A connection between crusading and anti-Jewish violence was forged in 1096, first in northern France, and then, most memorably, in the cataclysmic events of the Rhineland. Thereafter, attacks on Jews and Jewish communities became a regular feature of the crusading movement, despite the efforts of ecclesiastical and secular authorities to prevent them. The Second Crusade saw renewed assaults in the Rhineland and northern France. In the Third Crusade, assaults in the Rhineland recurrent, but the worst violence this time occurred in England, where something on the order of 10% of the entire Jewish community in England perished in the massacres of 1189–1190. After the 1190s, however, direct mob violence by crusaders against Jews lessened. Although crusades would continue to provoke anti-Jewish hostility, no further armed assaults on Jewish communities, on the scale of those that took place between 1096 and 1190, would accompany the thirteenth century crusades.

Attempts to analyze this connection between crusading and anti-Jewish assaults have generally focused on the First Crusade. This is understandable, and by no means misguided. Thanks to the work of Jonathan Riley-Smith, Robert Chazan, Jeremy Cohen, Yisrael Yuval, Ivan Marcus, Kenneth Stow and others, we now understand far more about the background, nature, and causes of the events of 1096 than we did a generation ago. The assaults that accompanied the Second and Third Crusades, however, have been much less thoroughly studied than have the events of 1096. Moreover, when they have been studied, scholars have usually taken for granted the continuing influence upon these later crusades of the connection between crusading and anti-Jewish violence established in 1096. The pre-

1) Although the evidence is poor, there may have been serious attacks by crusaders in 1236 upon Jewish communities in Anjou, Poitou and possibly Brittany: for discussion, see G. MENTGEN, Kreuzzugsmentalität bei antijüdischen Aktionen nach 1190, in this volume. 1236, however, was a crusade organized without royal sponsorship, and these attacks (if they did indeed occur) took place during a period of exceptional royal weakness in areas of France where Capetian control was limited at best. They are thus quite atypical of the general pattern of thirteenth-century crusading.
sumption has been, in other words, that of course crusaders would attack Jews in 1146–7 or 1188–972), just as they had done in 1096, unless they were prevented from doing so by the intervention of some higher authority committed to Jewish protection. St Bernard of Clairvaux thus becomes the hero of the Second Crusade, because his efforts to restrain the inflammatory preaching of a rogue monk in the Rhineland are presumed to have prevented a repetition of the large-scale massacres that took place there in 1096. In a similar way, King Richard the Lionheart of England becomes the villain of the Third Crusade for having left England in December 1189, while his crusading army was still assembling. The murderous attacks that followed the king’s departure, on Jewish communities at Norwich, Bury, Stamford, Lincoln, and York, thus become the predictable, even inevitable, consequences of King Richard’s irresponsible absence from England. What else could one expect when an English king summoned a crusade, and then went off to France, without taking steps to protect his Jewish subjects from the crusaders he left behind him3)?

By presuming the ubiquity of this connection between crusading and anti-Jewish violence, however, historians have made the task of explaining the anti-Jewish violence of the Second and Third Crusades easier than perhaps it should be. King Richard, for example, clearly did not anticipate the anti-Jewish assaults that erupted during his absence. And though we may judge him naive, perhaps even negligent, he had some reason for his confidence. So far as we know, there had been no crusader attacks upon the Jews of either England or Normandy since 1096, when the Jewish community of Rouen was apparently attacked by crusaders under the leadership of Robert Curthose4). After 1096, however, the Jews of both Normandy and England seem to have been immune from crusader assault until 1190; and even then, attacks on Jews by crusaders occurred only in England. Nor was King Richard in fact so negligent in protecting the Jews of England as has often been alleged. Following the attacks on Jews that erupted during his coronation in 1189, Richard issued stern orders to all his sheriffs not to permit any recurrence of such violence in future5). Richard had every reason to expect that his orders would be obeyed. There was no tradition of crusade-connected violence against Jews in England. More-

2) I choose these dates in order to include attacks on Jews in the Rhineland connected with the Emperor Henry VI’s intended crusade. For discussion, see G. MENTGEN, Die Juden des Mittelrhein-Mosel-Gebietes im Hochmittelalter unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Kreuzzugsverfolgungen, in: Monatshefte für Evangelische Kirchengeschichte des Rheinlandes 44 (1995), pp. 37–75, at pp. 72–73; and IDEM (supra, n. 1).


over, in Germany, where there was such a tradition of violence, similar protective orders from Frederick Barbarossa in 1188 are widely credited with having prevented crusade-connected assaults on Jews in the Rhineland. Why should King Richard have presumed that his orders would be any less effective in England than were Barbarossa’s in Germany?

The relative security of Anglo-Norman Jewry prior to 1189–90 is all the more striking when we take into account the accumulating evidence for the significant participation of Englishmen and Normans in both the First and the Second Crusade. It is simply not possible, in other words, to explain the apparent immunity of Anglo-Norman Jewry from crusader assaults on the grounds that prior to 1190, England and Normandy had been isolated from the main currents of crusading enthusiasm. Nor can we explain this security as a simple consequence of overweening royal and ducal power. In 1096, William Rufus’s strength may have played some role in protecting the Jews of London, but Robert Curthose’s authority as duke did not deter an attack on the Jews of Rouen. Recruitment for the Second Crusade, by contrast, took place in the midst of a devastating Anglo-Norman civil war that shook the political foundations of both realms. As the Life of St William of Norwich reveals, King Stephen’s capacity to protect his Jewish subjects in England was at a low ebb in 1146 and 1147, even in those areas of the country Stephen still controlled. And even within these areas, it is not entirely clear that Stephen still exercised the exclusive lordship that King Henry I had claimed over all Jewish communities in England.

