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TOM TILLEMANS

A Note on *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *Nyāyamukha*. What is the *svadharmin* in Buddhist logic?

The logical fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*, or “unestablished basis”, occurs when the “basis” (*āśraya*), or subject (*dharmin*), of an argument is non-existent – for our purposes, we shall call such a situation, “subject failure”. Now, clearly it is more or less East-West common sense that, in usual cases at least, subject failure implies that one will not succeed in demonstrating the whole proposition in which that subject figures. To take the well-worn Western example, a proposition like “The present king of France is bald” is either false or neither truth nor false, depending upon one’s philosophical analysis, *because* there is no such king to whom we can ascribe baldness. The logical dependence of the truth of the proposition upon the subject’s existence is agreed upon, even though the question whether subject failure implies falsity or presuppositional failure is not. Equally, a similar basic logical insight that the proposition’s truth is dependent upon the subject is to be found amongst Buddhist logicians, who hold that a thesis (*pakṣa*) cannot be established when the subject fails, because debate about its properties will naturally cease.¹ That said, there are problematic cases where a philosopher, Buddhist or otherwise, would certainly wish to maintain that subject failure, or *āśrayāsiddha*, does *not* occur, even though the subject is non-existent. For the Buddhist logician, this philosophical problem – i.e. when *āśrayāsiddha* genuinely occurs and when the accusation is simply misplaced – typically comes up in connection with such arguments as proofs of momentariness (*kṣaṇabhāgasiddhi*), refutations of pseudo-entities accepted by non-Buddhists, and in the later Madhyamaka proofs of the absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). Thus, for example, to take an argument which figures in Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛtti* and in the third chapter of his *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, if someone manages to show that the Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) accepted in

1. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 76-79, translated in TILLEMANS 1995b. Several studies have dealt with the Indian debates on *āśrayāsiddha*, one of the best still being MATILAL 1970.

Sāṃkhya philosophy does not in fact exist, then the Sāṃkhya proponent's thesis that *pradhāna* has such and such properties will thereby be invalidated. This much is fairly obvious (and little different from the case of the French king's baldness). The potential problem arises, however, when the Buddhist himself actually wants to show that a pseudo-entity like *pradhāna* does not exist, or when the Buddhist wants to simply deny that *pradhāna* has the essential properties which the Sāṃkhyas attribute to it. We can readily understand that for the Buddhist, in *this* type of context, where he is proving a simple denial of existence, a charge of *āśrayāsiddha* must somehow be ruled out, on pain of an absurd self-refutation.

The point of departure in many later Indian or Tibetan discussions on *āśrayāsiddha* is very often Dignāga's definition of the thesis (*pakṣa-lakṣaṇa*) in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III.2, in particular, the specification that the thesis should not be opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perception and other means of valid cognition *with regard to the proponent's own intended subject* (*svadharminī* "with regard to his own subject").

Pramāṇasamuccaya III.2: *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharminī* // "[A valid thesis] is one which is intended (*iṣṭa*) by [the proponent] himself (*svayam*) as something to be stated (*nirdeśya*) in its [proper] form alone (*svarūpeṇaiva*) [i.e. as a *sādhyā*]; [and] with regard to [the proponent's] own subject (*svadharminī*), it is not opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perceptible objects (*pratyakṣārtha*), by inference (*anumāna*), by authorities (*āpta*) or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*)."

By saying that the thesis or "what is being proven" (*sādhyā*) should not be opposed (*anirākṛta*) "with regard to [the proponent's] own [intended] subject (*svadharminī*)"², Dignāga supposedly recognized that not only the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*) should be unopposed by any means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), but also that the proponent's subject must be existent, for if the subject were not existent it could not have the property, and hence the thesis would be invalidated.³

Now, the term *svadharminī*, which figures briefly in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (but not in his earlier *Nyāyamukha*), will be commented upon *in extenso* in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 136-148 as meaning that one has to make a distinction between the subject actually intended by the proponent himself (*svadharminī*) and one which

2. Cf. Vibhūticandra's gloss on *svadharminī*, *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* 459, n.5: *vādineṣṭasya svasya dharmī svadharminī tatra*.

