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<i>General Introduction</i> by Robert KRITZER .....	201
Nobuyoshi YAMABE <i>On the School Affiliation of Āśvaghoṣa: “Sautrāntika” or “Yogā- cāra”?</i> .....	225
Takumi FUKUDA <i>Bhadanta Rāma: A Sautrāntika before Vasubandhu</i> .....	255
Bart DESSEIN <i>Sautrāntika and the Hṛdaya Treatises</i> .....	287
Yoshifumi HONJŌ <i>Sautrāntika</i> .....	321
Robert KRITZER <i>Sautrāntika in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i> .....	331
Oskar VON HINÜBER <i>Report on the XIII<sup>th</sup> Conference of the IABS</i> .....	385
Cristina SCHERRER-SCHAUB <i>IABS Treasurer Final Financial Report</i> .....	391
Notes on the Contributors .....	395
JIABS volume 26 Number 1 2003 • <i>Errata</i> .....	397



# SAUTRĀNTIKA IN THE *ABHIDHARMAKOŚABHĀŚYA*

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## I. Introduction

The term “Sautrāntika” appears in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* approximately twenty times. In almost every case, the opinion attributed to the Sautrāntikas contradicts the orthodox Sarvāstivādin/Vaibhāṣika position, and, as Katō shows (75-78), represents Vasubandhu’s own opinion. Sautrāntika is closely associated with Dārṣṭāntika, which is often considered to be either the same as Sautrāntika or its immediate predecessor, and many of Vasubandhu’s “Sautrāntika” opinions strongly resemble ones attributed to Dārṣṭāntika by the \**Vibhāṣā*.<sup>1</sup> Recently, however, scholars have begun to notice that some of the same opinions can also be found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. In this paper, I examine the occurrences in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of the term “Sautrāntika,” refer to relevant passages in the \**Vibhāṣā* and Harivarman’s \**Tattvasiddhi*, and show that the majority of the positions labelled Sautrāntika have correspondences in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, most frequently in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*. I also discuss the possible implications of Vasubandhu’s evident reliance on the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

I limit myself here to those passages in which the word “Sautrāntika” actually appears in the Sanskrit text. There are many other positions that have been identified by commentators such as P’u-kuang and Yaśomitra as Sautrāntika, not to mention the more than 200 references by Saṃghabhadra to the *ching-chu* 經主 or “sūtra-master,”<sup>2</sup> a term used to signal Vasubandhu’s departure from Sarvāstivādin orthodoxy (see Kritzer

<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Vasubandhu does not agree with all the Dārṣṭāntika positions. It seems, in fact, as though he himself uses the term Dārṣṭāntika pejoratively. When he agrees with a Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika opinion, he labels it Sautrāntika (see Cox 37-39, which is based largely on Katō; see also Harada).

<sup>2</sup> I borrow Cox’s translation (56).

*Comparison*, “Preliminary Report”).<sup>3</sup> I also ignore references to *yogācāras* (practitioners of yoga) and *pūrvācāryas* (earlier teachers), except when they occur within a larger argument attributed to Sautrāntika.

## II. Summary of Results

Of the nineteen positions that I have isolated,<sup>4</sup> eleven involve Vasubandhu’s rejection of *dharmas* that the Sarvāstivādins classify as real and independent entities, including a number of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* (forces not associated with mind), the *asaṃskṛtadharmas* (unconditioned *dharmas*), the *anuśayas* (latent defilements), and *vijñaptirūpa* (manifested matter) and *avijñaptirūpa* (unmanifested matter). Vasubandhu often asserts that the functioning of *bījas* (seeds), themselves merely *prajñapti* (provisional entities), is sufficient to explain the phenomena in question. Other positions concern the process of perception, the nature of the Buddha’s knowledge, the reality of the past, and the possibility of a fall from arhatship. In a number of these cases, too, Vasubandhu appeals to either *bīja* or the closely related idea of *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa* (transformation of the life-stream)<sup>5</sup> in his unorthodox statements.

One of the nineteen positions seems to have nothing at all corresponding to it in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. In two other cases, the *Yogācārabhūmi* contains no argument similar to Vasubandhu’s, but its general position on the subject is in agreement with his. In the remaining sixteen cases, a correspondence between the two texts is more or less clear.

Six of the positions identified as Sautrāntika by Vasubandhu are attributed to Dārṣṭāntika by the \**Vibhāṣā*; in three other cases, statements related to the Sautrāntika positions are attributed to Dārṣṭāntika. How-

<sup>3</sup> In an ongoing project, I am comparing every passage that Saṃghabhadra identifies as the position of the *ching-chu* with the *Yogācārabhūmi* and compiling a list of correspondences. So far, I have completed the comparison for the first four chapters of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*; the results of the first three chapters have been published (Kritzer *Comparison*).

<sup>4</sup> Katō identifies 17 (74-78).

<sup>5</sup> For this translation, see Cox (95).

ever, there is no mention of *bīja* or *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa* in the relevant passages in the \**Vibhāṣā*.<sup>6</sup> In other words, the Dārṣṭāntika maintains the same general position as Sautrāntika but its reasoning is either unstated or different.

Similarly, Harivarman's positions in the \**Tattvasiddhi*, many of which probably can be considered Dārṣṭāntika (see Mizuno), frequently agree in general with those of Vasubandhu. However, the reasons given by Harivarman are often different, and, again, Harivarman does not use the terms *bīja* or *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa*.

### III. Sautrāntika Opinions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and Correspondences in the \**Vibhāṣā*, the \**Tattvasiddhi*, and the *Yogācārabhūmi*

1. There is nothing that sees or is seen in perception: consciousness arises in dependence on organ and object.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>7</sup> – In the verse (*Abhidharmakośa* I 42), Vasubandhu gives the accepted Vaibhāṣika opinion that it is the eye that sees *rūpa* (matter), but he uses the word *kila* (“so it is said”), according to Saṃghabhadra, to indicate that he disagrees.<sup>8</sup> Vasubandhu then examines a number of other opinions found in the \**Vibhāṣā*, most prominently that of Dharmatrāta, to the effect that it is the eye-consciousness that sees *rūpa*. As Katō points out, the commentators think that Vasubandhu favors Dharmatrāta's opinion, but in fact, he may simply be using it to refute the Vaibhāṣikas (24). At the end of the discussion, Vasubandhu ascribes to the Sautrāntikas the opinion that there is nothing that sees or is seen;

<sup>6</sup> Nishi states that there is not a single attribution of *bīja* theory to Sautrāntika in the entire \**Vibhāṣā* (484), and an examination of the passages concerning *bīja* that he has collected from the \**Vibhāṣā* suggests that there is no attribution to Dārṣṭāntika, either (490-494).

<sup>7</sup> *atra sautrāntikā āhuḥ / kim idam ākāśaṃ khādyate / cakṣur hi pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣur-vijñānam / tatra kaḥ paśyati ko vā dr̥ṣyate / nirvyāpāraṃ hīdaṃ dharmamātraṃ hetuphalamātraṃ ca / tatra vyavahārārthaṃ cchandata upacārāḥ kriyante / cakṣuḥ paśyati vijñānaṃ vijñāntīti nātrābhīniveṣṭavyam / uktaṃ hi bhagavatā janapadanirukṭiṃ nābhīniveṣata saṃjñāṃ ca lokasya nābhīdhāved iti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 31.11-16). The references for the entire discussion are *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 30.3-31.17; T. 1558: 10c8-11b8; La Vallée Poussin I: 81-86; T. 1562: 363c12-368a11; Katō 23-24.*

<sup>8</sup> Saṃghabhadra uses the appellation *ching-chu* 經主 here (T. 1562: 365a11).

consciousness simply arises in dependence on the organ and the object. There is no action here, merely *dharmas*, merely causes and results. However, in worldly discourse one can say that the eye sees.<sup>9</sup>

\**Vibhāṣā*<sup>10</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* attributes to the Dārṣṭāntikas the position that the coming together of certain factors is equivalent to “seeing *rūpa*.”<sup>11</sup>

\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>12</sup> – Consciousness sees, not the organ.

*Yogācārabhūmi*<sup>13</sup> – The *Yogācārabhūmi* contains a number of statements to the effect that cognition is really the result of the laws of cause and effect, not of something seeing and something else being seen. In particular, the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that, at the highest level, neither the organ nor the consciousness per-

<sup>9</sup> Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the Dārṣṭāntikas. He does not use the appellation sūtra-master (T. 1562: 367b25; see Katō 75). Fukuhara comments that this is very close to a Mahāyāna way of thinking (159).

<sup>10</sup> 復有執和合見色。如響喻者 (T. 1545: 61c10-11).

<sup>11</sup> However, Katō shows that the Dārṣṭāntika position in the \**Vibhāṣā*, which is fully explained in the *Pañcavastukavibhāṣāśāstra*, is actually completely different from the Sautrāntika position in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, since the factors that come together in the Dārṣṭāntika position are consciousness and *dharmas* associated with mind, not organ, object, and consciousness (23-24).

<sup>12</sup> 諸根爲到塵故知。爲不到能知。答曰。非根能知。所以者何。善根能知塵。則可一時遍知諸塵。而實不能。是故以識能知 (T. 1646: 267a7-9; the argument continues until 268a10).

<sup>13</sup> *mig gis gzugs rnams mthoñ ba nas yid kyi chos rnams rnam par śes so źes bya ba'i bar du ji skad gsuñs pa de la / ci mig la sogs pas mthoñ ba nas rnam par śes pa'i bar du yin nam / 'on te de dag gi rnam par śes pa dag gis mthoñ ba nas rnam par śes pa'i bar du yin źe na / smras pa / don dam par ni mig la sogs pas kyañ ma yin la / de dag gi rnam par śes pa dag gis kyañ ma yin no / de ci'i phyir źe na / dños po rnams ni rten ciñ 'brel bar 'byuñ ba'i phyir dañ skad cig pa'i phyir dañ / g.yo ba med pa'i phyir ro / brda'i tshul du ni gts'o bo yin pa'i mig la sogs pa la mthoñ ba po la sogs pa ñe bar gdags pa ches rigs so / de ci'i phyir źe na / mig la sogs pa dbañ po rnams yod na ni rnam par śes pa 'byuñ ba ma tshañ pa med par ñes kyi / rnam par śes pa'i rgyun ni yod du zun kyañ dmig la sogs pa dbañ po rnams tshañ ba 'am ma tshañ bar dmigs pa'i phyir ro / lta ba la sogs pa tsañ la mthoñ ba la sogs pa ñe bar gdags pa gañ yin pa de ni don dam pa yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 83a6b3). 問如說眼見諸色乃至意了諸法。此爲眼等是見者乃至是了者耶。爲彼識耶。答約勝義道理。非是眼等亦非彼識。何以故。諸法自性衆緣生故。剎那滅故。無作用故。約世俗道理。眼等最勝故可於彼立見者等。何以故。若有眼等諸根。識決定生無所缺減。或有識流非眼等根。可於彼立見者等。若缺不缺俱可得故。此中實義唯於見等說見者等 (T. 1579: 610a19-27; cited in Saeki 1: 88). See also the *Paramārthagāthās* and their commentary (Wayman 168, 174, 178; *Yogācārabhūmi*; dzi 236b3-4, 238a4-6; T. 1579: 363a27-b1, 364a27-b1).*

ceives. It gives three reasons: because the *svabhāva* (real nature) of all *dharmas* arises due to a multiplicity of causes; because nothing endures for more than a moment; because there is no real action. At the worldly level, however, one can say that the eye sees, because whenever there is an organ, consciousness will definitely not be lacking. On the other hand, it is possible for the organs to be lacking even when the stream of consciousness exists.

Comment – Here the Sautrāntika argument closely follows the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* in its ultimate rejection of anything that perceives and its acceptance on the worldly level of the notion that it is the organ that perceives. The conclusion of the *\*Tattvasiddhi* is completely different.

2. *Prthagjanatvam* (the state of being an ordinary person) is not a real *dharma*. It is simply the *saṃtati* (life-stream) in which the *āryadharmas* (the attributes of a noble or spiritually accomplished person) have not yet arisen.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>14</sup> – Vasubandhu approves of the Sautrāntika definition of *prthagjanatvam*, according to which *prthagjanatvam* is the *saṃtati* in which the *āryadharmas* have not yet arisen.<sup>15</sup>

*\*Vibhāṣā*<sup>16</sup> – The *\*Vibhāṣā* attributes a denial of the real existence of *prthagjanatvam* to the Dārṣṭāntikas.

<sup>14</sup> *evaṃ tu sādhu yathā sautrāntikānām / katham ca sautrāntikānām / anutpannārya-dharmasantiḥ prthagjanatvam iti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 66.16-18; T. 1558: 23c2-3; La Vallée Poussin 1: 193; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master and criticizes Vasubandhu for denying the real existence of prthagjanatvam [T. 1562: 399b10-c7; Cox 203-206; Katō 75].)*

<sup>15</sup> Cox points out that Vasubandhu does not specifically state here that *prthagjanatvam* is unreal, but she says that its unreality is implied in its definition as a *saṃtati*, “which, as a composite entity, cannot be real” (224 n. 109).

<sup>16</sup> 復有執。異生性無實體。如譬喻者 (T. 1545: 231b26-27; see Cox 224 n. 109).

<sup>17</sup> 問曰。凡夫法是心不相應行。是事云何。答曰。凡夫法不異凡夫 (T. 1646: 289c3-4; the argument continues until 289c13).

<sup>18</sup> Katsura (86) cites T. 1646: 289a-c, in which various *cittaviprayuktas* are said to lack separate existence.

\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>17</sup> – There is no *prthagjanatvam* different from the *prthagjana*, the ordinary person himself. (The \**Tattvasiddhi* says that all of the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* are *prajñapti*.)<sup>18</sup>

*Yogācārabhūmi*<sup>19</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* defines *prthagjanatvam* as a designation for the state in which the *lokottara* (supermundane) *āryadharmas* have not yet arisen.

Comment – The definitions of *prthagjanatvam* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* are essentially identical. While it is possible that the *Dārṣṭāntika* position is the source for the common definition in these two texts, the \**Vibhāṣā* does not give us any details.

3. The *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* (marks of the conditioned) are not real *dharmas*.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>20</sup> – The *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* are not real entities since, unlike real *dharmas* such as *rūpa*, they cannot be known by perception, inference, or scripture.

\**Vibhāṣā*<sup>21</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* attributes a denial of the real nature of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* to the *Dārṣṭāntikas*.

<sup>19</sup> *so so'i skye bo gnas skabs gañ la gdags / rnam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / 'jig rten las 'das pa 'phags pa'i chos ma bskyed pa'i gnas skabs la'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 77a8). 問依何分位建立異生性。此復幾種。答依未生起一切出世聖法分位。建立異生性。(T. 1579: 607c8-9). The other passage in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* that deals with the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras* says that *prthagjanatvam* refers to the seeds of *darśanaheya dharmas* in the three worlds that have not yet been destroyed (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 26b1-2; T. 1579: 587b25-26). I have argued that there is no contradiction between the two definitions in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, or between this and the one favored by Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Kritzer *Rebirth* 246-248).

<sup>20</sup> *tad etad ākāśaṃ pāṭyata iti sautrāntikāḥ / na hy ete jātyādayo dharmā dravyataḥ saṃvidyante yathā 'bhivyajyante / kiṃ kāraṇam / pramāṇābhāvāt / na hy eṣāṃ dravyato 'stīve kiñcid api pramāṇam asti pratyakṣam anumānam āptāgamo vā yathā rūpādīnāṃ dharmānām iti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 76.20-23; T. 1558: 27b24-26; La Vallée Poussin 1: 226; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 406b16-20; Cox 311-312] and criticizes it on the grounds that Vasubandhu must accept the provisional reality of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*; according to Saṃghabhadra, their provisional reality cannot be proven by perception or scripture, while proof by inference of their provisional reality would imply proof by inference of their ultimate reality [T. 1562: 406b20-29; Cox 312]; Katō 75.)

<sup>21</sup> 謂或有執。諸有爲相非實有體。如譬喻者彼作是說諸有爲相是不相應行蘊所攝。不相應行蘊無有實體。故諸有爲相非實有體。(T. 1545: 198a14-17; see also Cox 358 n. 32).

<sup>22</sup> 生者。五陰在現在世名生。捨現在世名滅。相續故住。是住。變故名爲住異。非別有法名生住滅。又佛法深義。謂衆緣和合有諸法生。是故無法能生異法。又說。眼色等是眼識因緣。



\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>22</sup> – *Jāti* (birth), *vyāya* (destruction), *sthiti* (continued existence), and *anyathātva* (change of state, i.e., aging) simply refer to the five *skandhas* at various points. They are not separate *dharma*s.

*Yogācārabhūmi*<sup>23</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāya-manobhūmi* says that the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, including *jāti*, are not real entities, separate from *rūpa* and the other *skandhas*.

Comment – Later in his presentation of the Sautrāntika argument, Vasubandhu gives his own explanation of the four *lakṣaṇas*: the first arising of the series of *saṃskāras* is *jāti*; the series in the state of cessation is called *vyāya* (= *anityatā* [impermanence]); the procession of the series is called

是中不說有生。是故無生無咎。又說生法等一時生。若法一時生即滅。是中生等何所為耶。應思是事。又十二因緣中。佛自說生義。諸衆生處處生受諸陰名為生。是故現在世中初得諸陰名生。亦說。五陰退沒名死。亦說。諸陰衰壞名老。無別有老死法 (T. 1646: 289b18-29). This position closely resembles Vasubandhu's, except that Vasubandhu refers to *saṃskṛta-dharma*s, not *skandhas*: *tatra pravāhasyādīr utpādo nivṛttir vyayaḥ / sa eva pravāho 'nuvarttamānaḥ sthitiḥ / tasya pūrvāparaviśeṣaḥ sthityanyathātvam* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 77.6-8; T. 1558: 27c11-12; La Vallée Poussin 1: 227; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master, who, he says, is following the school of the Sthavira [T. 1562: 407c9-11; Cox 320] and criticizes it at length [T. 1562: 407c17-408b28; Cox 321-326]). Vasubandhu's position, in turn, resembles that of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāya-manobhūmi*: *de lta bas na skye ba la sogs pa yañ 'du byed rnams la [bta]gs pa'i yod pa yin par rig par bya'o / de la rgyu yod na rañ gi mtshan ñid sñon ma byuñ ba 'grub pa ni 'du byed rnams kyi skye ba źes bya'o / sñā ma las phyi ma gźan ñid du gźan du 'gyur ba ñid ni 'du byed rnams kyi rga ba źes bya'o / skye ba'i dus tsam la gnas pa ni 'du byed rnams kyi gnas pa źes bya ste / de lta bas na skye ba'i skad cig gi 'og tu 'jig pa'i skad cig ni 'du byed rnams kyi 'jig pa źes bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: zi 22a2-4). 故知生等於諸行中假施設。有由有因故諸行非本自相始起說名為生。後起諸行與前差別說名為老。即彼諸行生位暫停說名為住。生剎那後諸行相盡說名為滅。亦名無常 (T. 1579: 585c24-28; see Kritzer *Rebirth* 234-235).