In Normandy, where the dukes had never exercised exclusive lordship over all Jews, Geoffrey of Anjou was still in the process of establishing his authority within the newly-conquered duchy as the Second Crusade was gathering. His capacity to protect the Jews of Normandy from crusader assault cannot have been greater than was Stephen’s in England, and may well have been less. Yet despite the weakness of both Stephen and Geoffrey, we know of no attacks on the Jews of either England or Normandy in connection with the Second Crusade.


8) A. Jessopp and M. R. James, eds., The Life and Miracles of St William of Norwich by Thomas of Monmouth, 1896.

This fact is even more striking when we remember that it was precisely at this moment that the ritual crucifixion charge makes its first appearance on the European scene. Knowledge of the charge spread quickly, from Norwich where it began to other parts of England and to the continent. References to William’s martyrdom appear in Norman chronicles by the early 1160s; by 1163, there was already a shrine to a similar child martyr in Paris. In Germany, the charge may have been known even earlier. As Professor John McCulloh has recently pointed out, references to William’s alleged crucifixion appear in a Regensburg martyrlogy compiled during the late 1140s or early 1150s. And this fact must in turn lend additional support to Professor Friedrich Lotter’s argument, following the lead of Yisrael Yuval, that knowledge of William’s martyrdom lay behind the events of 1147 at Wurzburg. Here, a group of crusaders in the entourage of the King Conrad discovered the dismembered body of a Christian man. Concluding that Jews had murdered him, the crusaders promptly massacred more than twenty of the local Jewish population, and began to venerate the corpse as the remains of a martyr. This cult was suppressed by imperial and episcopal authority, but only with considerable difficulty, and at the price of a riot.

By the 1180s, shrines to child martyrs such as William of Norwich existed not only at Norwich itself, but also at Paris, Gloucester, and Bury St Edmunds, and the ritual crucifixion charge was already ramifying into a more easily generalizable suspicion that Jews would maliciously murder Christians of almost any age if given the opportunity. Yet in England, where charges of ritual or malicious murder were particularly widely known, they inspired no violence against any Jewish community until 1189–90, even though the ritual crucifixion charge first arose in England during the recruitment campaigns for the Second Crusade. Why should this have been so? If anti-Jewish violence on the part of crusaders was so regular and predictable a feature of northern European crusading as we have been led to believe, why were there so few attacks by crusaders upon Jewish communities in Normandy and England prior to 1189–90? And why, when attacks finally did occur in

13) The importance of this more general charge of malicious murder was pointed out to me by my friend Robert Chazan.
the Anglo-Norman realm, were these attacks limited to England, the most tightly governed kingdom in twelfth century Europe?

From whatever angle we approach it, the apparent immunity of Anglo-Norman Jewry from crusader assault prior to 1189-90 seems odd, and therefore interesting. How, then, ought we to explain it? Several logical possibilities present themselves. We might, perhaps, question the basic presumption noted at the beginning of this paper, that the events of 1096 established so essential a connection between anti-Jewish violence and crusading as to render it unnecessary to explain why subsequent outbreaks of crusader violence occurred when and where they did. We might, in other words, reverse the question, and suggest that it is not the absence of violence from England and Normandy, but the outbreaks of violence elsewhere, that require explanation; and we might then proceed to investigate the specific circumstances and conditions that could explain why crusaders attacked particular Jewish communities on the continent when and where they did.

As a research plan, this may be a useful proposal. As an analysis of the way in which twelfth century people perceived the world in which they lived, however, it is flawed. The evidence is simply overwhelming that, after 1096, Jews throughout western Europe simply took for granted the fact that crusaders meant trouble. Christian authorities made the same presumption. Bernard of Clairvaux’s letters condemning crusader attacks on Jews and ordering protection for Jewish communities are well known from the Second Crusade, and were sent even to countries, like England, where no previous such attacks had occurred. Bernard clearly presumed that the crusade carried with it the possibility of attacks on Jewish communities even where there was no previous history of such assaults. Recognition of the threat crusaders posed to Jewish communities was never sufficient to dampen ecclesiastical ardor for crusading, but it was sufficient to put church authorities on guard against subsequent outbreaks of crusader violence comparable to those of 1096. Throughout the twelfth century, Jewish and Christian authorities thus seem to have been agreed that there was a predictable connection between crusading and anti-Jewish violence. In England, however, that linkage did not manifest itself until the Third Crusade. Why then did it only emerge at this time?

The answer to this question reflects some important general developments that took place in the crusading movement during the twelfth century, which in turn had a very particular significance in England. It will be necessary to consider both these general developments and the specific circumstances which in England led up to the assaults of 1189-1190. But let us begin with the general developments first.