3. See *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 137-139.

is just unrelated, “isolated” (*kevala*), or (to adopt a frequent Tibetan gloss on *kevala*) is simply “nominal” in the sense that it is spoken about but is not the actual subject at stake.⁴ It is only when the proponent’s actual intended subject fails to exist that the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha* will occur. The necessity to make a separation between the two especially arises in the cases where one wishes to prove that a certain pseudo-entity is in fact non-existent or does not have such-and-such an essential property, for, as we saw earlier, it is especially in this type of case that *āśrayāsiddha* would be an absurd self-refutation. What is it in non-existence proofs that makes them of different logical structure from other proofs, so that differences of *svadharmin* and *kevaladharmin* can (and

4. The term *kevala[dharmin]* = *chos can 'ba' zig pa* does not seem to figure in Dignāga, but is introduced first in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 140: *nanv etad apy arthasiddhaṃ satyaṃ kecit tu dharmināḥ / kevalasyoparodhe 'pi doṣavattam upāgatāḥ //* “[Objection:] But surely this too is established by implication. [Reply:] That is true. But some hold that [the thesis] is faulty even when an unrelated (*kevala*) subject is negated.” Devendrabuddhi is sparing in his gloss on *kevala*, describing it as *yan gar ba* (“isolated, alone, separate”); see *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* D. 297b2. *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* ad k. 143 speaks of this “unrelated/nominal” *dharmin* as *tadasambaddhaparaparikalpitadharmin* (“a subject imagined by the opponent and unrelated to that [property to be proved]”). The term *yan gar ba* will be taken up again by Tson kha pa, in his *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*: *chos can 'ba' zig pa ni / chos can du smras kyaṅ skabs de'i bsgrub bya'i chos kyi rten min pas / chos can yan gar bar soṅ ba'i don no /* “*kevaladharmin* means that although it is stated as the subject it is not the basis of the property to be proved in that context [of the discussion] and is thus an isolated subject”; see TILLEMANS 1984: 366-367. Cf. Nag dbaṅ bstan dar's explanation (in his *gCig du bral gyi rnam bžag*, p. 455.3) of *chos can 'ba' zig pa* as *smras pa'i chos can* “the stated subject”; the section on *āśrayāsiddha* in this work has been translated in TILLEMANS and LOPEZ (1998). Finally, note that the Sa skya pa *Rigs gter* tradition as explained by Śākya mchog ldan speaks of the two types of subjects in terms of a somewhat different opposition, that of *soṅ tshod kyi chos can* versus *rlom tshod kyi chos can*, “the subject as it [actually] is” versus “the subject as it is taken by inflated misconception”. Cf. *Tshad ma rigs gter gyi dgoṅs rgyan smad cha* f.76a2-4: *de lta na yan skabs 'dir dpyad pa 'di 'jug dgos te / gtso bo chos can / yod pa ma yin te ma dmigs pa'i phyir / zes pa lta bu / med par dgag pa gtan tshigs su bkod pa rnams la rlom tshod kyi chos can med kyaṅ / chos can gyi ṅo bo ma grub par mi 'gyur la / yan gtso bo yod te / khyad par rnams rjes su 'gro ba'i phyir / zes pa lta bu sgrub pa'i gtan tshigs su bkod pa rnams la soṅ tshod kyi chos can yod kyaṅ / rlom tshod med na chos can gyi ṅo bo ma grub par 'jog dgos pa yin te / de lta bu'i tshul gñis ka sde bdun mdzad pa'i gzuṅ las gsal bar gsuṅs pa'i phyir /*. On the *soṅ tshod* vs. *rlom tshod* opposition, see DREYFUS 1997: 161, 168; see also TILLEMANS 1995a: 869-870, n. 19.

indeed must) be made? What is the *svadharmin* and what is the *kevala-dharmin* in such proofs?⁵

What we find in the Indian Buddhist literature is that Dharmakīrtian commentators, like Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, in their explanations of k. 136-148, emphasize the idea that subjects, like space, taken as real (*dños por gyur pa = vastubhūta*) by the opponents, are *kevala* in proofs where the property to be proved and the reason are “mere exclusions” (*rnam par gcod pa tsam = vyavacchedamātra*); in these special cases, the subjects can be negated with impunity. Although Devendrabuddhi himself does not gloss these “mere exclusions” by the notion of non-implicative negations (*prasajyapratishedha*) so often invoked in Buddhist philosophy, the transition is very natural and is, indeed, explicitly made by Śākyabuddhi: mere exclusion means that no entity or positive property is stated, implied or presupposed.⁶ The idea then is that

