THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

Volume 14 *1991* *Number 1*

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Pudgalavāda in Tibet? Assertions of Substantially Existent Selves in the Writings of Tsong-kha-pa and His Followers

by Joe Bransford Wilson

Introduction

In a recent article ("Śāntarakṣita on the Fallacies of Personalistic Vitalism")[1] Matthew Kapstein argues, with respect to research into Indian Buddhist philosophy, that the traditional way of studying it as a facet of Buddhist religion "may bias in certain respects our study of Buddhist thought."[2] This is the case, he says, because the issues current in Religious Studies or Philosophy of Religion would tend to define the areas of inquiry. The remainder of his article is devoted to an analysis of the concept of personalistic vitalism as it is seen in the West beginning in Plato's *Phaedo* through its criticism by Kant, and as it is seen in India in the writings of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and in its criticism by the Buddhist writer Śāntarakṣita. Kapstein summarizes his approach to this material in the following words:[3]

> To study these and many other topics in classical Indian thought from the perspective here advocated does not require our losing sight of the essential religious interests which motivated and informed the Indian discussions with which we are concerned; what it does require is an involvement in the history of ideas quite broadly conceived. In this context, we should recall that it is now possible to treat much of classical Indian thought from a truly historical, and not merely doxographical, vantage-point.

Kapstein has cogently argued elsewhere that one should "[reject] the prevailing segregation of philosophies according to cultural and geographic origins."[4] This argument arises in the course of a review of Steven Collins' *Selfless Persons*; in the introduction to that book, Collins speaks of his own approach:[5]

> In the pages which follow I will try to confront the native English thinker with certain aspects of the mental universe as it appears to the Buddhist mind. The result of thus placing oneself, for a moment, in a Buddhist world... will be, I hope, to widen a little the cultural horizons in which both our commonsense and our philosophy set their ideas of the person and of selfhood.

Both Kapstein and Collins present challenges that Buddhologists must try to meet, and in the present article—which treats one small part of the Tibeto-Mongolian philosophical discussion on personal identity—I shall try to do so. Following Kapstein, I hope that by clearly setting forth the positions articulated by several late eighteenth and early nineteenth century writers, I will be presenting evidence demonstrating, to those who discuss the issue of personal identity in other philosophical traditions, that Buddhist and Western thought are not incommensurable and, indeed, Buddhism may have contributions of its own to make to the global history of ideas. Following Collins, I am attempting to allow the Tibetan and Mongolian writers I discuss to speak for themselves, allowing the reader to enter the minds of at least some Buddhists.

This being said, it must also be said that my presentation and analysis of assertions about persons will be done from what will doubtless appear to comparative philosophers such as Kapstein to be a largely doxographical and not a truly historical standpoint. In part, this is because the state of the art in Tibetan Studies does not approach that of Indian Studies. However, I do this mainly because the state of the art in the study of Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhism will never approach that seen in Indology if comparative philosophy and comparative religion become the norm, and Tibeto-Mongolian systems of thought and practice are not studied (and then discussed in print) in their own terms. Comparative studies are indeed important, but not to the exclusion of all else. In order to

examine a topic in its own terms, it is necessary to present it, as well as we are able, first as it appeared to the Tibetan thinkers who framed it, perhaps also as it is understood by contemporary Buddhist philosophers, and only then to recast it in more provincially Western terms.[6]

Given that the first step in understanding Buddhist philosophies is to examine them in their own terms, the question becomes, how is this to be done? It has been nearly ten years since Paul Griffiths admonished us that "translation is very frequently not the best way of performing the hermeneutical task, a fact rarely realized by practicing Buddhologists, most of whom stand transfixed in awe of their texts and are concerned largely to transmit them by means of translation regardless of whether or not they have been understood."[7] There is a kernel of truth in Griffiths' provocative statement. It is possible to translate texts philologically without much concern for their philosophical meanings or implications, and the history of Buddhist Studies has not been without examples of this. Must there not, however, be some middle way between a Buddhist Studies which seeks merely to translate texts without analyzing the ideas presented in them and a Buddhist Studies which seeks merely to show how the ideas seen in the texts relate to issues discussed in the history of Western philosophy?[8] Furthermore, it *is* one of the tasks of the Buddhologist to stand in awe of the text at hand, in the sense of being open, at least temporarily, to its claims (as Collins calls for above). It is only then, as Griffiths says elsewhere, that "[w]e do the tradition a disservice if we refuse to move beyond the exegetical mode of academic discourse to the normative, the judgemental."[9]

Normative discourse, however, includes not merely negative and critical judgements but also positive and affirmative judgements. As Robert Wilkens said in his presidential address to the American Academy of Religion, quoting a previous president (Wendy Doniger):[10]

> She wrote: "Though it is deemed wrong to *care for* religion, it is not wrong to *care against* religion." Since the Enlightenment "hatred of religion has been a more respectable scholarly emotion than love, particularly hatred of one's own religion."

Thus, as Buddhologists who "feel a duty not merely to communicate with fellow specialists, but also with the wider scholarly world and with the interested public"[11] a twofold task is set for us. *As academicians who study religions in an objective fashion*, we must avoid both the reductive and the constructive extremes. We should fall neither to the extreme of reducing Buddhist ideas to those of other cultures nor to that of contructing a theology of our own. However, *as individuals participating in the intellectual histories of our own cultures*, we find that these extremes are not entirely avoidable and even that such avoidance is not entirely desirable. We must make the translation from, for example, the worldview of eighteenth century Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhism to that of our own contemporary culture (which is a necessarily reductionist enterprise), while at the same time, constructively, we bring from our own cultures a new critique to the Buddhist position and lay the groundwork for a Buddhist critique of those cultures. The latter task is constructive because it creates something new, something not previously present either in Buddhism or in our own cultures.

I have attempted such a middle way in the present article by combining an exposition of the presentations made by two relatively recent Tibetan Buddhist philosophers on the nature of the person with my own reflections on the implications of their writings. The topic itself, in fact, is already constructive in character because personal identity is not a traditional concern of Buddhism. (Of course, any ethics or metaphysics assumes something about what it means to be a person, no less those of Buddhism. However, the Buddhist concern—as has been pointed out in this context many times—is with not the sort of identity that persons have, but the sorts of identity they lack. That is, the concern is with selflessness and not self.) There is clearly much more that may and should be done of a comparative nature with this material, but that is the subject of a different and, I would argue, a later study.

