



B. Tschumi, *La Case Vide: La Villette 1985, London 1986, Fig. 3*

Quart 2019, 2
PL ISSN 1896-4133
[s. 89-119]

The Shadow of God in the Garden of the Philosopher

The Parc de La Villette in Paris in the context of philosophy of *chôra*

Part III

Cezary Wąs

University of Wrocław



¹ See E. J. Khamara, *Leibniz' Theory of Space: A Reconstruction*, "The Philosophical Quarterly" 1993, no. 173; R. Arthur, *Space and Relativity in Newton and Leibniz*, "British Journal for the Philosophy of Science" 1994, no. 45. The difference between the two authors is not obvious, despite appearances. Khamara undertakes to defend Leibniz's position and ultimately only states: "I believe I have shown that Leibniz' relative theory of space, as reconstrued, is subtler and more resting that it is commonly taken to be: it is not open to some of allegedly serious objection that are currently held against it" (E. J. Khamara, *op. cit.*, p. 488). R. Arthur's (*op. cit.*, p. 239) conclusions on the superiority of Leibniz's views are similarly cautious: "[M]y final conclusion is that Leibniz's approach to space is to be preferred just because it does not hypostatize the mathematical".

² I. Newton, *Opticks: Or A Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflexions and Colours of Light. The Second Edition, with Additions*, London 1718, t. 3, pp. 344-345.

³ I. Newton, *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and His System of The World*, transl. A. Motte [1729], revised F. Cajori, Cambridge 1934, p. 6.

⁴ Mr. Leibniz's Fourth Paper [2 June 1716]; *Being an Answer to dr. Clarke's Third Reply, Fife Letters to Samuel Clarke*, [in:] *The Philosophical Works of Leibniz*, transl. G. M. Duncan, New Haven 1890, p. 253; see also G. W. Leibniz, *Letters to Clarke, Fourth Letter*, [in:] *Readings in Modern Philosophy*, vol. 1: *Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Associated Text*, ed. R. Ariew, E. Watkins, Indianapolis 2000, p. 312: "space is only an order of things, as time also is, and not at all an absolute being".

⁵ *Leibniz's fifth paper* [18 August 1716], *Fife Letters to Samuel Clarke*, [in:] *The Philosophical Works of Leibniz...*, p. 272; see also E. Vailati, *Leibniz and Clarke: A Study of Their Correspondence*, New York 1997, p. 117.

⁶ B. Tschumi, *Questions of Space: The Pyramid and the Labyrinth (or Architectural Paradox)*, "Studio International" 1975, nr 190. I use the version included in the anthology of texts by that author - *Architecture and Disjunction*, Cambridge [Massachusetts] - London 1996.

Between space and its origins

The space that was created in the Parc de La Villette is impossible to define, because none of the fields of knowledge has a commonly accepted definition of space. Discussions on this subject indicate that at present it is possible rather merely to comment on positions on the question of space than to move closer to a definition without contradiction. The fields of mathematics, physics and the humanities use concepts of space that cannot be agreed on a single basis. It should also be noted that none of the major disputes in this matter has been resolved, such as the conflict between the relational position of Gottfried Leibniz and Isaac Newton's substantive approach (represented in this discussion by Samuel Clarke)¹. Undoubtedly Newton's views contained in *Scholium* (2) to Definition VIII, and in *Opticks* (Query XXVIII²), in particular the sentence that "absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immovable"³ seem to be obsolete, but we should remember that the English author treated his concept as abstraction and in the same fragment also wrote about the existence of relative space that was a measure of divine space or purely mathematical one. Therefore, it cannot be denied that also in Newton there are references to subjective space. Leibniz's opinions, on the other hand, completely ignore absolute reality, which is reflected in fragments of his fourth and fifth letters to Clarke stating that "space is only an order of things, as time also is, and not at all an absolute being"⁴, space itself is not an absolute reality"⁵.

Tschumi was well aware of the fact that each of the basic suggestions about space prompts the architect to act in a slightly different way. The complexity, multiplicity and problematic nature of the approaches to space was demonstrated by his extensive set of questions included in his essay *Questions of Space*⁶. It contains 65 questions, each of which six remain unanswered:

1.0. Is space a material thing in which all material are to be located? 1.1. If space is a material thing, does it have boundaries? 1.11. If space has boundaries, is there another space outside those boundaries? 1.12. If space does not have boundaries, do things then extend infinitely? 1.21. As every finite extend of space is infinitely divisible (since every space can contain smaller spaces), can an infinite collection of spaces then form a finite space ? 1.13. In any case, if space is an extension of matter, can one part of space be distinguished from another?

To this point of his questionnaire the author seems to ask questions in the substance paradigm characteristic of Newton, and whose elements are inherited by a small part of modern physics, including Albert Einstein's "special theory of relativity" (STR). However, the "general theory of relativity" (GTR) approximates relational positions and occupies an intermediate position between this view and

the substantial position. Tschumi's next questions enter logically into the world of relational approaches, which were advocated by Leibniz and now also by a decisive part of the participants of the dispute among physicists.

1.2. If space is not matter, is it merely the sum of all spatial relations between material things?

The relational approach opens the way for asking questions of a different kind, similar to Kant's views:

1.3. If space is neither matter nor a set of objective relations between things, is it something subjective with which the mind categorizes things? 1.31. If the structure of the mind imposes an *a priori* form (that precedes all experience) to the perception of the external world, is space such a form? 1.32. If space is such a form, does it have precedence over all other perceptions?

The last question should be supplemented by a direct question: does the perception of space precede the perception of time, is it the other way round, or are they parallel to each other?

The next issue relates to the active or passive character of the space and can be included in the following question:

1.4. If, "etymologically" space is both making space distinct and stating the precise nature of space, is this an essential paradox of space?

So whether defining is an act of marking the end of a certain space and separating it from some more ordinary form of space, or rather, does it mean recording space in its consciousness reflections, i.e. in words and concepts?

The above problem found its consequences in question 1.5. considering the nature of the conduct of the architect, who may think that they have defined the space by giving it distinctive values, but cannot escape from seeing and naming what they have done. With the same thought, Tschumi linked the doubt as to whether the architect's ability to give artistic qualities to space resonates with our ability to clarify the nature of space. On the one hand, therefore, we are dealing with developing space, expanding it with new properties, and on the other hand, we are affected by the tendency to link space with the awareness of its borders, with its intellectual closure. This leads to the question

1.6. Is architecture the concept of space, the space, and the definition of space?

The next question repeats the anguish of philosophers since Plato's time concerning the way of transition from idea to reality:

1.61. If the concept of space is not a space, is the materialization of the concept of space a space?

But can we be sure that the concept of space is not a space? For can we perceive space without concept? Does the concept not have spatial properties? If it has such properties, what creates these properties? Are they non-material? These reservations are summarised in a question:

1.611. Is conceptual space then the space of which material is the concept?

Even if we decide that a concept is only an imagination or an idea, it is however impossible to escape the impression that these unrealities are part of the constitution of reality. Thus, the concept Tschumi wrote about has also features of materiality, and these features can be components of space both when we acknowledge its materiality and when we accept its conceptuality. What is a feature of something cannot be separated from this something by the barrier of unreality. However, if we insist on the separation of conceptual space from natural space (if such a space exists), the question remains open: what is its component? What makes up a thought? Is the thought multi-component or one-component? Ultimately, what is the material of the concept (thought)? What is the range of reality (materiality) of the thoughts? A further doubt was formulated by the author as follows:

1.612. Incidentally, is the experience of the materialization of the concept of space the experience of space?

In the above issue it is necessary to ignore Kant's solution that space is a "pure" intuition preceding an "empirical" one, because here is considered a case when a theoretician and practitioner of architecture (so Tschumi himself) comes up with a concept of space that he needs in a specific case, then produces it and asks himself: what in this situation the viewer (including himself) experiences. Does one experience real space (after all, it was created), or does one experience a materialisation of an individualised concept of space, or maybe one experiences a certain unreal space, so still conceptual space (regardless of the fact that it has been made visible)? If one assumes that "conceptual space" is only a metaphorical notion from the area of art or humanities, it leads to the question: are there no connections of such space with real space, and is there any real space independent of the concept of real space? Which concept of real space is most reasonable?

Question 1.6.3 takes us to the level of an important component of modernist architecture ideology, which was contained in Sigfried

Giedion's work *Space, Time and Architecture* (1941)⁷. The Swiss researcher on architecture formulated an influential thesis assuming the development of architecture from shaping it as closed solids (cutting off from external spaces), through forms of hollow solids (in which internal space has already played a more serious role), to contemporary buildings, in which internal space freely connects with external space. Giedion's suggestive theory ignores the following problem: what is actually the material modelled by the architect? So: are the space of a closed solid and the empty space on its external side parts of the same, uniform space? However, the space understood in such a way would be far from approaches inspired by contemporary physics, and after all, Giedion inclined towards them. To understand space as an empty, neutral container seems to be outdated in this situation and led to the question:

1.7. If Euclidean space is restricted to a three-dimensional lump of matter, is non-Euclidean space to be restricted to a series of events in four-dimensional space-time?

The problem of the above question is related to the combining of discoveries in mathematics and geometry with the problems of physics and astronomy. As a consequence of the development of new approaches to geometry (made, among others, by Nikolai Lobachevsky, János Bolyai, Georg Riemann or David Hilbert), new images of space (including topological or affine space) were defined, which found their reference in mechanics and cosmology. At the beginning of the 20th century, Hermann Minkowski and his followers used the notion of space-time and, more specifically, pseudo-Euclidean space-time in reference to GTR and pseudo-Riemannian spacetime to STR to describe the results of the general and specific theory of relativity. In a certain generalization it can be assumed that in modern physics space-time is a collection of events. However, the event, also colloquially understood, is defined simultaneously in its spatial and temporal dimensions.

Already at the beginning of the twentieth century, when physicists and mathematicians discussed intensively the concepts of space, the artists made attempts to adapt them to new artistic ideas. Tschumi's architecture, consistently described by him as "events", combines many contemporary philosophies of event⁸ with theories of space, leading in consequence to a situation in which each of his works must be interpreted as inseparably spatial, temporal and material, simultaneously produced and perceived. It can be described as a kind of oscillatory movement between properties that are usually perceived separately, so between the purely sensual visibility of architecture and its presentation as an object or understanding as a spatial and time phenomenon. The features of reality, when separated in discourses, cease to enter into conflict with each other in inner



⁷ S. Giedion, *Space, Time and Architecture. The Growth of a New Tradition*, Cambridge 1941.