5. Note that Tibetan writers coined and widely used the term *rañ rten chos can* “the subject which is his own basis” and used this term instead of the term *svadharmin* [= *rañ gi chos can*]. It can be shown that this was an error which came from relying on the wrong translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. However, the idea is the same as *svadharmin*. The translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* by Vasudhararakṣita is extremely bad here. The text in KITAGAWA 1973: 472 reads: ... *ma bsal ba'o // mñon sum don dañ rjes dpag dañ yid ches grags pas rañ rten la'o*. This passage is what was cited by numerous authors, including Tson kha pa, lCañ skya and also Sa skya pas like Go rams pa bSod nams señ ge, but only as *mñon sum don dañ rjes dpag dañ yid ches grags pas rañ rten la'o*, which, without *ma bsal ba*, is little better than gibberish. The problem is that the phrase *ma bsal ba'o = anirākṛta*, having a final particle ('o) was probably not understood to go together with *mñon sum ... rañ rten la'o*, and as a result it was not cited at all. The translation of Kanakavarman correctly has *rañ gi chos can la mñon sum ... grags pas ma bsal ba'o (= 'nirākṛtaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharminī //)*; see TILLEMANS 1984: n. 42 . The phrase *rañ rten la'o* is also sometimes cited in earlier works, such as on p.438 of the 13th Century work, *rNam 'grel gyi rnam bśad gañs can gyi rgyan* of bTsun pa ston gžon, who followed the *Rigs gter* of Sa skya Pañḍita; however *rañ rten chos can* may be a later invention. At any rate, it is found in Tson kha pa's *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* and in the numerous dGe lugs explanations of *āśrayāsiddha* based on this *zin bris*.
6. *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* D. 296b4 et seq.; *Pramāṇavārttikaṭikā* D. 269a4-5: *gtan tshigs rnam par gcod pa'i no bo ma grub pa ñid ma yin no zes bya ba ni / cig car sgra sogs rgyu min phyir / zes bya ba'i gtan tshigs rnam par gcod pa tsam gyi no bo med par dgag pa tsam gyi mtshan ñid ma grub pa ñid ma yin te / dños por gyur pa'i chos can med na yañ tha sñad pa'i chos can rnam par gcod pa tsam la gnod pa med pa'i phyir roll. On prasajyapratishedha versus paryudāsapratishedha (“implicative negation”), see KAJIYAMA 1973 and the references in its n. 1.*

so long as we are merely denying that such-and-such a pseudo-entity has a property *P* (e.g. existence, permanence, etc.), no positive assertion of any other property is implied at all, and hence a charge of *āśrayāsiddha* would be misplaced. Such a position was adopted by writers such as Prajñākaragupta, Kamalaśīla and by Tibetan writers such as Tsoñ kha pa, lCañ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, A lag śa Ṇag dbaṅ bstan dar and the Sa skya pa, Śākya mchog ldan *et al.*, with the *further development* that when a Buddhist logician is proving a mere exclusion, or non-implicative negation, such as that the Vaiśeṣika's space (*ākāśa*) is not a permanent unity or that the Sāṃkhya's Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) does not exist, the *kevaladharmin* is just the space or Primordial Matter which the adversary takes to be real, whereas the Buddhist proponent's intended subject, the *svadharmin*, is the conceptual image of these pseudo-entities. In that case, the proponent's own intended subject, i.e. the *svadharmin*, will be unreal externally (*avastubhūta*), but will nonetheless exist qua conceptual representation; the fallacy of *aśrayāsiddhahetu* will thus be avoided.

This is, in its essentials, the approach which was advocated by later Indian writers as well as by Tibetans, although with a number of innovations and refinements centering on the theory of *apoha* and on the nature of the conceptual representations, as well as some interesting discussions in the Tibetan literature on subtleties such as whether *prasajyapratishedha* would *always* allow us to avoid *āśrayāsiddha* or whether a conceptual subject could *only* legitimately have *prasajyapratishedha* as its properties.⁷

In fact, as we shall show, there are competing scenarii as to what *svadharmin* was for Dharmakīrti and Dignāga when they dealt with Buddhist refutations of the pseudo-entities accepted by their adversaries.