The Place of Persons in Buddhist Philosophies

In terms of its ontology, Buddhism is above all a doctrine of selflessness (*anātman*)—where selflessness, depending on what Buddhist viewpoint we examine, is variously the rejection of

(a) a permanent, partless, and independent self (*rtag gcig rang dbang can gyi bdag*),
(b) a self-sufficient self (*rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod kyi bdag*),
(c) an inherently existent self (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa'i bdag*).[12]

Historically, this is what set the Buddha's teachings off from those of the Upaniṣadic philosophers and, later, from the orthodox (*āstika*) schools of Indian philosophy. Selflessness also has been seen as the basis of Buddhist ethics by philosophers such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva, when they take it as the rationale for universal compassion.[13]

At another level, however, there is a tension in Buddhism between selflessness and ethics. If Ajātaśatru murders his father (in his case, a regicide), surely Ajātaśatru must reap the fruits of his immorality as a harvest of suffering. This is the doctrine of karma, as basic to Buddhism as selflessness, if not more so. But if there is really no Ajātaśatru, who did the killing and who will experience the consequences?

It clearly is impossible to imagine a Buddhism without a basis for moral retribution, without a mechanism whereby an action of moral choice is able to produce an effect long after it has itself ceased. Thus, the question being addressed here is the following: have Buddhist philosophers felt they must posit the existence of persons (*gang zag, pudgala*)[14]—existent *selves*—in order to be able coherently to present a relationship between moral actions and their effects? And if they have so posited, how are we then to understand the commonplace that in Buddhism there are actions but no agents, that there is pain yet no one suffers?[15]

There was a school of Indian Buddhism, the Vātsīputrīyas, considered to be a subschool of the Vaibhāṣikas (the Distinctionalists),[16] who advocated the existence of a person. This person, according to commentators from sGo-mang College of 'Bras spung monastery, is an inexpressible (*brjod du med pa, anabhilāpya*), substantial (*rdzas su yod pa, dravyasat*) entity, neither the same as nor different from mind and body.[17] While the Tibeto-Mongolian tradition does not remember the Vātsīputrīyas as heretics, an inordinate amount of space is devoted to explaining why

they are not. (This is not the time to discuss the question of whether heresy is or has been possible in Buddhism in the same sense it has been seen in the Abrahamic religions.) According to dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po (pronounced Gön-chok-jik-mé-wang-bo), a philosopher is a Buddhist philosopher by reason of accepting four propositions to be true:[18]

1 all compound things (*'dus byas, samskṛta*) are impermanent;
2 all contaminated phenomena (*zag bcas, sāsrava*) are unsatisfactory;
3 all phenomena (*chos, dharma*) are selfless (*bdag med pa, nairātmya*);
4 nirvana is peace (*zhi ba, śānta*).

The self asserted by the Vātsīputrīyas seems to violate the third proposition, but it does not. The self rejected by *all* Buddhist philosophers (and seen directly in meditation as nonexistent by all superiors [*'phags pa, ārya*—defined as someone who has had a direct meditative perception of reality]) is the most superficial one—a permanent, single, and independent self. The self asserted by the Vātsīputrīyas is the substantial self (substantial in the sense of being self-sufficient).[19]

It must be borne in mind that the Vātsīputrīyas enjoyed a great popularity from the fourth to the seventh centuries C.E. in India; their assertion of such a self is not one remembered as an easy-to-refute curiosity, but reflects a view once widely accepted.[20]

Turning to more recent Buddhist philosophy, that of the dGe-lugs-pa (Gé-luk-ba) order of Tibetan Buddhism founded by Tsong-kha-pa (Dzong-ka-ba), we seem again to see the assertion of a real person, that is, a real self. If it is the case that there *is* a person who is the agent of actions and the basis for moral retribution, how does this person posited by the dGe-lugs scholars of Mongolia and Tibet differ from the person asserted—problematically—by the Vātsīputrīyas a millenium before in India? Tsong-kha-pa's followers and the Vātsīputrīyas are both "Proponents of a Person" (*Pudgalavādins*), but do they speak of the person in the same way?

Sources

The present analysis of Buddhist views on personal identity is based primarily on the work of two scholars of the dGe-lugs Order of Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhism who have addressed themselves to this issue: a Tibetan, Gung-thang dKon-mchog-bstan-pa'i-sgron-me (pronounced Gung-tang Gön-chok-den-bé-drön-mé, 1762–1823), and a Mongolian, Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan (Nga-wang-bel-den, b.1797).[21] In order to fully understand the context in which these two present their positions, it will be necessary to examine some of the ideas advanced by two earlier scholars upon whose works they saw themselves as commentators—the founder of their monastic order, Tsong-kha-pa bLo-bzang-grags-pa (Dzong-ka-ba lo-sang-drak-ba, 1357–1419) and the foundational thinker of their monastic college, 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa (Jam-yang-shé-ba, 1648–1721).[22] The brief overview of Indian and Buddhist philosophy written by dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po (Gön-chok-jik-mé-wang-bo, 1728–1791)—'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa's successor in terms of being his recognized incarnation (*sprul sku*)—has also been consulted.[23] Gung-thang himself was a student of dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po.

The dGe-lugs-pas, of course, are well known as the most scholastic of the orders of Tibetan Buddhism. (This is sometimes offered as a compliment, sometimes not.) Although all the philosophers of this order take the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika (the Consequentialist Middle Way School) of the Indian Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti as their own position and see the study of other doctrinal systems as precursors to an understanding of Candrakīrti, there is a good deal of variation among them. These scholastic rivalries are institutionalized in the various monastic colleges, especially those associated with the major monasteries formerly located in Lhasa—'Bras spung (Dé-bung), bLo gsal gling (Lo-sel-ling), and dGa' ldan (Gandën). Both Gung-thang and Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan were members of the sGo-mang (Go-mang—"Many Doors") College of 'Bras spung. The Tibeto-Mongolian interpretations of Buddhist doctrine examined in this paper will, for the most part, be taken from the distinctive assertions of this college.