⁸ M. Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* [1936–1938], [in:] *idem*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 65, Frankfurt am Main 1994; *idem*, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, transl. P. Emad, K. Maly, Bloomington 1999; re-translated as *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, transl. R. Rojcewicz, D. Vallega-Neu, Bloomington 2012.



⁹ D. Hollier, *La Prise de la Concorde: Essais sur Georges Bataille*, Paris 1974.

experience and after turning to their material sources. The combination of space with something other than the creations of the intellect leads to yet other problems. The second group of questions contained in the *Questions of Space* concerns the relationship between space and experience. It seems reasonable that an architect investigates relationships of this kind in a situation where architecture is defined as the art of shaping space and at the same time influencing the sensations of the recipients. The reception of architecture, including the types of sensations that it can provide, has rarely been the subject of consistent reflection in architectural research. It can be concluded that Tschumi's questions go beyond the repertoire of problems most often related to the tasks assigned to works in this field. When the subject of reflection becomes a work as exceptional as the Parc de La Villette, which was deliberately assigned the mission of transforming its users, the problems of experiencing architecture must be developed more deep than has been the case so far.

The questions of experience raised by Tschumi are linked to the troublesome legacy that Georges Bataille's concepts have left to French post-constructuralist thinkers. Disturbing observations of that thinker living on the sidelines drew readers' attention, first of all, by transgressing some well-established beliefs in philosophy. During Tschumi's intellectual adolescence, the views of this little-known worker of libraries in Paris, Carpentras and Orleans began to be discussed by Philippe Sollers, Julia Kristeva, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, among others. Many of Tschumi's essays also refer to Bataille's inquiries, either directly or through Denis Hollier's book⁹.

In the colloquial view experience was understood as a set of data collected by an individual and having features of directness and authenticity. The more philosophically treated experience, however, was similar to phenomenological proceedings and was a kind of thought attempt, in which the subject directed themselves to a specific set of collected information that could strengthen their identity. Directed reflection, as if the intentional focus of attention on experiences, after subtracting non-personal values from them, was selected as a component of the sense of one's own life and configured with other experiences into a story about one's own consciousness. Such an understanding of experience has been questioned in the milieu of French thinkers most often referred to as post-structuralists.

Barthes, Foucault, Kristeva, or Sollers, and initially also Derrida, despite their fascination with Bataille's writing, doubted whether the individual could have and collect direct experiences, independent of specific cultural or linguistic models. In their opinion, even a carefully profiled individuality by an individual had to be shaped by the intellectual patterns that preceded it. The adopted position contradicted the earlier concept emphasizing the sovereignty of the subject. In European culture, a model of an individual who needed independence

from the community for their constitution has been developed since modernity. Individuality required a strong self capable of controlling the accumulated experiences and separating them from the experiences of other people. The activity of a strong subject referred to the outside world, which was understood as a set of objects. The objects of thoughts were treated by the subject with the same determination. Such an ideal of functioning of an individual person was the effect of such a long-term development that it presented itself as obvious and natural. The opposition to the indisputability of such a standard was most strongly expressed in Derrida's opinion indicating that it was determined by the metaphysics of presence¹⁰. In his criticism, experience could neither refer to something as artificially constructed as being, the world, life or other people, nor be supported by something as unstable and diverse as one's own consciousness. Derrida, like the post-structuralist milieu, doubted an internally undifferentiated subject capable of penetrating the essence of things, controlling them and, at the same time, fully identifying with oneself. In return, he proposed to consider the self as much less self-confident, albeit striving for an unattainable internal cohesion. In this position, however, some cracks began to appear, which again drew attention to Bataille's concept of "inner experience" (*l'expérience intérieure*). The importance of experience was renewed in a situation where it focused on itself, but separately the need for better knowledge about its complex shape and functioning increased.

In a modified sense, the consciousness of the subject, of which experience is a part, can be understood as a kind of membrane between its activity directed outside (towards the world) and inside itself. Directing itself to the outside, the experience can be active and passive, penetrates the world, but it is also influenced by it. Part of the cognitive movement can be directed towards transcendence or metaphysics and discover the richness of impossibility, errors in fundamental assumptions or the radical uncertainty of the communication sphere. It was the path of poststructuralist thinkers and Derrida. Bataille, on the other hand, turned to the study of consciousness inside himself, but achieved different goals than the Christian mystics. While they were discovering within themselves a God, he found there only a bottomless, though active, abyss. By deepening into the inner experience, he reached for forbidden zones of immanence, elements of impure transcendence in psyche, as if belonging to the world of underground gods. The discoveries of the integrity and sovereignty of the externalized and recordable self, made by his French successors, turned out to largely ignore his revelations concerning the fouled world of the inner self. By not so much cleansing the body and thoughts, but rather overusing them both, he discovered the uncanny, strangeness and monstrosity inherent in the depths of the psyche. This other Otherness, however dangerous and destructive, is also life-giving and can be treated as an unexploited multiple-



¹⁰ J. Derrida, *Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas*, [in:] *idem, Writing and Difference*, transl., introd., additional notes A. Bass, Chicago 1978, p. 152: "Has not the concept of experience always been determined by the metaphysics of presence?"; as cit. in: M. Jay, *Songs of Experience: Modern American and European Variations on a Universal Theme*, Berkeley 2005, p. 364. Jay then (*ibidem*, pp. 365–366) quotes R. Terada's opinions that describe Derrida's sceptical stance towards "centered subject". He also recalls Derrida's view from his essay on Bataille: "That which **indicates itself** as interior experience is not an experience, because it is related to no presence, to no plenitude, but only on the 'impossible' it 'undergoes' in torture" (J. Derrida, *From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve*, [in:] *idem, Writing and Difference...*; as cit. in: M. Jay, *op. cit.*, p. 367).

ity, a radically multiplying madness necessary for the development of an individual or society. When transferring Bataille's observations to the philosophy of science in terms of Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, one can recall their positive assessment of the proliferation of errors for progress in science. It seems that Bataille proclaimed a similar truth about the beneficial sides of the multiplication of possibilities beyond any measure. At the same time, his emphasis on the corporeality of the spiritual abyss deprived it of its entanglement in dialectics and resisted attempts at an organized and rational explanation. It opened up possibilities of functioning beyond metaphysics and beyond discourse.

Bataille's doctrine also had an ethical and political dimension, persuading to abandon the cult of unity and to move towards a community of increased sovereignty of unstable individuals. It is at this stage of interpreting experience that Tschumi and his variations of the Parc de La Villette pavilions are located. Their multiplication, senselessness and defectiveness are a visualization and realization of the desire for otherness. They are not so much a representation of a certain theory, but rather an exposition of pure inner consciousness, a manifestation of a certain er(r)oticism and disturbances of space. However, this is only a starting point for questions posed by Tschumi to the relationships between space and experience.

The architect's initial question concerned the perception (and therefore also experience) of space and the consideration of possible differences between individual perceptions of space:

2.0. Is the perception of space common to everyone?

It can be assumed that this question has been put in a situation of doubt about the full belonging of individual perception to the universal, transcendental self. However, if one assumes that it is possible to have an individual concept of space, then such a situation generates a question: is there, behind a separate vision of space, a whole world dependent on it and to what extent do individual experiences constitute such a private cosmos?

Experience is a component of the understanding of space, but it is also a process, so it is variable. The consequences are suggested by the question:

2.2. If space consciousness is based on one's respective experience, then does the perception of space involve a gradual construction rather than a ready-made schema?

A community of experience cannot be ruled out, as well as the archaic models it contains; then

2.21. Does this gradual construction contain elements that have a degree of invariance, such as archetypes?

Also in the understanding of the park there are references to the mythical past. Is it possible for an individual to remove them from his or her association pool?

Acceptance of Kant's understanding of space makes it universal, but can't the common value be manipulated and directed towards the socially desired goals of today? Such a problem prompted Tschumi to ask a question:

2.4. If space is a basic a priori category of consciousness, independent of matter, is it an instrument of knowledge?

If we acquire knowledge through an a priori category, does it affect our sensual, emotional, and mental experiences? The next question was heading in a similar direction:

2.5. Is an instrument of knowledge the medium of experience?

Experience is treated as a more practical than theoretical matter, therefore:

2.51. Since it can be said that experience is contained within the nature of practice, is space inextricably bound up with practice?

The practice of space is saturated with variability, so space must change with each work. This would give the architect certain possibilities to influence the audience. One should ask: does such a case take place in the Parc de La Villette?

The question also returns: to what extent can theory and practice be separated? Shouldn't a finished object be situated between theory and practice? It is also a question about the ontological status of the Parc de La Villette, whose practical powers are derived from the theoretical potential.

2.52. Architecturally, if space is the medium for the materialization of theory, is a space the materialization of the architectural concept?

2.7. Is the experience of space the experience of the materialization of the concept of space? Or of any concept?

Question 2.7 applies specifically to the work in question because it is not so much a spatial development of the concept of space as a spatial development of other concepts. But aren't concepts also endowed with a certain spatiality? For such a thesis should be approached slowly.

Usually the concepts of space are linked with geometrical concepts, but this cannot be proven to be necessary. The concepts of

space can also be based on sensing or experiencing non-geometric space. Tschumi expressed this in another question:

2.71. Can a geometrical spatial concept be replaced by a concept based on one's experience of space?

This stage of investigating problems brings to mind the question: what else apart from space has spatial features? Let's assume that experience can also have spatial properties. Therefore, one should ask:

2.72. Does the experience of space determine the space of experience?

The experience, as Bataille emphasized, has bodily properties and even mystics, when they proclaimed the appearance of God in the soul, they expressed it as a touch. So in question 2.73. the problem is: "does (architectural) space exist independently of the experiencing body?". And developing this question: does the world exist without bodies experiencing it? What exists when there are no bodies to experience? Completely rejecting an independent space is quite difficult to imagine, but it would also be problematic to treat it too strongly as subordinate to the body.

The inseparability of space and bodies and the impossibility of negating their separate existence become apparent. Thus:

2.8. If space is neither an external object nor an internal experience (made of impressions, sensations and feelings), are space and ourselves inseparable?