First scenario : The proponent's own intended subject (*svadharmin*) in non-existence proofs and proofs of simple negations is taken to be just a *conceptual representation* of the entity in question and not the entity itself.

Second scenario : The reasoning in question should be *paraphrased* so that the *svadharmin* and the property to be proved are to be understood in ways acceptable to the Buddhist proponent himself.

7. These are developed in Ṇag dbaṅ bstan dar's *gCig du bral gyi nam bṣag*. See TILLEMANS and LOPEZ 1998: 101-102.

Now, the first way to take the *svadharmin*, which we shall designate as being the “Principle of Conceptual Subjects”, turns on a deliberate rapprochement with Dignāga’s discussion, in his *Nyāyamukha*, of the argument against the existence of Primordial Matter (*pradhāna* = *prakṛti*) and hence with the corresponding discussions in Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III.⁸ The second approach (i.e. the “Method of Paraphrase”) is probably what figures in the discussion on *svadharmin* in *Pramāṇasamuccaya*(*vṛtti*) III and *Pramāṇavārttika* IV. It is, broadly speaking, close to the Method of Paraphrase which was used in *Nyāyamukha* to analyse the Sāṃkhya’s supposed proof for *pradhāna* existing because of the individual things all bearing the same general characteristic.

Let us first look at the *Nyāyamukha* and *Pramāṇasamuccaya* in a bit more detail.⁹ In the *Nyāyamukha*, Dignāga had discussed different arguments in connection with the Sāṃkhya school, the first argument being a supposed Sāṃkhya proof of the existence of *pradhāna* due to the various individual things possessing the same general characteristic, the second being a Buddhist argument to show *pradhāna*’s non-existence. In both cases, given that the subject of the argument was *pradhāna*, a pseudo-entity, there was a potential charge of *āśrayāsiddha*. Dignāga, in the first case, had avoided this charge by giving what he took to be a more rigorous philosophical *paraphrase* of the opponent’s argument:

“For them, [as for the first syllogism,] they should formulate the thesis as ‘The various individuals certainly possess one and the same cause [i.e. *pradhāna*]’, in which case they do not prove [directly the existence of] the Primordial Matter [i.e. *dharmin*].”

Dignāga then took up the second reasoning, “Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) and so forth are non-existent because they are not perceived” (*na santi pradhānādayo ’nupalabdheḥ*)¹⁰, and avoided the fault of *āśrayāsiddha* by invoking the idea of the subject being merely conceptual:

8. *Pramāṇaviniścaya* P. 306a-307a; *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III, k. 53-57 = *Pramāṇavārttika* I, k. 205-208 and 210.

9. For the *Nyāyamukha*, see KATSURA 1992: 230-231, KATSURA 1978: 110-111, TUCCI 1930: 16-17; the parallel passage *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* is P. 128b6-8. The translations from the *Nyāyamukha*, in what follows, are those in KATSURA 1992: 230.

10. See *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (ed. Gnoli) 105: *atha yad idaṃ na santi pradhānādayo ’nupalabdher iti* /...

“When they [i.e. the Buddhists] argue that [Primordial Matter] does not exist[because of non-perception], ‘non-perception’ is a property of the imagined object [i.e. *pradhāna*] (*kalpitasyānupalabdhir dharmah*).”