Financing crusades was a formidable challenge. To get to Jerusalem, the vast majority of crusaders would need to borrow money, probably something like three to four times their annual revenues if they wished to travel to and from the Holy Land in any sort of

style at all\(^5\). The difficulty of securing such funds was apparent even to Pope Urban II, who quickly took steps to encourage monasteries to lend money to crusaders as a pious contribution to the crusading cause\(^6\). Monasteries were already well-established sources of credit in the eleventh century world\(^7\), and the crusade offered a chance to combine piety and profit in ways that many monastic houses found irresistible. The result, as is well known, was a noticeable surge in monastic land acquisitions during and after the First Crusade, sufficient in some areas as to actually lower the value of land\(^8\).

Not all crusaders, however, enjoyed the sorts of links with monasteries that would enable them to secure such loans. Nor did most crusaders have adequate lands to offer up in mortgage in the first place. A lucky few might attach themselves to greater lords, who did have such connections with monastic lenders. The majority of crusaders, however, had to borrow what they could by pledging what they had, and hope to make up the rest of their costs through charity and plunder.

Merchants were obvious sources of cash, and some of the merchants to whom crusaders turned to sell or pledge their plate, furs, and robes will likely have been Jews. As moneylenders, however, Jews in 1096 were not yet the significant figures in European credit markets that they would become by the end of the twelfth century. Whether as merchants or as moneylenders, Jews can have made only a miniscule contribution to the financing of the First Crusade.

As targets of extortion and plunder, however, Jews contributed much more to the costs of crusading. Partly this was simply the consequence of Jewish occupations and crusader opportunities. As members of largely mercantile communities, Jews were a visibly prosperous group in the towns of late eleventh century northern Europe, and were therefore an obvious group from whom to extort or steal cash. There was also, however, an ideological element in the crusaders’ deliberate victimization of Jewish communities. By 1096, Jews were already firmly identified as the people who had killed the crusaders’ savior\(^9\); and there was a sense, therefore, in which the crusaders could and did regard Jews as being no less responsible than were the Muslims for the necessity of the Crusade\(^20\). That being

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17) R. Général, Rôle des Monastères comme établissements de crédit etudié en Normandie du XI\(e\) à la fin du XIII\(e\) siècle, 1901.

18) Riley-Smith (supra, n. 15), pp. 44-47; Constable (supra, n. 15), pp. 71-76.


20) Although their thesis is much overstated, there is thought-provoking material in the notes to A. H. and H. E. Cutler, The Jew as Ally of the Muslim: Medieval Roots of Anti-Semitism, 1986.
so, what then could be more appropriate than that the Jewish communities through which the crusading armies passed should be made to pay the costs of such a holy and necessary expedition?

This idea took root remarkably quickly amongst the crusading armies. We see it already in existence in northern France in the winter of 1095–6, in the well-known efforts by Peter the Hermit and Godfrey of Bouillon to extort protection money from Jewish communities in France and Lotharingia. I suspect that it lay behind the events at Rouen as well. And the same idea touched off the events in the Rhineland in the spring of 1096, as Jonathan Riley-Smith has also suggested. I do not deny that notions of vengeance played a powerful role in these Rhineland massacres and suicides. Nor do I wish to dismiss the eschatological associations that developed around Emicho of Flonheim as the massacres proceeded and spread. What I do want to suggest, however, is that the essence of the link between Jews and crusader violence, from 1096 on, lay in the notion that because Jews were responsible for dishonoring Jesus through his crucifixion and death, they ought therefore to pay for the costs of recovering Jesus’s lands through the crusade. «Honor» was, of course, a word with many meanings in the eleventh century. As the famous exchange between Hugh de Lusignan and Duke William V of Aquitaine reveals, «honor» was a concept that could combine personal prestige and the possession of property into an inseparable amalgam of status and landholding. It was with precisely this understanding, I suggest, that the First Crusaders set out to restore the honor of Christ and Christendom in the East. Jews had dishonored Jesus by denying and crucifying him. It was only right, therefore, that Jews be compelled to assist in restoring the lands which comprised his earthly honor.

Forcible conversion was one approach to restoring Jesus’s honor; extortion and plunder of Jewish possessions was another. Crusaders chose between these approaches as circum-

26) See, for example, Baldric of Bourgueil, Historia Jerosolimitana, Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux, iv, 1879, p. 101, transl. in: Riley-Smith (supra, n. 15), pp. 48–49. Baldric makes precisely this point but casts Muslims in the role of Christ’s crucifiers.
stances and emotions dictated. Often, the two approaches overlapped. In the Rhineland and in northern France, attacks that began as plundering expeditions quickly led on to baptisms, especially of Jewish children\(^\text{27}\). Both the right to plunder and the obligation to convert arose, however, from the same bedrock of assumptions about the connections between Jews and Crusades. By the crucifixion, and by their continuing denial of his messiahship, Jews were seen by crusaders as depriving Jesus of the honor that was rightfully his. Jews ought, therefore, to be forced to restore that honor, either directly (by becoming Christians) or indirectly (by paying the expenses of crusading Christians).