This question prompts us to look for a solution in spatial concepts other than the previous ones, as the older ones only lead to insoluble complexities. However, it should be remembered that space is a concept common to many fields of knowledge, which, nonetheless, raises the question:

2.81. Are objective social space and subjective inner space then inextricably bound together?

But if space is an existential concept, can it not be assumed that more precise definitions than those made on the basis of the natural sciences can be derived from the humanities or social sciences? Tschumi poses a question that as if goes back Heidegger:

2.9. Is space thus one of the structures that expresses our "being" in the world?

Spacing as analogon of the *chôra*

As Louise Burchill noticed, the term spacing (*espacement*) is key in Derrida's philosophy and is combined with other philosophical terms characteristic of this philosopher, such as *différance*, *écriture* or *deconstruction*¹¹. Developing her thesis, Burchill stated that *différance* was combined by Derrida with the simultaneous introduction of time and space, which made *différance* "the becoming-time of space and becoming-space of time"¹². About writing (*écriture*), in turn, Derrida wrote that spacing is its "fundamental property"¹³. This term returned once again in the definition of deconstruction when it was considered to be its most basic term¹⁴.

Tracing Burchill's analyses allows us to see the entanglement of the issue of spatiality in important philosophical problems from Democritus to Heidegger, but above all it gives rise to further discoveries relating to the ways in which the Parc de La Villette affects users and its role as a political factor. When following Burchill's studies, it should be remembered that for Derrida *espacement* means, first of all, an interval or "in-between", which should be treated as an indication of the so-called irreducible externality. In his various texts, Derrida demonstrated how impossible it is to constitute any identity as something closed only in interiority and separated from the aggressive influences of exteriority. Thus, every territory, of a soul or a park, can be tracked as an area of recording transient imprints of exteriority and thus as a modification of exteriority. The interior would be just a form of the exterior. An isolated area is primarily a place where attacks of what comes from the outside take place, and leaves inside only traces that are not configurable in any permanent order. The park, when looking at its initial shape, devoid of arrangements, gave a field for recording transient inscriptions, but also evoked a tendency to write them. Such a situation reminds us that spatialization is actually a productive movement bringing to existence the impossible and indicating the fundamental changeability encoded in what seeks to be established. Through a number of intermediate elements, the idea of *espacement* returns to Democritus and his understanding of *rhythmos*, the word which is different from the concept of rhythm, but closer to the movement of the wave on the edge between the sea and the beach. Tourists or multi-ethnic locals who flow into the park, along with brutally understood politics, note the park every day, recording its "soul" not so much permanently, but rather preserving its very mobility – a force that also requires resistance.

When material Beings are denied the status of things functioning beyond the interaction with human cognitive capabilities, while ideas even by prominent contemporary mathematicians are granted the status of Beings, the role of reflection on all intermediate states between being and non-being and the ways of transition from non-being to being grows. The problem, which has already been identified in Plato, is that this gap between one and the other, such a split, tear-



¹¹ L. Burchill, *In-Between "Spacing" and the "Chôra" in Derrida: A Pre-Originary Medium?*, [in:] *Intermedialities: Philosophy, Arts, Politics*, ed. H. Oosterling, E. Plonowska Ziarek, Lanham 2011, p. 39.

¹² J. Derrida, *Différance*, [in:] *idem*, *Margins of Philosophy*, transl. A. Bass, Brighton 1982, p. 8; see also *ibidem*, p. 13: "the becoming-space of time or becoming-time of space (*temporization*)".

¹³ J. Derrida, *Freud and the Scene of Writing*, transl. A. Bass, [in:] *idem*, *Writing and Difference...*, Chicago 1978, p. 217, for: L. Burchill, *ibidem*.

¹⁴ J. Derrida, *Le Toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy*, Paris 2000, p. 207, for: L. Burchill, *op. cit.*.



¹⁵ Kants handschriftlicher Nachlaß, vol. 5, *Reflexionen zur Metaphysics*, Berlin 1928, no. 6359 [1797]: “Überhaupt ist der Schematismus einer der schwierigsten Punkte. Selbst Hr. Beck kann sich nicht darein finden. Ich halte dies Capitel für eines der wichtigsten”. “In general, the schematism is one of the most difficult points. Even Herr [J. S.] Beck cannot find his way therein. I hold this chapter [in CPR] to be one of the most important”, p. 160; as cit. in: **M. Heidegger**, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, transl. J. S. Churchill, foreword Th. Langan, Bloomington 1965, p. 118.

ing or rupture, may be suspected to be more originary than being and non-being. The interval forces Being to appear, but at the same time it remains open to the transition states of being and non-being. Both in the literary imagination and in the urban reality, similar interruptions seems to be necessary, introducing space for something that can only happen in future. Parks such as Eden or the Parisian La Villette are openings to something that can take place, forcing one to consider whether the area produced by the separation appears simultaneously with time or whether time is secondary to the gesture of spatialization.

Burchill distinguishes the question of the appearance of space among aporia of Derrida’s thoughts, because any beginning must take place. The assumption that the possibility of inscription no longer applies to a constituted space, but produces spatiality of that space does not remove the suspicion that this spatiality must have existed earlier, even if it was only a potential existence, another existence, or non-existence. In Burchill’s opinion, the productivity of spacing depends thus on the exteriority or a certain pre-originary space, even if Derrida does not develop the thought of such dependence more deeply. This pre-space, which is prior to all originarity, is neither existing nor ideal, but belongs to the property of another possibility, it is the *triton genos* (or *tertium quid*), which leaves it independent of rationalization, as a way of understanding rather what is present.

Derrida referred the ambiguity of spacing to the *chôra* or another equally famous philosophical “in-between”, which was Kant’s schematism. In both cases it was a matter of explaining the space between the world of phenomena and Being. When Kant is mentioned, it should be taken into account that pre-space should be considered in conjunction with the issue of anteriority to time, a problem which can be described as prototemporalism. Kant’s assumption (in edition B of *Critique of Pure Reason*) that the common root of two trunks of human cognition (i.e. sensuality and intellect) is unknown, although earlier (in edition A) he decided that it is made by transcendental imagination, did not remove the problem, but only postpones it. Although it may seem for a while that the originary intuition was accurate, there is much more cognitive benefit in the situation that what was initially accepted by Kant as recognized, he re-described then as unknown. Such a spacing of possibilities brings together several applied concepts and allows to make new remarks about space. However, before presenting an actualized account of spatiality, one should put in order the achievements of Kant, Heidegger and Derrida in relation to the issue of schematism, and in particular to the transcendental imagination.

Kant himself considered “The Schematism of Pure Concepts of the Understanding” or maybe the problems associated with it to be one of the most difficult parts of *Critique of Pure Reason*¹⁵. In the work of such a great rationalist like him, the following statement should be regarded as unexpected:

This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances and their mere form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty¹⁶.

The further part of Kant's quoted statement indicates that the reason for Kant's psychological rather than philosophical opinions about schematism was the nature of transcendental imagination, whose functioning turned out to be extremely difficult to grasp and, in Heidegger's opinion, even led Kant to the borders of the abyss¹⁷.

Heidegger's attempt to remove some of the uncertainties in this respect in his work *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929) did not provide adequate explanations. The suggestions made in this work show that the basic solutions to the decisive problems remained in the seed and provisional stage¹⁸. In the context of the deliberations on the character of the space of the Parc de La Villette made in this paper, it seems exceptionally inappropriate to continue to maintain the primacy of time over space, which was outlined in Kant's work and continued by Heidegger. To break this tradition requires a repetition of the path of Kant's reflections, so to do as Heidegger did earlier, but this time assuming a repetition of the latter's actions as well. The ambiguities existing in the works of both philosophers cause that even the most strict repetition imposes the necessity of making interpretations that go beyond what has been achieved so far. Heidegger might have expected attempts to transcend the existing ambiguities when, at the end of the chapter on transcendental imagination, he reminded that Kant's work was intended as an apology of Leibniz and his own interpretation is, in turn, an extraction of hidden passion from *Critique of Pure Reason*, which caused that many from what Kant did not say, appeared in his explanations.

The characteristics of schematism require a reminder that Kant initially, in the edition A of *Critique of Pure Reason*, accepted the existence of three sources of cognition, which Heidegger, not without serious justification, described as ontological.

There are three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul) which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely, *sense, imagination, and apperception*... All these *faculties* have a transcendental (as well as empirical) employment which concerns the form alone, and is possible *a priori*¹⁹.

We saw that there are three subjective sources of knowledge upon which rests the possibility of experience in general and of knowledge of its objects – *sense, imagination, and apperception*. Each of these can be viewed as empirical, namely, in its application to given appearances. But all of them



¹⁶ I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (further as CPR), transl., ed. P. Guyer, A. W. Wood, Cambridge 1998, B 180-181, p. 273.

¹⁷ See M. Heidegger, *Kant...*, p. 173: "Does not the *Critique of Pure Reason* deprive itself of its own theme if pure reason is transformed into transcendental imagination? Does not this laying of the foundation lead to an abyss? By his radical interrogation, Kant brought the »possibility« of metaphysics before this abyss. He saw the unknown; he had to draw back. Not only did the imagination fill him with alarm, but in the meantime [between the first and second editions] he had also come more and more under the influence of pure reason as such".

¹⁸ M. Heidegger, *op. cit.*, p. 225

¹⁹ CPR A 94, for: M. Heidegger, *Kant...*, p. 143.



²⁰ CPR A 115; as cit. in: **M. Heidegger**, *Kant...*, p. 143.

²¹ **M. Heidegger**, *Kant...*, p. 143–144.

²² CPR A 124; as cit. in: **M. Heidegger**, *Kant...*, p. 141.

²³ CPR B 180, p. 273.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

are likewise *a priori* elements or foundations, which make this empirical employment itself possible²⁰.

Kant's statements on the sources of cognitive faculties oscillate in his work (in edition A) between statements on the functioning of three abilities and two trunks of cognition²¹. The sensuality and intellect are distinguished, and the position of imagination is established as intermediary and at the same time as if more originary than the other two. "A pure imagination, which conditions all *a priori* knowledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul"²². Assigning the imagination important functions, its double positioning (being between the two remaining faculties and at the same time preceding them) and subsequently depreciating it (in edition B), remind us of the fate of the concept of *chôra* in the history of philosophy. Kant gave the imagination the task of assigning data of pure intuition to the concepts of the intellect. Imagination synthesizes data and presents them as a kind of images (more precisely schemata), which bring them closer to the formulas of thinking. "This representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image is what I call the schema for this concept"²³. At the same time, Kant clarifies: "In fact it is not images of objects but schemata that ground our pure sensible concepts"²⁴. Along with the statements that the described actions are giving time order to phenomena, there was an indication of time as the basis of imagination and its superiority over space, although both time and space take place equally as pure intuition. From a logical point of view, the undervaluation of space cannot be now maintained.