There is a further source to be considered. As Stephan Beyer noted almost twenty years ago, "a Buddhologist does not

deal with Buddhism so much as he deals with Buddhists."[24] Whether one is a philologist or a philosopher working with a text (or set of texts) or an anthropologist working with living Tibetans or Sri Lankans, the subject matter is still Buddhists. Buddhist texts are artifacts created at some point by Buddhists and used (and understood) in certain ways by Buddhists in the contemporary world. Thus, in terms of the present study, there is another important source (which may be considered a text), the oral commentaries by contemporary Tibetan and Mongolian philosophers on the written texts mentioned above.

The Taxonomy of Buddhist Doctrinal Systems

The standard Indo-Tibetan typology of four main schools of Buddhist philosophies is well known. The four schools of tenets (*grub mtha', siddhānta*), listed from what the tradition considers to be least to most sophisticated, are:

Distinctionalist School (*Vaibhāṣika*)[25]
Sutra School (*Sautrāntika*)
Mind-Only School (*Cittamātra*)
Middle Way School (*Mādhyamika*).[26]

Tibetan analysts of Indian philosophy like to speak not so much of individual thinkers or writers as they do of these *schools* of thought. They thus avoid the extreme of attributing a position merely to someone indefinite (which, however, is not uncommon in Tibetan texts)[27] and the extreme of citing a position in terms of its author and the book in which it may be found (which is also seen, although often as a citation of merely an abbreviated book title).

It is this Indo-Tibetan penchant for speaking of schools of thought rather than individual philosophers or commentators that leads to the use of the word "doxographical" in this context. The term "doxographer," Websters tells us, means "a collector and compiler of extracts from and commentator on ancient Greek philosophies."[28] Whereas "doxography" literally means merely "writing about opinions," the inference I believe we are supposed to make is that Tibetan doxographical writing

is an abstractive reporting of the assertions of Indian philosophers with no regard to historical concerns. The Tibetan technical term for such writing is *grub mtha'* (*grub pa'i mtha', siddhānta*—translated here as "tenets") and, in its most elementary form (as seen, for example, in dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po's *Precious Garland of Tenets*), it is abstractive reporting, painting the picture of Indian Buddhist doctrine in the broadest of strokes. Its more sophisticated form, however, seen in 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa's *Great Exposition of Tenets*, presents us with detailed and often constructive (not abstractive) analyses of positions taken by Indian philosophers and by earlier Tibetan commentators. Even, however, were the Tibetan scholastic tradition merely an exercise in reducing Indian Buddhist philosophy to easy-to-understand dogmatic positions, it would remain in our interests as Buddhologists to examine it in its own terms before we introduce the concerns of our own intellectual history.

Returning to the subject at hand, in a further abbreviation of the Indian typology of four main Buddhist tenet systems, 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa and his followers reduce Buddhist doctrinalists into two categories, those who accept and those who reject true existence (*bden par grub pa, satyasiddha*):[29]

1 Proponents of True Existence (*dngos por smra ba*) include:
  the Distinctionalists,
  the Sutra School,
  the Mind-Only School.[30]
2 Proponents of Entitylessness, or of No Intrinsic Identity (*Niḥsvabhāvavadins*), i.e., rejectors of true existence, are the Middle Way School, including both:
  the Autonomists (*rang rgyud pa, svātantrika*)
  the Consequentialists (*thal 'gyur ba, prāsaṅgika*)

The first group, the Proponents of True Existence—who assert that at least some phenomena are truly existent—may be further divided into two groups:[31]

1 Proponents of [External] Objects (*don smra ba*) assert truly existent external objects, and include the Distinctionalists and the Sūtra School.

2 Proponents of Mind-Only (*sems tsam pa, Cittamātra*) assert that minds are truly existent but that objects which are different entities from the minds perceiving them are not; that is, they reject truly existent external objects.

It should be noted that both the Middle Way School and the Mind-Only School are said by dGe-lugs-pas to deny the existence of truly existent external objects.

The Mind-Only School, however, denies the possibility of functioning, that is, of acting as a cause or being an effect, without being truly existent. According to them, whatever is not truly existent is an imaginary.[32] They differ from the Middle Way School in saying that any phenomenon that enters into causal relationships, i.e., any dependent (*gzhan dbang, paratantra*) phenomenon, is the same substantial entity (*rdzas, dravya*) as the mind apprehending it and, therefore, is not a truly existent external phenomenon.[33]

The Person in the Saṃyuttanikāya

In a section of his *Responses to Questions on Doctrinal Assertions*, Gung-thang comments on the *sūtra* passage in which the convention "sentient being" (*sems can, sattva*), or person, is identified as a designation made in dependence on the psychophysical aggregates (*phung-po, skandha*).[34] In presenting the aggregate or aggregates which are the basis for this designation, Gung-thang speaks not of the assertions of individual Indian doctrinalists, but, rather, makes use of the traditional fourfold taxonomy just outlined.

Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, on the other hand, is concerned not only with the observed object (*dmigs yul, ālambana*) of the *correct* apprehension of an existent person, but also with the object of the innate *mis*conception of self. This latter concern is with what it is among the aggregates of body and mind that is mistakenly held to be the self. Although the two scholars approach the problem from different angles, they are discussing the same phenomenon, the conventionally existent individual. Gung-thang also concerns himself with this topic in his *Textbook on Fundamental Consciousness*; there, the assertion that

the fundamental consciousness (*kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa, ālayavijñāna*) is a substantially existent self is treated in detail.[35]

The basis for Gung-thang's presentation of the person in *Responses to Questions on Doctrinal Assertions* is the *Saṃyuttanikāya* verse describing the way a sentient being is a designation made to the psychophysical aggregates:[36]

> Just as a chariot is spoken of
> In dependence on the collection of its parts,
> So there is the convention, "sentient being,"
> In dependence on the [psychophysical] aggregates.

This passage is quoted by Buddhaghosa (5th century C.E.) as scriptural proof of the thesis that apart from mind and body, there is no being or person.[37] Buddhaghosa concludes that although *conventionally* there is a person or sentient being, *ultimately*, there is no sentient being which is a basis for the conception of an I or ego; ultimately, there is only mind and body.[38] Candrakīrti also quotes this passage, in the autocommentary on his *Madhyamakāvatāra*; the context is his refutation of a person which is merely the collection or combination of the aggregates of mind and body.[39] Thus, it is evident that the concern of both scholars—whose views, within the spectrum of Buddhist doctrine, are not close—is mainly to refute a self, not to establish a person.

