Problems of Integration within the Lands Ruled by the Norman and Angevin Kings of England

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The history of the lands ruled by the kings of England during the 200 years after 1066 can contribute much to the controversial subject of integration in the middle ages. Here I pick out four themes.

1. The Norman Conquest of England resulted in the virtually total dispossession of the old elite – an event unparalleled in European history. The massive castles and churches built by English labour, paid for by English taxes and dues, lived in by Frenchmen, were the monuments of a deeply divided society, one that was dramatically less integrated than it had been at the start of the year 1066. One of the important developments of the next hundred years or so was a kind of ethnic re-integration, at any rate at the level of freemen. In the celebrated words of Richard FitzNigel writing in the 1170s: sed iam cohabitantibus Anglicis et Normannis et alterutrum uxoribus ducentibus vel nubentibus, sic permixte sunt nationes ut vix decerni possit bodie, de liberis loquor, quis Anglicus quis Normannus sit genere1).

2. The Norman Conquest had the effect of bringing English culture and society into the mainstream of continental culture. In 1966 in a lecture entitled ›England's First Entry into Europe‹, Sir Richard Southern examined what he called ›the first experiment in the political unity of England and the continent‹. He concluded that in the later 12th century not only in politics, but in aristocratic social life and culture, in its economic system and its ecclesiastical organization, England was joined to the Continent. It was an integral but

subordinate part of a western European order. Never before or since has the union of England with the community of Europe been so all-embracing and so thoroughly accepted as part of the nature of things\(^2\). 

3. During the course of the twelfth century people living in England began to look upon Ireland, Scotland and Wales as primitive societies that would benefit from being reformed on the English model\(^3\). In the case of the English invasion of Ireland beginning in 1169 this came to involve a conscious policy of introducing English law, both secular and ecclesiastical, with the intention of transforming the Irish way of life. In a document drawn up in 1210, King John stated: «we desire justice according to the custom of our realm of England to be shown to all in our realm of Ireland»\(^4\). Although the history of Ireland in the next few centuries shows that this early imperialising attempt to «anglicise» the Irish people amounted in practice to very little, the episode itself shows that people at the time were capable of thinking in terms of a policy intended to achieve an entirely new level of integration.

4. For almost 400 years after 1066 the king of England was also the ruler of very substantial territories in France. Among the questions which this has raised in the minds of historians are the following. To what extent, if at all, is it possible to speak of the integration of these territories into a single cross-Channel political unit? Were any conscious efforts made to achieve a greater degree of integration? Was it possible to make an integrated whole of England and Normandy but impossible to do the same for the post–1154 Angevin Empire established by Henry II? The problem of integration has become central to a historical debate. According to H. G. Richardson, the dominions ruled by the Angevin

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kings, Henry II, Richard I and John, possessed a unity of manners and conditions that opened the widest prospects for the adventurous .... Doubtless there were local laws and customs, local conditions and prejudices, even local differences in language, that a newcomer had to face, but no more than is involved today in passing from North to South in the United States or from Ireland to England or England to Scotland. But for many subsequent historians it was precisely a fatal lack of integration that led to the king of England losing control of Anjou, Normandy and much of Poitou in 1203–5 and then of the rest of Poitou in 1224. Indeed many historians consider that no serious attempt was made to integrate these diverse regions into a single whole and that empire is therefore an inappropriate term. The clear conclusion of a conference held at Fontevraud in 1986 was that there was no Plantagenet state and no Plantagenet empire; it is permissible to speak of l’espace Plantagenêt, but that is all. Against this Jean Dunbabin, while accepting that empire is clearly not an ideal term for a group of territories which were only just beginning to cohere, has argued that espace is too empty of meaning to serve the purpose better and has observed that no French historian thinks of talking of l’espace français in the twelfth century.

If an emperor were to be defined as someone who ruled more than one kingdom, then it is worth recalling that at one time or another many different kings submitted in some way or other to Henry II and his sons: Scottish kings, Welsh kings, and Irish kings. Moreover the terms of the settlement made between John and Innocent III in 1213 applied to totum regnum Anglie et totum regnum Hibernie. More than sixty years earlier the dating clause of a charter issued in Eleanor’s name in 1152 at and for Fontevraud, includes an intriguing phrase: Henrico pictavorum et andegavorum imperium gubernante.

1. The destruction of the old English aristocracy and its virtually total replacement by a new francophone elite meant that, in Henry of Huntingdon’s interpretation, God had chosen the Normans to wipe out the English nation (ad Anglorum gentem exterminandum). Thus because all the English had been reduced to servitude and lamentation (omes ad servitutem et merorem redacti essent), it became shameful even to be called English (ita etiam ut Anglicum vocari esset, opprobrio). The gens Anglorum had lost what Max Weber

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called ›ihre ethnische Ehre‹ – in Henry’s words: ›The lord had deprived the English people, as they deserved, of both safety and honour, and had commanded that they should no longer be a people (Dominus salutem et honorem genti Anglorum pro meritis abstulerit, et iam populum non esse iussit)‹\(^{10}\). As late as 1125 William of Malmesbury could observe that ›today no Englishman is an earl, a bishop or an abbot; everywhere newcomers enjoy England’s riches and gnaw at her vitals (Nullus bodie Anglus vel dux, vel pontifex vel abbas; advenae quique divitias et viscera corrodunt Angliae). Nor is there any hope of ending this miserable state of affairs‹\(^{11}\).