Countless interpretations of the question of cognition analysed by Kant are impossible to put in order and prompt to focus on basic issues and formulate one's own opinions on that matter. While it is understandable that Kant distinguishes empirical phenomena of time and space and treats them as consequences of their transcendental interpretations, further divisions should be made in the area of those transcendental interpretations and it should be stated that time and space in their transcendental versions are the result of imagination, which, although granted a temporal character, was not granted a spatial component. Imagination could be called a movement, which activate the dead and motionless time into action (only then making it a form of pure intuition) and similarly brings space out of some more general spatiality. The time before the introduction of movement would be temporality, while the activation of this temporality would be the temporizing of time. The same would happen with spatialisation of space (more precisely of spatiality) omitted as a component of imagination. It would also be appropriate to link the two parts of imagination in their active forms and to state that the activation of time is its spatialisation, while the temporalisation of space is also its temporalisation through "shaking" (described in

other circumstances as characteristic of the *chôra*). Time would not only be taken out of itself, but also introduced into space. Spatialisation would be a condition for activating time. As a consequence, imagination could be described as an activity activating time and space. Imagination should not be reduced only to pure time, or even to pure space ignored by Kant and Heidegger, but it would be necessary to emphasize an activity that is performed.

Temporalisation and spatialisation performed in the area of pure intuition prompt to consider their even more transcendental forms. If it is reasonable to separate the empirical or colloquially understood phenomena of time and space from their pure, transcendental interpretations, then their further “purification” and the next stage of transcendentalisation should also be considered. Then one could focus on the supertranscendental imagination as the basis for the transcendental forms of time and space. In such understood super-imagination, both of its components would rest in it as motionless. This prompts to accept, completely outside of Kant and Heidegger, that there is yet another ignored factor, i.e. movement, which can also be described as dislocation, displacement or difference of forces. The newly defined imagination in this situation is dead time, “empty” space (atopy) and unmoved movement (motionlessness). As one can see at this stage of the deliberations, Kant’s hidden thoughts, which led Heidegger to transcend his achievements, *Critique of Pure Reason*, now force to transcend the achievements of both philosophers and adopt even more originary forms of time (as timelessness), space (as emptiness, abyss or nothingness) and movement (as motionlessness). Just as it was a case in the complements of Kant and Heidegger carried out here, for which, however, one can find indications in very them, also in this case, there are source premises for separating out the next level of transcendence. So when Heidegger (following Kant) develops the concept of time as a self-affection of the soul, it justifies the thesis that such self-affection is not only the most originary form of time, but also the originary form of space and movement. It seems that on the way of this *regressus ad infinitum* it is not possible to go backwards any further, however, this level of deliberations on raising consciousness can be still developed. It may be useful at this stage of the journey to nowhere to trace, after Heidegger, the temporal, spatial and movement expressions that appeared during his presentation of transcendental imagination. They indicate that without movement, i.e. changes within themselves, time and space cannot reveal themselves. Continuation of reflection on originary time and space required the introduction of another factor, whose discovered super-transcendentalism logically prompted to save it from the fate of becoming another source or basis, and thus being situated alongside the existing principles of metaphysics and as if outside the existing language. The need to formulate this new term (which has become *différance*) and to deprive it of the deficiencies contained in other



²⁵ M. Heidegger, *Kant....*, p. 194.

²⁶ *Idem*, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Hrsg. F.-W. von Hermann, Frankfurt am Main 1991, p. 189.

fundamental notions was initially rooted in the concepts contained in the commentary to Kant analysed here.

Time is, by nature, pure affection of itself. But more than this, it is that in general which forms something on the order of a line of orientation which going from the self is directed toward ... in such a way that the objective thus constituted springs forth and surges back along this line. As pure self-affection, time is not an active affection concerned with the concrete self; as pure, it forms the essence of all auto-solicitation. Therefore, if the power of being solicited as a self belongs to the essence of the finite subject, time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity²⁵.

The above excerpt says that the self creates not only what it defines as the world, but also itself. Heidegger's formulations indicate that this creation of itself has a skeleton, which consists not only of time conditions emphasized by the author, but also spatial and movement conditions revealed in the expressions: "going from the self directed toward" (*von-sich-aus-hin-zu-auf*, from-out-itself-toward-there), "auto-solicitation" (*Sich selbst-angehen*), "solicited" (*angegangen*)²⁶. A separate problem was the circulation of French philosophical thought around the ultra-originary or super-transcendental source of everything, because the existing foundations such as Being (*Seiende*) or being (*Sein*) not only had the characteristics of old theology, but were also ethically and politically connected with authoritarian and sometimes also totalitarian systems. On the one hand, the reflection on the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, which gained a dominant position in the 1960s, and on the other, poststructuralism, whose influence Derrida not only succumbed to, but also took part in, obliged to rethink the metaphysics of presence. Within this theme, debatability ("discursivity") of existence has been emphasized and the links of all Being (*Seiende*) and being (*Sein*) with language, consciousness and subjectivity have been strengthened, which in the course of time have themselves been treated as successive variants of the *ousia* – fundamental being (*Sein*) As a consequence of focusing the reflection on the issues of language and consciousness, the position of the word "is" could not escape attention. A polemic element was introduced into the word "is" and the problem of nothingness was developed as if in the complementation. Thus, when the metaphysics of presence moved towards the study of absence, it became a philosophy of conditions for thinking and studying possibilities on an equal footing with impossibility.

The negations of the principle of the beginning and the centre, the polemic with the notion of the border and the negation of meaning (in the sense of reference of the structure of the work to external content) contained in Tschumi's comments to the Parc de La Villette, contributed to the metaphysical perversion that took place at that time. The starting point (or point at all), like the principle of

the centre, lost their previous simplicity and immobility, stability or absoluteness contained in them were replaced by almost their opposites: movement, instability and uncertainty. However, they were only almost replaced. Since the sharpening of the oppositions has been considered a part of the existing metaphysics, one should talk about acts of distorting basic notions rather than replacing them with opposites. The “distorting” of metaphysics has become a new metaphysics, even as if a religion, in which an indeterminate beginning and a moving multiplied centre were made the foundations of faith. Above all, however, all notions have become more deeply rooted in the variable historicity, which has led to current political and even personal problems becoming a hidden source of reflection.

The links between a philosopher’s biography and their achievements are usually rejected with a high degree of categoricity, but Heidegger’s cult of originarity and the fact that Derrida does not share it have both their sources and consequences in the personal lives of each one of them. Such subjects were reluctantly discussed in philosophy due to the customary separation of history of philosophy from biographies of philosophers. However, the vague objective of deconstruction is a question of new community, power and domination, in which the importance of singularity and the will to weaken social cohesion is growing. At the same time, the praise of idiomaticity in the language is at the same time a defence of the position of the alien and the other in the re-evaluated political community – in a newly organized union of non-identical individuals. The rationale for considering Tschumi’s distance towards the beginning or the centre as ethically and politically motivated is also strengthened by his direct involvement in the social revolution. In the specific case of the Parisian park, the link between the sphere of thinking and revolt are the problems of space, which are closely related to the central thinking of Derrida. In carrying out the proof of this thesis, the changeability of concepts used by the philosopher may be a certain difficulty, however, in the analyses of the terms of his philosophy, almost always there were specifically understood issues of the development of spatiality.

The circulation of influences between philosophically understood metaphysics and all ordinary forms of existence, starting from the life of the individual, through religious or political problems, leads us to consider them as a certain collective intelligible whole and to equate it with the structure of the language. Such a juxtaposition led to the conclusion that everything is a variation of discourse or text. Reflection on language, especially de Saussure’s findings, allowed to notice that “in language there are only differences”. As the fragment of *Course in General Linguistics* quoted by Derrida says.

The conceptual side of value is made up solely of relations and differences with respect to the other terms of language, and the same can be said of



²⁷ F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, ed. Ch. Bally, A. Sechehaye, col-
lab. A. Reidlinger transl. W. Baskin, New
York 1959, pp. 117–118, 120; as cit. in:
J. Derrida, *Différance...*, p. 10–11.

²⁸ J. Derrida, *Structure, Sign, and Play in
the Discourse of the Human Sciences*, [in:]
idem, *Writing and Difference...*, p. 292.

²⁹ J. Derrida, *Différance...*, p. 17: “Force
itself is never present; it is only a play of
differences and quantities”; p. 18: “Thus,
différance is the name we might give to
the ‘active’, moving discord of different
forces, and of differences of forces”.

its material side. [...] Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to this: in language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences **without positive terms**.

Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it²⁷.

In de Saussure’s and Derrida’s opinion, both the metaphysically treated language and the whole existence ceased to be closed structures and became a field of play that constantly reveals new meanings. In such an assumed area of play of senses there are no established beginnings or centres, which does not mean that no attempts are made to establish them. A further question arises: what is the origin of the game in this situation? It confirms the irremovable tendency to search for the beginning and close the structure again. Although the game undermines the existence in its immobility, or in other words “is the disruption of presence”²⁸, it seems inevitable to ask about the reason for the game, about its origin. The way to solve the problem was sketched out in earlier manifestations of the philosophy of difference, especially in Hegel, de Saussure and Heidegger.

The game is an opening up of possibilities that are made by the division of the conditions of possibilities, both the transcendental conditions, and especially the transcendental conditions – time and space. Thus, we are dealing with the emergence of the world as something seemingly external, as well as with the emergence of the world as a given inner consciousness, or with the appearance of consciousness itself as a basic illusion of presence. The divisions referred to here are the result of the action of differences, but these result from a particularly originary condition, which is *différance*. *Différance*, in order to be able to meet the condition of being a condition of conditions, had to be seriously different from all previous bases. Criticism of the origin of metaphysics has created the requirement that *différance* not only must avoid becoming another basis for thinking, but also that it must not be any form of existence known to date. *Différance* should not be. The answer to the question what “is” the *différance* and how it becomes the cause of time and space is not easy.

