the *sNgags-rim chen-mo* of Tsong-kha-pa and the *rGyud-sde spyi'i rnam-bzhag* of mKhas-grub-rje, printed by D. Seyfort Ruegg in his *Life of Bu ston Rin-po-che* (Rome: ISMEO 1966), p. 62 etc. Padma dKar-po's point is that they did not make the connection between *sahaja* and *yuganaddha*; this is certainly born out by the (quite extensive) extracts on *yuganaddha* printed by Seyfort Ruegg. Similar remarks apply to the extracts from Tsong-kha-pa's *mchan-'grel* on PPD printed by Wayman in his *Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra*. On the other hand, Thu'u-bkvan Blo-bzang Chos-kyi Nyi-ma (1732–1802) was certainly aware of the *sahajayuganaddha* relation (Ruegg, *op. cit.*, p. 59), but in connection with the Sa-skya tradition.

120. *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta*, 140b4.

121. According to some sources (BA 660–1; 'Brug-pa'i chos-'byung 283ab; *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* (23b2), Gling-ras went first to Khyung-tshang Ras-pa, but his real teachers for the *snyan-brgyud* were the latter's pupils Lo and Sum-pa. Other sources such as Padma dKar-po's *gsan-yig* and the mss. of the *Yid-bzhin nor-bu skor-gsum* give a different picture. The complexities of the early transmission history of the *snyan-brgyud* would repay independent study.

Among the specialities of the *snyan-brgyud* are the 13- and 62-deity-maṇḍalas of Cakrasaṃvara; these did not come to the 'Brug-pas till later (*gsan-yig* 51a3). The root-text for the *snyan-brgyud* practices is Nāropa's *Karṇatantravajrapada*, with its *sa-bcad* and commentaries by both gTsang-smyon and Padma dKar-po. Padma dKar-po taught the *snyan-brgyud* widely, and his *sNyan-brgyud yid-bzhin nor-bu legs-bshad rgyal-mtshan-gyi rtser blon-pa dngos-grub-kyi char-'bebs* was the subject of subcommentary by 'Jam-dpal dPa-bo (c. 1780: *sNyan-brgyud yid-bzhin nor-bu'i rnam-bshad yang-gsal-gyi zin-bris*, 2 vols., twice republished recently). Many of the *snyan-brgyud* practices are still followed today in Bhutan, Ladakh, etc.

122. *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod*, 21b3 ff.

123. *gZhung-'grel* 176b–179b; *Khrid-yig* 19b4. See also Broido (1979), p. 61.

124. *gZhung-'grel* 179a1, *khrid-yig* 20a2.

125. At *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 96b5 ff., Padma dKar-po criticises at some length Tsong-kha-pa's claims to teach a *sgom-rim* which will reach *nges-don* (*nitārtha*). [The difference here is a matter of substance, and not merely of differing interpretations of the word *nges-don*, on which Tsong-kha-pa and

Padma dKar-po were fairly much in agreement, as against, say, Bu-ston. For Bu-ston on the *nūārtha/neyārtha* distinction, see his *bDe-gshegs snying-po mdzes-rgyan* (e.g., 11b2) as regards the sūtras. The three authors were more in agreement in regard to the tantras. For detailed references, see Broido (1983).]

126. Padma dKar-po describes Gling-ras as a *cig-car-ba* and rGya-ras as a *thod-rgal-ba* (*Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 23b4, 24a1); other examples are found in his *chos-'byung*.

127. As bibliographical terms, the phrases *Dwags-po chos-bzhi* and *Lam-gyi mchog rin-po-che'i phreng-ba*, while not identical, seem to overlap a good deal. See vol. 11–12 of Padma dKar-po's *gsung-'bum*. However, the collection of aphorisms in 28 sections, also called *lam-mchog-gi rin-po-che'i phreng-ba*, has nothing to do with the *Dwags-po chos-bzhi*.

128. Williams (1953) as quoted above (referring to *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta* 67b4 ff., quoted extensively in his note 17). All Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's opponents are there said to be working with concepts that cannot lead to *mokṣa*: "*Jo-nang-pa dang Shākya mchog-ldan-sogs bod phal-cher . . . thar-lam-las log-par zhugs-pa . . .*"

129. *rNal-'byor bzhi'i lta-mig*, 7ab.

130. See Padma dKar-po's *rNal-'byor bzhi'i re'u mig*, a 1-folio chart summarizing the divisions of the "four yogas," printed together with the *mdzub-tshugs* in all the usual editions.