It is noteworthy that later, in the subsequent parallel discussion in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III, Dignāga prudently avoided even mentioning the problematical second reasoning and that elsewhere, taking up *pradhāna*, he seems to have advocated more rigid strictures, excluding as illegitimate all arguments which had such unacknowledged pseudo-entities as subjects. Primordial Matter was not to be a subject of inference. As KATSURA has pointed out recently, what may be the case is that Dignāga had little place in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* for such proofs at all, and that Dignāga, in his later writings, tended towards a logic in which unreal or conceptual subjects could have no role.¹¹

Be that as it may, Dharmakīrti used the argument in Dignāga’s *Nyāya-mukha* proving the non-existence of *pradhāna* as well as the *Nyāya-mukha*’s phrase *kalpitasyānupalabdhir dharmah*¹² to come up with a general principle in *Pramāṇavārttika* I, k.205-212, the *Svavṛtti* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III that the directly signified objects of words were always conceptual representations (*kalpanā*); he then maintained that although *pradhāna* did not exist as something real and external, its conceptual representation, or in other words, the object of the word (*śabdārtha*) existed, so that the charge of *āśrayāsiddha* did not apply. The argument relies on ideas from the theory of *apoha*, but is situated in the context of the general discussion of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*). To take *Pramāṇavārttika* I, k. 205-206 (= *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III, k. 53-54):

anādivāsanodbhūtavikalpapariniṣṭhitas /
śabdārthas trividho dharmo bhāvābhāvobhayaśrayaḥ //
tasmin bhāvānupādāne sādhye 'syānupalambhanam /
tathā hetur na tasyaivābhāvaḥ śabdaprayogataḥ //

“The verbal object (*śabdārtha*), which is completely derived from conceptualisation proceeding from beginningless karmic tendencies, is a dharma of three kinds: based on something existent, something non-existent or both.¹³

11. See KATSURA 1992: 231.

12. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (ed. Gnoli) 107: *yat punar etad uktaṃ kalpitasyānupalabdhir dharmā iti ...*

13. The point in k. 205’s specifying three kinds of *śabdārtha* is that the conceptual representation which is the direct object of words can have as its substratum an existent thing like a cloth, or a non-existent thing like a rabbit’s horn, or something which is “both existent and non-existent” – in this latter case, pseudo-entities like *pradhāna* or *īśvara* (“God”) are existent qua concepts, but non-existent

When this [verbal object, such as *pradhāna*, etc.], which is without any existent substratum, is being proven, then the non-perception of this as being in such a way [i.e. as existing externally] is the logical reason. The non-existence of this very [*śabdārtha*] itself is not, for we do use words [like '*pradhāna*', etc.]."¹⁴

Commentators, on the other hand, use the passages in the *Svavṛtti* and in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III, in which there is no talk of *svadharmin* but only of conceptual representations, as their textual justification for *also* taking the *svadharmin* spoken of in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV as being a conceptual representation when the Buddhist is arguing against pseudo-entities accepted by other schools. Significantly enough, though, the actual passages in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV (and in *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* III) which discuss *svadharmin* do not mention or even allude to this idea of the subject in such proofs being a conceptual representation at all. The application of the general idea of *apoha* and *śabdārtha* found in PV I, k. 205-206 to the *svadharmin-kevaladharmin* context figures only in the commentators.

We seem to have commentators taking notions from one context, i.e. the anti-Sāṃkhya discussion in *Nyāyamukha*, *Svavṛtti* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and the theory of *anupalabdhi* and *apoha*, and imposing them on another, namely, the discussion about *svadharmin* in *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti)* III and *Pramāṇavārttika* IV. How well does this stratagem work? It may work as a creative synthesis, but not, I think, as a faithful textual account.

Significant here are Prajñākaragupta's explanations of *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 141-142 in that we find this eighth century commentator *explicitly* stating that there were the two scenarii (which we spoke about above) when interpreting Dharmakīrti's refutation of the Vaiśeṣika notion of really existent and permanent space (i.e. a pseudo-entity which no Buddhist will accept). In particular, Prajñākaragupta makes it clear that one interpretation of these *kārikās* was to invoke what we have termed the "the Principle of Conceptual Subjects": the actual intended subject is not the space which the Vaiśeṣika takes to be a real external entity (*vāstubhūta*) – that is only the nominal subject, the one which is spoken about, but is not what possesses the properties to be proved or

qua external entities. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* ad k. 204: *katham ity āha / bhāvābhāvobhayaśrayaḥ / sadasadubhayavikalpavāsanāprabhavatvāt / tadadhyavasāyena tadviśayatvāt / tatra bhāvopādāno vikalpaḥ paṭādir abhāvopādānāḥ śaśaviśānādīḥ / ubhayopādānaḥ pradhāneśvarādīḥ /*

14. Additions based on *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*.

the reason – the *svadharmin* is the conceptual representation of space. Thus, according to Prajñākaragupta, on this first scenario the *svadharmin*, on the basis of which the proponent proves that space does not have “a novel nature unproduced [by causal conditions]” (*na ... anutpādyāpūrvarūpa*)¹⁵, is unreal (*avastubhūta*) and is completely derived from conceptualisation.