<sup>23</sup> *ci'i phyir gzugs la sogs pa 'du byed rnams las skye ba dañ / rga ba dañ / gnas pa dañ / mi rtag pa ñid dag rdzas gźan du yod pa ma yin par khoñ du chud par bya źe na* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: zi 21b1-2). 復次云何應知生老住無常離色等蘊無別實有 (T. 1579: 585c9-10 [this question is answered in the passage that follows: T. 1579: 585c10-28; *Yogācārabhūmi*: zi 21b2-22a4]).

<sup>24</sup> *tatra pravāhasyādīr utpādo nivṛttir vyayaḥ / sa eva pravāho 'nuvarttamānaḥ sthitiḥ / tasya pūrvāparaviśeṣaḥ sthityanyathātvam* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 77.6-8; T. 1558: 27c11-12; La Vallée Poussin 1: 227; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master, who, he says, is following the school of the Sthavira [T. 1562: 407c9-11; Cox 320] and criticizes it at length [T. 1562: 407c17-408b28; Cox 321-326]). See Kritzer *Comparison* 39.

<sup>25</sup> *de lta bas na skye ba la sogs pa yañ 'du byed rnams la [bta]gs pa'i yod pa yin par rig par bya'o / de la rgyu yod na rañ gi mtshan ñid sñon ma byuñ ba 'grub pa ni 'du byed*

*sthiti*; the difference between earlier and later moments of the stream is called *anyathātva*.<sup>24</sup> This explanation is very similar to one found later in the passage from the *Viniścayasamaṅgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyama-nobhūmi* mentioned above:<sup>25</sup> when, due to causes, formerly non-existent *saṃskṛtadharmas* (conditioned *dharmas*) arise, this is called *jāti*.<sup>26</sup> When the *saṃskṛtadharmas* that arise later are different from the earlier ones, this is called *jarā* (old age). When these *saṃskṛtadharmas*, having arisen, persist for a limited time, this is called *sthiti*. And when, after the moment of arising, the characteristics of these *saṃskṛtadharmas* are destroyed, this is called cessation or *anityatā*.

Again, the basic positions of the Sautrāntika in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and of the *Yogācārabhūmi* agree with those of Dārṣṭāntika and Harivarman. However, we have no record of the Dārṣṭāntika explanation of the individual *lakṣaṇas*, and Harivarman does not use expressions like *abhūtvā bhāvati* (“not having existed, it exists”), which are found throughout the discussions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

4. The Buddha did not say that an *asaṃskṛtadharma* can be a cause.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>27</sup> – The Sautrāntikas deny that the Buddha said that an *asaṃskṛta* could be a cause. On the contrary, he said that all causes are impermanent and hence *saṃskṛta*.

*rnams kyi skye ba zes bya'o / śna ma las phyi ma gzan nīd du gzan du 'gyur ba nīd ni 'du byed rnams kyi rga ba zes bya'o / skye ba'i dus tsaṃ la gnas pa ni 'du byed rnams kyi gnas pa zes bya ste / de lta bas na skye ba'i skad cig gi 'og tu 'jig pa'i skad cig ni 'du byed rnams kyi 'jig pa zes bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 22a2-4). 故知生等於諸行中假施設。有由有因故諸行非本自相始起說名爲生。後起諸行與前差別說名爲老。即彼諸行生位暫停說名爲住。生剎那後諸行相盡說名爲滅。亦名無常 (T. 1579: 585c24-28; not in Tibetan; see Kritzer *Rebirth* 234-235). See Kritzer *Comparison* 39.*

<sup>26</sup> Miyashita finds in the *Yogācārabhūmi* the origin of the *pen wu chin you* (本無今有) theory in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

<sup>27</sup> *naīva hi kvacid asaṃskṛtaṃ bhagavatā hetur ity uktam/ uktaṃ tu paryāyeṇa hetur iti sautrāntikāḥ / katham uktam / ye hetavo ye pratyayā rūpasotyopādāya te 'py anityāḥ / anityān khalu hetupratyayān pratītyoppannaṃ rūpaṃ kuto nityaṃ bhaviṣyati / evaṃ yāvad vijñānam iti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 91.13-17; T. 1558: 33c22-26; La Vallée Poussin 1: 277; not mentioned in Katō).*

<sup>28</sup> 復有執。唯有爲法是能作因非無爲法。爲止彼執顯無爲法亦能作因 (T. 1545: 103c21-23).

\**Vibhāṣā*<sup>28</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* mentions an opinion that *asaṃskṛtas* cannot be *kāraṇahetu*, but it does not attribute it to any specific group.

\**Tattvasiddhi* – (nothing relevant)

*Yogācārabhūmi* – (nothing relevant)

Comment – This sentence marks the beginning of a very long passage in which Vasubandhu criticizes the Vaibhāṣika definitions of *asaṃskṛta-dharmas* as real entities. Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not seem to include any statement similar to this one, see the following item for correspondences between the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* regarding the unreality of the *asaṃskṛtas*.

5. The *asaṃskṛtas* are not real and separate *dharmas*.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>29</sup> – According to the Sautrāntika, the *asaṃskṛtas* are not real and separate *dharmas* like *rūpa*, *vedanā* (feeling), etc.

\**Vibhāṣā* (1)<sup>30</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* quotes the Bhadanta as saying that *ākāśa* (space) is *prajñapti*<sup>31</sup> and refutes him.

<sup>29</sup> *sarvam evāsaṃskṛtam adravyam iti sautrāntikāḥ / na hi tad rūpavedanādivat bhāvāntaram asti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 92.3-4; T. 1558: 34a12-14; La Vallée Poussin 1: 278; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a21-23] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 429a28]; Katō 75-76).

<sup>30</sup> 大德說曰。虛空不可知非所知事故。所知事者色非色性虛空與彼俱不相應。所知事者謂此彼性虛空與彼俱不相應。此虛空名。但是世間分別假立。評曰應作是說。實有虛空非彼不知即謂非有由前教理實有虛空 (T. 1545: 388c24-29). The other \**Vibhāṣā* texts (T. 1546 and T. 1547) attribute this position to Buddhadeva and Dharmatrāta, respectively (Katō 22, 128 n. 47).

<sup>31</sup> The *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* attributes a similar opinion to Dārṣṭāntika: 譬喻者譬喻者說虛空非色亦非非色。言虛空者。隨順世間故說 (T. 1552: 944a7-9).

<sup>32</sup> 謂或有執。擇滅非擇滅無常滅非實有體。如譬喻者為遮彼執顯三種滅皆有實體 (T. 1545: 161a10-12).

<sup>33</sup> 問曰。若虛空非色為是何法。答曰。虛空名無法。但無色處名為虛空 (T. 1646: 343c12-14 [the argument is similar to that of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcaviññānakāyamanobhūmi*; see below]); 答曰。若實有法皆有所依。如名依色色亦依名。虛空無依故知無法 (T. 1646: 343c17-18). 答曰。非無泥洹。但無實法。若無泥洹則常處生死永無脫期 (T. 1646: 369a23-25 [a similar denial of the real existence of *nīrodhasamāpatti* together with an admission that it is not totally nonexistent is found in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*; see below]).

\**Vibhāṣā* (2)<sup>32</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* attributes to the Dārṣṭāntikas the opinion that three types of *nirodha* (cessation), including *pratisamkhyānirodha* (cessation resulting from knowledge) and *aprasamkhyānirodha* (cessation not resulting from knowledge), are not real and refutes them.

\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>33</sup> – *Ākāśa* and *nirvāṇa* are not real *dharmas*.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (1)<sup>34</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcaviñṣānakāyamanobhūmi* says that *ākāśa* is simply an appellation expressing the absence of *rūpa*. If some place does not contain anything, the notion arises that the place contains *ākāśa*. Therefore, *ākāśa* is only a *prajñapti* and is not real.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (2)<sup>35</sup> – The *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*, in a definition of \**phalaprājñapti* (果假有, provisionally real by way of being a result), mentions *pratisamkhyānirodha*, which, it says, is not non-existent, since it is a result of the path, but is not really existent, since it is simply a designation for

<sup>34</sup> *de la nam mkha' gañ ze na / gzugs med pa tsam gyis rab ti phyee ba ni nam mkha' yin te / 'di ltar gañ la gzugs yi rnam pa mi dmigs pa de la nam mkha' i 'du šes 'byuñ bar 'gyur pas de'i phyir de yañ btags pa'i yod pa yin par rig par bya'i rdzas su ni ma yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 39b1-2). 復次虛空云何。謂唯諸色非有所顯。是名虛空。所以者何。若處所行都無所得。是處方有虛空想轉。是故當知此唯假有非實物有 (T. 1579: 593a15-18). See also *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 879a14-18; not in Tibetan). Yamabe has noted the similarity between this passage and the Sautrāntika opinion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (personal communication).

<sup>35</sup> 果假有者。所謂擇滅是道果故。不可說無。然非實有。唯約已斷一切煩惱。於當來世畢竟不生而假立故 (T. 1579: 879a5-8; not in Tibetan). The *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* gives a definition of *pratisamkhyānirodha* that is similar but mentions *prajñā*: 釋滅者。謂由慧方便有漏諸行畢竟不起滅是離繫性 (T. 1602: 484c3-4).

<sup>36</sup> *so sor btags pa ma yin pa'i 'gog pa gañ ze na / de las gzan pa skye ba'i rkyen mion du gyur pa na de las gzan pa skye bas / de las gzan pa mi skye zin ñe bar zi ba'i 'gog pa tsam ni so sor btags pa ma yin pa'i 'gog pa šes bya ste / gañ de'i tshe na ma skyes šin skye bas'i dus las thal ba de ni de'i tshe na ma yañ skye bar mi 'gyur bas / de'i phyir de yañ btags pa'i yod pa yin gyi rdzas su yod pa ni ma yin te / de'i rañ gi mshan ñid ni gzan cuñ zad kyañ mi dmigs so / de yañ chos kyi rnam pa dañ ma bral ba'i phyir dus gzan gyi tshe rkyen dañ phrad na 'byuñ bar 'gyur bas de'i phyir so sor btags pa ma yin pa'i 'gog pa de ni gtan du ba ma yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 39b2-5). 復次云何非擇滅。謂若餘法生緣現前。餘法生故餘不得生。唯滅唯靜名非擇滅。諸所有法此時應生。越生時故彼於此時終不更生。是故此滅亦是假有非實物有。所以者何。此無有餘自相可得故。此法種類非離繫故。復於餘時遇緣可生。是故非擇滅非一向決定 (T. 1579: 593a19-25). See also *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* (T. 1579: 879a18-20; not in Tibetan). Yamabe has noted the similarity between this passage and the Sautrāntika opinion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (personal communication).

the total non-arising in the future of *kleśas* (defilements) that have already been destroyed.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (3)<sup>36</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that *apratisaṃkhyānirodha* is simply an appellation expressing destruction or pacification when a certain *dharma*, its conditions for arising having been actualized, does not arise because another *dharma* arises. Whenever the time for a *dharma* to arise is exceeded, that *dharma* is destroyed and will not arise. (However, if the conditions for arising are encountered, it may arise in the future, so this is not a permanent destruction.) Because it has no separate *svalakṣaṇa* (characteristic mark), *apratisaṃkhyānirodha* is a *prajñapti*, not a real entity.

Comment – I have not found any passage in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that explicitly states that the category of *asaṃskṛta* is not really existent. However, in the passages referred to, the *Yogācārabhūmi* questions or denies the real existence of *ākāśa*, *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*, and *apratisaṃkhyānirodha*. Its definition of *ākāśa* is very similar to that of the Sautrāntika, according to whom *ākāśa* is nothing more than the absence of that which is tangible.<sup>37</sup> The definitions of *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* are also similar, although the Sautrāntika definition stresses the role of knowledge,<sup>38</sup> which is not mentioned in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Finally, the Sautrāntika defines *apratisaṃkhyānirodha* as the non-arising of *dharma*s due not to knowledge but to a lack of causes for their arising.<sup>39</sup> Like the definition in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, this insists that

<sup>37</sup> *spraṣṭavyābhāvamātram ākāśam / tadyathā hy andhakāre pratiḡhātam avindanta ākāśam ity āhuḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 92.4-5; 34a14-16; La Vallée Poussin 1: 279; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a23-25] and criticizes it at great length [T. 1562: 429a28-430a7]). See Kritzer *Comparison* 53.

<sup>38</sup> *utpannānuśayajanmanirodhaḥ pratisaṃkhyābalenānyasyānutpādaḥ pratisaṃkhyānirodhaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 92.5-6; T. 1558: 34a17; La Vallée Poussin 1: 279; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a25-26] and criticizes it at very great length [T. 1562: 430a18-434b7]). See Kritzer *Comparison* 54.

<sup>39</sup> *vinaiva pratisaṃkhyayā pratyayaivaikalyād anutpādo yaḥ so 'pratisaṃkhyānirodhaḥ / tad yathā nikāyasabhāgaśeṣasyāntarāmarāṇe* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 92.7-8; T. 1558: 34a18; La Vallée Poussin 1: 279; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a26-27] and criticizes it at great length [T. 1562: 434b8-435b2]). See Kritzer *Comparison* 55.

<sup>40</sup> *naimittiko hi nāma bhagavān syād evaṃ sati na punaḥ sāksātkārī / tasmāt sarvam icchāmātreṇa bhagavān jānāntī sautrāntikāḥ / acintyo hi buddhānām buddhaviśaya ity*

*apratisaṃkhyānirodha*, as the non-existence of something, can only be a *prajñāpti*, not a real *dharma*. However, the phrasing is somewhat different, and I am not sure that the two definitions are completely in agreement.

## 6. The Buddha knows the future directly.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>40</sup> – Concerning the question of the Buddha’s knowledge of the future, the Sautrāntikas say that the Buddha knows it directly. Vasubandhu adds that the Buddha knows by merely wishing and explains that the Lord has said, “the Buddha-range of the Buddhas is *acintya* (unimaginable).”

\**Vibhāṣā*<sup>41</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* refutes two other theories, which it does not attribute to a specific group, of how the Buddha knows the future (by inference or by means of a mark in beings’ *saṃtatis* that indicates the future results of their actions) and accepts the idea that he knows it directly.

*uktam bhagavatā (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 99.9-11; T. 1558: 37a2-4; La Vallée Poussin 1: 304-305; Katō 76).*

<sup>41</sup> 復云何通。有說。世尊依過去現在。比知未來。故作是說。謂世尊觀過去現在。如是種類補特伽羅。造如是業。爾所劫中不墮惡趣。如是種類補特伽羅。造如是業現世受果。造如是業次生受果。造如是業後次受果。由此現見。如是種類補特伽羅。造如是業比知當來。爾所劫中不墮惡趣。如是種類補特伽羅。造如是業當現受果。造如是業當生受果。造如是業當後受果。

有餘師說。有情身中有如是相。是不相應行蘊所攝。世尊觀彼。便知如是補特伽羅於未來世。爾所劫中不墮惡趣。亦知如補特伽羅所造諸業。或當現受。

評曰。不應作如是說。若作是說。便顯世尊於未來事唯有比量智無現量智。此不應理。應作是說。佛知未來是現非比。謂佛智見明淨猛利。未來諸佛。雖雜亂住無有次第。而能現知。如是種類補特伽羅。造如是業。於未來世爾所劫中不墮惡趣。如是種類補特伽羅。造如是業。或當現受。或當生受。或當後受。明了無謬 (T. 1545: 51b15-c6)。

<sup>42</sup> 復次佛十力成就故智慧具足。以往反因緣故說十力。初處非處力。是因果中決定智也。知從是因生如是果不生是果。如行不善必得苦報。不生樂報。是處名有是事。非處名無是事。是初力者。諸力之本。問曰。世間亦知因果是處非處。如從麥生麥不生稻等。答曰。處非處力。知業等法故。名此力甚深第一。諸天世人所不能及。又了知生法因次第緣增上。是故此力名為微妙。謂知去來現在諸業及諸受法。知處知事。知因知報。是故此智名之為力。以知三世處事因報。故名甚深。所以者何。或謂過去未來無法故。佛於此說言有力。又法在過去未來世中。雖無現相佛亦現知 (T. 1646: 240a26-b10). See Kritzer “Unthinkable” 69-71.

<sup>43</sup> *g’han yañ dgra bcom pa ni sñoms par žugs na mñam par b’zag pa yin la lañs na mñam par ma b’zag pa yin gyi / de b’zin g’segs pa la ni gnas skabs thams cad du sems mñam par ma b’zag pa med pa dañ (Yogācārabhūmi: ’i 114a5-6); 又阿羅漢若入等至即名為定。若出等至即不定名。如來遍於一切位中無不定心 (T. 1579: 738c7-9).*

\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>42</sup> – Knowledge of the causes and effects of actions is very profound because the Buddha knows past and future *dharmas* even though they do not exist.

*Yogācārabhūmi*<sup>43</sup> – In the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the Tathāgata is said never to have an unconcentrated thought, while the *arhat* is said to be concentrated when he is in *samāpatti* (meditative trance) but not after he exits.

Comment – The position that the Buddha knows the future directly is in agreement with the \**Vibhāṣā*, and Saṃghabhadra does not attack it. However, P’u-kuang notes that there are two possible Sautrāntika explanations of knowing by merely wishing. One of these is based on the notion that the Buddha never has an unconcentrated thought (T. 1821: 135b15-c6). This position is unacceptable to the Vaibhāṣikas. For a more detailed analysis of this passage, see Kritzer “Unthinkable.”

7. In *ārūpyadhātu* there is no support for consciousness external to consciousness itself.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>44</sup> – According to Vasubandhu, in *ārūpyadhātu* (the immaterial realm) there is no support for consciousness other than the stream of consciousness itself. According to the *Ābhidharmikas*, the support is *nikāyasabhāga* (the homogeneous character of beings)<sup>45</sup> and *jīvitendriya* (life-force). The *ākṣepahetu* (projecting cause) is sufficient to establish the stream of consciousness in a new lifetime; if this cause

<sup>44</sup> *tasmān nāsty arūpiṇām sattvānām cittasantater anyo* [The first edition gives *anyam*, while the second edition gives *anyonyam*. I have corrected this on the basis of the Chinese and the Tibetan translations] *nīśraya iti sautrāntikāḥ / api tu yasyās cittasantater ākṣepahetur avitaiṣṇo rūpe tasyāḥ saha rūpeṇa sambhavād rūpaṃ nīśrīya pravṛttir yasyās tu hetur vitaiṣṇo rūpe tasyā anapekṣya rūpaṃ pravṛttih / hetos tadvimukhatvād iti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 112.18-20; T. 1558: 41b17-20; La Vallée Poussin 2: 6; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 458c4] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 458c4-458c25]; Katō 76).

<sup>45</sup> For this translation, see Cox (107).

<sup>46</sup> 謂或有疑欲色界有色故心相續依色轉。無色界既無有色心相續應無依轉欲令此疑得決定故。顯無色界心等相續亦有依轉故作斯論。如有色有情心相續依身轉。無色有情心相續依何轉耶。答依命根衆同分。及餘如是類心不相應行 (T. 1545: 137a23-29).