Why, then, do Tsong-kha-pa and his followers devote time to establishing the existence of the person? They do so in order to explain how cyclic existence and nirvana co-exist. It is clear in their works that while selflessness is very much the core of Buddhist doctrine, there must still be a coherent explanation of non-ultimates, of conventional truths. The central conventional truth, of course, is the mind. And the relationship of mind and body, and of mind and environment, is described by the doctrine of karma—the relationship between an intentional action that either helps or harms a sentient being and some later experience or state of mind and body. This is not as radical a move as it might seem, even in the context of Buddhist selflessness. It is, in fact, a highly conservative move, the reaffirmation of the Mahāyāna dictum that cyclic existence is *nirvāṇa* and *nirvāṇa* is cyclic existence.[40]

What Tsong-kha-pa and his school assert is that ultimate and conventional are compatible and do not harm or contradict one another. Analagously, selflessness and the person are compatible and provide a useful means of describing experience in an integrated and coherent way. As Gung-thang writes—citing Tsong-kha-pa's student mKhas-grub (Ké-ḍup, 1385–1438):[41]

> There is no proponent of tenets who would say the following: the contradictions in my presentations of the two truths which others speak of do exist; I myself assert that there exist contradictions in my own presentation of the two truths; the conventional is negated by valid cognition analyzing the ultimate.

This, then, is the context for examining the views of Gung-thang and Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan concerning the person. The problem is, as noted above, that if it is the case that there is a person who is the agent of actions and the basis for moral retribution, does this person posited by these dGe-lugs-pa scholars differ from the person asserted—heretically—by the Vātsīputrīyas?

In order to determine this, we must examine the expositions made by Gung-thang and Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan of Buddhist assertions concerning the person.

The Person According to Proponents of Objects

Proponents of [External] Objects—the Distinctionalists and the Sutra School—are actually proponents of truly existent sense objects which are not the same entities as the minds perceiving them. According to Gung-thang, most Distinctionalists and members of the Sutra School assert that the aggregates which are the basis of the designation "person" are the five individual aggregates of body and mind.[42] Just as a chariot is spoken of in reliance on the collection of its parts, so the person is posited in dependence on the collection of the individual aggregates.

Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan reports an explanation of the verse from the *Saṃyuttanikāya* (quoted above) in which the Kashmiri branch of the Distinctionalists and the Sutra School Ābhidhar-

mikas (known as the Sutra School Following Scripture) are said to assert the continuum of the aggregates (i.e., the continuum of mind and body) as the illustration of the person, whereas those of the Sutra School following Dharmakīrti (the Sutra School Following Reasoning) are held to assert the mental consciousness to be the person.[43]

Proponents of Mind-Only

Yogacāras or Cittamātrins—proponents of Mind-Only—assert that minds and objects are truly existent, but deny any existence at all to objects external to the minds apprehending them. They hold that the meaning of the designation "person" must, like the meaning of any designation, be findable when sought. Not only must one find a person, but one must find it among its bases of designation—the psychophysical aggregates.[44] Those of the Mind-Only persuasion who assert eight consciousnesses, the followers of Asaṅga (called Followers of Scripture), assert the fundamental consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) to be the illustration of the person.[45] The Followers of Reasoning, following the six-consciousness School of Dharmakīrti, are said to hold the mental consciousness to be the illustration of the person.[46]

Proponents of No Intrinsic Identity (Middle Way School)

Tibetan scholars divide the Middle Way School into two camps, those of the Autonomist School whose most prominent members were Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣita, and those who follow Candrakīrti's Consequentialist Middle Way. The two differ greatly in regard to their assertions on the person. Indeed, the Consequentialist Middle Way School differs from all other schools of Buddhist doctrine in their assertion that existents exist only conventionally, only nominally. Unlike other systems of Buddhist doctrine, they say that the search for an imputed phenomenon is an ultimate analysis—one that reaches the final nature of existence of that thing. According to

Consequentialists, a phenomenon cannot be found when sought among its bases of designation, but is merely imputed by thought.[47]

Autonomists, on the other hand, say that phenomena cannot be merely imputed by thought, but must be posited through the force of their appearance to unmistaken consciousnesses. Additionally, phenomena, including the person, must be established not merely through imputation, but from the side of the basis of imputation.[48] Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan says that the Autonomists who follow Bhavaviveka (the Sutra School Autonomists) assert, as the illustration of the person found among the bases to which it is imputed, the mental consciousness.[49] The other branch—the Yogic Practitioner Autonomists who follow Śāntarakṣita—say that the person is the continuum of the mental consciousness.[50] Gung-thang explains that the phrase from the *sūtra* quotation, "In dependence on the aggregates," is interpreted by Autonomists as an indication that (1) negatively speaking, the person has no existence without reliance on something other than it, an other that establishes its existence and (2) positively, the basis of designation of the person must be established from its own side.[51]

Candrakīrti's Consequentialist Middle Way rejects all other Buddhist assertions on the person through insisting on a rigorous analysis of the meaning of the *Saṃyuttanikāya* passage. If the person is posited in dependence on the aggregates, they say, it can be neither the aggregates as a whole nor any one of them.[52] Nothing can depend on itself. For Consequentialists, an object designated cannot be found among its bases of designation. All non-Consequentialist Buddhist doctrinalists hold, on the other hand, that a phenomenon is found when sought for among its bases of designation. Consequentialists agree with other Buddhists that the psychophysical aggregates are the basis of the designation of a person, as well as being the basis of the false view of self, but they disagree with the others when they say that this person cannot be found among its bases of designation.[53]

This does not mean that Consequentialists refute the person. In his commentary on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Tsong-kha-pa says:[54]

> The assertion by others that the aggregates or the mind are the self is a case of positing a self or person in the context of searching for the meaning of the imputation of that [person], without understanding that [the person] is merely posited by the power of convention.

He is more specific in his commentary on Nāgārjuna's (*Mādhyamikaśāstra*):

> The self which is the basis of observation when Devadatta thinks "I" without distinguishing selves of former and later [lifetimes], is the mere-I which has operated beginninglessly.[55]

Thus, from looking at these various assertions about the person, two principal models emerge.

1 The position of most Buddhist doctrinalists—the Sutra School, the Distinctionalists, the Mind-Only School and the Autonomist Middle Way School—is that there is a *substantially existent illustration of the person* (either the continuum of the aggregates, a subtle mental consciousness, or the fundamental consciousness [*ālayavijñāna*]) and this substantially existent illustration of the person is findable among the bases of designation of that person.
2 The position of the Consequentialist Middle Way School is that whereas there is no findable person, and no substantial existence anywhere, there is an *imputedly existent mere-I* which is the illustration of the person.