The connection forged in 1096 between Jews and crusading continued to develop throughout the twelfth century. In the Second Crusade, the 1096 pattern recurred, with crusaders once again extorting protection money from Jewish communities in the Rhineland on the promise not to mount direct attacks\(^\text{28}\). At the same time, however, changes in the ways crusades were financed during the twelfth century strengthened, in unexpected ways, the connection that had already been established between Jewish wealth and the expenses of crusading. Efforts by the church to ban moneylending by clerics were not fully effective, but by the 1140s they had made it difficult for monasteries to lend money to crusaders in the ways they had done in 1096\(^\text{29}\). Credit mechanisms were also becoming increasingly sophisticated. By the mid-twelfth century, most of the legal devices that would characterize thirteenth-century moneylending were already fully developed. From the Second Crusade on, therefore, when crusaders looked to borrow money, they turned increasingly to men for whom moneylending was a business rather than a charitable obligation. The majority of these men were Christians, a development reflected in the provisions of \textit{Quantum predecessores} that prohibited the collection of interest by Christians on loans made to crusaders\(^\text{30}\). But in growing numbers, Jews too were finding a place in the business of lending money, particularly, one suspects, among the less-wealthy and less-powerful borrowers\(^\text{31}\).

In 1145, Pope Eugenius III took note of these changes by ordering Christian lenders to absolve crusaders from their oaths to pay interest on their loans, and by declaring a mora-

\(^{27}\) Guibert of Nogent, ed. \textit{Labande} (supra, n. 5), pp. 246–248.

\(^{28}\) Ephraim of Bonn, in: \textit{Habermann} (supra, n. 6), pp. 115–116; translation in: \textit{CSJ} (supra, n. 6), pp. 107–108. Although Bernard of Clairvaux rejected calls to kill Jews, he nowhere objected to the extortion of protection money from Jewish communities by crusading armies. Ephraim of Bonn’s account makes clear that the Rhineland Jewish communities paid protection money to the crusaders even after Bernard had rebuked and silenced the monk Ralph.

\(^{29}\) Such lending had not stopped entirely, as the provisions of \textit{Quantum predecessores} that deal with ecclesiastical mortgage-holding make clear: PL 180, cols. 1064–1066; \textit{Constable} (supra, n. 15), pp. 72–73.

\(^{30}\) See note 29.

torium on repayment of the principal on such loans for the duration of the Crusade. In 1146, Bernard of Clairvaux called upon the kings of Europe to extend the Pope's provisions to Jewish lenders also – advice which the crusading King Louis VII quickly heeded by annulling all interest on the debts crusaders had contracted with Jews. Peter the Venerable, the abbot of Cluny, went even further. Declaring all Jewish wealth to be the product of moneylending, and hence of theft, Peter argued for a total confiscation of all Jewish property, with the proceeds to be applied to the expenses of the Crusade. In the thirteenth century, the connection Peter drew between Jews, moneylending, and crusading would become a commonplace, so much so, indeed, that rulers of tender conscience who confiscated Jewish property were regularly advised to donate that property to the crusade, so as to cleanse it from the taint of its usurious origins.

Peter the Venerable's claims notwithstanding, Jews were in fact still relatively minor figures in mid-twelfth century moneylending; but as his remarks reveal, Jews were already coming to be identified by their Christian neighbors as quintessential moneylenders, for reasons having less to do with economic reality than with Christian theological beliefs about Jewish carnality and the contaminating nature of money. Certainly Jews were more prominent in moneylending by the 1140s than they had been in 1096; but in 1146, when King Louis VII of France moved to extend the terms of Quantum predecessores so as to annul interest payments owed by crusaders to Jewish lenders, his motives were as much theological as economic. By 1187, however, when Audita tremendi renewed and extended the provisions of Quantum predecessores, Jewish lenders had become critical figures in crusade finance. Papally-ordered cancellations of interest charges, however, still

32) See note 29.
applied only to loans raised by crusaders from other Christians\textsuperscript{38}). The popes had no direct jurisdiction over Jewish moneylenders. In the Third Crusade as in the Second, therefore, crusaders who hoped to have their Jewish debts annulled could look for relief only to kings or to a mob.

This is the first of the general changes in crusading that took place during the twelfth century: a growing identification between crusader indebtedness and Jewish moneylending, rooted in the conviction that Jews had a special responsibility to pay for the costs of crusading. The second major change in twelfth century crusading is related to it: the growing identification of the crusading movement with kings. Kings had been deliberately excluded from the First Crusade, but from the Second Crusade on they were seen as the natural leaders of the crusading movement. This royal involvement brought with it a new and ominous element in the developing relationship between crusades and anti-Jewish violence.

From 1146 on, the obligation to avenge the dishonored Christ fell first and foremost upon the crusading kings who undertook these expeditions. Crusading kings were expected, therefore, to ensure that Jews helped pay the costs of crusades, whether by annulling the debts crusaders owed to Jewish moneylenders or by confiscating Jewish property and applying it directly to the crusading cause. But success in a crusade depended not only upon money. It depended also upon the moral and religious purity of the Christian people who undertook the crusade: upon the modesty of their dress, the purity of their morals, and the piety of their lives\textsuperscript{39}. Jews were perceived as a threat to such purity; moneylending aside, the mere presence of Jews in a kingdom could appear as a source of pollution. The moral requirements of crusading thus gave rise to a variety of non-economic restrictions on Jews also, most famously the Jewish badge, imposed at the Fourth Lateran Council in preparation for a new crusade to the East. The badge, of course, was a papal imposition, but like the myriad other restrictions Christians imposed on Jews in connection with crusading, its enforcement rested entirely upon kings. Kings would of course retain their traditional roles as the protectors of their Jewish subjects, but from the mid-twelfth century on they would also be held responsible for the success of the crusading armies they led. In the conflict of obligations that resulted, it was the crusade that triumphed.