<sup>47</sup> 答曰。或有物無因緣而生。如劫盡已。劫和大雨。是水從何所生。又諸天所欲。應念即得。如坐禪人。及大功德人。所欲隨意。是事有色相續斷已更生。若人生無色界。

is an action that is free from desire pertaining to *rūpa*, the stream of consciousness will evolve without requiring *rūpa* as its support.

\**Vibhāṣā*<sup>46</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* mentions an opinion that the stream of consciousness in *ārūpyadhātu* does not have a support. It does not attribute this opinion to a specific school but simply refutes it with the Ābhidharma position mentioned above.

\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>47</sup> – Rebirth in *rūpadhātu* (the subtle material realm) after the *rūpasamṭati* (material continuity) has been interrupted by birth in *ārūpyadhātu* is mentioned as an example of something arising without a

還生色界。是色以何爲本 (T. 1646: 262b10-15)。經主 無色界復何所依。答曰。無色界識無所依。法應如是。無依而住。所以者何。相差別故。意識能知有無。若有色則。依無色亦能住。故無色界。亦無依而住。又眾緣合故識生。如經中說同意緣法則意識生。比何所依。非知人依壁等。一切諸法。皆住自性 (T. 1646: 266b7-12)。

<sup>48</sup> *gal te rnam par śes pa gzugs kyi sa bon dañ ldan pa ma yin du zin na / so so'i skye bo gzugs med pa rnams su skyes pa tshe zad ciñ las zad nas de nas 'ci 'pho žin yañ 'og tu skye pa'i gzugs kyi sa bon med pas 'byuñ bar mi 'gyur ba žig na 'byuñ ste / de lta bas na gzugs kyi sa bon dañ ldan pa'i rnam par śes pa de la brten nas / de'i gzugs 'byuñ bar rig par bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 16b4-6; see Schmithausen 21, 288 n. 172 b). 復次若諸識非色種子所隨逐者。生無色界異生。從彼壽盡業盡沒已還生下時。色無種子應不更生。然必更生。是故當知諸色種子隨逐於識。以此爲綠色法更生 (T. 1579: 583c7-10). An explanation of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* in the *Savitarkādibhūmi pratītyasamutpāda* exposition contains a somewhat similar explanation of how *rūpa* can resume: *ārūpyeṣu punar nāmāśritaṃ rūpaṃ bījāśritaṃ* (corrected from *jīvāśritaṃ* on the basis of the manuscript by Schmithausen [ 469 n. 1135]) *ca vijñānaṃ vijñānāśritaṃ nāmarūpabījaṃ ca pravartate / yataḥ punar bījāt samucchinnasyāpi rūpasyāyatyaṃ prādurbhāvo bhavaty ayaṃ atrāpi viśeṣaḥ (Yogācārabhūmi; 200.1-3). gzugs med pa rnams na ni rnam par śes pa miñ la brten ciñ / gzugs kyi sa bon la yañ brten la / gzugs kyi sa bon dañ miñ yañ rnam par śes pa la brten ciñ 'jug ste / 'di ltar gzugs yoñs su chad pa las phyis sa bon las 'byuñ bar 'gyur te / 'di la yañ bye brag de yod do (Yogācārabhūmi; dži 116b1-2). 若於無色界。以名爲依。及色種子爲依。識得生起。以識爲依名及色種子轉。從此種子。色雖斷絕。後更得生 (T. 1579: 321b14-17; see Yamabe *Yugashichiron*). The *Vastu-saṃgrahaṇī* also says that the *bījas* of *rūpa* exist in *ārūpyadhātu* consciousness: *gzugs med pa dag ni rnam par śes pa miñ la yañ brten la gzugs kyi sa bon la yañ brten to / miñ dañ gzugs kyi sa bon yañ rnam par śes pa la brten ciñ 'dug ste / gzugs kyi rgyun chad zin pa las kyañ gzugs kyi sa bon de las phyi ma la 'byuñ bar 'gyur te / 'di la yañ bye brag ni [Derge adds de] yod do (Yogācārabhūmi; 'i 285b7-286a1). 在無色界。諸有情類識。依於名及色種子。名及色種依識而轉。由彼識中有色種故。色雖間斷後當更生。如是名爲此中差別 (T. 1579: 827c29-828b3).***

<sup>49</sup> *tatra vāsanāhetvadhīṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyākṣepahetuḥ prajñāpyate / tat kasya hetoḥ / tathā hi / śubhāśubhakarmaparibhāvitāḥ saṃskārās traidhātukeṣṭāniṣṭagatiṣṭāniṣṭātma-bhāvān ākṣipanti. (Yogācārabhūmi; 107.20-108.2). de la rgyu'i gnas bag chags la brten nas / 'phen pa'i rgyu 'dogs par byed de / de ci'i phyir že na / 'di ltar dge ba dañ / mi dge*



cause. Consciousness in *ārūpyadhātu* is said to be without support: *dhar-mas* are able to exist without support.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (1)<sup>48</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñāna-kāyamanobhūmi* says that, if consciousness did not contain the seeds of *rūpa*, rebirth after falling from *ārūpyadhātu* would be impossible.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (2)<sup>49</sup> – The *Savitarkādibhūmi* specifies that the *saṃskāras* perfumed by *karma*, i.e., *ākṣepahetu*, which consists of *bījas*, project a new lifetime in all three realms.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (3)<sup>50</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmayī Bhūmi* includes *nikāyasabhāga* and *jīvitendriya*, along with the other *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*, in a long list of *saṃskṛtadharmas* that are *prajñāpti* and thus not real.

Comment – The issue here is the support of consciousness in *ārūpya-dhātu*, where its usual support, the body, cannot exist. The Vaibhāṣika solution is that two *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*, *nikāyasabhāgatā* and *jīvitendriya*, ensure that the disembodied consciousness doesn't simply die in this realm. In the *Yogācārabhūmi*, on the other hand, consciousness itself is the support. However, as Schmithausen points out, the explanation

*ba'i las kyi yoñs su bsgos pa'i 'du byed rnams kyi khams gsum du sdug pa dañ / mi sdug pa'i 'gro ba rnams su / sdug pa dañ mi sdug pa'i lus rnams 'phen par byed pa dañ / de ñid kyi dbañ gis phyi rol gyi dños po rnams kyañ / phan sum tshogs pa dañ / rgud par 'gyur ba'i phyr te / de bas na 'du byed rnams kyi dge ba dañ mi dge ba'i las kyi bag chags la brten nas 'phen pa'i rgyu 'dogs so (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 64b5-8). 依習氣因依處。施設牽弓因。所以者何。由淨不淨業熏習三界諸行。於愛不愛趣中牽引愛不愛自體。又即由此增上力故外物盛衰。是故依諸行淨不淨業習氣依處。施設牽引因 (T. 1579: 301b28-c3). For other relevant definitions of *ākṣepahetu* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, see Kritzer Rebirth 155-165.*

<sup>50</sup> *'dus byas kyi miñ can gyi dños po la skye ba dañ / rga ba dañ / gnas pa dañ / mi rtag pa dañ / sa bon dañ rnam par rig byed dañ / rnam par rig byed ma yin pa dañ / thob pa dañ / 'thob pa ma yin pa dañ / srog gi dbañ po dañ / ris mthun pa dañ / miñ gi tshogs dañ / tshig gi tshogs dañ / yi ge'i tshogs rnams dañ so so'i skye bo ñid dañ / tshogs pa dañ ma tshogs pa dañ / 'jug pa so sor ñes pa dañ / sbyor ba dañ / mgyogs pa dañ / go rims dañ / dus dañ yul dañ grañs ñe bar 'dogs pa dañ (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 208a4-6). 又於有為諸法想事。假立生老住無常種子。有表無表得命根眾同分。名身句身分身異生性。和合不和合流轉定異相應。勢速次第時方及數 (T. 1579: 659a12-16).*

<sup>51</sup> Lamotte *Samdhinirmocana* 55 (5.2); *Yogācārabhūmi*; 'i 58a2-5; T. 1579: 718a17-23; see Schmithausen 47, 320 ns. 329, 330.

<sup>52</sup> *Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 4a8-4b5; T. 1579: 580a2-12; Schmithausen 51.

of how consciousness acts as a support develops over the course of the compilation of the text. In *Yogācārabhūmi* (1), quoted above, consciousness is taken to mean the six ordinary types of consciousness, which are said to contain the seeds of *rūpa*. Schmithausen thinks that the concept of *bīja* here, according to which consciousness and the material sense faculties contain each other's seeds, predates the theory of *ālayavijñāna* (21, 285-288, ns. 170-172).

Schmithausen, on the other hand, also refers to two other passages, one in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*,<sup>51</sup> the other in what he calls the “*Pravṛtti Portion*” of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*.<sup>52</sup> He infers that in both passages the *ālayavijñāna* (store-consciousness) acts as the *āśraya* (support) of the new being in *ārūpyadhātu*. If I understand him correctly, he thinks these passages are significant because they are on different sides of a dividing line in the development of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*. The relevant chapter of the *Samdhinirmocana*, according to Schmithausen, still conceives of the *ālayavijñāna* (or *ādānavijñāna* [the appropriating consciousness]) as “sticking in the body” (50). However, it also states that, in *ārūpyadhātu*, the *ādānavijñāna* does not appropriate the body, which does not exist there. Thus, the *ādānavijñāna* mentioned here represents an intermediate stage between the six ordinary consciousnesses containing the seeds of *rūpa* and the more fully developed *ālayavijñāna* of the “*Pravṛtti Portion*,” in which the association of the *ālayavijñāna* with the physical body no longer applies (51). This *ālayavijñāna* supplants the physical body as the *āśraya* of all beings in the realms in which a physical body exists, as well as providing an *āśraya* for beings without bodies.

Vasubandhu's claim that the *cittasamṭati* (mental continuity) is a sufficient support for beings in *ārūpyadhātu* shows that he thinks that consciousness can function as *āśraya*. However, it is difficult to show a clear connection between Vasubandhu's statement and the passages I have identified in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. His statement about the projecting cause is perhaps related to *Yogācārabhūmi* (2), but the context of that passage, an explanation of the ten types of causes, is quite different. As for *Yogācārabhūmi* (3), Vasubandhu's implicit denial of *nikāyasabhāga* and *jīvitendriya* is in line with the *Yogācārabhūmi*'s denial of the reality of *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*. However, his focus here is not on *nikāyasabhāga* and *jīvitendriya*.

The term *cittasamtati* suggests the six ordinary consciousnesses, which points to *Yogācārabhūmi* (1), but Vasubandhu does not explain the mechanism by which ordinary consciousness could again produce a physical body when a being is reborn in a lower realm. Elsewhere, in a well-known passage concerning the question of how consciousness can resume after unconscious states like *nirodhasamāpatti* (trance of cessation), Vasubandhu quotes the opinion of the *pūrvācāryas*, who make an analogy to the question of how the sense faculties and body can resume when one is reborn in a lower realm after a period in *ārūpyadhātu*. According to these *pūrvācāryas*, the fact that consciousness and the sense faculties contain each other's seeds answers both questions.<sup>53</sup> This is the same theory of *bīja* that underlies *Yogācārabhūmi* (1). However, in our current passage, Vasubandhu does not mention mutual seeding.

Nor does Vasubandhu refer to mutual seeding in yet another passage in which he explains the resumption of *rūpa* after rebirth from *ārūpyadhātu* into a lower realm. Here he states that the arising of *rūpa* is due solely to consciousness, the consciousness that was impregnated by the *vipākahetu* (cause of fruition) of that *rūpa*.<sup>54</sup> Katō, who points out that Pūrṇavardhana identifies this as a Sautrāntika opinion, thinks that this passage is another expression of a theory of mutual seeding (261), and Yamabe (*Yugashichiron*) seems to agree with Katō. However, the word *bīja* does not appear. Nor does Vasubandhu refer to the other aspect of mutual seeding, the arising of consciousness from *rūpa*. I think that this passage is more similar to the Sautrāntika statement under discussion here (that there is no support for consciousness in *ārūpyadhātu* besides consciousness itself) than to the opinion of the *pūrvācāryas*.

Therefore, it is possible that Vasubandhu distinguishes between the idea of the *pūrvācāryas* and that of the Sautrāntikas. Since Vasubandhu

<sup>53</sup> *apare punar āhuḥ / kathaṃ tāvad ārūpyopapannānāṃ ciraniruddhe 'pi rūpe punar api rūpaṃ jāyate / cittād eva hi taj jāyate na rūpāt / evaṃ cittam apy asmād eva sendriyāt kāyāḥ jāyate na cittāt / anyonyabījakaṃ hy etad ubhayaṃ yaduta cittaṃ ca sendriyaś ca kāya itī pūrvācāryāḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 72.18-21; T. 1558: 25c22-26; La Vallée Poussin 1: 212; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master and criticizes this statement along with the seed theory that underlies it [T. 1562: 404a2-20; Cox 273-274]). This passage and its relationship to the *Yogācārabhūmi* have been discussed by Hakamaya, Schmithausen (285 n. 170), and Yamabe (*Yugashichiron*).

<sup>54</sup> *rūpasyā cittād evotpattis tadvipākahetuparibhāvitāl labdhavṛttitas* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 435.20; T. 1558: 146b2-3; La Vallée Poussin 5: 142).

does not use the terms *ālayavijñāna* or *ādānavijñāna*, there is no obvious connection between the Sautrāntika position here and the passages mentioned by Schmithausen. Nevertheless, Vasubandhu says that the beings in *ārūpyadhātu* have “no support other than the stream of consciousness”; he does not say that their support is the seeds of *rūpa* contained in the stream of consciousness. Thus it seems as though the Sautrāntika statement is based on a notion of a consciousness that has already “transcended its original feature of essentially being bound, and somehow subordinate, to corporeal matter, and has rather in its turn become a fundamental constituent of personality” (Schmithausen 51). Furthermore, in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, Vasubandhu adduces the inability of *nikāyasabhāgatā* and *jīvitendriya* to act as a support for consciousness in *ārūpyadhātu* as proof that there exists a consciousness that can contain seeds and that is different from the six ordinary consciousnesses, namely the *vipākavijñāna* (maturation consciousness) or *ālayavijñāna* (Lamotte *Traité* 198.34-199.13, 248-249.)<sup>55</sup> If we admit the possibility that the term *cittasaṃtati* can stand for *ālayavijñāna*,<sup>56</sup> the connection between the passage in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* becomes more

<sup>55</sup> The same argument also is found in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* (Lamotte *La Somme* 1: 39.1-4; 2: 61-62).

<sup>56</sup> Schmithausen takes Odani to task for equating *cittasaṃtati* with *ālayavijñāna* in the context of the *Maulībhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* on the grounds that this is “inadmissible if we are to understand the materials of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in their original sense, and not from the point of view of later systematization” (342 n. 442). However, in the case of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu, unlike the author of the *Maulībhūmi*, was presumably familiar with a concept of *ālayavijñāna* that was systematized to at least some degree. Therefore, it is not impossible that he intentionally substituted the term *cittasaṃtati*, which was current in *abhidharma* texts, for *ālayavijñāna*, which, of course, was not.

<sup>57</sup> These are gods living in the second *dhyāna* heaven of *rūpadhātu*. See La Vallée Poussin 2: 18-20.

<sup>58</sup> *sautrāntikā vyācakṣate / sūtra uktaṃ yathā te nānāvasaṃjñīnāḥ / tatra ye sattvā ābhāsvare devanikāye 'ciropapannā bhavanti naiva saṃvarttanīkuśalā na vivarttanīkuśalā asya lokasya te tān arciṣaṃ dṛṣtvā bhūtāḥ santa udvijante saṃvegam āpadyante / sahaivaiṣā 'rciḥ śūnyaṃ brāhmaṇaṃ vimānaṃ dagdhvā 'rvāg āgamiṣyati / tatra ye sattvā ābhāsvare devanikāye ciropapannāḥ saṃvarttanīkuśalā vivarttanīkuśalāś cāsyā lokasya te tān sattvān bhūtān āśvāsyaṃti / mā bhaiṣṭa mārṣāḥ mā bhaiṣṭa mārṣāḥ / pūrvam apy eṣā 'rciḥ śūnyaṃ brāhmaṇaṃ vimānaṃ dagdhvā 'traivāntarhite ti / ato 'rciḥ āgamavyapagama saṃjñītvāt bhūtā bhūtasamjñītvāc ca te nānāvasaṃjñīno na sukhāduḥkhasukhasaṃjñītvād iti (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 116.16-23; T. 1558: 43a10-19; La Vallée Poussin 2: 20; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the position of the sūtramaster [T. 1562: 463b5] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 463b6-11]; Katō 76).*

likely. However, I shall have more to say later about the absence of the term *ālayavijñāna* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

8. The Ābhāsvara gods<sup>57</sup> have different ideas because some of them have the idea of fear, while others do not.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>58</sup> – The Ābhāsvara gods are said to have different ideas because, at the time of the destruction of the universe, some of them have the idea of fear, while others do not. (According to the Vaibhāṣikas, it is because their feelings alternate between pleasant and neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant.)

\**Vibhāṣā* (1)<sup>59</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* says that the Ābhāsvara gods have different ideas, because their feelings alternate between pleasant and neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant.

\**Vibhāṣā* (2)<sup>60</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* also mentions the *sūtra*<sup>61</sup> that states that some Ābhāsvara gods are not afraid of the conflagration.

\**Vibhāṣā* (3)<sup>62</sup> – It quotes the same *sūtra* describing Ābhāsvara gods as being afraid.

\**Tattvasiddhi* – (nothing relevant)

<sup>59</sup> 有色有情身一想異。如極光淨天。是第三識住。有色等如前說。身一者。謂彼有情有一類身。一類顯形狀貌無別。想異者。謂彼有情有樂想不苦不樂想 (T. 1545: 707b2-6).

<sup>60</sup> 云何釋通契經所說。如契經說。苾芻當知。有極光淨先生。諸天見後生者觀劫火焰心生恐怖。而慰喻言。大仙勿怖大仙勿怖。我數會見此劫火焰燒空梵宮即於彼滅 (T. 1545: 386b5-9).

<sup>61</sup> The *Saptasūryavākaraṇa* of the *Dīrghāgama* (T. 1: 429a22-29; see La Vallée Poussin 2: 20).

<sup>62</sup> 問若爾。經說當云何通。如說大地妙高山等皆悉洞然風吹絕焰展轉乃至上燒梵宮。極光淨天有生未久。於劫成壞不善了知。見已驚恐便作是念。勿彼火焰燒盡梵宮當復燒此 (T. 1545: 690b21-25).

<sup>63</sup> 'od gsal gyi lha gnas na ni śha phyir skyes pa rnam / tshahs pa'i 'jig rten tshig pa'i me lce mthoñ ba las 'jigs pa dan / mi 'jigs pa'i 'du śes su 'gyur bas / de dag ni 'du śes mi 'dra bar rig par bya'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*; dzi 211a5-6). 光音天衆先後生者。由觀梵世猛焰燒然。爾時便有怖不怖想。是故於彼有異類想 (T. 1579: 354c20-22).