Despite the pessimistic note on which William ended this train of thought, the ›miserable state of affairs‹ did end – as the passage already quoted from Richard FitzNigel makes plain. Richard’s description of the early post-Conquest period as a time when the English lay in ambush for the ›hated Norman people‹ and murdered them whenever opportunity offered, shows that he thoroughly approved of the way things had changed since then\(^{12}\). So also did his contemporary Walter Map. In Map’s view, the reigns of William I (1066–87) and William II (1087–1100) had witnessed per universum sevissima regnum sedicio; the first Norman kings had not been able to rule over a land compositam ad pacem because its old inhabitants (veteres incole) had continued to offer violent resistance to the incomers. Then Henry I (1100–35) ›by arranging marriages between them, and by all other means he could, brought peace to England, ad firmam populos utrosque federavit concordiam. His rule brought honour to God, and great wealth and happiness to his subjects‹\(^{13}\). Even though there is no evidence that Henry I had actually pursued a consciously integrationist marriage policy in his dealings with his barons, it is plausible that some such train of thought underlay his own marriage to Matilda. No doubt this marriage to the sister of the king of Scots helped to protect England’s northern border, but William of Malmesbury’s observation that Henry became the butt of jokes referring to the royal couple as Godric and Godgiva shows that it was perceived in ethnic as well as diplomatic terms\(^{14}\). In the 1160s Aelred of Rievaulx described ›our morning star Henry II (noster Henricus velut lu-


cifer matutinus exoriens) as *the corner stone (lapidem angularem) joining two walls of English and Norman stock (Anglici generis et Normannici)*; he looked back upon the marriage of love (*ex infuso ei amoris affectu*) between Henry I and Matilda as the starting point of an Anglicizing process. *Habet nunc certe de genere Anglorum Anglia regem, habet de eadem gente episcopos et abbates, habet et principes, milites etiam optimos qui ex utriusque seminis conjunctione procreati. (15)*

Whatever we may think of their history, it is clear that all three authors (Richard FitzNigel, Walter Map and Aelred) felt that integration between peoples was possible and desirable; hence it could and should be the object of policy. Moreover it was perfectly possible to think of a policy of imposing a common law as a means of integrating peoples. According to Aelred of Rievaulx, King Edgar had *settled the kingdom of the English into a heavenly peace, and joined peoples of different tongues by the pact of one law (regnum Anglorum celesti quadam pace composuit, et multarum linguarum gentes, unius foedere legis conjunxit). (16)* It was easy enough for both English and Normans to think in terms of the integration of a number of peoples into one. This, after all – the emergence of the *gens Anglorum* … _de tribus Germaniae populis fortioribus, id est Saxonibus, Anglis, Iutis_ – was the way in which Bede’s authoritative history was structured, while in Normandy a passage in the *Inventio et miracula Sancti Vulfranni*, a mid eleventh-century history of the relics and monastery of St Wandrille, speaks of the making of one people out of many different peoples: _atque unum ex diversibus gentibus populum effecit._ (17)

Whether the undoubted assimilation between Normans and English really was, as Walter Map thought, an intended consequence of policy is another question altogether. There is very little strictly contemporary evidence for such a policy. According to a tale told by Ælnoth of Canterbury, when William I feared there might be widespread English support for the invasion planned by Cnut of Denmark, he ordered the English *to shave their beards, change their arms and clothes to the style of the Romans, and indeed, in order to*

15) These phrases from Aelred’s *Vita sancti Edwardi* are taken from the improved text passages printed in Ian Short, *Tam Angli quam Franci*: Self-Definition in Anglo-Norman England, Anglo-Norman Studies 18 (1995) p. 170–172. As Short points out there, Aelred’s phrase alludes to the biblical: _ipsa summa angulari lapide Christo Jesu_ (Eph 2, 19–20; 1. Petr. 2, 6–9). William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum (as n. 11) c. 393 (p. 714) had also seen the marriage as one of love, i. e. arranged for the sake of love between two peoples.

16) Aelred, Genealogia Regum Anglorum, Migne PL 195, p. 726, composed in the 1150s. In the same passage Edgar was described in words very similar to those Aelred applied to Henry II – _quasi stella matutina in medio nevulae_. Cf. William of Apulia’s observation that Guiscard’s Normans taught their own language and customs to those who joined their band _so that one people could be made_, cited in Thomas, *The English* (as n. 1) p. 84.

deceive the invaders, appear in everything to be French – or as we prefer to call them – Romans.¹⁸) But setting aside this unreliable rumour of an emergency tactic, there is no evidence of a deliberate policy of trying to turn Englishmen and women into Normans, and there was certainly no policy of trying to turn Normans into English. On the other hand nor was any attempt made to maintain ethnic purity by prohibiting marriage or sexual relations between Normans and English. Indeed it seemed to William of Malmesbury that the Normans were accustomed to intermarry with those whom they subjected to their rule – in this respect they were, he wrote, _benignissimi²⁹). Moreover William’s claim to be the lawful heir of Edward the Confessor had massive, if possibly unintended, consequences. It meant, in the first place, that William made no effort to set aside the kingdom of England in the way that the kingdoms of Mercia, East Anglia, Northumbria and even Wessex had been set aside in course of the nine and tenth centuries – and as other kingdoms had been in earlier centuries²⁰). In the second place it meant that both Norman kings and their legal experts such as the French-born author of the Leges Henrici Primi and of Quadripartitus stood for the continuation of English law²¹). This implied that the English ought to be treated justly and their traditional rights recognised. The fact that Domesday Inquest juries were made up of French and English in equal numbers reflected the theory. In practice it did not happen like this. Orderic Vitalis believed that William I «struggled to learn some of the English language, so that he could understand the pleas of the conquered people without an interpreter, and benevolently pronounce fair judgements for each one as justice required. But advancing age prevented him from acquiring such learning, and the distractions of his many duties forced him to give his attention to other matters»²²). The conqueror’s military and political priorities meant that, as the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle noted, «the more just laws were talked about, the more unlawful things were done»²³). For a generation or so the political and social disaster of

¹⁹) William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum (as n. 11) c. 246 (p. 460).
²⁰) Thomas, The English (as n. 1) 276f., and cf. Anton Scharer in this volume.
²³) Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, sub anno 1087.
1066 spelt the end of the old English common law. But in the longer term, as Edward Freeman suggested long ago, the legal fiction may well have helped the process of fusion of peoples. Because they still had law in their mouths, they paved the way for those who had law not only in their mouths but in their hearts. Moreover the fact that Norman and other continental lords came to hold their estates in England according to the ancient laws of England meant that, in Freeman’s words, the conquerors themselves had in a manner become Englishmen. In consequence it did not often happen that the conquerors maintained one law for themselves and another for the English. The barrier between the peoples was not so great as to prevent the re-emergence of a new common law, the commune ius regni, first referred to under that name by Richard FitzNigel, in contrast to the significantly more arbitrary law of the forest.