All existence requires the beginning, which indicates change and movement. However, when a question is asked about the effective cause of the movement, philosophical thought falls into the trap of the concept of the beginning, which can be similarly questioned about the source, origin or effective cause. When the problem of *regressus ad infinitum*, i.e. moving back to the next beginning of the beginning, is partially solved by indicating that the originary movement is the result of a difference in forces or quantity²⁹, then atten-

tion will be paid to the difference itself, which after all has no substantial features and escapes from being another *arche*. However, it is not possible to go beyond metaphysics perfectly and definitively. An absolutised or purified difference, referred to as *différance*, retains certain features of the foundation of being or thinking. A difference from the previous supports of existence or thought is the fact that the decisive part of the terms attributed to it has a negative character: *différance* is neither active nor passive, it is neither present nor absent, it is neither real nor ideal, it is neither sensual nor intelligible. Despite the associations between *différance* and God, negative traits do not bring it closer to being in the meaning typical of negative theology.

And yet those aspects of *différance* which are thereby delineated are not theological, not even in the order of the most negative of negative theologies, which are always concerned with disengaging a superessentiality beyond the finite categories of essence and existence, that is, of presence, and always hastening to recall that God is refused the predicate of existence, only in order to acknowledge his superior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being³⁰.

The pure difference, *différance*, although reaching back to Heidegger's ontological difference, is older than Being itself, "refer us beyond the history of Being, and also beyond our language, and everything that can be named in it"³¹. "Différance is neither a word nor a concept"³², so that it cannot have a single accurate name, but is suspended between some single, non-communicable word and a multitude of terms such as archi-writing, archi-trace, gram, spacing, supplement, pharmakon, hymen, margin-mark-march"³³. It comes from nothingness and is "the abyss opening up in a place traditionally intended for the basis"³⁴.

The richness of negative and positive terms is accompanied by a multitude of different functions, puzzling enough in relation to something that does not exist in any way. From the point of view of the deliberations on the Parisian park and Tschumi's concepts, it is first of all necessary to consider the relation of *différance* to space and its definition. So *différance* in the most basic understanding is spatialisation or spacing, introduction of activity into time and space. *Différance* reveals differences, which are disintegration, shaken movement, dispersion activating time and space with the possibility of perceiving them. This perception leads to yet another cosmogony, a philosophical-religious justification, a story in which logic takes revenge on its original absence, because the narrative, ordered by memory, recreates and reveals its illegitimate origin and the negative beginning of all basicity. The logic necessary for the establishment of the epic tries to murder oneself with Oedipal fatalism. When a point appears, as if an archaic observer or the beginning of a saga, its func-



³⁰J. Derrida, *Différance...*, p. 6.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 25.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 3, 7.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 12.

³⁴ B. Banasiak, *Różni(c)ność*, [w:] J. Derrida, *O gramatologii*, transl. B. Banasiak, Warszawa 1999, p. 12.



³⁵ B. Markowska, *Gramatologia jako projekt polityczny: dekonstrukcja i kwestia sprawiedliwości*, "Idea. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych" vol. 20 (2008), p. 18.

³⁶ G. W. F. Hegel, *Jenenser Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie*, Hrsg. G. Lasson, Leipzig 1923; A. Koyré, *Hegel à Iéna. (A propos de publications récentes)*, "Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger" 1934, no. 9/10 (118); reprinted in: *idem, Études d'histoire de la pensée philosophique*, Paris 1961, pp. 153–154.

³⁷ G. W. F. von Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 202, as cit. in: J. Derrida, *Différance...*, pp. 13–14.

tioning is possible thanks to the impermanent present, which, in order to constitute itself, requires not only separation (distinguishing) from the past and the future, but also the loss of identity with itself, the demonstration of instability reaching non-existence.

The present can only happen in an unsuccessful way, as it is required to do so by the internal difference in itself. The unfulfilling identity of the present has analogies in all being gaining space for its development, in which being apparently develops more and more widely and multiplies its divisions, but is not able to lose its connection with non-being. The space of being tries to reach the daring substancealization, but its every manifestation is possible only thanks to its pure originarity saturated with internal contradictions. In both cases, the pure space and the objectified one, it must differ, separate and happen centrifugally, it must become something special, unlike anything from which it results.

There is something that has enabled the very manifestation of Being and being (presence and present) – some place (*chôra*) in which the movement of revealing occurs and which can not be called by us in the language that is only a derivative of its action³⁵.

The issue that emerges here: "how a simple thing can be a matrix of differences?" is based on an earlier philosophy. Derrida points in this respect to excerpts from Hegel's *The Jena System*, youthful inédits of the Prussian philosopher, written from manuscripts, published by George Lasson, and then commented by Alexandre Koyré in the 1930's³⁶. Hegel's instructive argument reads as follows:

The infinite, in this simplicity, is, as a moment opposed to the equal-to-itself, the negative, and in its moments, although it is (itself) presented to and in itself the totality, (it is) what excludes in general, the point or limit; but in its own (action of) negating, it is related Immediately to the other and negates itself by itself. The limit or moment of the present (*der Gegenwart*), the absolute 'this' of time, or the now, is of an absolutely negative simplicity, which absolutely excludes from itself all multiplicity, and, by virtue of this, is absolutely determined; it is not whole or a *quantum* which would be extended in itself (and) which, in itself, also would have an undetermined moment, a diversity which, as indifferent (*gleichgültig*) or exterior in itself, would be related to an other (*auf ein anderes bezöge*), but in this is a relation absolutely different from the simple (*sondern es ist absolut differente Beziehung*)³⁷.

According to Hegel, the present not so much "is", but is rather a certain relation. The similarity of Derrida's theses is very clear, which was due to Koyré's comments.

Koyré most remarkably specifies in a note: "*different Relation: differente Beziehung. One might say: differentiating relation*". And on the next page,

another text of Hegel's in which one can read this: "*Diese Beziehung ist Gegenwart, als eine differente Beziehung* [This relationship is [the] present as a different relationship]. Another note of Koyré's: "The term different here is taken in an active sense"³⁸.

Derrida denied the *différance* to be active or passive, but (his?) thinking returning to the deep current of old metaphysics inevitably indicates the strength of the differential relation (identified with the present). When following the traditional separation of the beginning, one should also put forward the thesis that the present seems to be later than the *differente Beziehung*.

The drawback of thinking about *différance* are only terse analyses of the relations between time and space, and in them a definitely smaller role is given to space. Discussions on the present show the ways of acting of pure *différance* and in this connection the links of *différance* with the establishment of space.

An interval must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval that constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is though on the basis of the present, that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly substance or the subject. In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be called *spacing*, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (*temporization*). And it is this constitution of the present, as an "originary" and irreducibly nonsimple (and therefore, *stricto sensu* nonoriginary) synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions and protentions (to reproduce analogically and provisionally a phenomenological and transcendental language that soon will reveal itself to be inadequate), that I propose to call *archi-writing*, *archi-trace*, or *différance*. Which (is) (simultaneously) *spacing* (and) *temporization*³⁹.

The term "différance" and some of its synonyms in French contain both temporal and spatial moments. Space turns out to be even less graspable than time, and philosophy does not have any work dedicated to space that would match Husserl's *Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* (*Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, 1928). From the fragment of Derrida's text about *différance* quoted above, it follows, however, that its inseparability from space is based on a "differential relation", which can be treated as a form of articulation, distinguishing distinctive and individualized parts and, consequently, leading to final singularity, breaking with communication and community based on identity. A community based on the difference and incompatibility is no longer a hidden value of Western culture. Spatiality understood as an infinite disintegration of space reveals a clear ethical and political value. The Parc de La Villette makes visible, but also



³⁸ J. Derrida, *Différance...*, p. 14.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 13.



⁴⁰ *Idem*, *Ousia and Grammē: Note on a Note from "Being and Time"*, [in:] *idem*, *Margins of Philosophy*, transl. A. Bass, Brighton 1982, pp. 41–42.

⁴¹ M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, transl. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson, New York 1962; as cit. in: J. Derrida, *Ousia ...*, p. 37.

elevates the infinite multiplication of divisions within the community and attributes positive moral values to this variety of spacing.

The continuation of reflections on the relations between time and space contained in the article *Différance* was given by the text *Ousia and Grammē: Note on a Note from "Being and Time"*⁴⁰.

It presents a commentary on the footnote used in the penultimate paragraph of the last chapter of *Being and Time* entitled *Temporality and Within-time-ness as the Source of the Ordinary Conception of Time*. Heidegger sketches in it the history of the understanding of time and space from Aristotle's *Physics* IV, through Hegel's *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 1817)* to Bergson's *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, 1889)*. Among other things, he states:

Bergson's view is in accord with Hegel's thesis that space 'is' time, in spite of the very different reasons they have given. Bergson merely says the reverse that time (*temps* [in French in the text in order to oppose *temps*, time, to *durée*, duration]) is space. Bergson's view of time too has obviously arisen from an Interpretation of the Aristotelian essay on time⁴¹.

Derrida's analyses draw attention to a number of problems that occur on the way of the so-called colloquial understanding of time. First of all, in Hegel's thought paraphrasing Aristotle it is not understandable

how do space, how do nature, in their undifferentiated immediacy, receive difference, determination, quality? Differentiation, determination, qualification can only overtake pure space as the negation of this original purity and of this initial state of abstract indifferenciation which is properly the spatiality of space. Pure spatiality is determined by negating properly the indetermination that constitutes it, that is, by itself negating itself. By *itself* negating itself: this negation has to be a determined negation, a negation of space *by* space. The first spatial negation of space is the POINT. "The difference (*Unterschied*) of space is, however, essentially a determinate, qualitative difference. As such it is first the *negation* of space *itself*, because this is immediate, *differenceless (unterschiedlose)* self-externality: the point" (*Enc.*, sec. 256, p. 31). The point is the space that does not take up space, the place that does not take place; it suppresses and replaces the place, it takes the place of the space that it negates and conserves. It spatially negates space. It is the first determination of space. As the first determination and first negation of space, the point spatializes or *spaces* itself. It negates itself by itself in its relation to itself, that is, to another point. The negation of negation, the spatial negation of the point is the LINE. The point negates and retains itself, extends and sustains itself, lifts itself (by *Aufhebung*) into the line, which thus constitutes the *truth* of the point. But secondarily this negation is a negation of *space*, that is, to the extent that it retains itself by suppressing itself (*als sich aufhebend*) the points is the *line*,

the first Being-other, that is, the Being-spatial of the point (ibid.). According to the same process, by *Aufhebung* and negation of negation, the truth of the line is the PLANE⁴².