The other interpretation of *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 141-142 mentioned by Prajñākaragupta – an interpretation which clearly turns on the Method of Paraphrase – is that the *svadharmin* is not the Vaiśeṣika’s permanent unitary space, nor the conceptual representation, but rather the impermanent space which the Buddhist himself accepts. The argument in k. 141-142 thus has to be paraphrased and actually means that space is impermanent because it produces effects sequentially. We quote k. 141-142 along with Prajñākaragupta’s *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*:

- (141) *yathā parair anutpādyāpūrvarūpaṃ*¹⁶ *na khādikam / sakṛc chabdādya hetuvād ity ukte prāha dūṣakaḥ ||*
 (142) *tadvad vastusvabhāvo 'san dharmī vyomādir ity api / naivam iṣṭasya sādhyasya bādhā kācana*¹⁷ *vidyate ||*

“For example, when [the Buddhist] states that space, etc. do not have a novel nature unproduced by other [conditions] because they are not causes for [producing their qualities such as] sound, etc. all at once, then the [Vaiśeṣika] adversary might say that like that the subject, space, etc., would also not have the nature of a real entity. [Dharmakīrti’s position:] In this fashion [even though the subject is invalidated¹⁸], there is in fact no invalidation of the intended [proposition] to be proved (*sādhyā*) at all.”

Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya ad k. 141-142: “Here an opponent might say: ‘But this proves that space and the like are not novel natures unproduced [by causal conditions]. In that way, it proves that a subject such as space is not real (*vastuvābhāva*)’. [Reply:] An unrelated invalidation of the subject is not faulty. Indeed, the proponent commits no fault like this. For, precisely what he intends to prove is that space and so forth are not real. Consequently, there is no fault in saying with reference to a subject, unreal space (*avastubhūtākāśadharminī*), that space does not have a novel nature unproduced [by other causal conditions], because it is not a cause [for producing its effects such as sound] all at once. This is because [he] establishes the [property] to be proved on the basis of a subject which is completely derived from conceptualisation (*vikalpapariniṣṭhite dharminī sādhyasāadhanād*). But a real thing is not the subject of that [property]. Therefore,

15. This is the same as proving that space is not a permanent unity.

16. The reading in MIYASAKA’s edition, i.e. *anutpādyā pūrvarūpan*, is wrong.

17. MIYASAKA, *kvacana*; cf. Tib. ‘ga’ yañ.

18. *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* ad k. 142: *evaṃ dharmibādhane ’pi*.

although there is invalidation of this unrelated (*kevala*) [subject], there is [in fact] no fault. This is what is meant by the word *svadharmin* [in *Pramāṇasamuccaya*]. Indeed, when the opponent's subject is invalidated it is not so that this property [i.e. non-existence] will be unestablished. So, as there is nothing annulling the establishment of the property to be proved (*sādhya-dharma*), there is no fault.

Alternatively, this [reasoning that space] does not have a novel unproduced nature because it is not the cause [for its effects] all at once, has the following meaning: space is impermanent. To this an adversary might say that the subject, permanent space, has been invalidated. But let it be invalidated. Even so the subject will be impermanent space. For, the contrary of the [property] to be proved will definitely be invalidated by the logical reason. And indeed a permanent subject is not the locus for the property to be proved under discussion, so when it is invalidated how could there be any fault at all!"¹⁹

The question immediately arises: Which of the two interpretations, or two scenarii, best fits *Pramāṇavārttika* IV? Or, in other words: How exactly did Dharmakīrti make the distinction between the proponent's own intended subject (*svadharmin*) and unrelated (*kevala*) subjects in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 136-148? Did Dharmakīrti opt for an approach which relied upon the Principle of Conceptual Subjects or did he use the Method of Paraphrase? In our opinion, there can be little doubt: Dharmakīrti's position in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV was the Method of Paraphrase. The commentators' attempts to read a Principle of Conceptual Subjects into k. 136-148 are an attempt to read the *Svavṛtti-Pramāṇaviniścaya* discussion of *apoha*, *śabdārtha* and *anupalabdhi* into a context where it does not easily belong. That said, most, if not all, of the later