As Gung-thang and other later dGe-lugs-pas present the latter position, the person is by definition an imputed and not a substantially existent phenomenon; it is "a phenomenon imputed to one or another of the four or five psychophysical aggregates."[56] The qualification "four or five" takes into account the Formless Realm, where there is no aggregate of form (that is, no physical body), and thus there are not five but four aggregates.

Whereas the *Saṃyuttanikāya* verse quoted by Gung-thang explicitly presents the imputedly existent person—in its words, "the convention 'sentient being'"—Gung-thang and Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan assert that there is, concomitant with this imputed self, a substantially existent person. Their assertion

goes back to Tsong-kha-pa and rests on the general principle that for all except Consequentialists, there must exist at least one illustration of all existent imputations, an illustration findable among its bases of imputation. Just as any illustration of table—for instance, wooden table—must be a table, so the illustration of the person must be a person. We read in Tsong-kha-pa's *Illumination of the Thought* (his commentary on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*):[57]

> This master [Bhāvaviveka], because he does not assert a fundamental consciousness [says] that the consciousness which appropriates the body is the mental consciousness. The others who do not assert a fundamental consciousness are similar to him. Those who do assert a fundamental consciousness say that it is just this fundamental consciousness that is the illustration of the person.
>
> Furthermore, although these [non-Consequentialist] systems [of Buddhist doctrine] assert that Hearers [*śrāvakas*] and Solitary Realizers [*pratyekabuddhas*] of the Modest Vehicle [*hīnayāna*] realize the non-existence of a substantially existent person, they do not realize the non-existence as a substantial entity of [either of] those two consciousnesses [i.e., the mental consciousness or the fundamental consciousness]. Hence, the position that the person is not substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient is an assertion made within the context of the self-isolate [*rang-ldog*] of the person [—that is, the person itself]. There is no such assertion made concerning the consciousness which is the illustration of the person.

When it comes time to posit something which is the person imputed to the psychophysical aggregates, an illustration must be presented. In the case of Asaṅga's Yogācāra School, this is the fundamental consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). Although the fundamental consciousness is the illustration of the imputed person, it is itself substantially existent. Moreover, since it is an illustration of the person, or self, it *is* a person or self. It must, therefore, be said to be a substantially existent self.[58] What is being rejected by Tsong-kha-pa and his followers is a self which is substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficient (*rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod*).[59] The substantially existent self asserted by the Vātsīputrīyas is said to be such a self.[60]

dGe-lugs-pas hold that Buddhist philosophers, with the exception of Consequentialists, do not reject substantial existence—more precisely, whereas they reject one kind of substantial existence, they accept another, at least for some phenomena. At sGo-mang College, the distinction is made between the following types of substantial existence:[61]

1 substantial existence in the sense of self-sufficiency (*rang skya thub pa'i rdzas yod*), where this is taken to mean an ability on the part of a thing to stand by itself without depending on bases of designations or on parts;
2 substantial existence in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible (*rang rkya 'dzin thub pa'i rdzas yod*), taken to mean the ability to appear as an object of consciousness without reliance on an other entity, for example, the prior elimination of an object of negation.

A pot, for example, is the second but not the first. It is self-sufficiently apprehensible because it may be directly perceived (by, for instance, a visual consciousness) without the prior elimination of an object of negation. It is, however, not self-sufficient, because it is not established independently of its parts.[62] All of the illustrations of the person presented by Gung-thang and Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan on behalf of the various Buddhist doctrinal systems would, for sGo-mang scholars, be substantially existent in the sense of being self-sufficiently apprehensible, but none would be substantially existent in the sense of self-sufficiency; all depend on their parts.

We thus see dGe-lugs-pas claiming that all Buddhists save Consequentialists assert two types of persons:

(a) an imputedly existent person
(b) a substantially existent person which is the illustration of the imputed person.

The imputed person, the person itself, is an imputation made to some basis or bases of imputation among the psychophysical aggregates. That person in no way substantially exists, since something whose entity is other than the person—the aggregates—must first appear as a basis for the designation

"person." However, the illustration of that person—the mental consciousness or the fundamental consciousness—does substantially exist; it is self-sufficiently apprehensible and not merely a designation made in dependence on something else.

The person or self that is refuted in the doctrine of selflessness is the self-sufficient person; although it appears to exist among the aggregates that are its bases of designation, it can be shown that there is no self-sufficient person there.[63] The Consequentialist Middle Way School additionally refutes even the substantially existent person the other schools accept. They say that when an illustration of the imputedly existent person is sought, nothing substantial will be found; there are merely imputedly existent aggregates with no substantial basis.[64] The Consequentialist assertion, according to dGe-lugs-pas, of a person which is a merely imputed "mere-I" (*nga tsam*) serves the same function as other Buddhists' assertion of a substantially existent consciousness or continuum of aggregates as the person. For, their mere-I exists on a par with other phenomena; in Consequentialist philosophy, everything that exists is merely imputedly existent.

The Person as Agent

Both the substantially existent illustrations of the person, such as the fundamental consciousness, and the imputedly existent mere-I of the Consequentialists are posited as transmigrators—takers of rebirth from life to life. Thus, they are posited for the sake of presenting a basis whereby intentional moral and immoral actions (*karma*) may be connected with effects at a later time, typically after the death of the one doing the action.[65]

Gung-thang makes the point that whereas Śāriputra's fundamental consciousness is a transmigrator, it is not a monk (even though Śāriputra, of course, is a monk). A transmigrator is a person posited from the viewpoint of the psychophysical aggregates as karmic fruitions; a monk, however, is an instance of an imputed person—the monk is dependent on having a preceptor, assuming and keeping certain vows, and so forth.[66] Similarly, if my own fundamental consciousness were a human or were Joe Wilson (both of which are imputations and neither of which are substantially existent), it would have a mother, yet it is absurd to speak of a consciousness having a mother.[67]

Gung-thang places this in the context of ethics when he says that although Ajātaśatru's fundamental consciousness is an ego that is an illustration of Ajātaśatru and, thus, an ego that is an illustration of a patricide, his fundamental consciousness is not a patricide.[68] To say that the fundamental consciousness is an ego that is an illustration of something is not to say that if one searches for that thing, one finds the fundamental consciousness.[69] When one says that Ajātaśatru's fundamental consciousness is the ego that is the illustration of a killer, this means that if one seeks the killer of Bimbisara, Ajātaśatru will be turned up, but not his fundamental consciousness. The fundamental consciousness is not the killer; however, the I or ego that is the killer is the fundamental consciousness. A fundamental consciousness, Gung-thang says, is neither an agent nor an experiencer. It can only be the ego found when the agent or experiencer is sought among its bases of designation.