Moreover, as William of Poitiers made explicit, the fact that both peoples were Christian (professione christiana pares) also implied that there should be fair treatment for the defeated. In many respects, of course, this pious aspiration rang hollow – especially in the ears of those well educated clerics of English birth such as Eadmer of Canterbury who knew that under the new regime they stood little chance of the promotion they felt they deserved. But if William of Malmesbury was right in his belief that William I abolished the slave trade at the instigation of Archbishop Lanfranc, then it does seem likely that here at least an argument from Christianity had some effect in integrating into society one inarticulate and hitherto rightless group: the slaves. As the early twelfth-century poet, Lawrence of Durham, observed: ‘After England began to have Norman lords then the English no longer suffered from outsiders that which they had suffered at their own hands; in this respect they found foreigners treated them better than they had themselves – and

24) Thanks above all to the work of Patrick Wormald (as n. 21), it is now widely accepted that the tripartite distinction between the laws of Wessex, Mercia and Danelaw was already largely illusory in pre-Conquest England, and that something like a common law had already been established. Certainly there is little or no sign of the tripartite distinction in the detail of Anglo-Norman records. See also John Hudson, The Formation of the English Common Law (1996) p. 16–23.
27) FitzNigel, Dialogus (as n. 1) p. 59f.
29) Unum eos, natio scilicet, dirimebat. Si Anglus erat, nulla virtus … eum poterat adjuvare. Si alienigena, … honori praecipuo dignus illico judicabatur. Eadmer, Historia Novorum in Anglia, ed. Martin Rule (1884) p. 224. This was written c. 1120 as a judgement on Henry I’s policy.
better than the native lords of Scotland and Ireland still continue to treat their own people.\(^ {31} \) Even so the programme of justice for defeated co-religionists might have remained a meaningless slogan, had it not been for the fact that there was a broad similarity between Norman and English cultures. Where there seemed to be a greater cultural difference – as between England on the one hand and Wales and Ireland on the other – the fact that the Welsh and Irish were also Christian was to give them very little protection against the prejudices of the invaders\(^ {32} \). In the sphere of law, as John Hudson emphasises, there were significant similarities between Norman and English custom. Both owed much to a Carolingian legacy\(^ {33} \). Although William I’s own attempt to learn English came to nothing, the next generation of incomers quite quickly learned to speak English, while at same time ambitious natives learned French. Hence bi-lingualism became an important feature of high status society\(^ {34} \). Naturally this facilitated the willingness of the incomers to identify with the law and traditions of the land they occupied, including English saints’ cults\(^ {35} \).

This willingness to assimilate and adopt helps to explain what is in some ways the most surprising aspect of the fusion of the two peoples – that it was the identity of the losers that triumphed, that the single people that emerged from the process identified themselves not as Normans or French, but as English\(^ {36} \). As Hugh Thomas has observed, taking up Susan Reynolds’s argument that governments create peoples rather than vice versa, the


\(^{33}\) Hudson, *The Formation* (as n. 24) 18.


\(^{36}\) Only one twelfth-century author used a term equivalent to ‘Anglo-Norman’ – itself an eighteenth-century neologism. This was the author of the work long known as the Hyde Chronicle who used the hybrid term *Normanangli* (together with closely related variants of it) no less than 23 times in a fairly short text (36 pages in the Rolls Series edition), Liber Monasterii de Hyda, ed. E. Edwards (1886) p. 284–321. The work has now been re-named the Warenne Chronicle by its most recent editor, and re-dated to the 1150s,
English government, simply by its very existence, helped to maintain and propagate the constructs of England and Englishness. In all its acts, great and small, the royal government maintained the strength of England as a construct. Whether king-led governments ever went further and adopted a conscious policy of propagating Englishness among the ruling elite seems very unlikely – above all because the kings themselves, so far as we can tell, remained resolutely Norman. At any rate for a long time they continued to be referred to as Normans. In the 1180s the anonymous author of the Waltham Chronicle – who thought of himself as English – wrote that our Norman kings (Normanni reges nostri) have adopted all that is best of the honourable traditions of the pre-1066 kings of England: quod precipuum est in omni munificentia et regni gloria et morum honestate et corporis habitudine decenti suscipisse. Similarly both Ralph Diceto, dean of St Paul’s, writing in the 1190s and Gerald de Barri, writing from the 1190s until c. 1217, referred to the kings of England as de genere Normannorum or Normannica regum prosapia.

Yet while, even after 1154, their kings continued to be perceived as Normans, the descendants of victorious Frenchmen were willing to identify themselves as English. The histories written in England in the second quarter of the twelfth century by authors such as William of Malmesbury, Henry of Huntingdon and Geoffrey Gaimar were histories of England and of the English both before and after 1066, not histories of the Normans. This is all the more surprising since the English were not merely defeated, they were also tinged with barbarism – at any rate in the eyes of learned Italians and Frenchmen such as Lan...
franc of Bec, Pope Paschal II, William of Poitiers, Ivo of Chartres and John of Tours\(^{42}\). A
history of a people as barbarous as the English had to be very skilfully interpreted and pre-
sented if the new French-speaking lords were to find it an acceptable version of their
history. This indeed is precisely what William of Malmesbury, the first great post–1066 En-
glish historian, achieved in his Gesta Regum Anglorum, completed by 1125\(^{43}\). To those who
said the English were barbarians, William’s answer was that they had been, but were no
longer. In his view a combination of Christian religion and French culture had civilised the
English\(^{44}\). Of the French, William wrote: *Est enim gens illa exercitatione virium et comi-
tate morum cunctarum occidentalium facile princeps*\(^{45}\). It was in this light that the patriotic
William interpreted the Norman, i.e. French Conquest. Politically 1066 was a catastrope,
but culturally it brought great benefits. And most significantly, as presented by William,
the Frenchification of the English was not merely a consequence of the Conquest of 1066.
That was just the most recent phase of a very old story.