Derrida's comment exposed a clear contradiction that occurs in the thesis that the space that should be called ordinary, empirical or sensual emerges as a negation of pure space characterized by a lack of differentiation. According to Hegel, "space itself [...] is immediate differenceless (*unterschiedlose*) self-externality"⁴³. The introduction of a definition, limit or measure is a negation of undifferentiation and the revealing of time. As Derrida explained: "Space, therefore, has become concrete in having retained the negative within itself"⁴⁴. And as he further stated:

It has become space in losing itself, in determining itself, in negating its original purity, the absolute indifferenciation and exteriority that constituted itself in its spatiality. Spatialization, the accomplishment of the essence of spatiality, is a despatialization and vice versa⁴⁵.

To the extent that it *is*, that is, to the extent that it becomes and is produced, that it manifests itself in its essence, that it **spaces** itself, in itself relating to itself, that is, in negating itself, space is time. It temporalizes itself, it relates itself to itself and mediates itself as time. Time is *spacing*. It is the relation of space to itself, its for-itself. [...] Time *relève* [relifts] space⁴⁶.

Bernard Tschumi, by making the "point-line-plane" sequence the basis of the Parc de La Villette project, both in his texts and in realised work, reinforced the conclusions stemming from Derrida's deductions. The three layers of the park, referring to the sequence mentioned above, made clearly incompatible, created a spatial and artistic apology of incompatibility, thus also of polemicity or problematicity. It is not possible to go beyond the thought of the space that was described by Heidegger, questioned by Derrida and which reaches back to Aristotle. However, it is possible to loosen its restraining form and partially change strong dialectics into weaker polemics. Instead of the decisive opposition or Hegel's system of contradictions and negations, diversity is introduced as an element analogous to the former metaphysical basis, origin or cause. In the space applied by Tschumi, nothing of its old terms is lost (which emphasizes the multiplicity of space) and thus, in the ethical and political sphere, the coexistence of non-coherent components becomes possible and visible. The logical layer of the problem of space, which has so far been based on the assumption of deriving complexity from simplicity, is also improved. Instead of a logically incorrect thesis that simplicity can be the source of multiplicity, another thesis was put forward, assuming that multiplicity is already in the very basis and reasonableness is an overused tool for limiting the state of free organization. Diversity replaces absolute simplicity and lack of difference, because



⁴² J. Derrida, *Ousia...*, pp. 41-42.

⁴³ G. W. F. von Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, Zweiter Teil: *Die Naturphilosophie* 1. *Die Mechanik, a. der Raum*, [in:], *idem*, *Werke*, vol. 9, § 256, Frankfurt am Main 1979, p. 43: *des Raums selbst, weil dieser das unmittelbare unterschiedslose Außersichsein ist*"; J. Derrida, *Ousia...*, p. 41.

⁴⁴ J. Derrida, *Ousia...*, p. 42.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 42-43.



⁴⁷ M. Kostyszak, *Istota techniki – głos Martina Heideggera*, Wrocław 1998, p. 109.

⁴⁸ L. Burchill, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁴⁹ J. Bollock, *Deux figures principales de l'atomisme d'après Aristote: l'entrecroisement des atomes et la sphère du feu*, [in:] *Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theophrast. Verhandlungen des 4. Symposium Aristotelicum veranstaltet in Göteborg, August 1966*, Hrsg. I. Düring, Heidelberg 1969; as cit. in: L. Burchill, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁵⁰ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, book A, part 4, 985b, transl. W. D. Ross, Oxford 1924, p. 503; see also *Aristoteles, Metafizyka*, book I, 985b 5–15, ed. M. A. Krapiec, A. Maryniarczyk, transl. T. Żeleźnik, foreword M. A. Krapiec, ed. scient. A. Maryniarczyk, Lublin 1996, pp. 32–34: “*Λεύκι ππος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος [5] αὐτοῦ Δημόκριτος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλήρες καὶ τὸ κενὸν εἶναί φασιν, λέγοντες τὸ μὲν ὄν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πλήρες καὶ στερεὸν τὸ ὄν, τὸ δὲ κενὸν τὸ μὴ ὄν (διὸ καλοῦσθαι μᾶλλον τὸ ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἶναί φασιν, ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ σῶμα), αἷτια δὲ τῶν ὄντων ταῦτα ὡς [10] ὕλην καὶ καθάπερ οἱ ἐν ποιοῦντες τὴν ὑποκειμένην οὐσίαν ἄλλα τοῖς πάθεσιν αὐτῆς γεννώσκει, τὸ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πικρὸν ἀρχὰς τίθεμενοι τῶν παθημάτων, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ οὕτοι τὰς διαφορὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἄλλων εἶναί φασιν. ταῦτα μὲν τρεῖς εἶναι λέγουσι, σχημά τε καὶ κάξιν καὶ [15] θέσιν: διαφέρειν γὰρ φασὶ τὸ ὄν ῥυθμῶ καὶ διαθιγῆ καὶ τροπῇ μόνον: τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν ῥυθμὸς σχημά ἐστιν ἢ δὲ διαθιγῆ τάξιν ἢ δὲ τροπῆ θέσις”.*

the very existence, also the existence of simplicity, is differentiation. The park, the *chôra* or space in such an approach show themselves as a nothingness saturated with contradictions, an entanglement of difference, chaos or a dwelling of *différance*.

Truth has a musical nature⁴⁷, so does architecture

What makes it possible for a work of art to participate fully in the above described disorders of old metaphysics, to have a share in a philosophy that is not only written but also happens? Up until now, it could be said that the happening of philosophy in space means making its divisions into different and incompatible parts visible, for example, as it is presented by the Parc de La Villette. The final fragments of Louise Burchill's article introduce yet another possibilities of describing the origin of any space. The author reminds us that spacing (*espacement*) is connected with the proto-temporalising movement, which according to Democritus was connected not with atoms, “the something” (*éon*) but with a vacuum “the nonsomething” (*me éon*)⁴⁸. The atoms, as Burchill goes on to explain, do not have a movement of their own, but differentiate themselves in relation to the vacuum, which is called *rhuthmoi*. Burchill quoted a Greek source, for Jean Bollock, stating that “[the atoms] glide in the void, which, by not offering any resistance, is equivalent to a proper movement”⁴⁹. It should be added here that, among the most ancient Greek applications of the word *chôra*, there were those that assumed its connection with the act of giving or giving up a place. The existing philosophy does not have a tradition of contemplation on withdrawal, but perhaps avoidance or evasion is a symptom of the functioning of nothingness?

Searching in Greek philosophy for the relationship between **originally** structured movement (*rhuthmos/rhythm*) and space/place as a certain form of non-existence (*chôra*), it is worth to refer to the content of the discussion on the philosophy of Democritus contained in Book Alpha Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

Leucippus and his associate Democritus say that the full and the empty are the elements, calling the one being and the other non-being – the full and solid being being, the empty non-being (whence they say being no more is than non-being, because the solid no more is than the empty); and they make these the material causes of things. And as those who make the underlying substance one generate all other things by its modifications, supposing the rare and the dense to be the sources of the modifications, in the same way these philosophers say the differences in the elements are the causes of all other qualities. These differences, they say, are three-shape and order and position. For they say the real is differentiated only by “rhythm” and “inter-contact” and “turning”; and of these rhythm is shape, inter-contact is order, and turning is position⁵⁰.

The quoted fragment “gives space” to interpret that what some philosophers call things can also be described as an effect of difference or tension between fullness and vacuum. When assuming such a thesis, one should consider that the two elements belong to each other, are necessary for each other’s existence and come from the difference itself. Their union of belonging could even lead to the idea that they are the same, which seems unacceptable, but leads to the hypothesis that at least they are given the opportunity to pass from one to the other. Consequently, everything that exists can be a derivative of that difference. At the same time, differences of difference are nothing more than some kind of rhythms or sounds.

Rhythms, as well as their perception and concepts, organize and influence all forms of human activity⁵¹. In the history of the notion of rhythm, there have also been changes characteristic for many other notions, from their initial state, which could be an observation concerning nature, sexuality or agricultural activities, to more intellectual or colloquial approaches, concealing the incomprehensibility of the deeper content of a given notion. As Benveniste noted, the dictionaries explaining the words of ancient Greek without exception indicate that “ῥυθμός” is derived from the word “flow” and referred to the observation of the regular movement of sea waves⁵². Benveniste also showed that already in the fifth century BC the use of the term “ῥυθμός” to describe the movement of the sea was abandoned. Instead, this word was combined with the notion of form, which is only justified by the fact that the form is always taken by a matter of originary indeterminacy characterised as if by the fluidity of water. Considerations on the notion of rhythm are burdened with unresolved problems of the origin, character and comprehensibility of the content of this word, as well as the phenomenon it describes. The question then arises: do the visible rhythms belong to a more general world order (cosmos, *logos*), or are they purely human in nature, not necessarily parallel to the universal one. From this one, another question arises: are rhythms in human activities reproduced as of transcendental origin or are they produced according to non-transcendental measures? For there is a probability of lack of external reasons for rhythms and rather of designing the vision of externality according to reasons that are purely human and historical.

The starting point for this fragment of the reflection on the Parc de La Villette was the question: on what basis does the analysed work participate in the happening of philosophy? An attempt to answer the question led, through Burchill’s comments on motion and its connection with the spacing (*spatialization*), to the concept of *rhythm*. This makes it possible to assume the thesis that the development of space, which is the Park, would be based on a kind of sound that juxtaposed – in accordance with the architect’s assumptions – non-coherent elements. The created “sound”, a specific speech of the park,



⁵¹ E. Benveniste, *La Notion de “rythme” dans son expression linguistique*, “Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique” 1951, no. 44, p. 401; *idem*, *The Notion of Rhythm in Its Linguistic Expression*, [in:] *Problems in General Linguistics*, transl. M. E. Meek, Coral Gables 1971, p. 281.

⁵² É. Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, étudiée dans ses rapports avec les autres langues indo-européennes*, Heidelberg-Paris 1916, s. 845: “mouvement réglé et mesuré, cadence, rythme: ῥεω ‘couler’ [...], le sens du mot ayant été emprunté au mouvement régulier des flots de mer”. See also E. Wolf, *Zur Etymologie von ῥυθμός und seiner Bedeutung in der älteren griechischen Literatur*, “Wiener Studien” no. 68 (1955), s. 106; W. Seidel, *Rhythmus*, [in:] *Ästhetische Grundbegriffe*, ed. K. Barck [et al.], Stuttgart-Weimar 2010, t. 5: *Post-moderne – Synästhesie*, p. 292 [Etymologie].



