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Dhism may be understood in terms of Christian theology, and offers the possibility that the message of Christ will transform other traditions in the same way that other traditions transform Christianity. Roger Corless attempts to find theological parity in five types of thinkers, imaginatively placing primary figures of each tradition in dialogue, such as Thomas Aquinas with Budhaghosa and Gregory of Nyassa with Dōgen. This technique informs the reader both of the common rubric that allows these "conversations" to take place and the uniqueness of each thinker's position. The somewhat confessional essay of Masaaki Honda narrates a journey through Zen training and Pure Land devotionalism to mystical Christianity. In *The Cloud of Unknowing*, the author finds the best expression of God's paradoxical relation to self, which Honda describes as "one, but not identified," "different, but not separated" (p. 51). The essay by Tokiyuki Nobuhara is an extremely well-documented theological discussion that attempts to link natural and revealed theology through the medium of Buddhism. Jay McDaniels offers a well-written and imaginative article exploring whether Zorba the Greek could have been a Christian, testing his model against liberation theology. The two closing essays, by Eshin Nishimura and Seiichi Yagi, give an anecdotal, personal account of the encounter of religions. Although this approach might seem the least scholarly, it is in fact perhaps the most important for the actualization of the dialogue process.

This collection of essays, not unlike the journal *Buddhist-Christian Studies* of the East-West Religions Project of the University of Hawaii, balances academic analysis with a genuine human concern for religious life. As such, it is important reading for those involved with the increasing contact between Buddhism and Christianity, both at the theoretical and experiential levels.

Christopher Chapple


The publication of Jeffrey Hopkins' magnum opus shows how much progress has been made in Tibetan studies since the revolt of 1959 brought many lamas to India, Europe and America. In his introduction Hopkins retraces his studies since
1963, the year in which he became first acquainted with the *Great Exposition of Tenets* by 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa (1648–1721), one of the main sources for his book, which is based both on oral explanations and the works of 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa and other scholars such as I'Cang-skya Rol-pa'i rdo-rje (1717–1786). Hopkins has an admirable knowledge of literary and spoken Tibetan and he has obviously derived great profit from the teachings he has received from several learned lamas. A text such as the *Great Exposition of Tenets* is extremely difficult to understand without the help of Tibetan scholars. Hopkins' translation of a section of the chapter on the Prāsaṅgika doctrines in part six of his book is a remarkable achievement. Another important text translated in this book is a section of the first chapter of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapada* (ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, pp. 14.1–36.2), which is one of the principal documents on the differences between the two Madhyamaka schools, the Prāsaṅgikas (represented in this text by Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti) and the Svātantrikas (represented by their founder, Bhāvaviveka). The first half of Hopkins' book comprises four parts, entitled "Meditation," "Reasoning into Reality," "The Buddhist World" and "Systems," in which he gives a comprehensive survey of Buddhist Mahāyāna philosophy, with special emphasis on the doctrines of the Madhyamaka school.

Undoubtedly, the general reader will find it easier to understand the first half of Hopkins' book than the highly complicated and technical texts translated in parts five and six. The specialist in Buddhist studies who is not familiar with the dGe-lugs-pa tradition will also find in it much to glean. However, he will probably be somewhat disturbed by the way in which Hopkins has presented his materials, i.e., by using both written texts and oral teachings. At the beginning of each section, Hopkins scrupulously enumerates his sources, and in the notes he often indicates the sources even for very small sub-sections. Nevertheless, it is not always easy to know which particular text is being used, and in the case of oral teaching one would like to know on which texts they are based. Sometimes, also, Hopkins introduces concepts that are explained much later on in his book. For instance, on p. 57 Hopkins mentions "the diamond slivers," which are only explained in note 619. In this note, Hopkins makes some remarks about the possible meanings of the Sanskrit equivalent of sliver, i.e., *kana*. This suggests that the term "the diamond slivers" is based upon a Sanskrit original. However, the only authority Hopkins quotes is Kensur Lekden, although he refers
vaguely to oral and written sources, adding that the oral traditions with which he has been in contact are by no means always accurate. One would like to know more about the written sources in which this term is used and explained, and in particular about Indian sources referred to by Tibetan scholars. If no Indian sources can be traced, it seems rather strange to speculate on the meaning of a Sanskrit equivalent of a term used by Tibetan scholars.

In part five of his book, Hopkins translates and explains the controversies between on the one hand, Buddhapalita, and on the other, Candrakirti. Hopkins refers to the Sanskrit text edited by L. de La Vallée Poussin, but his translation of Candrakirti’s text seems to be based entirely on the Tibetan version. This has some strange consequences. For instance, Hopkins translates bādhā (Tib. gnod-pa) by “damage, harm” (cf. pp. 502, 526 and note 395), whereas the technical meaning of the Sanskrit term “refutation, annulment” is well-known from Sanskrit philosophical texts, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Even more amazing is his persistent use of the term “renowned” for siddha and prasiddha (Tibetan grags-pa) which results in such incomprehensible renderings as: “Therefore, some say ‘There is no harm by inference that is through the force of being renowned to the other [party] because [we] wish to refute mere renown to others’.” (p. 526). The Sanskrit text has: na parataḥ prasiddhibalād anumānābādhā / parasiddher eva nirācikīśatvatvād iti (35.4—5): “It is not possible to refute by inference on the strength of that which is admitted by others because it is just that which is admitted by others, that one wishes to refute.” Also, in other instances Hopkins’ renderings of technical terms are not very satisfactory, for example, “unmistaken” (p. 485) for avyabhicārin (21.5). Wrong is Hopkins’ rendering of sādhyadharma by “predicate of the probandum” (p. 508). The sādhyadharma is the “property to be proved”, i.e., the probandum.