The process had begun five hundred years earlier when King Æthelberht of Kent mar-
rried the Merovingian princess Bertha. *From then on*, William wrote, *by association with
the Franks (Francorum contubernio) a previously barbarous people (gens eatenus barbara)
turned to more refined ways (ad leniores mores)*\(^{46}\). In the seventh century Sigeberht of
East Anglia had all his barbarism polished away by his upbringing among the Franks (*om-
nemque barbariem pro Francorum nutritura exutus*). When he returned from exile to rule
the East Angles, he founded schools so that the delights of literature could be enjoyed by
people hitherto boorish and idolatrous\(^{47}\). In the later eighth century the West Saxon prince
Egberht was driven into exile at the court of Charlemagne. There, according to William,
he acquired manners very different from the barbarism of his own people (*mores longe a
gentilitia barbarie alienos*). He returned to Wessex to become king having learned what
William called *regnandi disciplinam*. This *disciplina* involved ruling his people *cum
clementia et mansuetudine*\(^{48}\). The English, in William’s book, were a European people
with a long civilising process behind them – a process in which the French were the teach-

\(^{42}\) John Gillingham, Conquering the Barbarians: War and Chivalry in Britain and Ireland, The Haskins
\(^{43}\) Rodney M. Thomson, William of Malmesbury (2nd ed. 2003). Before Thomson’s researches, the best
analyses of William as historian were the chapter on him in Heinz Richter, Englische Geschichtsschreiber
as long ago as 1815, reprinted in William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum (as n. 11) 2 p. xxxvi–xlvi.
\(^{44}\) John Gillingham, Civilising the English? The English histories of William of Malmesbury and David
\(^{45}\) William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum (as n. 11) c. 106 (p. 152).
\(^{46}\) Gesta Regum (as n. 11) c. 9.
\(^{47}\) Gesta Regum (as n. 11) c. 97.
\(^{48}\) Gesta Regum (as n. 11) c. 106. In William’s history the reign of Egberht of Wessex was pivotal. It was
he who made England by unifying the four kingdoms of Wessex, Mercia, East Anglia and Northumbria.
ers and the English the pupils. No doubt it helped that, as he pointed out, the two peoples had once been linguistically close. The native tongue of the Franks is related to English because both peoples originated in Germany.\(^{49}\) The implication here is that Franks too had been barbarians once\(^ {50}\). All this presumably helped to salvage English pride and honour after the catastrophe of 1066, while simultaneously enabling the second and third generation of continental settlers to be proud of their new Englishness. The most dramatic illustration of this is Gaimar’s verse Estoire des Engleis\(^ {51}\). Composed in the late 1130s, much of it a version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, this – the earliest history written in the French language – presented a view of English history from the beginnings to c. 1100, in which William the Conqueror could be criticised and Hereward the Wake regarded as an English hero\(^ {52}\). Gaimar, who was also the author of a French version, now lost, of Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia Regum Britanniae, may stand as representative of the new learned class of twelfth-century England, at home in three languages: English, French and Latin, a reflection of the multi-culturalism and multi-lingualism of a clerical community that had learned to define itself as English\(^ {53}\).

If, however, by the later twelfth century nearly all of the descendants of those who had come from France in and after 1066 had become bi- or tri-lingual Englishmen, this was certainly not true of one French-speaking group who had arrived in England in the aftermath of the Norman Conquest: Jews\(^ {54}\). As late as 1130 there is no evidence for Jews residing anywhere in England except London; by the 1220s there were Jewish communities in about twenty towns. H. G. Richardson drew attention to the evidence suggesting a

49) *Naturalis ergo lingua Francorum communicat cum Anglis, quod de Germania gentes ambae germi-
naverint.* Gesta Regum (as n. 11) c. 68. In chapter 5 when referring to the continental origins of the Angles, Saxons and Jutes, William noted that the Normans, like the Vandals, Goths and Lombards (who still hold Italy), also came from Germany. In chapter 68 he distinguished “those whom we call Franks” from “the peoples across the Rhine subject to the Teutonic emperor who are more correctly called Franks,” and pointed out that Charlemagne had spoken the language of the Franks across the Rhine.

50) In passing I observe that William was here rejecting the story of the Trojan origin of the Franks. *Volo de linea regum Francorum de qua multa fabulatur antiquitas, veritatem subtexere.* Gesta Regum (as n. 11) c. 67.


54) According to William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum (as n. 11) c. 317 (p. 562), William I transferred Jews from Rouen to London.
steady flow of Jewish converts to Christianity, especially among relatively poor Jews with little to lose, but still concluded that the community stood steadfast as a whole through good times and ill.⁵⁵) Although Richardson emphasised the ›Frenchness‹ which English Jews shared with English nobles and the higher and more learned of the English clergy, even he acknowledged that religion and ritual meant that they remained a small and unassimilable minority.⁵⁶) Religion prevented intermarriage, and a Christian society was determined to prevent conversion to Judaism – as a case from 1222 demonstrates. A deacon who fell in love with a Jewess and converted to Judaism was degraded and burnt on the orders of council held at Oxford by Archbishop Stephen Langton⁵⁷). The Jews remained everywhere what they were in York; in Barrie Dobson’s words, ›an exotic and largely artificial growth in the city’s history‹⁵⁸).

The establishment of greater numbers of Jewish communities and the wealth of some Jews meant not so much integration as a rising tide of anti-Jewish sentiment⁵⁹). By 1144 the Jews of Norwich were sufficiently prominent to become the victims of Thomas of Monmouth’s imaginative construction of the first recorded blood libel in European history. Although the attitude of the great majority of townspeople towards the Jews may well have been one of passive tolerance, the fact remains that within the next forty years more Christian ›boy-martyrs‹ were discovered in imitation of the cult of William of Norwich: St Harold of Gloucester (1168), St Robert of Bury St Edmunds (1181), and Adam of Bristol (1183). Anti-Jewish violence in London associated with the coronation of Richard I (September 1189) and the preparation of a crusade, led to further riots and murders in February and March 1190 at King’s Lynn, Norwich, Thetford, Colchester, Stamford, Bury St Edmunds, and Lincoln, culminating in the pogrom and mass self-destruction of the Jewish community at York on 16 March, the eve of Passover.