<sup>64</sup> *Pratīyasamutpāda* is the principle of conditioned origination, often expressed in a twelve-membered formula; according to the *āvasthika* interpretation, each member of the formula represents a different state (*āvasthā*) of the five *skandhas*.

<sup>65</sup> *atra tu sautrāntikā vijñāpayanti / kiṃ khalv etā iṣṭaya ucyante yā yasyeṣṭir āhosvit sūtrārthaḥ / sūtrārtha ity āha / yadī sūtrārtho naiṣa sūtrārthaḥ / kathaṃ kṛtvā / yat tāvad*

*Yogācārabhūmi*<sup>63</sup> – According to the *Śrutamayī Bhūmi*, the Ābhāsvaras have different ideas because when they see Brahmā's conflagration, some are afraid and some are not.

Comment – Vasubandhu and the *Yogācārabhūmi* clearly agree here. The \**Vibhāṣā* does not seem to recognize a controversy about what it means for these gods to have different ideas.

9. The *āvasthika* (static) interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda*<sup>64</sup> cannot be justified by *sūtra*.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>65</sup> – Vasubandhu criticizes the *āvasthika* interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda*. He says that it cannot be justified by *sūtra* because the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* is *nītārtha* (of explicit meaning).

\**Vibhāṣā* – (nothing relevant)

\**Tattvasiddhi* – (nothing relevant)

*Yogācārabhūmi* – (In the exposition of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *Savitkādhūmi*, the explanation of the individual members essentially follows and comments upon the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* [T. 1579: 322b2-324a15; *Yogācārabhūmi*: 204.1-212.3; see Kritzer *Rebirth* 33-52 for a summary of this section]. Due to the length of the passage, I do not provide the text.)

*uktam āvasthika eṣa pratītyasamutpādo dvādaśapañcaskandhikā avasthā dvādaśāṅgānīty etad utsūtram / sūtre 'nyathā nirdeśād / avidyā katamā / yat tat pūrvānte 'jñānam iti vistareṇa / yac ca nītārthaṃ na tat punar neyaṃ bhavātīti naiṣa sūtrārthaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 136.14-18; T. 1558: 50a7-13; La Vallée Poussin 2: 75; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the *sūtra*-master, relates it to the last of the Sthavira's six arguments against the *āvasthika* interpretation, and refutes it [T. 1562: 495c22-496a10; Katō 76]).

<sup>66</sup> See Kritzer *Rebirth* 183-189.

<sup>67</sup> *saṅgītiparyāye cokaṭṭa mahāsamudrād audārikāḥ prāṇino jalāt sthalaṃ abhiruḥya sikatāsthale 'ṇḍāni sthāpayitvā sikatābhir avaṣṭabhya punar api mahāsamudre 'vataranti / tatra yāsāṃ mātṛṇāṃ aṇḍāny ārabhya smṛtir na muṣyate tāny aṇḍāni na pūṭibhavanti yāsāṃ tu muṣyate tāni pūṭibhavanti / tad etan na varṇayanti sautrāntikāḥ / mā bhūt parakīyeṇāhāreṇāhāra iti / evaṃ tu varṇayanti / yeṣāṃ aṇḍānāṃ mātaram ārabhya smṛtir na muṣyate tāni na pūṭibhavanti / yeṣāṃ tu muṣyate tāni pūṭibhavanti / tasyāḥ sparśāvasthāyāḥ smarantīti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 154.4-7; T. 1558: 55b28-c1; La Vallée Poussin 2: 125; Katō 76-77).

Comment – Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not contain an explicit criticism of the *Vaibhāṣika āvasthika* interpretation, Vasubandhu seems to follow the *Savitarkādibhūmi* in relying on the *Praṭīyasamutpādasūtra*.<sup>66</sup>

10. The *Samgītiparyāya* is criticized for its statement that large sea-beings, after they lay their eggs on the shore, provide nourishment in the form of *manaḥsaṃcetanā* (mental action or volition) by thinking of their eggs.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>67</sup> – Vasubandhu criticizes the *Samgītiparyāya* for its statement that large sea-beings, after they lay their eggs on the shore, provide nurture in the form of *manaḥsaṃcetanā* by thinking of their eggs. The Sautrāntikas say that one being’s thought cannot be nourishment for another being. Instead, the eggs, by thinking of their mother, provide such nourishment for themselves.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>66</sup> La Vallée Poussin says that some commentators specify “Sautrāntika” here, but so far the only texts that I’ve found that use the word are the Sanskrit text of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and Paramārtha’s translation (T. 1559: 212c8). Neither the Tibetan (gu 162b1-4) nor Hsüan-tsang’s translation mentions whose opinion this is. Yaśomitra, Saṃghabhadra, and Pu-kuang likewise fail to attribute the position to any teacher or school. Fa-pao mentions only that it is Vasubandhu’s preferred opinion (T. 1822: 612b14-15). According to Yamaguchi and Funahashi, none of the commentators attributes it to Sautrāntika (343 n. 8).

Katō notes that Hsüan-tsang omits “Sautrāntika” for reasons unclear. He also mentions that Saṃghabhadra does not identify whose opinion this is (76-77).

As Saeki notes (2: 450), the opinion that Vasubandhu quotes from the *Samgītiparyāya* is an alternate opinion in the \**Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 676b20-21). But Saeki does not note that the opinion that Vasubandhu prefers, which is attributed to the Sautrāntikas in the Sanskrit and in Paramārtha’s translation, is actually the preferred opinion of the \**Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 676b16-20) and is what is said in the *Samgītiparyāya* (T. 1536: 400c7-11). The \**Vibhāṣā* (T. 1545: 676b21-23) refutes the alternate opinion with the same argument as Vasubandhu’s. Yamaguchi and Funahashi do not mention this discrepancy.

The opinion favored by Vasubandhu is also given in the \**Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* (T. 1552: 952c8-9).

Van den Broeck suggests that Hsüan-tsang altered the text of the *Samgītiparyāya* on the basis of Vasubandhu’s opinion, but he does not give any real basis for his suggestion (100 n. 7).

<sup>69</sup> 有說思食增。云何知然。如集異門說。海中有獸時出海濱。於沙渾中產生諸卵。以沙埋覆還入海中。彼在卵殼憶念母故身不爛壞。謂憶念母先孚煖時所有觸故。若忘其母身便爛壞。有餘師說。若母憶念卵中子者卵則不壞。母若忘之彼卵便壞。此不應理。所以者何。勿以他食能持自命。是故前說於理為善 (T. 1545: 676b16-23).

<sup>70</sup> *nāsti saṃsthānaṃ dravyata itī sautrāntikāḥ / ekadīnṃ mukhe hi bhūyasi varṇa utpanne dīrghaṃ rūpam itī prajñāpyate / tam evāpekṣyālpīyasi hrasvam itī / caturdīśaṃ bhūyasi*

\**Vibhāṣā*<sup>69</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* quotes the same passage from the *Samgūtiparyāya* and refutes it using the same argument as Vasubandhu.

\**Tattvasiddhi* – (nothing relevant)

*Yogācārabhūmi* – (nothing relevant)

Comment – Most texts do not consider this a Sautrāntika opinion; furthermore, the actual position of the *Samgūtiparyāya* is not clear. Therefore, it is hard to know what to make of this passage.

11. *Samsthānarūpa* is a *prajñapti*.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>70</sup> – *Samsthānarūpa* (matter as shape) is only a *prajñapti*, because if it were real, then a single *samsthānarūpa* would be perceived by two *rūpīndriyas* (material sense organs), i.e., the eye, which would see the shape, and the faculty of touch, which would feel it. In fact, it is simply a designation for quantities of *varṇa* (matter as color) arranged in various ways.

\**Vibhāṣā* – (see the following item)

*caturasram itī / sarvatra same vṛttim itī / evaṃ sarvam / tad yathā 'lātam ekasyāṃ dīśi deśāntareṣu anantareṣu nīrantaram āśu dṛśyamānaṃ dīrgham itī pratīyate sarvato dṛśyamānaṃ maṇḍalam itī na tu khalu jātyantaram asti samsthānam / yadi hi syāt dyigrāhyam svāt cakṣuṣā hi dṛṣṭvā dīrgham ity avasīyate kāyendriyeṇāpi sprṣṭveti dvābhyāṃ asya grahaṇaṃ prāpnuyāt / na ca rūpāyatanaśya dvābhyāṃ grahaṇam asti / yathā vā spraṣṭavye dīrghādīgrahaṇaṃ tathā varṇe saṃbhāvyaṭām* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 194.14-21; T. 1558: 68b1-11; La Vallée Poussin 3: 8-9; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 535c23-536a4] and criticizes it at length [T. 1562: 536a4-b5]; not mentioned in Katō).

<sup>71</sup> *athedanīṃ kāyasya gatīṃ nīrākṛtya samsthānaṃ ca tatra bhavantaḥ sautrāntikāḥ kāṃ kāyavijñaptīṃ prajñāpayanti / samsthānam eva hi te kāyavijñaptīṃ prajñāpayanti / na tu punar dravyataḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 195.15-17; T. 1558: 68c8-9; La Vallée Poussin 3: 12; Saṃghabhadra says that the sūtra-master is stating the opinion of his own school [T. 1562: 537a25-26] and criticizes it at length [T. 1562: 537a27-b13]; Katō 77). In the course of this argument, Saṃghabhadra refers to Sautrāntika three times (T.1562: 537b3, b7, b8). It seems as though he is all but identifying Sautrāntika as the school of the sūtra-master.

<sup>72</sup> As Katō points out (77), the implication of the whole Sautrāntika argument about *vijñapti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 195.15-196.2) is that all *karma* is *cetanā*. The \**Vibhāṣā* attributes such a position to the Dārṣṭāntikas: 又譬喻者說。身語意業皆是一思。 (T. 1545: 587a7-8; see Katō 71).

<sup>73</sup> 然彼所言此表無表體。若是色青黃赤白爲是何耶。此責不然非顯色外無別色故。當知身表是形非顯 (T. 1545: 634c26-28). We know that 彼 refers to the Dārṣṭāntikas because



\**Tattvasiddhi* – (see the following item)

*Yogācārabhūmi* – (see the following item)

Comment – (see the following item)

12. *Kāyavijñāpti* (physically manifested matter) is *saṃsthāna*, which is a *prajñāpti*.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>71</sup> – The Sautrāntika answer to the Sarvāstivādins' question regarding the nature of *kāyavijñāpti* is that it is *saṃsthāna*, which is, however, *prajñāpti*, not *dravya* (substantially real).<sup>72</sup>

\**Vibhāṣā*<sup>73</sup> – The Dārṣṭāntika objects: “If *vijñāpti* and *avijñāpti* are *rūpa*, then what are blue, yellow, red, and white?” The \**Vibhāṣā* answers that it is not the case that there is no *rūpa* besides *varṇa*. *Kāyavijñāpti* is *saṃsthāna*, not *varṇa*.

\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>74</sup> – *Samsthāna* is nothing other than *rūpa* (i.e., *varṇa*). If there is no color, there can be no perception of shape, while if shape

the stated purpose of the whole section is to refute the Dārṣṭāntika opinion that *vijñāpti* and *avijñāpti* are unreal (T. 1545: 634c9-10).

<sup>74</sup> 又言。青黃等色名爲色入。如經中說。取入滅色相離。是處應知。問曰。有說。業 (mistakenly for 形?) 量亦是色入。所以者何。如經中說黑白長虛麤細諸色。答曰。形等是色之差別。何以知之。若離色則不生形量等心。若形等異色。離色亦應生。心而實不生。故知不異 (T. 1646: 273a23-28).

<sup>75</sup> *riñ po dañ thuñ ñu ñid la sogs pa gañ dag dbyibs źes bya ba de dag kyañ ci rdzas su yod pa 'am / btags pa'i yod pa yin par brjod bar bya źe na / smras pa / btags pa'i yod pa yin par brjod par bya'o / de ci'i phyir źe na / bsags pa las gnas pa ni dbyibs źes bya ba'i ñes pa'i tshig yin pa dañ bsags pa tsam dmigs pa dañ / mtshan ñid las gźan pa'i don mi dmigs pa dañ / bltos śiñ bltos na ño bo ñid 'dres par 'gyur ba dañ (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 56a1-3). 問諸長短等所說形色。當言實有爲假有耶。答當言假有。何以故。積集而住故名爲形。唯有衆色積集可得。餘形色相不可得故。又必相待。相待之法有自性者。彼法便有雜亂過失 (T. 1579: 599b7-11). Yamabe has noted the similarity between this passage and the Sautrāntika opinion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (personal communication).*

<sup>76</sup> *saṃsthānaṃ katamat / yo rūpapracayo dīrghādi-paricchedākāraḥ (Yogācārabhūmi; 5.2). dbyibs gañ źe na / gañ gzuḡs rgyas par riñ po la sogs par yoñs su bcad [corrected from *gcad* on the basis of the Derge] pa'i rnam pa'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 3a6). 形色者謂若色積集長短等分別相 (T. 1579: 279b8-9).*

<sup>77</sup> *de blos bye bas śiñ rta la sogs pa dañ 'dra ba'i phyir ro (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 56a3). 又如車等彼覺可壞故 (T. 1579: 599b11).*

were different from color, there could be a perception of it, even without a perception of color.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (1)<sup>75</sup> – In the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*, *saṃsthānarūpa* (shape) is said to be a *prajñāpti* because it is nothing more than a conglomeration of *rūpa* with no characteristics of its own.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (2)<sup>76</sup> – In a passage in the *Pañcavijñānakāyabhūmi* (just after the one mentioned above), it is stated that *saṃsthāna* is a conglomeration of *rūpa* having features distinguished as “long,” etc.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (3)<sup>77</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* adduces another reason for why *saṃsthānarūpa* is a *prajñāpti*: the mind can break down *saṃsthānarūpa*, like a cart, into component parts.

Comment – Vasubandhu and the *Yogācārabhūmi*<sup>78</sup> agree that *viñāpti* is a *prajñāpti*, and the reasoning (see item 11) is essentially the same. The *Dārṣṭāntikas* also deny the reality of *viñāpti*, but the \**Vibhāṣā* gives

<sup>75</sup> Yamabe has identified another passage from the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, according to which all *viñāptikarma*, including *kāyaviñāpti*, is merely *prajñāpti* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 30b8; T. 1579: 589b11ff.) He notes the similarity between this passage and the Sautrāntika opinion in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (personal communication).

<sup>76</sup> The *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* describes the theory of the Sauryodayikas (Lamotte *Traité* 188.33-189.11; 219-220), who may be the same as the *Dārṣṭāntikas* (Lamotte *Traité* 219 n. 31). However, it is completely different from the Sautrāntika argument in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

<sup>77</sup> *karmasvabhāvaḥ katamaḥ / yo dharma utpadyamāno abhisamkāralakṣanaś cotpadyate tasya cotpādāt kāyābhisamkāro vāgabhisamkāras tad uttarakālaṃ pravartate / ayam ucyate karmasvabhāvaḥ (Yogācārabhūmi: 170.17-19); las kyi ño bo ñid gaṇ ze na / chos gaṇ skye ba na mñon par 'du byed pa'i mtshan ñid kyaṅ skye la / de skyes pas de'i rjes la lus kyi mñon par du 'byed pa dan / ñag gi mñon par du 'byed pa 'jug par 'gyur te / 'di ni las kyi ño bo ñid ces bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 99b5-6); 業自性云何。謂若法生時。造作相起。及由彼生故。身行語行於彼後時造作而轉。是名業自性 (T. 1579: 315a18-20; see *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* Yuga-bu 1: 151 n. 27).*

<sup>78</sup> *sā 'pi dravyato nāstīti sautrāntikāḥ / abhyupetyākaraṇamātratvāt / atītāny api mahābhūtāny upādāya prajñāptes teṣāṃ cāvidyamānasvabhāvatvād rūpalakṣaṇābhāvāc ca (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 196.5-6; T. 1558: 68c26-28; La Vallée Poussin 3: 14; Saṃghabhadra quotes this passage [T. 1562: 539c9-11] and criticizes it at very great length; however, he does not mention the sūtra-master but simply attributes it to the Sautrāntikas [T. 1562: 539c11-540a25]; Katō 77).*

no further details about their argument.<sup>79</sup> As for the nature of *karma*, the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not say, in so many words, that *karma* is essentially volition. However, a definition in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the real nature of *karma* seems to suggest the primacy of volition: “What is the real nature of *karma*? When a *dharma* arises, that which is characterized as (mental) determination also arises, and due to its arising, physical and vocal determination proceed later. This is the real nature of *karma*.”<sup>80</sup>

13. *Avijñapti* does not really exist, for three reasons.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>81</sup> – Vasubandhu attributes to the Sautrāntikas the statement that *avijñapti* does not really exist, for three reasons: it is simply the non-performance of an action that one has undertaken not to do; it is a *prajñapti* based on past *mahābhūtas* (great elements, i.e., the four types of matter [earth, etc.] in its most basic form), which themselves do not exist; it lacks the characteristics of *rūpa*.

<sup>82</sup> 表無表若是色者。青黃赤白爲是何 (T. 1545: 634c6-7; see above).

<sup>83</sup> 問曰。已知有無作法非心。今爲是色爲是心不相應行。答曰。是行陰所攝 (T. 1646: 290b9-10). 因作所集罪福當隨。是心不相應法名爲無作 (T. 1646: 304a17-18). See Katsura 88.

<sup>84</sup> *dharmāyatanaparyāpannaṃ punā rūpaṃ dvidvidhaṃ dravyasat prajñaptisat ca / yat prabhāvataḥ samādhigocaraṃ nirmitavat tatphalaṃ tadviśayaṃ tatpratīśamuktavijñānaviśayaṃ ca tad dravyasat / saṃvarāsaṃvarasaṃgrhītaṃ tu prajñaptisat* (according to Matsuda [personal communication], this passage appears in a Sanskrit manuscript fragment of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* preserved in St. Petersburg, and Matsuda has reconstructed it as above [non-italicized portions represent Matsuda’s reconstruction]). *chos kyi skye mched du gtogs pa’i gzugs ni rnam pa gñis te / rdzas su yod pa dañ btags pa’i yod pa’o / mthu las byuñ ba’i tiñ ñe ’dzin gyi spyod yul sprul pa lta bu de’i ’bras bu dañ / de’i yul dañ de dañ mthuñs par ldan pa’i rnam par śes pa’i yul gañ yin pa de ni rdzas su yod pa yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 51a8-b1). 隨法處色亦有二種。謂實有假有。若有威德定所行境猶如變化。彼果彼境及彼相應識等境色是實物有。若律儀色不律儀色皆是假有 (T. 1579: 597b6-9).

<sup>85</sup> These are special types of *avijñapti* (Hirakawa 191-193).

<sup>86</sup> *Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 208a4-6; T. 1579: 659a12-16. See note 50 above.