19. *atra prativādy āha / athaivāyam anutpādyāpūrvarūpatābhāvaṃ sādhayati vyomādīnāṃ (I) tathā vyomādīdharmino 'pi vastutvābhāvaṃ sādhayati / na dharmibādhanam kevalam doṣavat / na hy evaṃ vādino doṣaḥ / tena hi vastubhūtam ākāśādīkaṃ na bhavati ity etad eva sādhayitum iṣṭam / tato 'vastubhūtākāśadharmiṇy anutpādyāpūrvarūpam ākāśādīkaṃ na bhavati sakṛd ahetutvād iti na doṣaḥ / vikalpaparinīṣṭhite dharmiṇi sādhyasāadhanād vastubhūtas tu dharmī na tasya / tena tasya kevalasya bādhyāṃ api na doṣa iti svadharmivacanam / na hi paradharmini bādhyamāne sa dharmo na sidhyati / tataḥ sādhyadharmasiddher* avyāghātād adoṣaḥ /*
*atha vānutpādyāpūrvarūpaṃ na bhavati sakṛd ahetutvāt / asyāyam arthaḥ / anityam ākāśam (I) tatra paraḥ / nityam ākāśam dharmibādhitam bhavati / bādhyatāṃ tathāpy anityam ākāśam dharmī bhaviṣyati / avāśyaṃ hi hetunā sādhyaviparyayo bādhitavyaḥ / nityo hi dharmī na prakṛtasādhyadharmādhāras** tatas tadbādhanē ka iva doṣaḥ / . *R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana read: sādhyadharmisiddher; but see Tib. P. 234a5: des na bsgrub bya'i chos 'grub pa la gnod pa med pa'i phyir ñes pa ma yin no // **Read prakṛtasādhyadharmādhāras following B (= Dānaśīla's ms) instead of prakṛtasādhyadharmākāras.*

Indo-Tibetan tradition has understood the relevant *kārikās* in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* IV according to the first scenario!

If we look at the rest of the discussion in this section of *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, it is clear that k. 144-145 is a complete parallel to k. 141-142: what holds for the latter should hold for the former. In k. 144-145, Dharmakīrti is confronted by the objection that if his refutation of the Vaiśeṣika's permanent space is correct, then a certain Buddhist argument against the Sāṃkhya will fail, for the Buddhist will have to face the charge that refuting the subject would lead to invalidation of the whole thesis and hence *viruddhahetu*. Briefly said, the negative existential proof would turn out to be self-refuting. The stated subject of the anti-Sāṃkhya argument is "pleasure, etc." (*sukhādi*), that is to say, "pleasure, pain and bewilderment", each of these terms being understood in the light of Sāṃkhya philosophy where each feeling is correlated with one of the three *guṇas* ("qualities"), these *guṇas* in turn being of the essence of Primordial Matter. The Buddhist then argues that pleasure, etc., i.e. *pradhāna*, is not the permanent nature of the various effects or transformations (*vikṛti*) making up the world, because if it were, then all its effects such as sound and the like would have to be produced simultaneously, and such is not in fact the case. Here the Sāṃkhya supposedly retorts that refuting the permanence of pleasure, etc., i.e. *pradhāna*, is tantamount to refuting the subject itself. Dharmakīrti then uses the Method of Paraphrase, to maintain that what the proponent is actually proving is that ordinary (and real) pleasure, etc., which are acknowledged by all, are impermanent, because they produce their effects sequentially (*kramakriyā*) – thus one does not refute the proponent's actual subject, which is pleasure, etc. taken as the ordinary, impermanent and fully real entity (*vastubhūta*) accepted by Buddhists and others alike, and not the theoretical pseudo-entity "pleasure, etc." as accepted by only Sāṃkhya philosophers.