⁵⁵) Richardson, The English Jewry (as n. 5) p. 28–32.
⁵⁶) ›Their lives were patterned like the lives of the higher military, clerical and mercantile classes with whom they had the closest contacts and with whom they shared a common speech‹. Richardson, The English Jewry (as n. 5) p. 3f., 6, 27. But as Paul Hyams has observed, the fact that the Jews shared a language (their second one) with the ruling class, is rather thin grounds on which to take so rosy a view of Jewish life in the twelfth century: Hyams, The Jews in Medieval England (as n. 2) p. 178.
⁵⁹) It seemed to a contemporary Augustinian canon, the Yorkshireman William of Newburgh, that the rich Jews of York had built ›lavishly luxurious great houses like royal places‹ (profusissimis sumptibus domos amplissimas, regalibus conferendas palatiis): Historia rerum Anglicarum, Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I, vol. 1 lib. 4 c. 9, ed. Richard Howlett (1884) p. 312 s. On William’s attitude to the Jews see Michael J. Kennedy, ›Faith in the one God flowed over you from the Jews, the sons of the patriarchs and the prophets‹: William of Newburgh’s writings on anti-Jewish violence, Anglo-Norman Studies 25 (2002) p. 139–152.
Within five years of the massacre, Jews had returned to York. Indeed for much of Henry III’s reign the York community was the richest in England\(^{60}\). But after the massacres of 1190 they came under even stricter royal protection and surveillance. From now on their fortunes were even more dependent upon the attitudes of the government. In England the Fourth Lateran Council’s requirement that Jews and Saracens should wear distinctive dress was more honoured in the breach than in the observance. When Stephen Langton sought to enforce papal legislation relating to Jews, he was informed by the king’s council that he had no business to meddle with our Jews\(^{61}\). The real turning point in the history of the Jews in England came in the 1250s, a combination of unrelentingly heavy taxation and of Henry III’s piety in deciding to execute 19 Jews on the grounds that they had kidnapped and crucified a small boy, ‘little St Hugh of Lincoln’ – the first time a king of England had endorsed the blood libel. By the time Edward I decided to win some popularity by expelling the Jews from England (as he had already from Gascony), the English Jewry was in both numbers and wealth just a pale shadow of its former self\(^{61}\).

2. No country caught up in the process that Robert Bartlett has called the ‘Europeanization of Europe’ – the shift from the greater differentiation within the different parts of early medieval Europe to an increasingly homogeneous European society and culture – was Europeanized more rapidly than England in the decades after 1066\(^{62}\). The new intensity of the European dimension of English history was recognised by William of Malmesbury. He saw William the Conqueror as totius Europae honor\(^{63}\). In his account of William II’s reign, he gave more space to the crusade than he did to events in England and Normandy, and he more than once defined the crusade as expeditio Asiatica that nostris diebus Europa contra Turchos movit\(^{64}\). In his eyes the crusade was ‘a pan-European military action aimed at territory previously occupied by Islam’, one in which the French took the lead. The reconquests of the First Crusade had been achieved per Francos et omnis generis ex Europa Christianos; indeed had it not been for the might of the Frankish emperors, Europe would long since have been subjugated by the Saracens (Europam etiam...
Thus William included a good deal of French history in his Gesta Regum Anglorum on the explicit grounds that they are our neighbours and «the people mainly responsible for the Christian empire» (ad eos maxime Christianum spectet imperium). Although Gesta Regum Anglorum was his own choice of his history’s title, reflecting, as he explained in his prefatory letter to Earl Robert of Gloucester, «the greater part of its contents», he also intended that it «serve as a summary of many fields of history» (multarum historiarum breviarum). Essentially what William envisaged himself writing was a history of England in a Europe dominated by French culture.

During the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries the cultural links between England and the continent, especially France, were so close as to suggest «a kind of cultural unity». In London, Lincoln, Oxford and Winchester the political, social and religious leaders belonged to very nearly the same cultural world as their neighbours and rivals in Angers, Araras, Paris, Poitiers and Troyes. The new rulers of England sent their children to be educated in the schools of northern France or, later, on the tournament fields of France. In these respects this meant a degree of dependence – as has been powerfully urged by Sir Richard Southern. «Culturally the most obvious thing about England in the twelfth century is its dependence on France. It was a colony of the French intellectual empire». In Southern’s rather philosophical/theological view of the development of European culture, Paris is central. In other respects, however, a case can be made for the vitality and precociousness of culture in twelfth-century England, precisely indeed of French culture in England. Ian Short has claimed that

«French literature begins ... in twelfth century Anglo-Norman England. The first adventure narrative (or proto-romance) in French literature; the earliest example of historiographic writing in French; the first eye-witness history of contemporary events in French; the earliest scientific texts in French; the first administrative...»

66) William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum (as n. 11) c. 67 (p. 98).
67) Ibid. Epistola III (p. 12) – no doubt an allusion to Eutropius.
70) Richard W. Southern, Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe 1–2 (1995, 2001). It is also arguable that Paris was central to the development of what historians of manuscript painting have called the «Channel style». See Christopher de Hamel, The Production and Circulation of Glossed Books of the...
texts in French; the first Biblical translations in French; the earliest French versions of monastic rules; the first scholastic text to be translated into French; the earliest significant examples of French prose; the first occurrence of the French octosyllabic rhyming couplet (the standard verse form of medieval French narrative); the first explicit mention of secular courtoisie in vernacular French; the first named women writers in French; the earliest named and identifiable patrons of literature in French – an impressive list of firsts by any standards, and all to be credited not to Continental French culture, but to Insular Anglo-Norman society of the twelfth century.\(^71\).

England after 1066, Short argues, possessed a ‘uniquely tri-lingual culture’, and it is in large part to this multi-culturalism and concomitant multi-lingualism, that he attributes its ‘precocity’ in French literature.\(^72\) If French was the language of polite and sophisticated society, and was to remain so for at least three hundred years after 1066, the English language had a strong literary tradition of its own. This meant that in twelfth-century England virtually all, if not all, authors must have known and spoken at least three languages: English, French and Latin. Moreover the presence of Welsh or Anglo-Welsh clerks such as Geoffrey of Monmouth, Walter Map and Gerald de Barri meant that Celtic songs and tales, the stories of King Arthur and Tristan, were better and earlier known here than anywhere in continental Europe outside Brittany. The courts of King Henry I’s queens and, above all, the court of his son, Robert, earl of Gloucester and lord – in this context significantly – of Glamorgan in south Wales, played important roles in the transference of Welsh and English narrative into French and Latin, the principal languages of European court culture.\(^73\). The place of the Plantagenet court in the wider dissemination of an aris-
tocratic culture is not something that needs emphasising to readers of the Rolandslied, Ulrich of Zatzikhoven’s Lanzelet or Gottfried of Strassburg’s Tristan74).