<sup>87</sup> *Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 19a1-21b1; T. 1579: T. 1579: 584c18-585c8. Due to the length of the passage, I have not included the text.

\**Vibhāṣā*<sup>82</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* attributes to the *Dārṣṭāntikas* the argument that *avijñapti* is not real because, like *vijñapti*, it is not *rūpa* in the way that *varṇa* is.

\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>83</sup> – *Avijñapti* is a *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*, and thus it has no separate existence.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (1)<sup>84</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that *saṃvararūpa* (a form of matter produced by taking a virtuous vow) and *asaṃvararūpa* (a form of matter produced by taking an evil vow)<sup>85</sup> are merely *prajñapti*.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (2)<sup>86</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmayī Bhūmi* includes *avijñapti*, along with the *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*, *vijñapti*, and *bīja*, as *prajñaptis*, saying that they are nominal designations for *saṃskṛtadharmas*.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (3)<sup>87</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* denies the reality of past *dharma*s.

Comment – As in the case of *vijñapti*, Vasubandhu and the *Yogācārabhūmi* agree that *avijñapti* is a *prajñapti*. Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not give any reasons, Vasubandhu bases his second argument on a denial, which he shares with the *Yogācārabhūmi*, of the reality of the past.

14a. When the *sūtra* mentions *rūpa* that is invisible and not subject to collision (*apratigha*), it is referring not to *avijñapti* but to *rūpa* that is produced by meditation.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>88</sup> – The *Vaibhāṣikas* give many different types of arguments in support of the real existence of *avijñapti*, but they are wrong. One argument in support is that the *sūtra* says that there are three

<sup>88</sup> *atra sautrāntikā āhuḥ bahv apy etac citram apy etat / naivaṃ tv etat / yat tāvad uktaṃ trividharūpokter iti / tatra yogācārā upadiśanti / dhyāyināṃ samādhiviśayo rūpaṃ samādhīprabhāvād utpadyate / cakṣurindriyāviśayatvāt anidarśanam / deśānāvaraṇatvād apratigham iti / atha matam / katham idānīm tat rūpam iti / etad avijñaptau samānam* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 197.3-7; T. 1558: 69a29-b4; La Vallée Poussin 3: 18; S a m g h a - bhadra identifies this as the opinion of the *sūtra*-master [T. 1562: 540c22-24] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 540c24-541a8]).

types of *rūpa*, one of which is invisible and not subject to collision (*apratigha*). According to the Vaibhāṣikas, this must be *avijñapti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 196.9-11; T. 1558: 69a2-4; La Vallée Poussin 3: 14). Vasubandhu, in making what he describes as the Sautrāntika argument against Vaibhāṣika, quotes those who practice *yoga* (*yogācārāḥ*) as saying that, due to the power of meditation, *rūpa* that is the object of meditation is produced in meditators. This *rūpa* is invisible because it is not the object of *cakṣurindriya*, and it is not subject to collision because it does not cover any place. Vasubandhu defends this statement against a possible Sarvāstivādin objection.

\**Vibhāṣā* – (nothing relevant)

\**Tattvasiddhi* – (nothing relevant)

*Yogācārabhūmi*<sup>89</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāya-manobhūmi* includes, in the category of really existent, *rūpa* that, due to supernatural power, is the object of *samādhi* (meditation), like a magical creation, *rūpa* that is the result of that *samādhi*, *rūpa* that is the object of that *samādhi*, and *rūpa* that is the object of the consciousness associated with that *samādhi*. This is contrasted with *saṃvararūpa* and *asaṃvararūpa*, which are merely *prajñapti*.

<sup>89</sup> *Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 51a8-b1; T. 1579: 597b6-9. See note 84 above.

<sup>90</sup> *yad apy uktam anāsravarūpakter iti tad eva samādhiprabhāvasaṃbhūtaṃ rūpaṃ anāsrave samādhāv anāsravaṃ varṇayanti yogācārāḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 197.7-8; T. 1558: 69b4-6; La Vallée Poussin 3: 18-19; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 541a11-13] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 541a13-19]). Saṃghabhadra questions the identity of these *yogācāras* and expresses surprise that Vasubandhu quotes from them in interpreting *sūtra* (T. 1562: 541a14-15).

<sup>91</sup> 又如行者雖離色相以虛空邊能緣四禪。如無色定能緣無漏色。是中無過非煩 惱處故餘亦應爾 (T. 1646: 343b17-19).

<sup>92</sup> *tat punaḥ samādhigocaraṃ rūpaṃ yatpratisaṅgyutaḥ samādhīḥ tatpratisaṅgyuktāny eva tanmahābhūtāny upādāya laukikaṃ sāsravānāsravaṃ samādhim upādāyotpadyate na tu lokottaraṃ / saprapaṃcākārasamādhīhetukatvāt tasya* (according to Matsuda [personal communication], this passage appears in a Sanskrit manuscript fragment of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* preserved in St. Petersburg). *tiñ ṅe 'dzin gyi spyod yul gyi gzugs de yañ tiñ ṅe 'dzin 'byuñ ba chen po dag rgyur byas pa'i gzugs gañ dañ mtshuñs par ldan pa de dag ṅid dañ de yañ mtshuñs par ldan pa yin no / 'jig rten pa'i tiñ ṅe 'dzin zag pa dañ*

Comment – There is a clear correspondence here between the statement of those who practice *yoga*, quoted by Vasubandhu, and the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

14b. *Anāsravarūpa* (undefiled matter) is not *avijñapti*. The *rūpa* produced by the power of *samādhi* is *anāsrava* if the *samādhi* in which it is produced is *anāsrava*.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>90</sup> – Another Sarvāstivādin argument in support of the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* is that the *sūtra* says that there is an *anāsravarūpa*. Vasubandhu again quotes those who practice *yoga*, who say that the *rūpa* produced by the power of *samādhi* is *anāsrava* if the *samādhi* in which it is produced is *anāsrava*.

\**Vibhāṣā* – (nothing relevant)

\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>91</sup> – The *\*Tattvasiddhi* does not make this argument concerning *avijñapti*, but in another context it refers to the fact that an *ārūpya samādhi* can produce an *anāsrava rūpa*.

*Yogācārabhūmi*<sup>92</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that the *rūpa* that is the object of *samādhi* arises on the basis of the *mahābhūtas* associated with that *samādhi*, and it arises on the basis of *laukikasamādhi* (mundane meditation), whether *sāsrava* or *anāsrava*. However, it does not arise on the basis of *lokottarasamādhi* (supermundane meditation) because it is caused by a *samādhi* in which *prapañca* (conceptual proliferation)<sup>93</sup> is present.

*bcas pa dañ zag pa med pa la brten nas skye ba yin gyi / 'jig rten las 'das pa las ni ma yin te / de ni spros pa'i rnam pa dañ bcas pa'i tiñ ñe 'dzin gyi rgyu las byuñ ba'i phyir ro* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: zi 51b1-3). 又定所行色若依此繫定。即由此繫大種所造。又此定色但是世間有漏無漏由定而生。非出世間由此定色有戲論行定爲因故 (T. 1579: 597b9-12).

<sup>93</sup> For this translation, I follow Ñāṇananda as quoted in Schmithausen's long note on the term (509 n. 1405).

<sup>94</sup> *yad apy uktaṃ puṇyābhivṛddhivacanād iti tatrāpi pūrvācāryā nirdiśanti dharmatā hy eṣā yathā yathā dātīñāṃ dāyāḥ paribhujyante tathā tathā bhoktīñāṃ guṇaviśeṣād anugrahaviśeṣāc cānyamanasām api dātīñāṃ tadālambanadānacetanābhāvīṭḥ saṃtatayaḥ sūksmaṃ pariñānaviśeṣaṃ prāpnuvanti yenāyatyāṃ bahutaraphalābhiniṣpattaye samarthā bhavanti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 197.15-19; T. 1558: 69b14-20; La Vallée Poussin 3: 20; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the *sūtra*-master [T. 1562: 541c8-14] and explains and criticizes it at very great length [T. 1562: 541c14-542b6]).

Comment – The passage in the *Yogācārabhūmi* implies what Vasubandhu states more clearly, that *anāsravarūpa* can arise due to *samādhi*.

14c. Merit increases, not due to *avijñapti*, but due to a gradual transformation of the *saṃtati* of the giver.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>94</sup> – A third Sarvāstivādin argument in support of the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* is that the *sūtra* says that merit increases.

<sup>95</sup> *yeṣu saṃskāreṣu yac chubhāśubhaṃ karmotpannaniruddhaṃ bhavati tena hetunā tena pratyayena viśiṣṭā saṃskārasantatiḥ pravartate sāvāsanety ucyate / yasyāḥ prabandhapatitāyā iṣṭāniṣṭaphalaṃ nirvartate (Yogācārabhūmi: 128.2-4). 'du byed gañ dag la dge ba dañ mi dge ba' i las skyes nas 'gags pa yod la / rgyu de dañ rkyen des 'du byed bye brag can gyi rgyud 'jug pa de la ni bag chags zes bya ste / de rgyun du gnas pa las sdug pa dañ mi sdg pa' i 'bras bu grub par 'gyur ba' i phyir (Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 75b4-5). 謂於諸行中。曾有淨不淨業。若生若滅由此因緣彼行勝異相續而轉是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故。愛不愛果生 (T. 1579: 305b3-6).*

<sup>96</sup> *ji ltar na sbyin pa las loṅs spyod can du 'gyur ba yin ze na / 'di ltar 'di na la la shon gyi tshes rabs gzan dag tu sbyin pa las byuñ bai bsod nams bya ba' i dños po byas śiñ bsags par gyur te / de da ltar phyug pa' i khyim dañ / nor che ba nas mdzod dañ / bañ mdzod kyi tshogs mañ ba' i bar gyi khyim du skye bar 'gyur ba 'blta bu' o (Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 269a2-4). 云何布施能具珍財。謂如有一昔餘生中及增長施福事業。由此因緣。今生巨富大財寶家。乃至衆多府軍盈積云 (T. 1579: 375b13-16).*

<sup>97</sup> *dharmatā-yuktiḥ katamā / kena kāraṇena tathābhūtā ete skandhā(s) tathābhūto lokasaṃniveśaḥ kena kāraṇena khara-lakṣaṇā pṛthivī dravalakṣaṇā āpaḥ uṣṇalakṣaṇaṃ teja(h) samudīranalakṣaṇo vayuḥ / anityāḥ skandhā(h) / kena kāraṇena śāntaṃ nirvāṇam iti / tathā rūpa[na]lakṣaṇaṃ rūpaṃ anubhavana-lakṣaṇā vedanā saṃjñānālakṣaṇā saṃjñā abhisamskāraṇa-lakṣaṇāḥ saṃskārā vijñānālakṣaṇaṃ vijñānam iti / prakṛtir eṣāṃ dharmāṇāṃ idaṃ svabhāva eṣa īdṛśaḥ dharmatāiṣā(m) caiva cāsau dharmatā / saivātra yuktir yoga upāyah evaṃ vā etasmāt / anyathā vā naiva vāsmāt sarvatraiva ca dharmatāiva pratiprasaraṇaṃ dharmatāiva yuktiḥ / cittanidhyapanāya cittasaṃjñāpanāya iyam ucyate dharmatā-yuktiḥ (Śrāvakahūmi: 143.4-16; Śrāvakahūmi; Wayman 79). chos nīd kyi rigs pa gañ ze na / ci' i phyir phuñ po rnams de lta bur gyur pa yin / 'jig rten gnas pa de lta bur gyur pa yin / ci' i phyir sa' i mtshan nīd sra ba yin / chu' i mtshan nīd gśer ba yin / me' i mtshan nīd tsha ba yin / rluñ gi mtshan nīd g.yo ba yin / ci' i phyir phuñ po rnams mi rtag pa yin / ci' i phyir mya ñan las 'das pa źi ba yin / de bźhin du ci' i phyir gzugs kyi mtshan nīd gzugs su ruñ ba yin / tshor ba' i mtshan nīd myoñ ba yin / 'du śes kyi mtshan nīd kun śes par byed pa yin / 'du byed rnams kyi mtshan nīd mñon par 'du byed pa yin / rnam par śes pa' i mtshan nīd rnam par śes par byed pa yin ze na / de ni chos nīd yin te / chos de dag gi rañ bźin de yin źiñ / de dag gi ño bo nīd de lta bu yin pas chos nīd de gañ kho na yin pa de nīd 'dir rigs pa dañ / sbyor ba dañ / thabs yin no / de bźin du de lta bu 'am / gźan nam / gźan du ma 'gyur pa ni sems la bźag par bya ba dañ / sems la go bar bya ba' i phyir thams cad du yañ chos nīd kho na la brten pa dañ / chos nīd kho na' i rigs pa yin te / de ni chos nīd kyi rigs pa zes bya' o (Yogācārabhūmi; wi 68b6-69a4). 云何名為法爾道理。謂何因緣故即彼諸蘊。如是種類。諸器世間。如是安布。*

Vasubandhu quotes the *pūrvācāryas*, who say that the merit increases when the recipient of a gift uses the gift, even though, in the time between the giving of the gift and its use, the giver of the gift might have a bad thought. Due to the nature of *dharmas*, the *saṃtati* of the giver of a gift is perfumed by the volition towards the recipient that accompanied the gift, and his *saṃtati* undergoes a gradual transformation until the *saṃtati* can give rise to greater results.

\**Vibhāṣā* – (nothing relevant)

\**Tattvasiddhi* – (nothing relevant)

*Yogācārabhūmi* (1)<sup>95</sup> – The *Savitarkādībhūmi* uses the phrase *viśiṣṭā saṃskārasaṃtatiḥ pravartate* (“a distinguished series of conditioning forces proceeds”) in explaining how good or bad actions produce desired or undesired results.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (2)<sup>96</sup> – In the *Cintāmayī Bhūmi*, it is said that wealth accrues due to good *karma* produced by *dāna* (charity) and accumulated in former lives.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (3)<sup>97</sup> – The idea that certain observable phenomena are attributable to the nature of *dharmas* [*dharmatā*] appears in various places in the *Yogācārabhūmi* in definitions of *dharmatāyukti* (reasoning with respect to the nature of *dharmas*), for example in the *Śrāvakahūmi*.

Comment – Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not explain the accumulation of merit in terms of *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa* (the transformation of the *saṃtati*), Vasubandhu’s theory of such a transformation may be based on the *Yogācārabhūmi* (see Yamabe “*Bīja*”). Hakamaya mentions this passage and suggests the possibility that the idea of *pariṇāmaviśeṣa* here

何因緣故地堅為相。水濕為相火煖為相風用輕動以為其相。何因緣故諸蘊無常諸法無我涅槃寂靜。何因緣故色變壞相受領納相。想等了相行造作相。識了別相。由彼諸法本性應爾。自性應爾。法性應爾。即此法爾說名道理瑜伽方便。或即如是或異如是或非如是。一切皆以法爾為依。一切皆歸法爾道理。令心安住令心曉了。如是名為法爾道理 (T. 1579: 419b28-c9).

<sup>95</sup> *avijñāptivad asaṃvaro 'pi nāsti dravyata iti sautrāntikāḥ / sa eva tu pāpakriyābhi-saṃdhir asaṃvaraḥ / sānubandho yataḥ kuśalacitto 'pi tadvān ucyāte* (*Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*: 213.8-9; T. 1558: 75a12-14; La Vallée Poussin 3: 64; Katō 77; Saṃghabhadra does not quote this statement).

<sup>96</sup> 若撥無表無表業。應無建立三品有異。謂住律儀品。住不律儀品。住非律儀非不律



may be that of a Sautrāntika group that preceded Vasubandhu and that cannot be identified with Yogācāra. However, Hakamaya does not provide any evidence from, for example, the \**Vibhāṣā*, the \**Tattvasiddhiśāstra*, or the \**Nyāyānusāra*, and he leaves the question open.

15. *Asaṃvara* does not really exist separately (from volition).

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>98</sup> – The Sautrāntikas say that *asaṃvara* does not really exist separately (from volition). It is the intention to do something bad, an intention that continues until it is destroyed.

\**Vibhāṣā*<sup>99</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* does not deal with this issue directly. However, it mentions that those who assert the unreality of *vijñapti* and *avijñapti* would be unable to establish the differences between those who are established in *saṃvara*, *asaṃvara*, or *naivasamvarāsaṃvara* (neither *saṃvara* nor *asaṃvara*).

\**Tattvasiddhi* – *Avijñapti* is a *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*, and thus it has no separate existence (see above).

儀品 (T. 1545: 634c24-26).

<sup>100</sup> *sdom pa ma yin pa'i rigs su skyes pa ji lta ba bzin du gañ su yañ ruñ ba gañ dañ gañ nas 'oñs kyañ ruñ ste / sems skyed par byed pa yañ de bzin du rgyas par rig par bya'o / de ni ji srid du sdom pa ma yin pa'i sems pa spoñ bar mi byed pa de srid du ma bsdams par brjod par bya ste / de ni ñin gcig bzin du sems pa de mañ du sog pa dañ / las de kun tu sbyor bas bsod nams ma yin pa mñon par 'phel bar rig par bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 31b1-3). 如生不律儀家如是。隨是何人。隨由何事起決猛心。廣說應知。此人乃至不律儀思未捨己來。常得說名不律儀者。於日日分彼不善思廣積集故。彼不善業多現行故。當知非福運運增長 (T. 1579: 589c3-7). See note 104 below.*

<sup>101</sup> *yathābhyupagamāṃ vikalo 'pi syāt prādeśiko 'py asaṃvaraḥ saṃvaraś cānyatrāṣṭavidhā itī sautrāntikāḥ tanmātraśīladauśīlyapratibandhāt (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 222.5-6; T. 1558: 79a3-6; La Vallée Poussin 3: 93); Saṃghabhadra quotes this statement [T. 1562: 563b17-19] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 563b20-24]; Katō 77).*

<sup>102</sup> 問如善律儀有支不具。諸不律儀亦如是耶。答健馱羅國諸論師言。不律儀業有支不具。若諸有情生在種種不律儀家。生便啗啞盡眾同分不能言說。彼但可得身三業性不律儀業。不得語四。迦濕彌羅國諸大論師咸作是說。諸不律儀無支不具。如善律儀漸次受者有支不具。諸不律儀則不如是。無漸受故易可得故 (T. 1545: 608b20-27).

<sup>103</sup> 問曰。爲從可殺等衆生得善律儀。爲於一切衆生得耶。答曰。皆於一切衆生邊得。若不爾。律儀則有分。有分則不具足。又此律儀則可增減。亦同尼延子法。謂百由旬內不殺生等有此等過。是故律儀無有分別 (T. 1646: 303a20-25).

<sup>104</sup> *de la sdom pa ma yin pa'i rigs su skyes zin pa gañ la la 'tsho ba 'dis 'tsho ba[r] bya'o 'zes rañ gi sems mñon par 'du byed ciñ / de 'tsho ba de la 'dod pa bzod par byed*

*Yogācārabhūmi*<sup>100</sup> – The long explanation of *asaṃvara* in the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcaviññānakāyamanobhūmi* (T. 1579: 589b24-c20) contains a definition very similar to that of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

Comment – Both Vasubandhu and the *Yogācārabhūmi* explain *asaṃvara* in terms of volition. Harivarman's explanation is quite different.