What happened, in short, is that in the course of the twelfth century the link between anti-Jewish violence and crusading became royalized, and in this royalized form it would continue throughout the thirteenth century. From 1146 until at least 1291, proper kings

\textsuperscript{38}) Only in 1198 did the papacy attempt, for the first time, to coerce Jewish lenders to remit interest to crusaders: see K. R. Strow, Papal and Royal Attitudes toward Jewish Lending in the Thirteenth Century, in: Association for Jewish Studies Review 6 (1981), pp. 161–184.

were under an obligation to lead a crusade. And part of the job of leading a crusade was to ensure that Jewish property helped to pay for it, while Jews lives were ringed about by new statutory restrictions of various kinds. Kings could be more subtle than were the crusaders of 1096. They could confiscate Jewish property and expel Jewish populations without necessarily having to murder their Jewish subjects. But their assumptions in so doing were, in essence, the same as those of the crusaders in 1096: Jewish property ought to be devoted to defraying the expenses of crusading; and crusaders therefore had a right, even a responsibility, to ensure that this occurred.

Kings who failed to live up to their obligations as crusaders put their thrones at risk. In 1247, King Sancho of Portugal was deposed as a *rex inutilis* for failing to prosecute the crusading wars against the Muslims. In England, the failure of King Henry III to fulfill his own crusading obligations helped structure the political opposition which nearly brought him down. In 1215 and again in 1264, English armies in rebellion against their king assumed crusader crosses; while in Germany the crusade became a critical issue in the papacy's attempts to depose the Emperor Frederick II. But this connection between crusading and political opposition to kings dates back even further than 1215. It began in the preparations for the Third Crusade. And it led to the notorious assaults on the Jewish communities of England in 1189–90 to which we must now turn.

King Henry II was the first king of England to promise to go on crusade. Like so many of that wily king's promises, however, this one too went unfulfilled throughout his long reign. Henry sent large sums of money to the Holy Land, and in 1172 promised to go himself. But he never went, and never showed any serious prospect of going. Even when Jerusalem fell to Saladin in 1187, Henry himself did little. It was his eldest surviving son, Richard the Lionheart, who immediately took the cross, the first transalpine prince to do so. Henry first tried to talk Richard out of his vow, but when this failed Henry took the cross himself, together with King Philip of France. Henry and Philip imposed heavy taxes on their territories to support their intended expedition, and made preliminary arrangements to regulate the crusading armies they proposed to summon. But the armies themselves never gathered. Instead, border wars between Henry and Philip escalated, as did conflict between Richard and Henry over the succession to the aging king's empire. In the last six months of Henry's life, Richard allied himself with King Philip, and a full-scale

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41) Stacey (supra, n. 39), pp. 137–150.
war broke out between the erstwhile crusading allies. When Henry finally died, on 6 July 1189, Richard inherited the entirety of his father’s empire and began in earnest to organize the crusade his father had for so long promised.

Grievances against Henry II’s government had accumulated rapidly in the old king’s last years. By 1189, even his closest supporters had come to resent Henry’s failure to reward loyal service, his chicanery and his broken promises. Richard was a man of very different reputation, and his succession was greeted with jubilation by his subjects. Almost everyone, it seemed, had a grievance they expected the new king to remedy, or a promise they hoped he would fulfill. Every new king confronted such expectations, but Richard’s status as a crusader lent them a particular urgency. Crusading kings had an obligation to do justice at home before embarking on their pilgrimage abroad, and the new king gave every indication that he would take these obligations seriously. Prison gates were opened, Queen Eleanor was released from confinement, the old king’s officials were dismissed, and noble heirs were restored to their property, all before the new king himself even set foot in England.

To many of Richard’s English subjects, however, both justice and the crusade demanded that the new king also take measures against Jews and Jewish moneylending. Jews were relative newcomers to England. They had arrived only after the Norman Conquest, and had begun to move outward from London only in the 1140s. Fantasies that these newcomers might be expelled from England were already circulating in the 1140s. But talk of an expulsion seems to have increased during the 1180s, as the Jewish population of England grew, moved northward, and became more dependent upon moneylending for its livelihood. A Lincolnshire knight named Roger de Asterby had even appealed to the king himself, warning that if Henry did not expel the Jews, he would die miserably within four years.

Henry, however, did not expel the Jews. Quite the opposite. When Aaron of Lincoln died in 1186, King Henry confiscated the entirety of his estate, and then sent royal officials out to collect Aaron’s debts from his Christian debtors. This marked a dangerous new development in the crown’s relationship to Jewish moneylending. Aaron was by far the wealthiest man in England. At a time when a thousand pounds a year was a substantial income for an earl, Aaron may have been owed as much as £ 50,000 by his debtors. His business connections extended throughout England, but the center of his operations lay in the north, in Lincolnshire and Yorkshire, where more than half his recorded debtors

46) Jessopp and James (supra, n. 8), pp. 25, 47, 97.
resided. By confiscating Aaron's bonds for collection on the crown's behalf, Henry accomplished two things, both dangerous. First, he identified his government directly with Jewish moneylending in a way it had never previously been. As a result, by 1189 English chroniclers were speaking openly of Jews as «the royal usurers»\(^{48}\). Second, Henry profoundly alienated the northern gentry, who made up the bulk of Aaron's debtors. Both these developments were new, and both are important for understanding the events of 1189–90.