3. The court of the king of England was regarded, at least by English writers, as the centre from which the new French-style civilisation of England would be taken north and west into Scotland, Wales and Ireland. From the 1090s onwards David, the brother of Queen Edith/Matilda, was brought up at the court of the king of England. According to William of Malmesbury, ›As a result of the time he has spent with us, he has been made more courtly and the rust of his native barbarism has been polished away‹. On becoming David I, king of Scots (1124–1153), he promised tax exemptions to those of his subjects who would ›live in a more civilised style, dress with more elegance, and eat with more refinement‹. Connections between the English and Scottish courts meant that, on the whole, it was by invitation that the new French-speaking elite entered Scotland. According to an early thirteenth-century English chronicler, ›the more recent kings of Scots profess themselves to be French in race, manners, language and culture (sicut genere ita moribus, lingua, cultu), and having reduced the Scots to utter servitude, admit only Frenchmen to their friendship (or household: familiaritatem) and service‹. One of these Frenchmen may well have been Guillaume le clerc, author of the Scottish-French romance, the Roman de Fergus, who has recently been identified as William the Lion’s chancellor, William Malveisin, bishop of Glasgow (1199–1202) and of St Andrews (1202–1238)77).

In Wales and Ireland, of course, the Frenchified elite of England shouldered their way in by force of arms – but still represented what they did as a civilising process. According to the author of the Gesta Stephani, ›Wales is a country of woodland and pasture … abounding in deer and fish, milk and herds, but it breeds men of an animal type (hominum nutrix bestialium), swift-footed, accustomed to war, volatile always in breaking their words, as in changing their abodes. When war came and the Normans conquered the English, this land also they added to their dominion and fortified with numberless castles; … to

75) David … nostrorum convictu et familiaritate limatus a puero, omnem rubiginem Scottiae barbariae deterierat. Denique regno potitus mox omnes compatriotas triennialium tributorum pensione levavit qui vel lent habitare cultius, amiciri elegantius, pasti accuratius. William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum (as n. 11) c. 400 (p. 726).
encourage peace they imposed law and statutes; they made the land ... so to abound in peace and productivity that you would think it a second England (secunda Anglia). A generation later the English invasion of Ireland was perceived and justified in similar terms. From England the Irish, as Gerald de Barri put it, would learn a better way of life (meliorem formam vivendi ex Anglia). In 1210 the anglicisation of Ireland became official government policy. King John issued a charter ordering that English law and customs were to be observed in his lordship of Ireland. The charter itself does not survive, but according to letters patent issued in 1226, in 1210 English law was put into writing and a copy deposited at the Exchequer at Dublin. The same letters patent state that the charter was issued at the request of the Irish, and it does seem clear that it extended to all Irishmen living within the lordship. In fact, as Paul Brand has shown, a good deal of English common law was already being applied in Ireland well before 1210, including modes of proof such as trial by battle and by ordeal, as well as writs such as de rationalibus divisis, de fugitivis et nativis and the writ of right. But what these early references to the charter of 1210 show is that this could be done not just instinctively and ad hoc, but as part of a conscious policy of the integration of law. Indeed it seems likely that it was following the charter of 1210 that the earliest extant register of writs was drawn up and sent to Ireland, together with a letter.

Since we desire justice according to the custom of our realm of England to be shown to all in our realm of Ireland who complain of wrongdoing, we have caused the form of writs de cursu by which this is customarily done, to be put into writing and herewith transmitted to you.

78) Gesta Stephani, edd. K. R. Potter/Ralph H. C. Davis (1976) 14–16. William of Newburgh asserted that Brittany benefited in similar fashion from being ruled by Henry II: eam in cunctis finibus suis ita disposit atque composit, ut, populis in pace agentibus, desertam paulatim in ubertatem verterentur, William of Newburgh, Historia rerum Anglicarum (as n. 59) lib. 2 c. 18 (p. 147).
80) Gerald of Wales, Expugnatio Hibernica/The Conquest of Ireland, trans. and ed. A. Brian Scott/F. X. Martin (1978) p. 98–100. Whether forgery or authentic, the papal bull Laudabiliter is by far the most celebrated evidence for this attitude.
82) Early Registers of Writs (as n. 4) p. 1.
A policy of transferring English law to Ireland fits well into the context of the perception of the Irish as a barbarous people needing to be reformed. The Irish clergy too were to be anglicised. According to Gerald, Henry II issued ecclesiastical constitutions with the aim of making the Irish church conform to the norms of the English: *constituciones sacras que adhuc extant ... quam plures emisit, ecclesie illius statum ad Anglicane ecclesie formam redigere modis omnibus elaborando*. Gerald believed that by the time of writing, in the late 1180s, the Irish had already been induced to give up many of their evil customs.83)

Within the expanding lordship, Ireland was now ruled by Englishmen who spoke French, and who wrote in French. The two earliest surviving literary works composed for the English of Ireland were both written in French. The earlier of the two, probably composed in the 1190s, is the narrative poem long known as The Song of Dermot and the Earl but most recently edited under the title *La Geste des Engleis en Yrlande*. The later, written in or very soon after 1265, is the *Rithmus facture ville de Rosse*. This poem, with its welcome to all foreigners wishing to buy and sell in the town, is a reminder that French was not just the language of aristocratic society but also *the lingua franca of commerce and trade*.85) Some of the new rulers of Ireland were very French indeed. In 1273 Edward I appointed Geoffrey de Geneville as Justiciar of Ireland; the conventional form of his name disguising the fact that his brother was the biographer of Saint Louis, Jean de Joinville. All this meant that if the Irish were to be integrated into the self-consciously civilised world of twelfth- and thirteenth-century England, they would have to learn to speak French. After completing a visitation of 21 native Irish Cistercian houses in the late 1220s, Stephen of Lexington, abbot of Stanley (Wiltshire), laid down that *no one, no matter what his nation, is to be received as a monk unless he knows how to confess in French or Latin* and that *in future the Rule is to be expounded in French, and chapter conducted in French or Latin. In consequence those who wish to be received as monks shall have to attend school somewhere where they may learn gentler manners* (mores mansuetiores).86)
In 1210 King John knighted the king of Thomond, Donnchad Cairprech Ua Briain. Here too the integrative intentions of policy makers c.1200 are plain, for, as Rees Davies observed, initiation into the order of knighthood opened the door into an exhilarating international world of aristocratic fellowship and customs.\(^87\). In the event in Ireland the door was soon closed again. Although Scottish kings were admitted readily enough – and in one remarkable case the international prestige of King David I was high enough for him to knight a French-born future king of England, Henry Plantagenet –, very few indeed of the native rulers of Wales and Ireland were admitted into the ›magic circle‹ of chivalry: after 1210 no more Irish kings until 1395. The Irish continued to live by Irish law, and English law became the privileged possession of the settler population, a key marker of their Englishness.\(^88\). Despite the intentions and hopes of the twelfth- and early thirteenth-century English invaders and settlers Ireland was to remain a deeply divided land.\(^89\).