Consequentialists disagree with other Buddhist doctrinalists when they say that the mere-I that is Ajātaśatru's basis of conception of I exists beginninglessly. The others say that if the basis of designation of the imputedly existent I is sought it will be found among the aggregates of this lifetime. For non-Consequentialists, Ajātaśatru and his aggregates are contemporaneous.[70] Consequentialists speak of the mere-I as a shared I that exists over many lifetimes, past, present, and future.[71] They say that this mere-I is the basis of the thought "I" when someone clairvoyantly remembers a former lifetime and is the basis of that person's acting ethically due to fear that he will suffer in a future lifetime should he do otherwise.[72] An individual such as Ajātaśatru is not this mere-I. "Ajātaśatru's I" is only a particular instance of the mere-I of his continuum; Tsong-kha-pa calls it "the minor self of an individual rebirth."[73]

Conclusions

Certain things have become evident in this brief examination of assertions on selves and selflessness. First, it is clear that there are many different senses in which the word "self" is used, even when used in the term "selflessness."[74] Within the selflessness of persons, a division is made into coarse and subtle selflessnesses. Vātsīputrīyas are able to maintain their

standing as Buddhists because, while they do propound a self-sufficient person, they reject the coarse self—a permanent, partless, and independent person. The Tibetan and Mongolian writers examined in this article are able to assert the existent self as they do because they clearly differentiate it from the subtle nonexistent self. That is, they interpret non-Consequentialist Buddhist doctrinalists to be rejecting a self-sufficient self but (at least from the viewpoint of sGo-mang College) to be asserting a self-sufficiently apprehensible illustration of the person. The distinctions they make within substantial existence, particularly that between self-sufficiency and self-sufficient apprehensibility, seem to be novel to them; if they have their origin in the works of such Indian scholars as Asaṅga, it must be said that such origin is by way of suggestion or implication rather than explicit indication.

It is further apparent that there are some similarities and some dissimilarities between the analyses of person and personal identity made by these modern Tibeto-Mongolian philosophers and analyses of personal identity made by modern Anglo-American philosophers.

Both are clearly identifying an entity within the context of moral responsibility, but from different viewpoints. However, where Western philosophers regard the person as being a rational, responsible entity, a self-aware being who is an actor in the moral sphere,[75] the Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhist philosophers examined in this paper hold a position that implies a different perspective. Whereas one can speak of a designation—the imputedly existent person—which is an actor and is therefore morally responsible, once one turns and seeks an illustration of this person, what is found is not an actor and therefore not morally responsible.

This is because what is found is either nothing (according to the Consequentialists) or is a subtle type of consciousness that is neither virtuous nor nonvirtuous—i.e., not morally definitive (*lung du ma bstan pa*, *avyākṛta*)—such as the fundamental consciousness.[76] Actions are for most Buddhists really fulfilled intentions, and thus mental in nature.[77] This, however, is not enough: moral actions must definitively be either virtuous or nonvirtuous. The substantially existent person, which is the ground of personal continuity and thus the entity that car-

ries the seeds left by actions/intentions, must be neither virtuous nor nonvirtuous. Were it otherwise, it would not be able to be present while its opposite was present; for, virtuous minds and nonvirtuous minds are incompatible and cannot coexist at the same time in the same place.[78] Were the person one or the other, it would cease as soon as its inimical opposite arose and in that case personal continuity would be lost.

Buddhists posit substantially existent persons within the moral sphere, but they are not actors. They do, however, serve to make moral responsibility possible. Illustrations of the person, such as the fundamental consciousness, the basis carrying the seeds left by moral and immoral actions, are merely neutral mechanisms by which an action can bring about a later effect. They are persons because they survive over time; they are not selves (that is, as the term is used in "selflessness") because within that continuity they change and because they are aggregates of temporally discrete parts, and therefore not self-sufficient.

NOTES

1. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 17:43–59 (1989).
2. Ibid., p. 43.
3. Ibid., pp. 55–56.
4. Matthew Kapstein, "Collins, Parfit, and the problem of personal identity in two philosophical traditions—A review of *Selfless Persons* by Steven Collins and *Reasons and Persons* by Derek Parfit" (*Philosophy East and West* 36/3 [1986]: 289–298), p. 295.
5. Steven Collins, *Selfless Persons* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 3.
6. Roger Corless says, in his recent book, *The Vision of Buddhism* (New York: Paragon House, 1989), p. xx: "It is my contention that history, a western, post-Christian, academic discipline, is non-Buddhist, even anti-Buddhist... and, hence, any attempt to explain Buddhism *primarily* by means of its history obscures, and sometimes destroys, the reality, that is, the Buddhism that it is trying to study and explain."
7. "Buddhist Hybrid English: Some Notes on Philology and Hermeneutics for Buddhologists" (pp. 17–32 in *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 4/2 [1981]), p. 20.
8. The former extreme may be seen in many translations published by Western centers of Tibetan Buddhism, whereas the latter is seen in Kapstein's article, "Śāntarakṣita on the Fallacies of Personalistic Vitalism."

9. *On Being Mindless. Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1986), p. xix.

10. "Who Will Speak *for* the Religious Traditions?" (*Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 57: 699–717), p. 701. Wilkens is quoting Doniger in "The Uses and Misuses of Other Peoples' Myths" (*Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 54: 219–239).

11. Griffiths, "Buddhist Hybrid English," p. 21.

12. See 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, 131b.6–132a.1—there he distinguishes the Vaibhāṣika or Distinctionalist School from the Sautrāntika or Sutra School; the former reject only a permanent, partless, and independent self whereas the latter also reject a substantial self. See also Joe Wilson, *Chandrakīrti's Sevenfold Reasoning: Meditation on the Selflessness of Persons* (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1980), p. 14.

13. Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*—the commentary on the basic verses (*Madhyamakāvatāra*) 1.3–4; see the translation of Tsong-kha-pa's commentary in Jeffrey Hopkins, *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (Valois, New York: Gabriel/Snow Lion, 1980), pp. 116–125. Śāntideva implies that an understanding of selflessness underlies compassion in his discussion of self and other at *Bodhicāryāvatāra* 8.99ff. (pp. 162ff. in the Bibliotheca Indica edition of Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya [Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1960]).

14. The Tibetan is given here prior to the Sanskrit following a format suggested by Leah Zahler ("Meditation and Cosmology: The Physical basis of the Concentrations and the Formless Absorptions According to dGe-lugs Tibetan Presentations," pp. 53–78 in *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 13/1 [1990]), note 1, p. 73). I am not presenting Tibetan philosophical analyses merely as an aid to an understanding of Indian Buddhist writers, but in their own right. The Sanskrit is given as a point of reference for the convenience of those with no Tibetan.

15. See, for example, Étienne Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien* (Louvain-la-neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1976), p. 671.

16. 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, 126a.5–6 and 130b.3–4. Vasubandhu's commentator Yaśomitra (in the commentary on the ninth-chapter refutation of the self in the *Abhidharmakośa*) seems to equate the Vātsīputrīyas and the Saṃmatīyas. See Yaśomitra, *Abhidharmakośasphuṭārthavyākhyā* (edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri [Bauddha Bharati Series No.5] as *Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Acharya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārtha Commentary of Acarya Yaśomitra* [Banaras: Bauddha Bharati, 1970]).

17. dKon-mchog-'jig-med-dbang-po, *Precious Garland of Tenets (Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i 'phreng ba* [Mundgod, India: Drepung Loseling Printing Press, 1980], p.7) identifies the self asserted by the Vātsīputrīyas as one that exists substantially in the sense of being self-sufficient. 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa discusses this in *Grub mtha' chen mo* (137b.1–139a.5). The relevant annotation is in Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, *Annotations for (Jam-yang-shé-ba's ['Jam-dbyangs-bzhed-pa]) "Great Exposition of Tenets," Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, a Precious Jewel of Clear Thought (Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad ndud grol blo gsal gces nor* [Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1964]), vol. *dngos*,

16a.4–21b.6. On this school, see also A. K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), pp. 240–242.

18. See, for example, dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, *Grub mtha rin che 'phreng ba*, p. 17.

19. Kapstein's translation of *ātman* as "substantial self" seems ill considered, given that Buddhist philosophers differentiate among so many different sorts of *ātman*, only one of which is a *rdzas yod kyi bdag*.

20. See Lamotte, *Histoire*, pp. 600, 673–4.

21. The main source for the assertions on personal identity presented in this article is Gung-thang's *On a Variety of Responses to Questions on Doctrinal Assertions* (literally, *Various Answers to Questions Concerning Assertions in the Four Tenet Systems—Grub mtha' bzhi'i 'dod tshul sogs dris lan sna tshogs kyi skor*, pages 127–170 in *The Collected Works of Gun-than Dkon-mchog-bstan-pa'i Sgron-me* [New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972], Volume III)—abbreviated as *Grub mtha' dris lan*. The material relevant to personal identity is seen at 3b.4–7a.3 (that is, pp. 132–139). Another important source is Gung-thang's *Textbook on Fundamental Consciousness* (*Kun gzhi'i yig cha*). The full name of this work is *A Ford for the Wise: An Explanation of the Difficult Topics of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "[Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Topics of] Mentality and Fundamental Consciousness" (Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka'i gnad rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa'i 'jug ngog* [Buxa: 1965]). It has been translated in Joe Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in the Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only* (doctoral dissertation: University of Virginia, 1984). My source for Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan's positions is his *Annotations for (Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa's ['Jam-yang-shé-ba]) "Great Exposition of Tenets," Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, a Precious Jewel of Clear Thought (Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor* [Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1964])—abbreviated hereafter as *Annotations*.

22. 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, *Explanation of [the Basic Verses Called] "Tenets," Sun of the Land of Samantabhadra Brilliantly Illuminating All of Our Own and Others' Tenets and the Meaning of the Profound, An Ocean of Scripture and Reasoning Fulfilling All Hopes of All Beings (Grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong* [Musoorie: Dalama, 1962])—known as (and abbreviated here as) *Grub mtha' chen mo*.

23. dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, *Precious Garland of Tenets (Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i 'phreng ba* [Mundgod, India: Drepung Loseling Printing Press, 1980])—known as (and abbreviated here as) *Grub mtha rin che 'phreng ba*.

24. Stephan Beyer, *The Cult of Tārā: Magic and Ritual in Tibet* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. xvi—quoted in Paul Griffiths, *On Being Mindless*, p. 146 (note 8). Griffiths confesses to difficulty with this idea, asserting that Buddhist texts are as much a part of the study of Buddhism as Buddhists.

25. According to 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa (*Grub mtha' chen mo*, p. 132a.1–5), the word *Vaibhāṣika* derives both from the fact that these writers are followers of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and from the fact that they make distinctions among substantial entities (*rdzas, dravya*).

26. See 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, 124b.6–126a.3.

27. Many positions are identified in ambiguous ways—as those of *kha cig* ("someone"), or *la la* ("someone"), or *bod pa snga ma* ("a previous Tibetan"), etc.

28. *Websters' Third New International Dictionary* (Chicago: Merriam-Webster, 1981).

29. Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, *Grub mtha' mchan*, vol. *stod*, 20.4–6.

30. 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, 249.5.

31. Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, *Grub mtha' mchan*, vol. *stod*, 20.7.

32. dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, *Grub mtha rin che 'phreng ba*, p. 45. See also Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Cutting Through Appearances: Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism* (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1989), pp. 260–267.

33. dKon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbang-po, ibid., page 50.

34. *Grub mtha' bzhi'i 'dod tshul sogs dris lan sna tshogs kyi skor* (pages 127–170 in *The Collected Works of Gun-than Dkon-mchog-bstan-pa'i Sgron-me* [New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972], Volume III), 3b.6–4a.1 (that is, pp. 132–133).

35. The full name of this book is *A Ford for the Wise: An Explanation of the Difficult Topics of (Tsong-kha-pa's) "[Extensive Commentary on the Difficult Topics of] Mentality and Fundamental Consciousness" (Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka'i gnad rnam par bshad pa mkhas pa'i 'jug ngog* [Buxa: 1965]. It has been translated in Joe Wilson, *The Meaning of Mind in the Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only* (doctoral dissertation: University of Virginia, 1984). See especially pages 513–519 and 561–581 of the translation.