Nor did Henry act to reduce the burden of Jewish debts borne by intending crusaders. In 1188, he pronounced his sole piece of crusade legislation, permitting crusaders to retain one year's income from their mortgaged estates\(^{49}\). But this was a measure aimed almost entirely at Christian lenders, not at Jews, who by and large did not lend by mortgages in the first place.

The contrast with King Philip of France could not have been starker. In 1181, Philip had pardoned all debts owed by Christians to Jews on royal lands, and in 1182 had expelled the entire Jewish population from the royal demesne. Now a crusader, King Philip could hardly do more than he had already done to respond to his subjects' expectations that a crusading monarch should take steps to limit Jews and Jewish moneylending. But could the crusading King Richard afford to do less? That was the question on the minds of Richard's English subjects as his coronation approached.

For the Jews of England, the entire situation boded ill. They knew almost nothing about Richard, but they were anxious to establish good relations with the new monarch, not least so as to avoid the kinds of disasters that had occurred elsewhere in connection with crusades. A delegation of leading members of the Jewish community resolved, therefore, to present themselves at Richard's coronation\(^{50}\). Such appearances were common enough at twelfth century continental coronations, and usually involved the presentation of gifts and perhaps a symbolic payment of tribute. On September 2, however, the day before his coronation at Westminster Abbey, Richard banned both women and Jews from attending it. The ban on women may have been traditional\(^{51}\). The ban on Jews almost certainly was not.

Prohibited from appearing in the Abbey Church, the Jewish representatives decided instead to approach the king at the banquet that followed in the royal hall. But when they arrived at the banquet hall door, they were repulsed and beaten by the king's doorkeepers, who evidently believed that the king's ban pertained to the hall no less than to the Abbey Church. The crowd gathered outside the hall, seeing royal officials attacking the Jewish

\(^{48}\) William of Newburgh, in: Howlett, ed. (supra, n. 5), i, pp. 322–323.

\(^{49}\) Howden, Chronic, ed. Stubbs (supra, n. 45), ii, p. 337.

\(^{50}\) Gesta Henrici, ed. Stubbs (supra, n. 5), ii, p. 83; Howden, Chronic, ed. Stubbs (supra, n. 45), iii, p. 12; William of Newburgh, ed. Howlett (supra, n. 5), i, pp. 294–295.

\(^{51}\) Gillingham (supra, n. 44), p. 130.
magnates, quickly concluded that the king had ordered the assault, and joined in it. In the resulting melee, Benedict of York was nearly killed; to save himself, he accepted a hasty, and quickly regretted, baptism.

News of the attack reached London almost immediately. When it did, »a most pleasing rumor (rumor gratissimus) swept through all London with incredible speed, that the king had commanded that all the Jews be eliminated«.52) Excited by the crusade and encouraged by Richard’s edict banning Jews from his coronation, the Londoners had clearly been anticipating that the new king would act decisively against the Jews. What they were anticipating, it appears, was an expulsion; and so when news of the assault in Westminster reached London, it immediately touched off a full-scale riot against the Jewish community of the city. Damage to property was extensive, and as many as one hundred Jews may have been killed.

Richard’s reaction to this riot was interestingly ambivalent. On the following day, he sent special messengers to every county in England ordering that Jews be left in peace.53) It was clearly not his intention that the Jews of England be expelled, eliminated, or forcibly converted to Christianity; and so he permitted Benedict of York to return to Judaism.54) At the same time, however, the London rioters went essentially unpunished. No communal or individual fines were imposed, and only three rioters were hung, »one because he had stolen the property of a Christian, and the other two because they had set fire to the city, whence the houses of Christians were burned«.55) In his Chronicle, Roger Howden makes the point explicit: the three rioters were hung «not for the sake of the Jews, but on account of the houses and property of Christians which they had burned and plundered«.56)

The king’s leniency was widely publicized; we must presume, therefore, that it was purposeful. In Yorkshire, William of Newburgh worried that it might encourage future disturbances, but concluded that the king had had little choice but to act as he did. Almost the entire population of London had participated in the riot, said Newburgh; and they had been joined by the knights and servants of the noblemen in attendance at Richard’s coronation. Plainly it was impossible to punish so many, a fact in which Newburgh discerned the hand of God. »It was useful therefore to ignore what he could not avenge, God doubtless arranging it so that as few as possible of those who stepped forward as the ministers of Divine vengeance against infidels and blasphemers should be brought before human judgement on that account«.57)

52) William of Newburgh, ed. HOWLETT (supra, n. 5), i, p. 295.
53) William of Newburgh, ed. HOWLETT (supra, n. 5), i, pp. 298–299, 313, 323; Gesta Henrici, ed. STUBBS (supra, n. 5), ii, p. 83.
54) The story is in Howden, Chronica, ed. STUBBS (supra, n. 45), iii, pp. 12–13.
56) Howden, Chronica, ed. STUBBS (supra, n. 45), iii, p. 12; SINGER (supra, n. 55), p. 82.
57) William of Newburgh, ed. HOWLETT (supra, n. 5), i, pp. 298–299.
Newburgh’s analysis notwithstanding, Richard certainly could have fined the citizens of London for their conduct had he chosen to do so. But he did not. His eyes were on Jerusalem. He was not about to risk the crusade by alienating the city of London or his noble companions in arms by overreacting to a riot against Jews. He put the riot behind him, and in the next three months turned his attention toward collecting the men and money he would need for the crusade.