4. A Cross-Channel Empire: Problems of Unity, Integration and Survival

William I made no conscious attempt to integrate England and Normandy into a single kingdom.\(^90\). On his deathbed in 1087 he divided his two lands between his two older sons, Robert Curthose and William II Rufus. None the less short and medium term military and political expediency meant that before the end of his reign the Conqueror had both destroyed the native English elite and had created a new class, the cross-Channel aristocracy – lords who held estates on both sides of the Channel and whose charters, like royal charters, were addressed to their men – French and English.\(^91\). This new class, ecclesiastical lords as well as secular barons, constituted a powerful interest group favouring unity. Orderic Vitalis believed that men such as Odo of Bayeux acted in support of Robert Curthose in 1087–88 and 1100–01 ad servandum unitatem utriusque regni.\(^92\). This unity was further entrenched during the long period (1106–35) when King Henry I, after de-


\(^{89}\) For discussion of the ways in which cultural exchange and assimilation did or did not characterise relations between the Irish and the English of Ireland see the essays by Seán Duffy, Katharine Simms and Brendan Smith in: Law and Disorder in thirteenth-century Ireland, ed. James Lydon (1997). For a valuable case study, and as yet the only one of its kind, see Brendan Smith, Colonisation and Conquest in Medieval Ireland: The English in Louth, 1170–1330 (1999).


\(^{92}\) Orderic Vitalis (as n. 22) 4 p. 124.
feating and capturing his elder brother Duke Robert at the battle of Tinchebrai, ruled both England and Normandy. In the words of Henry I’s biographer, Warren Hollister, “England and Normandy became in many respects two parts of a single political unit. … The single Anglo-Norman ruler was supported by a single homogeneous feudal aristocracy that shared with him the responsibility of governance and formed the core of his royal court and household. … He could rule as a king throughout his dominions, surrounded by a single curia, served by a single chancellor, a single scriptorium, a single household.”

Although Henry continued to mint Norman coin, this was evidently supplemented by English coin sent across the Channel — on one notorious occasion when the silver content of the coin was allegedly not of the purity expected most of the moneyers of England were punished by mutilation.

In the 1970s a great deal of emphasis was given by John Le Patourel and C. Warren Hollister to the notion of a homogeneous cross-Channel aristocracy. Since the late 1980s this has been qualified by an increasing awareness of the degree of heterogeneity and of different points of view within that aristocracy — the work of Judith Green and David Crouch being particularly important here. One of the most significant contrasts between the kingdom and the duchy noted by Judith Green is the relatively greater distance of the continental Norman aristocracy from Henry I’s court and their greater propensity to revolt. None the less in 1135 when Henry I died without a legitimate son, the Normans who chose Theobald count of Blois and Chartres as their duke, changed their minds and decided to support Theobald’s brother, Stephen, as soon as they heard that he had already been crowned and anointed king in England. By this date, as David Bates has put it, “the maintenance of the union was regarded as an overwhelming priority.”

From 1106 until 1204, except for one period of ten years, England and Normandy shared the same ruler. Moreover during those ten years (1144–53), both King Stephen of

95) John Le Patourel, The Norman Empire (1976); Hollister, Monarchy, Magnates (as n. 93).
98) Bates, Normandy and England (as n. 90) p. 872.
England and his Angevin rivals in Normandy claimed to be the rightful ruler of both England and Normandy. In this sense throughout the period from 1144 to 1153 both sides accepted the notion of an Anglo-Norman realm even if it did not exist in fact. Indeed in 1153 Henry of Anjou, duke of the Normans since 1151, granted the hereditary stewardship of England and Normandy to Robert Beaumont, earl of Leicester and to his son, Robert99). Thus although the English term ›Anglo-Norman‹ is an eighteenth-century neologism, by the 1150s, if not earlier, one author – but only one – was using words such as

\[ \text{regnum normananglorum} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{principes normananglorum}^{100} \].

1154 marked a significant turning point. Henry II was not only king of England and duke of Normandy, but also duke of Aquitaine and count of Anjou. Not that he was satisfied. In 1159 he launched an expedition against Toulouse; in the 1160s he took over control of Brittany (a take-over facilitated by fact that many Breton lords held land in England) and in the 1170s he invaded Ireland. This Angevin empire (to use the name for it created by Kate Norgate) placed immense resources at the disposal of its ruler. In a famous anecdote Walter Map wrote:

On one occasion when I was in Paris and chatting with the King (Louis VII), he compared the wealth of various kings: the emperor of Constantinople and the king of Sicily, he said, glory in their gold and silk, but their men can do nothing but talk for in matters of war they are useless; the Roman emperor, whom we call the emperor of the Germans has fine soldiers and war-horses, but no gold or silk or other opulence. But your lord the king of England lacks nothing, he has men, horses, gold, silk, jewels, fruits, wild-game and everything else. We in France have nothing but bread and wine and gaiety. This saying I made a note of, for it was merrily said – and truly, \( \text{et vere}^{101} \).

The notion that it was indeed truly said is lent some support by the events of the Third Crusade. It was to Richard I's greater wealth that many attributed the leading role played by the king of England, and his arrogant treatment of other princes. In the words of Ansbert, \( \text{rex Anglie primum et precipuus in tota militia christiana, eo quod in facultatibus et in omnibus opibus alios precededebat}^{102} \). But the empire was in tatters by 1204. Between au-

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99) This cross-Channel stewardship was discussed in L. W. Vernon Harcourt, His Grace the Steward and Trial of Peers (1907) p. 37–43. Cf. David Crouch, The Beaumont Twins. The Roots and Branches of Power in the Twelfth Century (1986) p. 87. But despite the charter of 1153, there is no evidence to show that Robert de Breteuil, son and heir of Robert Beaumont, held a stewardship of England and Normandy after his father’s death in 1168. He, of course, was to be a leading rebel in 1173.

100) See above n. 36.