36. Gung-thang, *Grub mtha' dris lan*, 4a.1 (p. 133.1). Gung-thang's source for this passage is probably Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* (commentary on *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.135ab, where this as well as the immediately preceding verse of the *sūtra* are quoted. The Tibetan (Dharamsala edition [Tibetan Publishing House, 1968], p. 198.7–9; Bibliotheca Buddhica edition of Poussin, p. 258) reads: *Ji ltar yan lag tshogs rnams la/ brten nas shing rtar brjod pa ltar/ de bzhin phung po rnams brten nas/ kun rdzob sems can zhes bya'o/*. The original is *Saṃyuttanikāya* I, page 135 (Pali Text Society edition [reprinted 1973]): *yatha hi angasambhara / / hoti saddo ratho iti / / evam khandhesu santesu / / hoti satto ti sammuti / /*.

37. *The Visuddhi-Magga of Buddhaghosa*, edited by C.A.F. Rhys Davids (London: Pali Text Society, 1975), p. 593; translation in Bhikkhu Nyanamoli, *Path of Purification* (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1986), p. 688 (Visuddhimagga XVIII,25–26).

38. *Ibid.*, XVIII, 28; Pali text, p. 594.

39. *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* (Dharamsala edition), p. 198; commentary on *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.135. See Tsong-kha-pa, *Illumination of the Thought: An Extensive Explanation of (Candrakīrti's) Madhyamakāvatāra (Dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal* [P6142, volume 154]—Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973), pp. 379–80. Abbreviated hereafter as *Dgongs pa rab gsal*.

40. See Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1983), p. 415.

41. Gung-thang, *Kun gzhi'i yig cha*, 21a.4–5. The passage quoted is translated following the citation in the Buxa edition and not the Lhasa edition which erroneously reads *brdzod pa* for *brjod pa*. I have been unable to find this quotation in Mkhas-grub's *Stong thun mig 'byed*; however cf. 214b.2 in Lha-mkhar Yons-

dzin Bstanpa-rgyal-mtshan [ed.], *Stoṅ thun chen mo of Mkhas-grub Dge-legs-dpal-bzang and other texts on Madhyamika philosophy* (New Delhi: 1972).

42. Gung-thang, *Grub mtha' dris lan*, p. 133.2–3.
43. Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, *Grub mtha' mchan*, vol. *dbu* 25b.8–26a.1.
44. Gung-thang, *Grub mtha' dris lan*, p.133.3–5.
45. *Ibid.*
46. Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, *Grub mtha' mchan*, vol. *dbu* 26a.1.
47. See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, pp. 170, 173, 192.
48. Gung-thang, *Grub mtha' dris lan*, pp.133.5–134.2.
49. Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, *Grub mtha' mchan*, vol. *dbu* 26a.1.
50. *Ibid.*, 26a.1–2.
51. Gung-thang, *Grub mtha' dris lan*, pp.134.1–2.
52. Gung-thang presents the Prāsaṅgika refutation of the other systems in *Grub mtha' dris lan*, , 4b.2–5a.4.
53. See Wilson, *Chandrakīrti's Sevenfold Reasoning*.
54. Tsong-kha-pa, *Dgongs pa rab gsal* (Sarnath), p. 373.6–8.
55. Tsong-kha-pa, *Ocean of Reasoning: An Explanation of (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle Way" (Dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* [Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973]), p. 215.8–10. Abbreviated hereafter as *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*.
56. This is the definition of person (*gang zag*) presented orally by contemporary dGe-lugs-pa scholars.
57. Tsong-kha-pa, *Dgongs pa rab gsal*, p. 368.3–9.
58. Gung-thang, *Kun gzhi'i yig cha*, 49b.6.
59. See Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness*, p. 303; Wilson, *Chandrakīrti's Sevenfold Reasoning*, pp. 16–17; and Gung-thang, *Kun gzhi'i yig cha*, 50a.3–51a.3.
60. Gung-thang, *Kun gzhi'i yig cha*, 50a.4–5.
61. *Ibid.*, 50b.5–6.
62. *Ibid.*, 50b.6–51a.1.
63. See Tsong-kha-pa, *Dgongs pa rab gsal*, p. 368.10ff., 391.12ff.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 404.17–405.6.
65. See Gung-thang, *Kun gzhi'i yig cha*, 28a.1–2, 28b.5–29a.2.
66. *Ibid.*, 27b.5–6.
67. I owe this insight to the Abbot Emeritus of Go-mang College, Geshé Ngawang Nyima.
68. Gung-thang, *Kun gzhi'i yig cha*, 24b.3.
69. *Ibid.*, 24b.1.ff.
70. *Ibid.*
71. *Ibid.*, 28b.6–29a.2—quoting Tsong-kha-pa, *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*, pp. 237.16–238.1.
72. Gung-thang, Kun gzhi'i yig cha, 28b.5–6.
73. Tsong-kha-pa, *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*, 215.12–13—quoted in Gung-thang, *Kun gzhi'i yig cha*, 28b.5.
74. See Wilson, *Chandrakīrti's Sevenfold Reasoning*, pages 13–15 for an analysis.
75. See, for example, Daniel Dennett, "Conditions of Personhood" (pp. 175–196 in Amélie Oksenberg Rorty [ed.], *The Identities of Persons* [Berkeley: Uni-

versity of California Press, 1976]), pp. 177–178 where six "familiar themes" are enumerated: (1) persons are rational beings; (2) persons are beings to which states of consciousness are attributed; (3) persons are treated in certain special ways; (4) persons are capable of reciprocating this treatment; (5) persons are capable of verbal communication; (6) persons are distinguishable from other entities by being conscious in some way.

76. Concerning the morally neutral nature of the fundamental consciousness, see Gung-thang, *Kun gzhi'i yig cha*, pp. 11b.6–12a.1 and 30a.1–30b.1.

77. See Étienne Lamotte, "Le traité de l'acte de Vasubandhu: Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa" (pp. 151–288 in *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 4 (1935–36)), pp. 166–171.

78. This is, according to the Mind-Only philosophers, one of the reasons one must assert a fundamental consciousness or something functionally equivalent to it. See Wilson, "Meaning of Mind," pp. 321–325.