The parallel with k. 141-142 is striking and deliberate: the arguments have the exact same reasons and virtually the same *sādhya*dharmas, differing only in their choice of subjects, i.e. space, etc. or pleasure, etc. If Dharmakīrti's whole argument is to work, then the *svadharmin* in k. 141-142 cannot be the conceptual representation, it must be the Buddhist's own accepted notion of impermanent space; just as in k. 144-145 the *svadharmin* is *not* an unreal conceptual representation, but is just the ordinary accepted entities. Not only that, but if we look at the terms used in Prajñākaragupta's description of the first approach (i.e. relying

on the Principle of Conceptual Subjects), when Prajñākaragupta speaks of *vikalpapariniṣṭhite dharminī sādhyasādhanād* the choice of words deliberately mirror k. 205's *anādivāsanodbhūtavikalpapariniṣṭhitāḥ*. The matter is thus probably as follows: the first approach, where one takes *Pramāṇavārttika* IV's discussion of *svadharmin* versus *kevaladharmin* along the lines of the first approach is a commentator's strategy consisting in a transposition into *Pramāṇavārttika* IV of a discussion elsewhere in Dharmakīrti, but it is a transposition which probably does not fit the actual context of Dharmakīrti's argumentation of *svadharmin* and *kevaladharmin*.

I would not want to suggest that this "transposition" grossly falsifies the notion of *svadharmin* – that type of conclusion would not only look somewhat arrogant on our part but would denigrate the creative syntheses that commentators typically make in juxtaposing a doctrine in one part of a work with one in another. Nonetheless, I think it is important to see this later synthesis for what it is and that it probably did not *already* figure in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's own thought. The question of conceptual representations being the subject in negative proofs was most likely not at stake in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, k. 136-148, this in spite of the fact that so many authors from Prajñākāragupta and Kamalaśīla to Tsoṅ kha pa and Ṅag dbaṅ bstan dar cite these *kārikās* as the source for the idea that the *svadharmin* is a conceptual representation.

A final remark. It is probably fair to say that the history of Buddhist thought about *āśrayāsiddha* and *svadharmin* would have been quite different if the Method of Paraphrase had been emphasized and further developed by later writers. Was it a good thing that the solution by conceptual representation became predominant in Buddhist logic? A type of Method of Paraphrase can be used very well to deal with the problem of talk about non-being, as we see in certain contemporary applications of RUSSELL's Theory of Descriptions. We can, for example, paraphrase "Pegasus does not exist", or "Pegasus does not fly" as respectively: "There is no x which is Pegasus" or "There is no x, such that x is Pegasus and x flies, etc."; these approaches avoid the problem of a pseudo-entity nonetheless existing somehow as a concept. Paraphrase starts with the assumption that what is literally said is often not what is actually meant, and this assumption yields an extremely effective approach for avoiding commitment to needless conceptual entities. Thus a sentence like "I did it for Peter's sake" bears only an apparent simi-

larity to "I did it for Peter's brother". Although we are committed to the existence of brothers, we are not actually obliged to accept that there are odd metaphysical or purely conceptual entities known as "sakes": "sakes" can be paraphrased away when we reformulate what we really mean. However, the Buddhists did not go that route; arguably they took a less promising path, fraught with avoidable problems. Indeed, the later Tibetan writings on the problem show just how complicating a development it was to mix *apoha* with the *svadharmin-kevaladharmin* problem. It is curious that most elements for a satisfactory theory of talk about non-being were already present to varying degrees in Dharmakīrti and some of the earlier commentators: a developed use of philosophical paraphrase and a theory of negation without presupposition of existence. The problem of *āśrayāsiddha* could have been treated purely as one concerning the *logical form* of statements and negations, but the temptation to turn to the all-purpose and ever-present semantic theory of *apoha* seems to have been irresistible. In the hands of commentators less taken with *apoha*, things could perhaps have turned out to be much simpler, but they did not.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

A lag śa Ṇag dbaṅ bstan dar: *gCig du bral gyi rnam bṣag = gCig du bral gyi rnam bṣag legs bśad rgya mtsho las btus pa'i 'khrul spon bdud rtsi'i gzeags ma*. In Vol. I of the *Collected gSuñ 'bum of bsTan-dar lha-ram of A-lag-sha*. Published by Lama Guru Deva. New Delhi 1971.

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