131. See the *Phyag-chen zin-bris*, and Si-tu bStan-pa'i Nyin-byed's *Phyag-chen smon-lam 'grel-pa*, 45b–47a.

132. Part of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticism of Tsong-kha-pa's notion of the two *satyas* is formulated in terms of the claim that Tsong-kha-pa's *paramārtha-satya* is not *spros-bral* (*niṣprapañca*): see *Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta*, 138b1 ff.

133. PSP on MK 18.5 (quoted by Williams (1980), note 135). Also for Parma-dKar-po, this is the most important Indian Madhyamaka source on *niṣprapañca*.

134. *blo dman-pa rnam*: *rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs*, 17b3.

135. In this remark, the word *nūārtha* connects the subject-matter with *paramārtha-satya*, probably with *niṣparyāya-paramārtha*, a connection made explicit in the parallel passage *Phyag-chen gan-mdzod* 96b5. See note 125. For Padma dKar-po's use of the term *rnam-grangs ma-yin-pa'i don-dam* and similar terms, see Broido (1983).

136. Guenther (1977), p. 75.

137. Guenther (1963) p. 70 n.2, and (1977) p. 75.

138. A portion of this has also been covered by Guenther (1977, pp. 77–8). However, the passage on his p. 77 comes from the *lta-mig* (not the *mdzub-tshugs*). The passage on his p. 78 translates passage k: of Appendix B (up to . . . *zung-du 'jug-pa yin-nol*). Some of Guenther's renderings of individual terms are very idiosyncratic, e.g., "conateness" for *lhan-cig skyes-pa*; "forbid every formulation by concept or by speech" for *spros-bral*; "unique kind of whole" for *rtse-grig*, etc. For reasons given below, I also think his translation of *tha-mal-gyi shes-pa* by "primordial knowledge" does not pay enough attention to what Padma dKar-po himself says about this phrase in this very context.

In spite of these details, however, Guenther seems to have got the gist of what Padma dKar-po was saying.

139. Very unusually, Padma dKar-po has given the definitions B-E in the *sa-bcad* and then repeated each at the beginning of the relevant section; I have followed him for the case of *spros-bral*.

140. *don spyi*. This really means a mental object postulated purely to serve as the referent for an otherwise non-referring term, as T. Tillemans has shown (in his paper mentioned in note 90).

141. E.g., *rNal-'byor bzhi'i mdzub-tshugs*, 12a1.

142. *Ibid.* 13b1.

143. *Ibid.* 13b–14a (extracts).

144. *spros-bral-gyi dus-su snang-ba thams-cad sems-nyid-du rtogs sa'am/ martogs/*, etc. Of course, this use of *sems-nyid* is not ontological in any way and does not commit Padma dKar-po to some kind of mentalism. The bKa'-brgyud-pas thought that mind and mental processes are important. That is another matter from being a mentalist. Guenther recognizes this distinction in his essay "Mentalism and Beyond in Buddhist Philosophy" (1977 pp. 162–177) and yet sweepingly ascribes a mentalistic position to the bKa'-brgyud-pas in general (top of p. 166) on the basis of just such quotations (from the *Phyag-chen zla-zer*) as support merely the view that mind and mental events are important. He is right in saying that the bKa'-brgyud-pas used *sems-nyid* in a different sense from the rNying-ma-pas, but mistaken in saying that the later bKa'-brgyud-pas did not distinguish between *sems* and *sems-nyid*. (On the other hand there appears to be some mentalism in the thought of the early bKa'-brgyud-pas).

145. dBang-phyug rdo-rje's account is mainly directed to the *rim-gyis-pa*. It contains (140b6) the following summary, which may be compared with passages B-E of Appendix B: *zhi-lhag zung-du 'brel-ba'i rgyun-la rtse gcig-tu gnas-pa de rtse-gcig/ lsems-kyis sems-nyid skye-med-du gsal sing-gi shar-ba de'i rang-ngos-nas 'khor gsum-gyi spros-pa dang bral-ba spros-bral/ lsnang-ba sna-tshogs-su snang yang rang-gi sems-nyid-du ro gcig cing bdag-gzhan 'khor-'das-sogs gnyis chos thams-cad ro gcig-tu gyur-pa ro-gcig/ lyin-min phan-tshun gang-du bltas kyang rang-gi sems-nyid de'ang bsgom-bya sgom-byed-la-sogs-la gang-du'ang ma-grub-par 'od-gsal-du cham-cham 'char-ba sgom-med-kyi rnal-'byor zhes-bya'o/* Roughly speaking, these remarks explain the references of the four terms for one who already knows their senses, while in B-E of Appendix B, Padma dKar-po explains their references without making use of their senses.