Despite his devotion to the crusade, Richard thus did little to respond to his subjects’ expectations that he would take action against Jews and Jewish moneylending. He did not expel Jews from the kingdom; he did not even pardon debts owed by crusaders to Jews. Instead he carried on the highly unpopular policies of his father’s government. He continued to collect debts owed to Aaron of Lincoln, and he continued to guarantee the legal rights of Jews to lend money, even to crusaders. He renewed his father’s charter of protection for the Jews of England and Normandy, and he issued additional charters of his own. It was not at all what his subjects had expected from their crusading monarch.

Faced with Richard’s failure to fulfill their expectations, the crusading armies took matters into their own hands. Less than two months after King Richard’s departure for Normandy, the first armed attacks on Jews by crusaders began in East Anglia. At Norwich on 6 February, crusaders attacked Jewish houses, murdering the inhabitants and systematically looting their property. Another attack, less clearly crusade connected, occurred at King’s Lynn. On Palm Sunday, yet another assault occurred, this time at Bury St Edmunds, where between 50 and 100 Jews were killed.

As Easter approached, the attacks on Jewish communities began to multiply, giving the impression of an organized campaign of anti-Jewish violence by the crusading forces. At Stamford in Lincolnshire, the Jewish community was attacked on 7 March by a group of young crusaders gathered at the annual Stamford fair. William of Newburgh explains their motives in these words: “Indignant that the enemies of Christ who lived there possessed so much, when they themselves had less than enough for their journey, they determined to extort from the Jews such unjust possessions, so that they could apply what they took to the necessary expenses of their pilgrimage.” One could hardly wish for a more explicit statement of the ideology that linked crusading with anti-Jewish violence. What had changed since 1096 was simply the presumption that the responsibility for confiscating Jewish property on behalf of the crusade now lay, first and foremost, with kings. If kings failed to act, however, crusaders would act in their place, just as they had done in 1096.

58) Foedera (1816), i, p. 51; Public Record Office, C 52/21 m. 3.
59) William of Newburgh, ed. Howlett (supra, n. 5), i, pp. 310–312; Radulphi de Diceto Opera Historica, ed. W. Stubbs, RS, 1876, ii, pp. 75–76.
60) William of Newburgh, ed. Howlett (supra, n. 5), i, p. 310.
The attack at Lincoln seems to have been a local affair. Although it followed only a few days after the assault at nearby Stamford, none of the contemporary chroniclers report that crusaders were involved. Royal records suggest the same conclusion: all the men who were later punished for their involvement in the riot were either citizens of Lincoln or residents of the immediately surrounding countryside. These attacks were suppressed by the personal bravery of St Hugh of Avalon, bishop of the city and one of the most sympathetic figures of the 12th century, and seem to have resulted in only a few Jewish casualties. If our narrative sources were better, or if subsequent investigations of the attack by royal officials had been more thorough, we might well find that crusading knights were, in fact, involved in the attack at Lincoln, as they were elsewhere. We might also be able to verify the hunch that the rioters who invaded Lincoln Cathedral, only to be repulsed by St Hugh, were looking to destroy records of Jewish debts that were stored there. At Lincoln, however, we do not have such information. At York, we do.

The massacre and mass-suicide of the Jewish community of York on Shabbat hagadol was the product of a conspiracy organized and led by several of the leading members of the Yorkshire gentry. In contrast to Lincoln, however, this attack was by no means a purely local affair. The principal conspirators had familial and tenural links not only with each other, but also with some of the most powerful men in England, including the king’s brother, Prince John, and Hugh de Puiset, Bishop of Durham and co-justiciar of England. The newly-installed sheriff of York, John Marshal, was the brother of William Marshal, a member of the council King Richard had appointed to rule England during his absence. Another brother, Henry Marshal, had just been appointed dean of York Cathedral chapter; while Burchard de Puiset, one of Hugh de Puiset’s several sons, was the newly-appointed cathedral treasurer. Both were opponents of the exiled archbishop-elect of York, Geoffrey Plantegenet, the illegitimate son of King Henry II and half-brother to both King Richard and Prince John. And all were the political opponents of William de Longchamp, Bishop of Ely and the other co-justiciar of England appointed by King Richard.

What took place at York is well known, and need not be recounted here. What we must consider, however, is the connection between these events and the crusade. William of Newburgh gives us an analysis of the conspirators’ motives which can hardly be bettered.

64) R. B. Dobson, The Jews of Medieval York and the Massacre of March 1190, 1974, is the standard account.
The authors of this daring plan were certain nobles indebted to these impious usurers for great sums, some of whom, having handed over their property to them for loans, were now oppressed by great want; others, obligated by their own pledges, were being continuously pressed by the exactors of the exchequer to satisfy the royal usurers; while others, who had taken the sign of the Cross, were now readying themselves for their journey to Jerusalem, and could be all the more easily impelled to meet the expenses of a journey undertaken for God out of plunder taken from God’s enemies, especially as they had little fear of being questioned for the deed once they had started on their journey. 65) Behind Newburgh’s remarks, we can hear the grievances that had arisen as a result of the crown’s efforts to collect Aaron of Lincoln’s debts on its own behalf; and we can hear too the influence of this long-established connection between Jewish wealth and crusading expenses.