16. *Saṃvara* and *asaṃvara* can be incomplete or partial.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>101</sup> – The Sautrāntikas say that *saṃvara* and *asaṃvara* can be incomplete or partial.

*pa ni de'i tshe na ma bsdams pa yin par brjod par bya'o / sdom pa ma yin par gtogs pa'i tshul bzin ma yin pa yid la byed pa rab tu dam pos bcom pas sems bsdus pa'i phyir ji srid du / srog gcod pa las byuñ ba 'am de las gzan pa'i mi dge ba'i las kyi lam las byuñ ba mi byed pa de srid ruñ* (Derge reads *spyod pa de srid du*) *yañ mi dge ba'i rtsa ba rgya chen po dañ ldan pa yin no / gañ las dañ gañ dañ ji tsam du spyod par byed pa ni des na de tsam du śas cher mi dge ba dañ ldan pa yin no / sdom pa ma yin pa'i rigs su skyes pa ji lta ba bzin du gañ su yañ ruñ ba gañ dañ gañ nas 'oñs kyañ ruñ ste / sems skyed par byed pa yañ de bzin du rgyas par rig par bya'o / de ni ji srid du sdom pa ma yin pa'i sems pa spoñ bar mi byed pa de srid du ma bsdams par brjod par bya ste / de ni ñin gcig bzin du sems pa de mañ du sogs pa dañ / las de kun tu sbyor bas bsod nams ma yin pa mñon par 'phel bar rig par bya'o / de'i log par smon pa'i sems pa ma dad pa dañ / le lo dañ brjed ñas pa dañ / rnam par g.yeñ ba dañ / śes rab 'chal pa dañ ldan pa las de yañ dag par len par byed pa / las de kun nas sloñ bar byed pa de yañ ji srid du gtoñ ba'i rgyu dag gi spoñ bar mi byed / yoñ su gtoñ bar mi byed kyi bar du de phyin chad kyañ sa bon dañ kun tu spyod pa las rgyud du gtogs pa 'byuñ ba ni sdom pa ma yin pa źes bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: zi 31a6-b4). 復次若有生不律儀家有所了別自發期心。謂我當以此活命事而自活命。又於此活命事重復起心欲樂忍可。爾時說名不律儀者。由不律儀所攝故。極重不如理作意。損害心所攝故。但成廣大諸不善根。然未成就殺生所生。及餘不善業道所生諸不善業。乃至所期事未現行。後若現行。若少若多隨其所應。更復成就諸不善業。如生不律儀家如是。隨是何人。隨由何事起決猛心。廣說應知。此人乃至不律儀思未捨已來。常得說名不律儀者。於日日彼不善思廣積集故。彼不善業多現行故。當知非福運增長復次此邪惡願思。恒與不信懈怠忘念散亂惡慧俱行。能受彼業能發彼業。從此已後由種子故及現行故。處相續中現在轉時名不律儀者。乃至由捨因緣未捨未棄 (T. 1579: 589b24-c11).

<sup>105</sup> *evaṃ tu sādhu yathā sautrāntikānām / katham ca sautrāntikānām / kāmarāgasyānuśayaḥ kāmarāgānuśaya itī / na cānuśayaḥ saṃprayukto na viprayuktas tasyādravyāntaratvāt / prasupto hi kleśo 'nuśaya ucyate / prabuddhaḥ paryavasthānam / kā ca tasya prasuptiḥ / asaṃmukhībhitasya bījabhāvānubandhaḥ / kaḥ prabodhaḥ / saṃmukhībhāvah / ko 'yam bījabhāvo nāma / ātmabhāvasya kleśajā kleśotpādanaśaktiḥ / yathānubhāvajñānaja smṛtyupādanaśaktir yathā cāñkurādīnām śāliphalajā śāliphalotpādanaśaktir*

\**Vibhāṣā*<sup>102</sup> – According to the \**Vibhāṣā*, the Gandhāra teachers say that *asaṃvara* can be incomplete, while the Kāsmīra teachers say that it cannot.

\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>103</sup> – The \**Tattvasiddhi* says that *saṃvara* cannot be partial.

*Yogācārabhūmi*<sup>104</sup> – The explanation of the unrestrained person in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* suggests that becoming unrestrained is a gradual process resulting from the accumulation of bad actions based on bad thoughts or intentions.

Comment – Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not contain a similar argument or an explicit statement that *saṃvara* or *asaṃvara* can be partial or incomplete, its description of the gradual process of becoming *asaṃvara* may imply that one can be unrestrained toward certain beings and not others or with regard to certain rules and not others. In this case, Harivarman seems to disagree with Vasubandhu and perhaps the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

*iti* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 278.17-22; T. 1558: 99a1-9; La Vallée Poussin 4: 6-7; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 596c24-597a2] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 597a2-15]; Katō 78).

<sup>106</sup> 分別論者又說隨眠是纏種子。隨眠自性心不相應。諸纏自性與心相應。纏從隨眠生 (T. 1545: 313a1-3).

<sup>107</sup> 故不應言諸使非心相應 (T. 1646: 258c7-8).

<sup>108</sup> Katsura points out that, according to the \**Tattvasiddhi*, *caittas* are not real *dharma*s (44).  
<sup>109</sup> *ñon moṅs pa'i kun nas ñon moṅs pa'i rab tu dbye ba rnam par gžag pa gañ ze na / mdor bsdu na ñon moṅs pa dañ ñe ba'i ñon moṅs pa ji skad bstan pa rnam kyis ni rgyu gñis kyis sems can rnam kun nas ñon moṅs par byed de / 'di lta ste / kun nas dkris pa dañ bag la ñal gyis so / de la ñon moṅs pa kun tu 'byuñ ba miñon du gyur pa ni kun nas dkris pa zes bya'o / de ñid kyi sa bon ma spaṅs šiñ yañ dag par ma bcom pa ni bag la ñal zes bya ste / gnas ngan len kyañ de yin no / ma sad pa'i phyir ni bag la ñal yin la sad pa'i gnas skabs kyi phyir ni kun nas dkris pa yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 118a8-b3). 云何建立煩惱雜染淨差別。謂如所說本隨二。惑略二緣故染惱有情。一由纏故。二隨眠故。現行現起煩惱名纏。即此種子未斷未害。名曰隨眠亦名龜重。又不覺位名曰隨眠。若在覺位說名爲纏 (T. 1579: 623a20-24). Yamabe has noted that the passage from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is directly based on this passage (personal communication).

<sup>110</sup> *sarvalaukikotkarṣabījānugamyātvād anuśayāḥ* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 167.6). 'jig rten pa'i yar 'phel ba thams cad kyi sa bon dañ ldan pas na bag la ñal rnam so (*Yogācārabhūmi*; dzi 97b8-98a1). 一切世間增上種子之所隨逐故名隨眠 (T. 1579: 314b25-26).

<sup>111</sup> *de la dañ ba'i gzugs dañ / sems dañ sems las byuñ ba'i chos ji skad bstan pa thams cad la ñon moṅs pa'i sa bon yañ dag par ma bcom pa dañ / ma spaṅs pa gañ yin pa de ni bag la ñal zes bya ste / gnas ñan len kyañ de yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 215a5-6).

17. *Anuśayas* are *kleśas* in the state of seeds, not separate entities (*dravyas*).

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>105</sup> – The Sautrāntikas define *anuśayas* as *kleśas* in the state of seeds and say that they are not separate *dravyas*. *Anuśayas* are dormant, i.e., not actualized, while *parāvasthānas* (active defilements) are awakened.

\**Vibhāṣā*<sup>106</sup> – According to the Vibhajyavādins, *anuśayas* are the seeds of *parāvasthānas*, and they are dissociated from mind (*cittaviprayukta*).

\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>107</sup> – *Anuśayas* are *cittasamprayukta*.<sup>108</sup>

*Yogācārabhūmi* (1)<sup>109</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* contains an explanation of *anuśaya* and *parāvasthāna* almost identical to that in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (2)<sup>110</sup> – The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* identifies *anuśayas* as being the seeds of *kleśas*.

若於清淨諸色。及於如前所說一切心心所中。煩惱種子未害未斷。說名隨眠。亦名龜重 (T. 1579: 661b26-29).

<sup>112</sup> *Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 208a4-6; T. 1579: 659a12-16. See note 50 above.

<sup>113</sup> *naiva hi sautrāntikā atītāt karmaṇaḥ phalotpattiṃ varṇayanti / kiṃ tarhi / tatpūrva-kāt saṃtānaviśeṣād ity ātmavādapratīśedhe saṃpravedayisyāmaḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 300.19-21; T. 1558: 106a11-13; La Vallée Poussin 4: 63; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 629b3-5], refers to Vasubandhu's longer explanation at the end of Chapter 9 [*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 477.7-18] of *saṃtānapariṇāma* [T. 1562: 629b5-17] and criticizes it at very great length [T. 1562: 629b18-630a11]; Katō 78).

<sup>114</sup> 復有三法。謂過去未來現在法。問何故作此論。答爲止他宗顯正理故。謂或有執。世與行異。如譬喻者分別論師。彼作是說。世體是常行體無常 (T. 1545: 393a9-12).

<sup>115</sup> 佛知是業雖滅而能與果作因。不言定知如字在紙。罪業亦爾。以此身造業是業雖滅果報不失 (T. 1646: 255c24-26). See Katsura, who points out that Harivarman does not mention *saṃtānapariṇāmanaviśeṣa* in this respect (41).

<sup>116</sup> *yad apy uktam asty atītaṃ karma yataḥ sattvāḥ savyābaddhā vyābādhāṃ vedayan-tīti / tatrāpi tadvāsanāyāṃ tadastitvopacāram abhipretyoktaṃ / yeṣu saṃskāreṣu yac chu-bhāśubhaṃ karmotpannaniruddhaṃ bhavati tena hetunā tena pratyayena viśiṣṭā saṃskāra-santatiḥ pravartate sā vāsanety ucyate / yasyāḥ prabandhapatitāyā iṣṭāniṣṭaphalaṃ nirvartate iti na yujyate / tato 'pi nāsti doṣaḥ* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 127.19-128.4). 'das pa'i las yod do źes gsuñs pa gañ yin pa de la yañ / bag chags de la / de yod pa'i 'dogs pa la dgoñs nas gsuñs pa yin te / 'du byed gañ dag la dge ba dañ mi dge ba'i las skyes nas 'gags pa yod la / rgyu de dañ rkyen des 'du byed bye brag can gyi rgyud 'jug pa de la ni bag chags źes bya ste / de rgyun du gnas pa las sdug pa dañ mi sdug pa'i 'bras bu grub par 'gyur ba'i phyr mi ruñ ste (*Yogācārabhūmi*; dzi 75b3-5). 又雖說言有過去業。由此業故諸

*Yogācārabhūmi* (3)<sup>111</sup> – In the *Cintāmāyīprajñābhūmi* of the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī*, the undestroyed seeds of *kleśas* are called *anusayas*.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (4)<sup>112</sup> – According to the *Cintāmāyīprajñābhūmi* of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, *bījas* are *prajñāpti*.

Comment – Vasubandhu and the *Yogācārabhūmi* explain *anusayas* in the same way. Harivarman's explanation is very different.

18. A result arises due to a *saṃtānaviśeṣa* (a special state of the *saṃtati*) based on a past action, not directly due to a past action.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>113</sup> – A result does not directly arise from a past action; instead, it arises due to a *saṃtānaviśeṣa* based on a past action.

有情受有損害受無損害受。此亦依彼習氣密意假說為有。謂於諸行中。曾有淨不淨業。若生若滅由此因緣彼行勝異相續而轉是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故。愛不愛果生。是故於我無過。而汝不應道理 (T. 1579: 305b1-6).

<sup>117</sup> *bcom ldan 'das kyis las 'das pa ni yod de gal te las 'das pa med du zin na 'di na la las gnod pa dañ bcas pa dañ / gnod pa med pa'i tshor ba myoñ ba mi 'gyur zes gañ gsuñs pa de la dgoñs pa gañ ée na / 'das pa'i tshor bas rnam su las dge ba dañ mi dge ba bskyed ciñ 'gags pas phyi ma la 'bras bu 'dod pa dañ mi 'dod pa mñon par 'grub par de'i sa bon gyis 'du byed kyi rgyun phyi ma phyi ma yoñs su bsgom pa las dgoñs nas* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 20b4-6). 問如世尊言。有過去業。若過去業體是無者。不應今時有一領納有損害受。或復不應有一領納無損害受。此何密意。答過去生中淨不淨業已起已滅。能感當來愛不愛果。此業種子攝受熏習。於行相續展轉不斷。世尊為顯如是相續。是故說言有過去業 (T. 1579: 585b7-13).

<sup>118</sup> *arhatvād api nāsti parihāñir iti sautrāntikāḥ / eṣa eva ca nyāyaḥ / katham idaṃ gamyate / āgamād yuktitaś ca* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 375.10-11 [but the whole argument continues until 377.5]; T. 1558: 130a16-130c16; La Vallée Poussin 4: 258 [-265]; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 711c2-3] and criticizes it at exceedingly great length [T. 1562: 711c7-716a13; I have not distinguished here between his brief quotations of Vasubandhu's opinions and his lengthy criticisms]; Katō 78).

<sup>119</sup> *yadi tāvad arhataḥ tadrūpaḥ pratipakṣa utpanno yena kleśā atyantam anutpattidharmatām āppanāḥ / katham punaḥ parihīyate / atha notpannaḥ / katham kṣiṇāsravo bhavati / atyantam anayoddhṛtāyāṃ tadbījadharmatāyām akṣiṇāsravo vā punaḥ katham arhan bhavatiṭy evaṃ yuktīḥ* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 376.17-20; T. 1558: 130c2-4; La Vallée Poussin 4: 263-264; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 716a1-4] and criticizes it [T. 1562: 716a4-13]).

<sup>120</sup> 或有執。定無退起諸煩惱義。如分別論者。彼引世間現喻為證。謂作是說。如瓶破已

\**Vibhāṣā*<sup>114</sup> – At the beginning of its long defense of the reality of the three times, the \**Vibhāṣā* identifies *Dārṣṭāntika* and *Vibhajyavāda* as the opponents. However, it does not refer to the theory of *saṃtānaviśeṣa*.

\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>115</sup> – Although past *karma* gives rise to real results, it does not exist.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (1)<sup>116</sup> – The *Savitarkādibhūmi* explains that when the Buddha said that a past action exists, he was really talking about impres-

唯有餘瓦不復作瓶。諸阿羅漢亦應如是。金剛喻定破煩惱已不應復起諸煩惱退。如燒木已唯有餘灰不還爲木。諸阿羅漢亦應如是。無漏智火燒煩惱已不應復起諸煩惱退 (T. 1545: 312b8-14; La Vallée Poussin 4: 264 n. 2).

<sup>121</sup> 譬喻尊者作如是言。退無自性唯假施設。所以者何。身中先有諸善功德。今遇退緣退失此法有何自性。如人有財爲賊所奪。有人問曰。汝今失財以何爲體。財主答曰。我本有財今爲賊奪但無財物知有何體。如人有衣爲他奪去露形而住。有人問曰。汝今無衣以何爲體。衣主答曰。我先有衣今被奪去知有何體。如人衣破有人問曰。汝今衣破用何爲性。衣破者曰。我衣先完今衣破已知有何性。如是身中先有勝德今唯退失有何自性 (T. 1545: 313a14-25).

<sup>122</sup> For example: 不退相者。又佛說偈。勝若還生不名爲勝。勝而不生是名眞勝。若阿羅漢還生煩惱則不名勝。又阿羅漢生已盡故不復受身。汝經雖說阿羅漢退法應還得。若爾亦可法應不退。若比丘能令諸相不生名阿羅漢。是故無退 (T. 1646: 258a24-b1).

<sup>123</sup> *bcom ldan 'das kyi ji skad du dge sloñ dag dgra bcom pa yañ tshē 'di la lhag pa'i sems las byuñ ba bde bar gnas pa bži po de dag las gañ yañ ruñ ba las yoñs su ñams par ña smra žes gañ gsuñs pa de la / gal te de'i ñon moñs pa can gyi chos thams cad kyi sa bon dag yañ dag par bcom na ni / ji ltar de la 'og ma pa'i ñon moñs pa 'byuñ bar 'gyur / gal te mi 'byuñ na ni ji ltar de yoñs su ñams par 'gyur že na / yongs su ñams pa ni gñis po 'di dag yin te / spoñ ba'i yoñs su ñams pa dañ / gnas pa'i yoñs su ñams pa'o / de la spoñ ba'i yoñs su ñams pas ni so so'i skye bo kho na yoñs su ñams par 'gyur ro / gnas pa'i yoñs su ñams pas ni 'phags pa dañ / so so skye bo yañ yoñs su ñams pa 'gyur ro / de la 'jig rten pa'i lam gyis ñon moñs pa spañs pa yañ mñon du byed pa ni spoñ ba'i yoñs su ñams pas yoñs su ñams par 'gyur te / gnas pa'i yoñs su ñams pas yoñs su ñams par 'gyur ba yañ de yin no / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam gyis ñon moñs pa spañs nas / de las gžan pa'i phral gyi bya ba dag la rab tu chags pa'i blo can yid la mi byed pa'i rgyus de'i mjug thogs su tshē 'di la bde bar gnas pa la šñon ji lta bar phyis kyañ de bžin du mñon du byed mi nus la / sa 'og ma pa'i ñon moñs pa ni / mñon du mi byed pa gañ yin pa de ni de lta na gnas pa'i yoñs su ñams par 'gyur ba yin gyi spoñ ba'i yoñs su ñams pa ni ma yin no / gal te dgra bcom pa ñon moñs pa thams cad spañs pa'i ñon moñs pa can gyi chos de dag thams cad kyi sa bon yañ dag par ma bcom na ni / ji ltar na dgra bcom pa sems šin tu rnam par grol ba dañ / zag pa zad par 'gyur / gal te yañ dag par bcom na ni de'i sems kyi rgyud ñon moñs pa can gyi chos thams cad kyi [corrected from kyiis on the basis of the Derge] sa bon med pa la tshul bžin ma yin pa yid la byed pa tсам yañ 'byuñ bar mi 'gyur na / ñon moñs pa lta smos kyañ ci dgos te / de lta bas na 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam gyis ñon moñs pa spañs pa la ni yoñs su ñams ba med par khoñ du chud par bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 17b7-18b1). 問如世尊言。我說阿羅漢心獨於四種增上心法現法安樂*

sions of the action, not the action itself. These impressions endow the *saṃtati* with the potential to yield results.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (2)<sup>117</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* gives a similar explanation, but with the addition of the term *karmabīja* (seed of *karma*).

Comment – See item 14c.