⁵³ W. Wrotkowski, *Jeden wieloimien-ny. Bóg Heraklita z Efezu*, Nowa Wieś – Warszawa 2008.

⁵⁴ K. Mrówka, *Heraklit. Fragmenty, przekład i komentarz*, Warszawa 2004, pp. 344–346.

⁵⁵ H. Diels, W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Zürich 1989, (further as: DK), B 80 Origenes, *C. Cels.*, VI, 42; as cit. in: J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy, Chapter 3 (Heraclitus of Ephesos)*, 3rd ed., London 1920, p. 102.

⁵⁶ DK, B 8, Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.*, VIII, 1, 1155 b 4; as in: Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, transl. H. Rackham, London 1934.

⁵⁷ F. Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, transl., introd. M. Cowan, Washington, D.C. 1998, p. 55.

can be considered a kind of ideological message, but also equated with a melody. The park affects the recipient with a special variety of the harmony of non-convergent components. However, if the park's operation is effective by mastering the contradiction, a question arises about the nature of the order introduced there. For the suspicion arises that with all the commitment to the spirit of disintegration – in Tschumi's language, “disfunction”, “dissociation” etc. – an order of uniting and unexpected power manifested itself in the park. It is possible to explain the situation using a new analogy and the latest interpretations of the philosophy of Heraclitus. In this context, attention should be paid in particular to the study by Wojciech Wrotkowski, which highlights the theological aspects of the preserved sentences of the philosopher from Ephesus⁵³. Wrotkowski's analyses, but also those of Kazimierz Mrówka, combine the threads of Heraclitan gnomes into a consistent system in which opposing values are harmonized as the basic property of the *logos* – on the ontical, cosmic and discursive level⁵⁴.

In the Heraclitus system, all existence is the consequence of a conflict, in other words: the conflict of contradictions that are necessary for being of things. “All things come into being and pass away (?) through strife”, as Origen summarized this view of Heraclitus⁵⁵. In a similar manner Aristotle noted the origin of things according to Heraclitus writing that “Tis strife (*erin*) that makes the world go on” (B 8)⁵⁶. The apt approach to this position is also contained in Nietzsche's comment stating:

The things in whose definiteness and endurance narrow human minds, like animal minds, believe have no real existence. They are but the flash and spark of drawn swords, the quick radiance of victory in the struggle of the opposites⁵⁷.

Tschumi, never mentioning Heraclitus, refers nevertheless directly to these views. However, Tschumi's persistence in emphasizing in his work the value of any dissociation or dissonance is based on perceiving in the structure of reality the importance of another kind of necessity, which is – apart from striving for the extraction of incompatibilities – harmonizing them at the same time. The art of architecture in this configuration is a protest against the weakening of tensions, but at the same time it is also a slowly fossilizing, from which only art can recover. Logically, it cannot be denied that harmonisation is directed towards a lack of difference, which cannot be effective neither in reality nor in the *logos* itself. Harmonisation is an astonishing coercion leading to the introduction of contradictions into the state of order. Harmonising by ordering differences tries to destroy them, but does so ineffectively, as the difference returns, revealing a more primordial disorder. According to some aspects of Derrida's philosophy, the difference is the most irremovable.

The question also arises here: is the difference apolitical in relation to the park? Surprisingly, it seems that it was a purely personal situation of Derrida and Tschumi that was the source of the philosophy discussed here. Both were emigrants trying to settle in a hostile environment. Of course, the level of reluctance towards each of them can be graded, or the reluctance of the environment towards them can be ignored at all, but the introduction of nuances is only a blurring of the obvious: they were both strangers. It is therefore justified to refer to the Parc de La Villette also as a record of painful but denied experiences. In this context, Tschumi's park would be a place of the settlement of strangeness in which, through the temporary location of a guest on the existential level, the uncertainty of the fate of the native and the foreigner was equated. They both turn out to be "a Nothing in comparison with the Infinite, an All in comparison with the Nothing, a mean between nothing and everything"⁵⁸. The park is a diminished State and a globe to which one is seemingly invited, but to a similar extent unwelcome. Doesn't that mean, however, that any delusion, and in this particular case the illusion of a tolerant society, is the only value worth insisting on?

The *logos*, manifesting itself in its confusing form, proves its uncanniness and monstrosity from the human point of view. It shows its inner tension by exposing its diversity, which means that it is audible or visible primarily in articulations containing antinomy. It becomes the speech of the universe, of which human speech is a part. Such a speech bases its value on truth, because it is in truth where the dignity of the *logos* presents itself in particular. However, it is necessary for the *logos* in question that this speech be false at the same time. The speech which is true is therefore only a convincing, cunning and insidious speech, which constantly accompanies the Greek gods or Homeric heroes, and later its character manifests itself in the philosophy of sophists or Gorgias. It can only express itself productively with the participation of beauty, which Heraclitus combined with the concept of "palintropos harmonie" ("παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη"). "The fairest harmony" (B 8)⁵⁹ is "the inverse harmony of a bow and lyre" (B 51)⁶⁰. Each point of a string is tensioned in two opposite directions. This kind of order conceals its proper nature, it does not allow to reach it easily. Hence Heraclitus states: "Harmony invisible is better than visible" (B 54)⁶¹. So it is not a coincidence that "the most beautifully adorned things are like rubbish piled up random" (B 124)⁶². When a park architect bases their design on organised disorder, in an appropriate situation the effect is identical to when the planning is based on visible regularity. However, their work requires more careful listening to the hidden *logos*. It is not to be expected that there will be a common understanding in this regard. "Of the *logos* which is as I describe it men always prove to be uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it" (B 1)⁶³.



⁵⁸ B. Pascal, *Pensées* [Thoughts], sect. II, no. 72, transl. W. F. Trotter, New York 1909, p. 58.

⁵⁹ DK B 8, Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.*, VIII, 1, 1155 b 4 (for: H. Rackham, *op. cit.*).

⁶⁰ DK B 51, Hippolytus, *Refut.*, IX, 9, 2, transl. J. H. MacMahon, [in:] P. Schaff, *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 5, *Fathers of the Third Century: Hippolytus, Cyprian, Caius, Novatian*, ed. A. Roberts, J. Donaldson, rev., chronologically arranged, pref., notes A. Cleveland Coxe, Buffalo 1886, p. 126.

⁶¹ DK B 54,, Hippolytus, *Refut.*, IX, 5, 2; as cit. in: Ch. Wordsworth, *St. Hippolytus and the Church of Rome, in the Earlier Part of the Third Century: From the newly-discovered "Philosophumena"*, London 1853, p. 235.

⁶² See W. J. Korab-Karpowicz, *The Presocratics in the Thought of Martin Heidegger*, New York 2017, p. 141; DK 22 B 124, Theophrastus, *Metaphys.*, 15: "ὄκόςπερ σάρμα εἰκὴ κεχυμένον ὁ κάλλιστος κόσμος". See also M. Heidegger, *Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking; Logic: Heraclitus's Doctrine of the Logos*, transl. J. Goesser Assaiane, S. Montgomery Ewegen, London 2018, p. 125.

⁶³ DK B 1, Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, VII, 132; as cit. in: Heraclitus, *The Cosmic Fragments*, ed., introd., comment. G. S. Kirk, Cambridge 1962, p. 33. See also: E. O'Connell, *Heraclitus and Derrida: Presocratic Deconstruction*, New York 2006, p. 24, 76, 172, 182.



⁶⁴ John Paul II, *The Stream*, [in:] *idem*, *Roman Triptych: Meditations*, transl. J. Peterkiewicz, Washington D.C. 2003.

⁶⁵ Plato, *Timaeus*, 47b-c, [in:] *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, vol. 9, transl. W. R. M. Lamb, London 1925: "God devised and bestowed upon us vision to the end that we might behold the revolutions of Reason in the Heaven and use them for the revolvings of the reasoning that is within us".

⁶⁶ Plato, *Timaeus*, 48a, [in:] *Plato...*

⁶⁷ Plato, *Timaeus*, 48a, [in:] *Plato...*: "Wherefore if one is to declare how it actually came into being on this wise, he must include also the form of the Errant Cause, in the way that it really acts (*to tês planômenês eidos aitias*)".

⁶⁸ A. Hernas, *Husserlowska wizja czasu bez przyszłości*, [in:] *Czas, przemijanie, wieczność*, ed. A. Bobko, M. Kozak, Kraków 2008, p. 53. Hernas refers to a part of Husserl's deductions, see: E. Husserl, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, "Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung" 1928, no. 9, p. 375, 438.

The *logos* may reveal itself more easily to the listener, but it also expresses itself in a kind of hollow echo or fading sound that is disturbing, hard to hear, as if there was also a powerful, influential silence in what the listener could perceive. "The Eternal Word. / How amazing is Your silence / in everything, in all that on every side / unveils the world of creation about us..."⁶⁴. The poet's words indicate that the world's speech contains sounds of silence, emptiness or nothingness saturated with energy. The force immersed in nothingness seems to be much greater than that which has passed into sensual perception. Tschumi's park is a lyre and sound of such deepening, reversing palintropical sound of the *logos*. If commentators have recognized Heraclitus' ability to hear the eternally resounding speech of the universe, one should include in such a statement the ability to hear the inaudible chords of the *logos*.

Plato, when considering the issue of palintropic harmony, pointed mainly to sight as a tool for learning about the periodic movements of reason (also referred to as divine movements), almost immediately adding that voice and hearing were also given by gods to discover the fundamental balance⁶⁵. The rediscovered rhythm is to save souls from the disorder into which cyclical movements fall in them. Cases of intemperance and lack of gracefulness result from the fact that the world "was generated as a compound, from the combination of Necessity and Reason" (*Timaeus*)⁶⁶. Plato's considerations show that necessity (*ἀνάγκη*) is surprisingly unintentional, as if blind and deaf but nevertheless it is precisely this necessity that is the moving force⁶⁷.