We should note also, however, the extent to which the attacks at York reflected regional animosities between the northerners and the crown; and the way in which the conspirators’ political connections lead us straight into the factional conflicts that were already embroiling the absent king’s government in England. For nearly two decades, northern society had been dominated by two powerful patronage networks, one controlled by Ranulf de Glanvil, the other by Bishop Hugh de Puiset. Glanvil, however, had either been dismissed by King Richard, or else had resigned, as justiciar of England and sheriff of Yorkshire shortly after the new king’s coronation. Hugh de Puiset was, for the moment, still secure, but his position at court was being steadily undermined by the rising man in Richard’s administration, William de Longchamp, Bishop of Ely, chancellor of England and co-justiciar with Hugh de Puiset. Richard seems to have hoped to control the north with new men, in particular his brothers John and Geoffrey. Neither, however, had as yet had adequate time to establish himself in the region, and neither was himself a northerner. The result in 1190, as Barrie Dobson has pointed out, was “a quite exceptional crisis of authority” [...] both the city and the county of York. 66) Almost all the men whose duty it was to protect the Jews of York in March 1190 were either absent from the county or uncertain of their authority within it. Those who attacked and massacred the Jews of York, on the other hand, were men with wide connections in local society and important links to the political opponents of William de Longchamp around the royal court.

News of the massacre at York reached the king’s court in Normandy within a week. 67) William de Longchamp was immediately commissioned to deal with the rioters. Returning to England, he gathered an army, marched north, and used the opportunity to eliminate the influence of his political opponents. Hugh de Puiset was stripped of his position at the exchequer, and restricted to a single one of his episcopal manors. Those of the York con-

66) Dobson (supra, n. 64), p. 31, order of phrases rearranged.
spirators who were most closely associated with Puisset lost their lands and fled to Scotland. The rest, however, went essentially unpunished. John Marshal was dismissed as sheriff of Yorkshire, and replaced by Longchamp’s brother Osbert. Longchamp laid an interdict on York Cathedral, excommunicated both Burchard de Puisset and Henry Marshal, and then turned west to attack William Marshal’s castle at Gloucester. The castle, however, held, and within a year, Longchamp’s opponents had rallied. When Longchamp fell from power in 1191, the Marshals were among his principal opponents, in an alliance led by Prince John, and that included Hugh de Puisset and the principal York conspirators, who now returned to England in the Prince’s entourage and speedily recovered their estates.

Behind the massacres of 1189–90 in England there thus lay a complicated mixture of anti-Jewish prejudice and hostility: of sadism, greed, carnival and riot; of economic resentment and regional hostility; of political rivalry; and of protest against the crown’s relationship to Jews and Jewish moneylending. The crusade did not create these hostilities and resentments, but it did establish a presumption on the part of Richard’s subjects that he would deal with them. When he came to the throne in 1189, many of his English subjects clearly expected their crusader king to reduce or end their indebtedness to Jews. Some even expected him to expel the Jews from England. Richard did not live up to their expectations. The frustrations of those who awaited such actions from their new monarch were all the greater, however, because their hopes for him had initially been so high. The king, moreover, had encouraged these hopes, first by taking the cross, then by banning Jews from his coronation, and finally by his leniency in punishing the rioters at Westminster and London. But then he changed course, renewing royal protection for the English Jewish community, and continuing to collect the enormous debts his Christian subjects owed to Aaron of Lincoln. The assaults on the Jewish communities of northern and eastern England that followed Richard’s departure for Normandy were an exercise in self-help by men who felt betrayed on many levels by the new king’s government. Richard had not taken the anti-Jewish actions the crusade demanded of kings; and so his subjects stepped in to make good his failure.

Strikingly, however, this sense of betrayal did not attach to Richard himself. Many of those who took part in the anti-Jewish assaults of 1190 were crusaders, who departed almost immediately thereafter to join their king on his expedition to the east. These are not the ordinary actions of men who feel themselves betrayed by their monarch. Nor did Richard’s own reputation as a crusader suffer from his failure to take the anti-Jewish measures his subjects expected of him. Quite the contrary: Richard became in his lifetime, and remained long after his death, the very epitome of the royal crusader. Must we, then, with-

draw the claim that the obligation to expropriate Jewish property in the name of the crusade had become by 1190 an expected element in crusading kingship? If the massacres of 1190 emerged out of anger at royal policy towards Jews and Jewish lending, why then did the blame for this policy not attach to King Richard?

The answer, I believe, is because the blame for Richard's Jewish policies was assigned to Longchamp. It was Longchamp who, as chancellor, sealed the writs and charters that protected Jews, and who, as justiciar, supervised the collection and enforcement of Jewish debts through the exchequer. It was Longchamp whom the chroniclers identified as the man responsible for the crown's fiscal exploitation of the English Jews69, and it was Longchamp who was called upon to punish those responsible for the massacres of 1190. Richard's faithful servant in all things, Longchamp thus became the target of a popular rage against the crown's Jewish policies that might otherwise have been directed at the king himself. We need not spare him any pity, but to this extent at least, Longchamp too was one of the very many victims of the link between crusading, kingship, and anti-Jewish violence that emerged during that critical century between 1096 and 1190.

69) Howden, Chronica, ed. STUBBS (supra, n. 45), iii, p. 145; Gesta Henrici, ed. STUBBS (supra, n. 5), ii, p. 218.