19. One cannot fall from arhatship.

*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*<sup>118</sup> – The Sautrāntikas say that one cannot fall from arhatship. They argue that the definition of an *arhat* is one whose *kleśas* are completely destroyed. This implies that the seeds of his *kleśas* are likewise destroyed, in which case it is impossible for the *kleśas* to arise again.<sup>119</sup>

\**Vibhāṣā* (1)<sup>120</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* mentions the view of the Vibhajyavādins, who say that the *kleśas* cannot arise again after having been destroyed.

\**Vibhāṣā* (2)<sup>121</sup> – The \**Vibhāṣā* attributes to the Dārṣṭāntika the view that *parihāṇi* (fall from arhatship) is a *prajñāpti* and not a real *dharma*.

\**Tattvasiddhi*<sup>122</sup> – The \**Tattvasiddhi* gives many arguments to the effect that once the *arhat* has destroyed the *kleśas*, they cannot arise again. But it does not mention the destruction of the *bījas* of *kleśas*.

*Yogācārabhūmi* (1)<sup>123</sup> – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that the *arhat*, who has destroyed the *kleśas* and their *bījas*, cannot fall from arhatship.

住中隨一而退。若彼一切染污種子皆已永害。云何復起下地煩惱。若不復起彼云何退。答退有二種。一者斷退。二者住退。言斷退者唯是異生。言住退者。是諸聖者亦是異生。若世間道斷諸煩惱復起現前。當知爾時斷退故退。亦是住退。若出世道斷煩惱已心營世務。不專修習如理作意。由此不能於其中間。現法樂住數起現前如先所得後亦如是。然其下地已斷煩惱不復現前。如是名為住退故退。非是斷退。又若已斷一切煩惱成阿羅漢。而彼一切染法種子未永害者。云何名為心善解脫阿羅漢果諸漏永盡。若已永害。於相續中永無一切染法種子。尚不應起不正思惟。況諸煩惱。是故當知由出世道斷煩惱者。定無有退 (T. 1579: 584b3-19).

<sup>124</sup> *rnam par byañ ba'i phyogs dañ mthun pa'i chos rnam kyis de yoñs su bstan to /*

*Yogācārabhūmi* (2)<sup>124</sup> – The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Śrāvakabhūmi* says that one cannot fall from the four *śrāmaṇyaphalas* (attainment of the four stages of advanced Buddhist practice).

Comment – Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika position here and his argument for it are identical to those of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*. The \**Tattvasiddhi* and the *Vibhajyavādin* positions seem to agree with Sautrāntika to a great extent.

#### IV. Sautrāntika or Yogācāra?

##### A. The Dilemma

There are two possible explanations of the relationship between Vasubandhu’s ideas and those found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*: 1) Vasubandhu and the authors of the *Yogācārabhūmi* both relied on ideas, particularly a theory of *bīja*, developed by a group, called Sautrāntika by Vasubandhu, that was active before the composition of the *Yogācārabhūmi*; or 2) the authors of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, perhaps influenced by a non-orthodox group, developed these ideas, which were then adopted by Vasubandhu, who, for reasons of his own, referred to them as Sautrāntika. Both explanations, however, present problems.

The problem with the first explanation is that we don’t really know what “Sautrāntika” means. Primarily on the basis of a handful of attributions by Vasubandhu, scholars beginning with Vasubandhu’s contemporary, Saṃghabhadra, and continuing up until the present, have assumed that a group of thinkers called “Sautrāntikas” preceded Vasubandhu. Thus, for example, one often sees references to Sautrāntika theories of seeds (e.g., Jaini) or to a Sautrāntika conception of *ālayavijñāna*, different from that of Yogācāra (Lamotte *Traité* 178-179). However, prior to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* itself, we have no textual evidence for a group of that name that asserts such ideas.<sup>125</sup>

*dge sbyon gi tshul gyi ’bras bu bzi po dag ni yañ phul yin te / de dag las ltuñ ba med pa’i phyir dañ / jig rten las ’das pa yin pa’i phyir ro* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 281a2-3). 又若顯示清淨品法。謂應稱讚四沙門果。從彼決定無退墮故。或出世間故 (T. 1579: 687a17-19).

<sup>125</sup> See Cox (38), who summarizes Katō as saying that while both the \**Vibhāṣā* and the



On the other hand, an examination of the passages in which Vasubandhu attributes a doctrinal position to Sautrāntika shows that, in almost every case, a closely related, if not identical, position can be found somewhere in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Corresponding passages appear most frequently in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*, followed by the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the *Maulībhūmi* and other sections of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*. If, however, Vasubandhu is actually following the *Yogācārabhūmi*, one must explain why he uses the term Sautrāntika and why he never refers to the *Yogācārabhūmi* or its characteristic doctrine, *ālayavijñāna*, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.

#### B. The Traditional Explanation: Vasubandhu's Position in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is Sautrāntika

The commonly held view concerning Vasubandhu's philosophical development is the one sarcastically described by Lamotte in his introduction to the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*: "Who can believe that Vasubandhu without mentioning his acquaintance with the Sāṃkhyā, was a Vaibhāṣika in his youth, a Sautrāntika in his mature years, a Vijñānavādin in his old age, and a Pure Land follower of Amitābha at his death?" (Lamotte *History* 39 [English translation of *Histoire* 179]). Having asked this acute rhetorical question, Lamotte indicates that he accepts at least the traditional description of the mature Sautrāntika, whom he identifies as the author of both the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*.<sup>126</sup>

Since Lamotte's exposition of Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika standpoint in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* is the most explicit that I know, and since most of his arguments apply equally to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, I discuss it as representative of the traditional explanation of Vasubandhu's position. Lamotte begins by saying that the purpose of both texts is "to combat, within the framework of the Hīnayāna and relying on the best of the Sautrāntika, the exaggerated realism of the Vaibhāṣikas and the spiritualism of the Vātsīputrīyas" (Lamotte *History* 40 [English translation of

*Samayabhedoparacanacakra* use the term Sautrāntika, neither text uses it to refer to the same group as Vasubandhu.

<sup>126</sup> For a discussion of Vasubandhu's career, see Kritzer *Rebirth* 198-199.

Lamotte *Histoire* 180]). Furthermore, he points out that the two texts ignore Mahāyāna, including Yogācāra idealism, and goes on to refute the Chinese and Tibetan tradition that the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* is a Mahāyāna work, disagreeing in particular with Bu-ston's characterization of the text as idealistic.

Then Lamotte presents what he considers to be internal evidence supporting his claim that the text is Sautrāntika. First, he calls attention to the fact that the teachers and schools mentioned and the majority of the scriptures quoted in the text, with the exception of two quotations from the *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra*, belong to Hīnayāna. However, this in itself does not prove anything. After all, many portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* also fail to quote Mahāyāna sūtras. The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, which does quote Mahāyāna sūtra, to the best of my knowledge quotes primarily the *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra*.

<sup>127</sup> See item 11 above.

<sup>128</sup> *de la gzugs kyi phuṅ po thams cad ni skad cig pa yin par brjod par bya'o / de'i ci phyir že na / skyes nas 'jig [corrected from na jig on the basis of the Derge] pa dmigs pa'i phyir ro / skye ba'i rgyu ni 'jig pa'i rgyu yin par mi ruṅ ste / mshan ṅid mi 'dra ba'i phyir ro / skyes pa gnas pa'i rgyu de las gzan pa yaṅ mi dmigs pas de'i phyir 'du byed thams cad ni raṅ gi ṅaṅ gis 'jig pa yin par rig par bya ste / de'i phyir skad cig pa ṅid rab tu grub po (Yogācārabhūmi: zi 58a4-6). 復次一切色蘊當言皆是剎那滅性。何以故。壞滅。現可得故。又不應謂能生之因即是滅因。其相異故。又法生已餘停住因不可得故。是故當知一切諸行皆任運滅。由此道理剎那義成 (T. 1579: 600a18-22). See also the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: *saṃskṛtasyāvaśyaṃ vyavāt ākasmiko hi bhāvānām vināśaḥ / kiṃ kāraṇam / kāryasya hi kāraṇam bhavati / vināśaś cābhāvaḥ / yāś cābhāvas tasya kiṃ kartavyam / so 'sāv ākasmiko vināśo yadi bhāvasyotpānamātrasya na syāt paścad api na syād bhāvasya tulyatvāt / athānyathābhūtaḥ na yuktam tasyaivānyathātvam / na his sa eva tasmād vilakṣaṇo yujyate / ko 'yam kṣaṇo nāma / ātmalābho 'nantaravināśi / so 'syāstīti kṣaṇikam / daṇḍikavat (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 193.5-10; T. 1558: 67c17-20; La Vallée Poussin 3: 5; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 533b21-22] and criticizes it, saying that, because of the validity of the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas*, destruction must have a cause [T. 1562: 533c10-21]; see Rospatt 180-181).**

The passage from the *Yogācārabhūmi* is translated by Rospatt, who also provides the Tibetan text and the text from the Sanskrit manuscript (181-182 n. 399). Rospatt thinks that the argument here is somewhat different from that of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (181-182).

<sup>129</sup> *de la lus yul nas yul gzan du 'byuṅ ba tsam daṅ / de ṅid na 'gyur ba 'byuṅ ba tsam ni lus kyi rnam par rig byed do / ṅag tsam ni ṅag gi rnam par rig byed do / de bzin du sems mñon par 'du byed pa skyes pa'i sems pa tsam ni yid kyi rnam par rig byed do / de ci'i phyir že na / 'du byed thams cad ni skad cig pa yin pa'i phyir yul nas yul gzan du 'pho bar mi rigs pas (Yogācārabhūmi: zi 31a4-5). 此中唯有身餘處滅於餘處生或即此處唯變異。生名身表業。唯有語音名語表業。唯有發起心造作思名意表業。何以故。由一切行皆剎那故。*

Next, Lamotte identifies and characterizes as Sautrāntika a number of positions asserted by Vasubandhu (*Traité* 177-179), many of which are also found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Below I summarize these positions and provide corresponding passages from the *Yogācārabhūmi*:

1) According to Lamotte, Vasubandhu adopts Sautrāntika positions on major issues regarding *karma*.

a) Positions concerning *vijñapti* and *avijñapti*:

*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* – *Samsthāna* does not exist separately from color. *Yogācārabhūmi* – The same position is found in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*.<sup>127</sup>

*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* – Destruction is spontaneous, without a cause. *Yogācārabhūmi* – The same position is found in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*.<sup>128</sup>

*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* – There is no duration or movement.

*Yogācārabhūmi* – A similar statement is found in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*.<sup>129</sup>

*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* – The essence of body and speech *karma* is volition. *Yogācārabhūmi* – A similar position may be implied by the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi*.<sup>130</sup>

*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* – *Avijñapti* proceeds from volition, not from matter. *Yogācārabhūmi* – The definition of *asaṅvara* in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* implies that *asaṅvara* is based on volition.<sup>131</sup>

b) Positions concerning action and retribution:

從其餘方徙至餘方。不應道理 (T. 1579: 589b18-22).

<sup>130</sup> See note 66, comment on item 12.

<sup>131</sup> See item 15.

<sup>132</sup> See item 18.

<sup>133</sup> See item 14c.

<sup>134</sup> 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa tsaṃ ñe bar 'zi bar zad kyi / kun g'zi rnam par śes pa ñe

*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* – Past actions do not really exist.

*Yogācārabhūmi* – The same position is found in the *Savitarkādhībhūmi* and *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*.<sup>132</sup>

*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* – Action comes to fruition by means of *saṃtati-pariṇāmaviśeṣa*.

*Yogācārabhūmi* – A similar mechanism is described in the *Savitarkādhībhūmi*.<sup>133</sup>

c) Position concerning the perfuming of a retribution consciousness:

*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* – In the context of explaining how *nirodhasamāpatti* is *sacittaka* (accompanied by mind), Vasubandhu agrees with the *Sūtraprāmāṇikas* in believing that a *vipākavijñāna*, perfumed by the *pravṛttivijñānas* (the six ordinary consciousnesses), is not interrupted in the meditations “not accompanied by mind” (*acittaka*).

*Yogācārabhūmi* – A similar position (according to which, however, the term *vipākavijñāna* is replaced by *ālayavijñāna*) is found in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*.<sup>134</sup>

2) According to Lamotte, the *ālayavijñāna* Vasubandhu teaches is “*Sautrāntika*,” differing from that of *Vijñānavāda*.

*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* – There is no two-fold division of consciousness into *nimittabhāga* (image portion) and *darśanabhāga* (vision portion).

*Yogācārabhūmi* – A developed form of idealism characterized by such a division of consciousness is not found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* either.<sup>135</sup>

*bar ṣi ba ni ma yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 39a5-6). 此定唯能滅靜轉識不能滅靜阿賴耶識 (T. 1579: 593a4).

<sup>135</sup> See Schmithausen 32-33.

<sup>136</sup> *ci'i phyir gnas len pa mi ruñ ze na smras pa* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 2b4). 何故若無阿賴耶識依止執受不應道理 (T. 1579: 579a25-26).

<sup>137</sup> See note 112.

<sup>138</sup> *len pa'i rnam par ṣes pa zab ciñ phra / sa bon thams cad chu bo kluñ ltar 'bab / bdag tu rtog par gyur ni ma ruñ zes / byis* [corrected from *phyis* on the basis of the Derge] *pa rnam la ṅas ni de ma bstan* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 2b1). 阿陀那識甚深細 一切種子如瀑流 我於凡愚不開演 恐彼分別執爲我 (T. 1579: 579a15-16).

*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* – The *ālayavijñāna* appropriates a body that consists of *rūpa*, the reality of which is not questioned.

*Yogācārabhūmi* – One of the proofs of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* is that, without an *ālaya*, there could be no appropriation of the body.<sup>136</sup> Furthermore, the *Yogācārabhūmi* generally does not question the reality of *rūpa*.<sup>137</sup>

*Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* – The explanation of why the Buddha did not teach *ālaya* to his disciples is different from Asaṅga’s in the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, which is predicated on the unreality of the external object. In the *Karmasiddhi*, Vasubandhu quotes the *Samdhinirmocana*, saying that ignorant people would mistake the *ālaya* for a soul.

*Yogācārabhūmi* – The *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* quotes the same passage at the beginning of its exposition of *ālayavijñāna* to explain why it has not been taught before.<sup>138</sup>

As we can see, all of these positions supposedly characteristic of Sautrāntika can be traced more or less clearly to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, particularly to the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*. And not one of these positions can be traced to a text earlier than the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* in which it is identified as Sautrāntika. Thus, the Sautrāntika positions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, a text that is considered to be later than the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and more developed, i.e., closer to classical Yogācāra, are comparable if not identical. The only striking difference is that the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* mentions *ālayavijñāna*.<sup>139</sup>

Therefore, Lamotte’s “internal evidence” that the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* is a Hīnayāna Sautrāntika text can equally well be viewed as testimony to Vasubandhu’s reliance on the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, a reliance similar to that which we have seen in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Lamotte calls the positions that he cites “Sautrāntika” because Vasubandhu has identified them as such in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* or because the commentator on the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*

<sup>139</sup> Schmithausen disagrees with Lamotte, who thinks that the *ālayavijñāna* that appears

does so. In either case, the ultimate source of this identification is Vasubandhu himself.

Those, like Lamotte, who argue that Vasubandhu's position in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* is Sautrāntika point to the fact that his theories, while departing from Sarvāstivāda, are not classical Yogācāra, that is to say, they are not *viññaptimātra* (consciousness-only). It is not claimed that Vasubandhu was in the process of working out the system; that role is traditionally attributed to Asaṅga. Rather, Vasubandhu was in the process of his own conversion from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna, from Sarvāstivāda to Yogācāra, and these Sautrāntika positions were a step away from the orthodox Sarvāstivāda that had become unsatisfactory to him. On the other hand, he was not ready to take the final step to Mahāyāna idealism.

Interestingly, a similar progression is described by Schmithausen with respect to the composition of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. He identifies an earlier stratum of the text that is, in his coinage, "pre-ālayaviññānic," a stratum in which the term *ālayaviññāna* is used but the concept is not fully developed, and a later stratum in which the *ālayaviññāna* more closely resembles that of later Yogācāra texts such as the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.<sup>140</sup> According to Schmithausen, the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* as a whole comprises the third stratum, although even there one can find earlier material in which the *ālayaviññāna* is not mentioned or presupposed (14, 271-272 n. 131). It is as if Schmithausen sees the *Yogācārabhūmi* as a fossil record of the evolution of the concept of *ālayaviññāna*, and if the text is a compilation, it makes sense that ideas that are the forerunners of *ālayaviññāna* should be preserved therein.

However, I find it difficult to accept a similar model for the development of Vasubandhu's thought. Although we know the precise dates of none of the texts under discussion, I assume that the *Yogācārabhūmi* was available to Vasubandhu in a form similar to the one we know, i.e., with at least the *Maulībhūmi* and the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* included in one text. If Vasubandhu was not familiar with the *Yogācārabhūmi*, then we would have to assume that he learned his Sautrāntika ideas from the same sources as the authors of the corresponding passages in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. As we

in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* reflects a Sautrāntika theory of *ālayaviññāna*. Rather, Schmithausen thinks that Vasubandhu uses the Yogācāra *ālayaviññāna* as a model (257-258, n. 78).

have seen, written records of these sources, if they ever existed, are no longer extant.

According to the traditional view of his career, Vasubandhu wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* after he had come to accept Sautrāntika ideas. Some time later, having learned the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*, perhaps directly from Asaṅga, perhaps from a text like the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, he converted to Mahāyāna and became a Yogācāra/Vijñānavādin. In this case, it is difficult to explain his mentioning *ālayavijñāna* in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*. According to the traditional explanation, Vasubandhu wrote this text before his conversion. Did he invent a non-Vijñānavādin version of *ālayavijñāna* independently, as a sort of logical development of his Sautrāntika seed theory, in the same process that Schmithausen describes with respect to the *Yogācārabhūmi*? Did he borrow the term from one of the no longer extant Sautrāntika sources that I postulated above? If Schmithausen is correct that the theory of *ālayavijñāna* developed within the *Yogācārabhūmi*, both of these hypotheses seem far-fetched.

It is far more likely that Vasubandhu was, in fact, familiar with the *Yogācārabhūmi*. If so, he would have known the positions that he calls Sautrāntika from that text and perhaps from the lost Sautrāntika sources as well. In either case, according to the traditional explanation, at the time of writing the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu must have adopted these ideas, while not yet accepting the theory of *ālayavijñāna*, which he would have also known from the *Yogācārabhūmi*. By the time he wrote *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, he tentatively believed in a not fully developed, Sautrāntika-like *ālayavijñāna*, which he knew from the *Yogācārabhūmi* and perhaps from a lost Sautrāntika source. Finally, he wrote texts like the *Trimśikā* after his conversion to Mahāyāna. In other words, the development of Vasubandhu's belief in *ālayavijñāna* paralleled the develop-

<sup>140</sup> Schmithausen 34-65. I have undoubtedly grossly oversimplified his complex argument.

<sup>141</sup> Schmithausen 10, 259 n. 92. He identifies the section as *Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 1b2-10b6; T. 1579: 579a7-582a12.