In a rich collection of first causes, *ἀνάγκη* is now considered to be the most originary. Musicality of this cosmic violence was the subject of many philosophical considerations, from Pythagoreans to Husserl, who referred to its regularities imposed by reason to explain the functioning of time. The problem is that necessity (with its irremovable error) must be connected with reason, which indicates that movement and lack of movement are connected with each other in the undiscovered depth. A situation of this kind led to the paradoxes of movement by Zeno of Elea, as well as difficulties in defining the time, especially in describing the present. In every more insightful description, the present turns out to be "dynamic, internally transforming and temporally extended"⁶⁸, contradicting the equally strong intuition that it is the cessation of time, its point stagnation. Platonic descriptions of the components of the world and the consequences of the philosopher's thesis for subsequent reflections on them lead to think that any balance in them, however transient it may be, is desirable with the same necessity that makes it impossible. In the most visible way, the tendency to introduce rhythmic order was manifested in architecture, but attempts to formulate an understandable characteristic of order always combined it with a non-dimensional, erotic and mystical element. Matila Ghyka quotes a fragment of Paul Valéry's *Eupalinos* in this regard:

There where the passer-by sees but an elegant chapel – ‘t is but a trifle: four columns, a very simple style – there I have enshrined the memory of a bright day in my life. O sweet metamorphosis! This delicate temple, none knows it, is the mathematical image of a girl of Corinth, whom I hapily loved. It reproduces faithfully the proportions that were peculiarly hers. It lives for me. It gives mi back what I have given it...⁶⁹

The mysteries of Eros “the greater and more hidden” (210A1)⁷⁰, are difficult to penetrate, but inevitably lead to divinity, which, in the light of the arguments conducted here, is above all the “place” of conflict. For this reason, any exacerbation of the contradictions manifested in Tschumi’s works must remain unsuccessful. The adoption of such a thesis does not rule out the possibility that any attempt to harmonise contradictions, as conservative architects have usually sought, will remain equally imperfect. Inevitably and necessarily “rubbish piled up random” must remain, in its secret principle, a part of the only *logos*. The recurring harmony entitles to recurring analogies, which leads to considering the park as a form of cult of values and features having their source in Being located outside its own borders⁷¹. Contemporary philosophy, just like all its tradition, describes this Being by new names, which must have their share in the complex interpretation of the Parisian park.

Słowa kluczowe

projekt Parku de La Villette, architektura i teoria Bernarda Tschumiego, koncepcja chôry, wyobraźnia transcendentalna, filozofia Jacquesa Derridy, różnia (*différance*)

Keywords

project of the Parc de La Villette, architecture and theory of Bernard Tschumi, concept of *chôra*, transcendental imagination, philosophy of Jacques Derrida, *différance*

References

1. **Burchill Louise**, *In-Between “Spacing” and the “Chôra” in Derrida: A Pre-Originary Medium?*, [in:] *Intermedialities: Philosophy, Arts, Politics*, ed. H. Oosterling, E. Plonowska Ziarek, Lanham 2011.
2. **Derrida Jacques**, *Différance*, [in:] *idem*, *Margins of Philosophy*, transl. A. Bass, Brighton 1982.
3. **Derrida Jacques**, *Ousia and Grammê: Note on a Note from “Being and Time”*, [in:] *idem*, *Margins of Philosophy*, transl. A. Bass, Brighton 1982.
4. **Heidegger Martin**, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, transl. J. S. Churchill, Bloomington 1965.
5. **Kant Immanuel**, *Critique of Pure Reason*, transl., ed. P. Guyer, A. W. Wood, Cambridge 1998.
6. **Tschumi Bernard**, *Questions of Space: The Pyramid and the Labyrinth (or Architectural Paradox)*, “Studio International” 1975, nr 190.



⁶⁹ M. C. Ghyka, *Le nombre d’or. Rites et rythmes pythagoriciens dans le développement de la civilisation occidentale*, Paris 1931, s. 56. P. Valéry, *Eupalinos, or The Architect*, [in:] *idem*, *Dialogues*, transl. W. McCausland Steward, pref. W. Stevens, Princeton 1989, p. 82; *idem*, *Eupalinos ou l’Architecte*, [w:] *idem*, *Oeuvres*, t. II, Paris 1960, s. 104: “Où le passant ne voit qu’une élégante chapelle, c’est peu de chose: quatre colonnes, un style très simple, j’ai mis le souvenir d’un clair jour de ma vie. O douce métamorphose ! Ce temple délicat, nul ne le sait, est l’image mathématique d’une fille de Corinthe, que j’ai heureusement aimée. Il en reproduit fidèlement les proportions particulières. Il vit pour moi! Il me rend ce que je lui ai donné...”.

⁷⁰ Plato, *Symposium*, [in:] *Dialogues of Plato*, transl. B. Jowett, 2nd ed., Oxford 1875, vol. 2, p. 61.

⁷¹ M. C. Ghyka, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

Dr. habil. Cezary Was, wascezar@gmail.com

Assistant Professor at the Institute of Art History, University of Wrocław. Curator of the Museum of Architecture. Author of the books: *Antynomie współczesnej architektury sakralnej* (Antinomies of the Contemporary Sacred Architecture, 2008), *Architektura a dekonstrukcja. Przypadek Petera Eisenmana i Bernarda Tschumi* (Architecture and Deconstruction. The case of Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi, 2015) and dozens of articles on phenomena of the ancient and modern culture.

Summary

**CEZARY WAS (University of Wrocław) / The Shadow of God in the Garden of the Philosopher
The Parc de La Villette in Paris in the context of philosophy of chôra.**

Part III

Tschumi believes that the quality of architecture depends on the theoretical factor it contains. Such a view led to the creation of architecture that would achieve visibility and comprehensibility only after its interpretation. On his way to creating such an architecture he took on a purely philosophical reflection on the basic building block of architecture, which is space. In 1975, he wrote an essay entitled *Questions of Space*, in which he included several dozen questions about the nature of space. The questions he formulated could be regarded as analogous to the situation in the philosophy of the time, in which the interest in questioning the most obvious forms of understanding the world and intellectual categories increased. The research on space is an area common to many fields of natural sciences, humanities and artistic creation, but it also deals with other problems, such as issues of experience. The concept of space-time continuum proposed by Hermann Minkowski drew attention to the identity of time and space with the events taking place. Probably regardless of the postulates of physicists commenting on Einstein's discoveries, also in philosophy it increased the importance of the concept of the event which became dominant in Heidegger's latest work *Contributions of Philosophy. Of the event*.

Furthermore, Tschumi's reflections on space entered into relation with the problem of experience, which aroused the interest of a group of French philosophers trying to assimilate Georges Bataille's concept of "inner experience". Both Tschumi and Derrida referred to Bataille because his views could be used not only to modify the concept of the subject, but also to change the understanding of what constitutes the area of architecture. The discussion on experience has led to the recognition that the subject is not sovereign, but actually a form of what is on their outside. Such insights make it possible to treat the area of the Parc de La Villette as existing mainly when it is organised by its users. The decisive features of the Park are its assumptions, according to which it is a variety of active void that leads to agreeing new social relations with it. The park does not force to participate in already existing moral or political communities, but tries to move into an unknown future in which the scope of free functioning of individuals will be increased. Doubts about the principles of functioning of the individual self and its discovery as a whole composed of non-coherent parts, as well as its dependence on its own depth full of disordered forces, influenced the understanding of architecture as a set of contradictions whose source is a fundamental void anticipating the empty phenomenal space. The use of this phenomenal void in architecture, as well as the rejection of the whole and unity, had a specific political purpose and drew its inspiration from political analyses. In the Parc de La Villette, metaphysics and politics were brought closer together because the philosophy of void was

used to create new conditions for community action. It can be argued that the source of this philosophy was the perception of errors in existing societies dependent on the shortcomings of traditional metaphysics.

Spacing (*espacement*) was one of the key terms in Derrida's philosophy, which was also combined with the concepts of *différance* and *chôra*. The study of the nature of space, especially its transition from the level of pure possibility to the level of sensual phenomenon, also contributes to understanding how well designed space can have an impact on its audience. This explanation is based on Tschumi's assumption that the space of the Parc de La Villette contradicts the integrating approaches and instead exposes contradictions, but it does so in a way that combines incompatible properties into a single piece of architecture. The specificity of such integration is similar to the invention of a musical phrase, which is an ideological message: moral and political. Such a thesis may raise doubts, however, if both the clearly adopted assumptions and those deduced from the work allow for their logically ordered presentation then to a limited extent it may be assumed that the work has achieved a connection between a specific philosophy of space and its practical application.

Derrida combined the problem of spatiality with the problem of transcendental imagination in Kant's philosophy, who in the first version of *Critique of Pure Reason* assumed that pure imagination precedes the appearance of time and space, even in their transcendental forms. The imagination in such a situation can be described as a factor activating time and space, which indicates what function is played by movement in this activity. This leads us to recognize that the ultra originary source of pure forms of sensual intuition is movement, which in early Greek philosophy was identified with void and its lack of resistance to phenomena occurring in it. Derrida's philosophy in search of a certain super-transcendental source of time and space pointed to *différance* which, like void or the *chôra*, does not have material features or even any other form of being. *Différance* is the primary cause of the disruption of motionlessness and the introduction of activity into motionless time and space, thus its activity can be described as spacing (*espacement*). Derrida's discoveries in this respect are not entirely original, because Hegel already pointed out when examining the present that it is primarily a differential relation (*differente Beziehung*), which, being seemingly neutral, influences the present with supernatural force and makes it unidentifiable with itself. *Differente Beziehung* must similarly influence the originary space, negating its initial character by multiplying its divisions and expanding its boundaries. *Différance* acts by revealing contradictions wherever there is apparent undifferentiation. Tschumi, composing the Parc de La Villette as a variety of void and a set of incompatible layers, followed the rules of *différance* or the *chôra*: he made void visible together with its saturation with contradictions.

If space can be considered to be the result of the activity of difference, such activity has a certain regularity, which influences the behaviour of its observers. Differences or contradictions fall into a certain rhythm, which can be considered a manifestation of transcendent order. The problem is that what can be considered the source of such order, namely the *logos* or God, is partly disorder and error. According to descriptions contained in *Timaeus*, the world is a combination of forces that drive to order with forces of erroneous necessity that resounds in every order and forces it to return to disorder. Derrida denied the possibility of understanding *différance* as a theological value, even if it were a negative or apophatic theology, but no categorical denial could be perfect. The assumption that *différance* or the *chôra* are not endowed with any substance properties cannot deny their activity, and thus a certain force. Already since Democritus, philosophy has multiplied the names of such a force and the contradictory variety of its manifestations, never forgetting also the necessity for reason to withdraw from the possibility of giving its correct characteristics. Such a withdrawal may be interpreted as an expression of respect and, in certain situations, as a cult of the force that precedes reasonableness. The Parc de La Villette, which is an artistic divagation about the contradictions and forces behind them, can be considered as a place of their sublimation, and therefore as a variation of the temple of what differs from order and disorder.