In the Great Exposition of Tenets 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa quotes many texts, but often in abridged form. Hopkins has given the full quotations in his edition of the Tibetan text, which is added at the end of the book. As Hopkins remarks, these quotations constitute an anthology of the basic texts for the study of the Prāśāṅgika system. It is therefore desirable that these quotations should be carefully translated. On p. 608, Hopkins translates the following extract from the Dhāranīśvararājaparipṛcchāsūtra: “He leads those sentient beings to the Tathāgata’s land through discourse on the irreversible wheel
[cultivation of the union of method and wisdom] and discourse on the complete purification of the three spheres [of agent, action, and object], those sentient beings of various lineages and natures—having become equal—realize the nature of Tathāgata-hood. Thus, they realize [the six perfections and so forth], the highest boon [bestowing omniscience].” The Sanskrit original of this quotation is to be found in the Ratnagotravibhāga (ed. E.H. Johnston, p. 6.3—7): 

\[
tatah pascād avivartyaḥdharmaśeṣakathayā trimandalapariśuddhiḥkathayā cā tathāgataśeṣaye tān sattvān avaitārayati nānāprakṛtiḥetukān / avaitirnāś ca samānās tathāgatadharmaśeṣam adhigamyānutterā daksinīyā ity ucyante. \]

The same passage is quoted in the Tibetan version of Nāgarjuna’s Sūtrasamuccaya. Bhikkhu Pāśadika, who refers to the Ratnagotravibhāga, translates it as follows: “Through discourses on the ‘irreversible wheel’ (of the Doctrine of ekāyāna) and the purity of the ‘three spheres (of giving, viz. the giver, recipient, and the act of giving)’ he causes sentient beings of diverse extraction and dispositions to enter the sphere of the Tathāgata. Having entered it and having discovered Buddhahood (tathāgata-dharmaśeṣa) (in themselves), they are called the highest (‘field of merit’) worthy of veneration.”

It is obvious that Hopkins’ rendering gives a wrong idea of the original. This is partly due to the imperfect Tibetan translation as found on page 33 of the text edited by Hopkins, but also to the fact that Hopkins has clearly misunderstood such well-known terms as sbyin-gnas (daksinīya). In another passage, Hopkins has misread the text in Ngawang Geleg Demo’s edition, p. 906.5: \( \text{jig lta} \text{ sangs rgyas kyi gdung chad pa lta bu de dag gis} \ldots \). Hopkins’ text has \( \text{jigs lta} \), etc., and he translates this as follows: “through fear [of the suffering of cyclic existence Foe Destroyers have forsaken helping others, and thus] their Buddha lineage has been severed” (p. 604). In this passage the Arhats are compared to those whose Buddha lineage has been severed on account of a false notion of personality (\( \text{jig-lta, satkāyadrṣṭi} \)). Twice, the text mentions those who have entered into the yang-dag-pa nyid-du nges-pa, which Hopkins renders as “who strictly abide in the right,” and adds between brackets “in a nirvana without remainder” (pp. 603 and 606). Hopkins fails to explain this term, which corresponds to Sanskrit samyaktvaniyāma or -niyama, and which has been studied by Wogihara, de La Vallée Poussin, Seyfort Ruegg and Rahula. In the translation of this text, Hopkins is careless too in his renderings of technical terms. Probably nobody will recognize in “unusual attitude” Tibetan lhag-bsam, Sanskrit adhyāśaya (p. 604). On p. 617, Hopkins mistranslates a quotation
from the *Ghanavyāhasūtra*: "[Just as] lands [are the basis of] the varieties [of all things grown]." A correct interpretation has been given by Seyfort Ruegg who translates: "Les différentes Terres (*bhūmi*) [sont] l'ālaya." 3

In order not to give rise to a wrong impression, it is absolutely necessary to repeat again that Hopkins' work is a remarkable achievement. However, it is perhaps not superfluous to point out that it is not always satisfactory to rely entirely on rather recent Tibetan works and on oral explanations. There are many Sanskrit texts that have been carefully studied by several generations of scholars, and it is not advisable to neglect them. Hopkins' work could be so much more useful if he would take the trouble to pay more attention to Indian texts and to the study of the technical vocabulary that is found in these texts. It is impossible to study Tibetan Buddhism, and especially such a learned school as that of the dGe-lugs-pas, without a profound knowledge of its Indian background and of the Indian texts that are quoted over and over again.

J.W. de Jong

NOTES