<sup>142</sup> Schmithausen identifies the section as *Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 2b2-4a4; T. 1579: 579a14-c22 (300 n. 226). He also shows that the various proofs are not completely consistent in the ideas of *ālayavijñāna* on which they are based (194-196).

ment of the theory of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Yogācārabhūmi* but some time after the *Yogācārabhūmi* was already completed.

However, it seems strange that Vasubandhu would repeat the entire process of the discovery of *ālayavijñāna*. A fairly complete version of the theory must have been available to him in what Schmithausen calls the “*ālayavijñāna* treatise” at the beginning of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*.<sup>141</sup> It is hard to believe that Vasubandhu would have been satisfied with a theory like mutual seeding once he had been exposed to the eight-fold proof of *ālayavijñāna*, which includes among its arguments a refutation of that very theory.<sup>142</sup> Nevertheless, Vasubandhu does, in fact, present the theory of mutual seeding on at least one occasion, evidently with approval.<sup>143</sup> If Vasubandhu already believed in *ālayavijñāna* when he wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, we must explain why he introduces such positions that are superseded by the more developed theory of *ālayavijñāna*.

### C. An Alternative Explanation: Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika Position in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Reflects his Yogācāra Beliefs

I have previously speculated that Vasubandhu was a Yogācāra when he wrote the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Kritzer “Vasubandhu,” *Rebirth* 199-204), and I have not changed my mind. In this article, I hope to present more persuasive arguments based on further evidence.

In my earlier works, I reasoned primarily on the basis of two arguments in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: Vasubandhu’s “Sautrāntika” definition of *vijñāna* as a member of the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula and his criticism of certain *cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras*. Since then, I have begun a more systematic examination of Vasubandhu’s unorthodox opinions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. In addition to my search for the term Sautrāntika, the results of which I have presented in Section III of this paper, I have also searched for opinions identified by Saṃghabhadra as those of the sūtra-master. Saṃghabhadra uses this appellation with reference not only to most of the positions that Vasubandhu himself labels Sautrāntika,

<sup>143</sup> See section III, item 7.

<sup>144</sup> I have published the results regarding the first three chapters of the *Abhidharma-*



but to many others as well. Many of these passages also correspond more or less clearly to passages in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.<sup>144</sup>

Although some of the correspondences that I have identified are less certain than others, their sheer number strongly suggests that Vasubandhu relies heavily on the *Yogācārabhūmi* for his criticism of Sarvāstivāda. However, the great majority of the correspondences between the Sautrāntika positions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (and the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*) and the *Yogācārabhūmi* involve passages that do not appear to be based on a theory of *ālayavijñāna*.

In trying to account for this, I run the danger of reading too much into Vasubandhu's statements. In essence, I argue that Vasubandhu favors positions in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that do not mention *ālayavijñāna* because he infers a theory of *ālayavijñāna* underlying them. This is clearly a risky proposition, especially since Sautrāntika is traditionally seen as preceding Yogācāra, both historically and in the development of Vasubandhu's thought. With reference to the *Yogācārabhūmi*, Schmithausen warns us not to "lightly interpret our text on the lines of later sources and developments" (205). This very principle is what enables Schmithausen to challenge the traditional view that the *Yogācārabhūmi* is a coherent composition of one man, Asaṅga, and I believe that Schmithausen is correct in his approach.

*kośabhāṣya* (Kritzer *Comparison*).

<sup>145</sup> Kritzer *Rebirth* 200. As far as I know, Aramaki has not published this observation, which he conveyed to me personally. However, in the meantime, he has publicly stated his ordering of the strata of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which differs significantly from Schmithausen's. According to Aramaki, the *Maulībhūmi* (excluding the *Śrāvaka* and *Bodhisattva* *bhūmi*), which contains much of the traditional *abhidharma* material found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, is later than the *Viniścaya* *saṃgrahaṇī*, in which *ālayavijñāna* is taught and the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* is quoted.

<sup>146</sup> *de la kun rdzob kyi tshul rnam par b'zag pas 'jug pas ni 'di lta ste / yid kyi sar śhar bstan pa zin du rig par bya'o / de la don dam pa'i tshul rnam par b'zag pa b'ad par bya ste / don dam pa'i tshul rnam par b'zag pas 'jug pa gañ ze na / mdor bsdu na rnam par śes pa ni rnam pa gñis te / kun g'zi rnam par śes pa dañ / 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 189a8-b2). 云何世俗道理建立。謂依世俗道理建立諸心差別轉義。當知如前意地已說。勝義道理建立差別我今當說。云何名為勝義道理建立差別。謂略有二識。一者阿賴耶識。二者轉識。(T. 1579: 651b11-15; see Schmithausen 689-690).

<sup>147</sup> *sa bon rnam par b'zag pa'i tshul 'di ni kun g'zi rnam par śes pa rnam par ma g'zag pa la rig par bya'o / rnam par b'zag pa la ni mdor bsdu na de la chos thams cad kyi sa bon yod par rig bar bya ste / sa bon de dag ni ma spañs pa dañ spañ bar bya ba ma yin*

Nevertheless, there are two major differences between the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* that I feel justify some departure from Schmithausen's principle. First, several of the most important sources for Yogācāra doctrine, including the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, the completed *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, and the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* are generally considered to predate Vasubandhu's work. In other words, Vasubandhu must have known the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*, whether he agreed with it or not. Second, to the best of my knowledge, no one, not even Schmithausen, has suggested that the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is not a coherent composition of one man, Vasubandhu.

I have proposed that Vasubandhu's reason for not mentioning *ālayavijñāna* in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* has to do with the nature of the text, which is an exposition and criticism of traditional *abhidharma*, not a presentation of Yogācāra ideas (Kritzer *Rebirth* 203-204). I referred to Aramaki Noritoshi's idea that portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* present the Yogācāra exposition of ultimate truth, that is, the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*, while other portions, which do not mention *ālayavijñāna*, represent provisional truth.<sup>145</sup> My conclusion was that the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, like the *abhidharma* portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, is an exposition of provisional truth. Since the Yogācāras seem to have arisen from a Sarvāstivādin milieu (Yamabe "An Shigao"), it is not surprising that much Yogācāra

*pa'i chos de dag dan ci rigs su ldan par rig par bya'o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 17b6-7). 復次此所建立種子道理。當知且依未建立阿賴耶識聖教而說。當知且依未建立阿賴耶識聖教而說。若已建立阿賴耶識當知略說諸法種子。一切皆依阿賴耶識 (T. 1579: 584a27-b1; see Schmithausen 271 n. 131).

<sup>148</sup> *de la 'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa gañ ée na / ci yañ med pa'i skye mched kyi 'dod chags dan bral goñ ma'i 'dod chags dan ma bral yañ ruñ / 'dod chags dan bral yañ ruñ ba'i gnas pa'i 'du śes sñon du btañ ba'i yid la byed pas sems dan sems las byuñ ba'i chos rnam 'gog pa tsam dan / ñe bar źi źiñ mi 'byuñ ba tsam ni 'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa źes bya ste / 'jug pa'i rnam par śes pa tsam ñe bar źi bar zad kyi / kun gźi rnam par śes pa ñe bar źi ba ni ma yin no* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 39a3-6). 復次云何滅盡定。謂已離無所有處貪未離上貪。或復已離由止息想作意爲先故。諸心心所唯滅靜唯不轉。是名滅盡定。此定唯能滅靜轉識。不能滅靜阿賴耶識 (T. 1579: 593a1-4; see Schmithausen 272 n. 131).

<sup>149</sup> *'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa ni ci yañ med pa'i skye mched kyi 'dod chags dan bral ba'i gnas pa'i 'du śes sñon* [corrected from *mñon* on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese] *du btañ ba'i yid la byed pas miñ 'gog pa'i gnas skabs la'o / de yañ rnam pa gsum ste / ño bo ñid las ni dge ba ñid yin no / gañ zag las ni 'phags pa'i rgyud du gtogs te / slob pa'i rgyud dam mi slob pa'i rgyud du gtogs pa yin no / skye ba las ni kun gźi rnam par śes pa rnam par ma gźag ni dan por 'dir skyes ciñ / de'i og tu gzugs kyi khams su mñon du byed do / mñon du byed pa ni gzugs kyi lus la rag las pa yin pa'i phyir ro / kun*

and Sarvāstivādin teachings on this level essentially agree. Thus, Vasubandhu is able to use the general framework of the Sarvāstivāda *abhidharma*, while he “corrects” those details that seriously conflict with the Yogācāra *abhidharma*.

I have noticed that Schmithausen refers to a passage in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that supports Aramaki’s idea. In the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Sacittakabhūmi*, it is said that the traditional way of establishing consciousness is taught in the *Manobhūmi* (of the *Maulībhūmi*), while the ultimate teaching is that there are two types of consciousness, the *ālayavijñāna* and the *pravṛttivijñānas*.<sup>146</sup> Although Schmithausen mentions this only to prove that the mention of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Manobhūmi* is a later addition to the text, the passage shows that the author(s)/compiler indeed distinguishes between levels of teaching within the text.

Three passages in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi*, identified by Schmithausen, may also be relevant. The first comes at the end of a long explanation of mutual seeding (see section III, item 7), in which mutual seeding is said to be taught only when *ālayavijñāna* is not yet established.<sup>147</sup> The next states that the definition of *nirodhasamāpatti* as a state in which all *citta* and *caitasikas* (mental *dharma*s) are suppressed refers only to the *pravṛttivijñānas*, not to *ālayavijñāna*.<sup>148</sup> In the third passage, *nirodhasamāpatti* is said to be obtainable in *rūpadhātu* after it has been obtained in *kāmadhātu* (the realm of desire).

*gzi nram par ses pa rnam par gzag na ni mñon du byed pa thams cad du 'gro ba yin par blta bar bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 76b2-5). 依已離無所有處貪止息想作意爲先。名滅分位。建立滅盡定。此復三種。自性者唯是善。補特伽羅者在聖相續。通學無學。起者先於此起。後於色界重現在前。¶ (T. 1579: 607b4-10; see Schmithausen 271 n. 131).*

<sup>146</sup> The text actually uses the near-synonym, *ādānavijñāna*.

<sup>147</sup> *len pa'i nram par ses pa zab ciñ phra / sa bon thams cad chu bo'i kluñ ltar 'bab / bdag tu rtog par gyur na mi ruñ zes / byis pa rnam la ias ni de ma bstan (Lamotte Saṃdhanirmocana 58 [5.7]; Lamotte supplies the Sanskrit, presumably from the *Triṃśikābhāṣya*: *ādānavijñāna gabhīrasūkṣmo / ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo / bālāna eṣo mayi na prakāśi / mā haiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ*). See also the version of the *sūtra* contained in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi (Yogācārabhūmi; 'i 60a1; T. 1579: 718c2-3)*. See note 138.*

<sup>148</sup> *prajñā 'malā sānucarā 'bhīdharmah tatra prajñā dharmapracayaḥ / amaleti anāsravā / sānucareti saparivārā / evam anāsravaḥ pañcaskandhako 'bhīdharmā ity uktam*

However, according to the text, when *ālayavijñāna* has been established, *nirodhasamāpatti* must be obtainable in *ārūpyadhātu* as well.<sup>149</sup>

Schmithausen mentions all of these references to *ālayavijñāna* as examples of later additions made by the compiler (271-272 n. 131). In the case of the first passage, at least, he also states that he does “not hesitate to take this systematical statement of the compiler historically, viz. in the sense that this *bīja* theory was devised when *ālayavijñāna* had not yet been introduced” (288 n. 173). Schmithausen thus does not connect these statements with that of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Sacittakabhūmi* concerning two levels of teaching. Given his confidence that the *Yogācārabhūmi* is not the work of a single author, this is understandable. However, Schmithausen does assume that there was a compiler who put together the various strata into the text we now have, and he allows for the possibility of the compiler’s having inserted his own comments into the text.

Therefore, in light of the fact that either the author of the *Viniścaya-samgrahaṇī* on the *Sacittakabhūmi* or the compiler explicitly refers to *ālayavijñāna* as an ultimate teaching, it does not seem unreasonable that the author/compiler’s comments on the three passages in the *Viniścaya-samgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* reflect his judgement regarding the level at which their statements apply rather than, or as well as, his understanding of the historical development of the relevant doctrines. Furthermore, the *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra* contains the famous statement that the Buddha did not teach *ālayavijñāna*<sup>150</sup> to fools who might mistake it for a soul (*ātman*).<sup>151</sup> The *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra*, which Lopez (6) describes as providing for Yogācāra the criteria for determining “what

*bhavati / eṣa tāvat pāramārthiko 'bhidharmaḥ / sāmketikas tu tatprāptaye yāpi ca yac ca śāstram (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 2.3-6; La Vallée Poussin 1: 3-4).*

<sup>153</sup> *atas tadhetos tasya dharmapracicayasyārthe śāstrā kila buddheṇābhidharma uktaḥ (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 3.1; La Vallée Poussin 1: 5-6).*

<sup>154</sup> *prāyeṇa hi kāśmīravaiḥbhāṣikāṇāṃ nītyādisiddha eṣo 'smābhir abhidharma ākhy-ātaḥ (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 450.1-2; La Vallée Poussin 5: 223).*

<sup>155</sup> :經主此中述己本意。言依此國諸善逝子。議對法理大毘婆沙。發起正勤如理觀察。爲令正法久住世間。饒益有情故造斯論。多言顯示少有異途。謂形像色去來世等 (T. 1562: 775b20-23; La Vallée Poussin 5: 223 n. 1b).

<sup>156</sup> See Jaini’s introduction to the *Abhidharmadīpa* (second ed. 111); Rhys Davids and Stede (488).

<sup>157</sup> See, for example, Vasubandhu’s definition of *bīja* in the context of his denial of the

constitutes the definitive (*nītārtha*) and the interpretable (*neyārtha*),” implies that the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*, besides being dangerously difficult to understand, is a more definitive teaching than that of the traditional six ordinary types of consciousness. Although the main force of the statement in the *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra* is to explain why the crucial term *ālayavijñāna* cannot be found in the *āgamas* (scriptures), it also suggests a reason for the limited use of the term in Yogācāra *abhidharma*.

It is true that, in the context of Sarvāstivāda, *abhidharma* is the definitive teaching. But early in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu distinguishes between *abhidharma* in its ultimate meaning, i.e., pure wisdom, and *abhidharma* in a conventional sense, namely impure wisdom as well as the *śāstras* (doctrinal treatises) that result in the attainment of pure wisdom.<sup>152</sup> Furthermore, as is well known, Vasubandhu denies that the *abhidharma śāstras* are the words of the Buddha.<sup>153</sup> Therefore, from Vasubandhu’s point of view, although most of the Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* that he describes without criticism in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is conducive to pure wisdom, it is not necessarily a statement of all that is known by pure wisdom.

In other words, the purview of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* does not include Mahāyāna teachings such as *ālayavijñāna*. Vasubandhu accurately describes his own work as *abhidharma* based in general on the teaching of the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas.<sup>154</sup> Saṃghabhadra elaborates on this, quoting Vasubandhu as saying that, in addition to Vaibhāṣika teachings, he has also taught a bit of another path.<sup>155</sup> Saṃghabhadra gives as examples Vasubandhu’s statements about *saṃsthānarūpa* and the past and

reality of *prāpti*: *kiṃ punar idaṃ bījaṃ nāma / yan nāmarūpaṃ phalotpattau samarthaṃ sākṣāt pāraṇparyeṇa vā / santatipariṇāmaviśeṣāt* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 64.4-5).  
<sup>158</sup> *kaḥ Sautrāntikārthaḥ. ye sūtra-prāmāṇikāḥ na sāstra-prāmāṇikāḥ. te Sautrāntikāḥ* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 11.29-30).

future. We can speculate that Vasubandhu feels it necessary to correct the Vaibhāṣika positions on these and other issues because they are irretrievably in conflict with his true beliefs. But rather than introducing terms like *ālayavijñāna*, totally alien to the *abhidharma* literature on which he claims to rely, he appeals to concepts like *bīja*, which, on the one hand, is not completely unknown in the traditional *āgama*, where metaphors concerning seeds can be found,<sup>156</sup> and, on the other hand, can be explained technically in terms familiar in an *abhidharma* context.<sup>157</sup>

Finally, I must return to the term “Sautrāntika,” the significance of which remains unclear. It would be nice to imagine that the *sūtras* in question are Mahāyāna *sūtras*, particularly the *Samādhinirmocanasūtra*, and that Vasubandhu uses the term to signal a reliance on such works. However, I have found no evidence to support such a fanciful theory. For now, I must follow Yaśomitra’s explanation: “What is the meaning of *sautrāntika*? Those who take *sūtra* as their authority, not *śāstra*, are Sautrāntikas.”<sup>158</sup> At least some of Vasubandhu’s opinions in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*,

whether or not they can be characterized as Yogācāra, contradict orthodox Vaibhāṣika, for which the texts of the Sarvāstivādin *abhidharma* are authoritative. If Vasubandhu admitted that they are indeed authoritative, he would not be able to criticize them as fundamentally as he does. By siding with “those who take *sūtra* as authority,” he is free to reject that with which he disagrees, implying that it has not been taught in the *sūtras*. On the other hand, he is still free to accept those Sarvāstivādin opinions with which he agrees. As Yaśomitra makes clear, much of *abhidharma* can be found in the *sūtras*, particularly ones like the *Arthaviniścayasūtra* that illuminate the characteristics of *dharmas*.<sup>159</sup> Furthermore, the *sūtras* can often be interpreted in more than one way. For example, the words *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* are mentioned together in the *Dīghanikāya*,<sup>160</sup> apparently as synonyms, which is in fact the way that they are understood by the Vaibhāṣikas.<sup>161</sup> But the *Yogācārabhūmi* famously differentiates them: *vijñāna* refers to the six traditional forms of consciousness, *manas* is *kliṣṭamanas*, and *citta* is *ālayavijñāna*. If Vasubandhu’s intention in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* is secretly to reinterpret *abhidharma*, it is perhaps no wonder that he refers to his opinions as “Sautrāntika.”<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> *sūtre ’pi hy abhidharma-piṭakaḥ paṭhyate. traipiṭako bhikṣur iti naiṣa doṣaḥ. sūtra-viśeṣa eva hy Arthaviniścayādayo ’bhidharma-saṃjñāḥ yeṣu dharmā-lakṣaṇaṃ varṇyate* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 11.32-12.1).

<sup>160</sup> *Yañ ca kho idaṃ vuccati cittaṃ ti vā mano ti vā viññānaṃ ti vā ayaṃ attā nicco dhuva sassato avipariṇāma-dhammo sassati-samaṃ tath’ eva ṭhassaṭṭi* (*Dīghanikāya*: 21.20-23).

<sup>161</sup> *cittaṃ mano ’tha vijñānaṃ ekārthaṃ* (*Abhidharmakośa* II 34ab [*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 61.20]).

<sup>162</sup> See *Yogācārabhūmi*: 11.3-8 (*Yogācārabhūmi*; dzi 6a8-b3; T. 1579: 280b5-8; Schmitthausen 117).



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