101) Walter Map, De Nugis Curialium (as n. 13) p. 450f.

tumn 1202 and summer 1204 John lost Anjou, Normandy and much of inland Poitou. For as long as he held the coast of Poitou, and in particular the great port of La Rochelle (at which he disembarked in 1206 and 1214), there was some realistic hope of recovery, but the loss of La Rochelle in 1224 marked the end. Why did so large and rich an empire collapse so rapidly?

Was it due to accidental reasons – the unanticipated death of Richard I, the characters of John and Henry III as opposed to Philip Augustus, Louis VIII and Louis IX? Was, in other words, »eine den Kanal übergreifende Reichsbildung … eine durchaus realistische Alternative«103) – or was it doomed? Either as a result of external causes such as the increasing resources, financial and cultural, of the Capetian monarchy104). Or as a result of its own intrinsic fragility, a consequence of the fact that as David Hume expressed it long ago, »these different members, disjointed in situation, and disagreeing in laws, language and manners were never thoroughly cemented into one monarchy«105). Even the historian who coined the term »Angevin Empire«, Kate Norgate perceived »the empire of Richard Cœur-de-Lion« as having three or four rival centres, and in consequence being subject to a process of disintegration which his father had been unable to check and against which he was well-nigh helpless106). Her word »disintegration« has been picked up recently again by Turner and Heiser: »large shifts in politics, economy and society in France had more to do with the disintegration of the Angevin »empire« than John Lackland's personal failings, numerous as they were«107). One aspect of the empire's structure, the fact that for his territories in France its ruler owed allegiance to the king of France, has in effect encouraged a combination of both the second and the third type of explanation. »Philip's dual advantages of steadily increasing financial resources and his suzerainty over the Plantagenet con-

104) As was emphasised by Powicke in the first really substantial analysis of the problem. F. Maurice Powicke, The Loss of Normandy (1913; 2nd ed. 1961) p. 298f. Cf. »The attraction of Paris – cultural as well as political – was too strong for the Plantagenets to counteract«, Ralph Turner/Richard Heiser, The Reign of Richard Lionheart. Ruler of the Angevin Empire, 1189–1199 (2000) p. 40. However Powicke himself believed that during the reigns of Henry and Richard, Parisian-Capetian culture was outshone by Plantagenet, see below p. 135. There have been many attempts to compare the financial resources available to the Angevin and Capetian kings c.1200. For two of the more recent ones see Nicholas Barratt, The revenues of John and Philip Augustus Revisited, in: King John (as n. 77) p. 75–99; and Gillingham, Angevin Empire (as n. 8) 95–100.
105) Not that Hume absolved John from blame. »The king of France whose ambitious and active spirit had been hitherto confined by Henry ... and Richard, seeing now the opportunity favourable against this base and odious prince, embraced the project of expelling the English king from France«, David Hume, The History of England 1–3 (1871 reprint of 1786 ed.) vol. 1 p. 206, 287.
tinental lands could well have proved insurmountable to Richard, had he lived longer, just as they later proved for John,\(^{108}\). Most historians have, predictably, interpreted the collapse as a combination of structural factors and personal failings.

In recent years, and in contrast to the point of view adopted by H. G. Richardson (see above p. 86f.), major advances made in the publication of administrative records have led to a greater emphasis on the lack of administrative integration. For Hollister, the Anglo-Norman possibility of an independent trans-Channel *regnum* was ... abandoned by their Angevin successors ... Henry II’s accession in 1154 marked the expansion and transformation of a tightly-integrated Anglo-Norman state into a cluster of diverse provinces.\(^{109}\). Robert-Henri Bautier described the Angevin dominions as “un conglomérat hétéroclite de pouvoirs très divers sur des territoires de statut très différent ... Aucun pouvoir central, ni administration judiciaire, financière, militaire commune\(^{110}\). For Sir James Holt, “there was no such thing as an Angevin Empire stretching in a homogeneous *regimen* from the Cheviots to the Pyrenees.\(^{111}\). In the judgement of Nicholas Vincent, “Detailed study of the various regions over which the Plantagenet ruled, from Gascony to Ireland, has brought to light the vast differences in local administration and in the effectiveness of royal, ducal or comital command. Even within their French *Espace*, the Plantagenets failed to impose any common administrative structure, any common monetary system, or any overriding cultural consensus.\(^{112}\).

Obviously there are problems with this emphasis. By tending to see the collapse as inevitable it fits a little too comfortably within the familiar, cosy and patriotic assumption that the nation-states of England and France were bound to rise, and a cross-Channel realm was bound to fall. Moreover the historian of internal structures faces a major difficulty in the nature of the evidence. Relatively speaking, there is a great deal of evidence for England, rather less for Normandy, and increasingly less the further south one goes. This is true of both narrative and record evidence. In England there were no less than seven major and historically minded authors at work between the late 1180s and c.1202: Roger of Howden, Ralph Diceto, Richard of Devizes, Gerald de Barri, Gervase of Canterbury, Ralph of Coggeshall, and William of Newburgh. In this same period, when Richard the Poitevin, Robert of Torigny and Geoffrey of Vigeois were no longer writing, it is difficult to find a single author of similar stature at work within the continental dominions of the

\(^{108}\) Turner/Heiser, The Reign of Richard (as n. 104) p. 247. John Le Patourel in particular saw the feudal dependence of the empire’s French parts upon the kings of France as its fatal weakness.

\(^{109}\) Hollister, Normandy, France (as n. 93) p. 56.


Angevins – the nearest being Bernard Itier at Limoges and anonymous annalists at Jumièges and at St Aubin, Angers. Or consider the surviving records of royal government. In England there is a virtually unbroken run of exchequer rolls from the second year of Henry II’s reign onwards. In Normandy just a few exchequer rolls survive. South of Normandy nothing of the sort. In consequence historians have tended to assume that Anjou and Aquitaine generated little or no revenues for their rulers.

In the expectation of obtaining a more balanced overview of the administrative structure of the entire empire we can turn to the chancery records. Whereas English and Norman exchequer rolls are records of two provincial administrations, the chancery travelled everywhere with the king, or at any rate close to him, and so chancery records relate to every part of his dominions. Yet in some ways this undoubted advantage creates more complex problems. Of the 3,013 texts of charters and mentions of charters in the name of Henry II that Nicholas Vincent had collected by October 2001, more than 2,200 are for beneficiaries in England, compared with some 500 for Normandy, and just over 200 for the rest of France. In 1999 he counted over 100 texts of charters for Anjou, Maine and Touraine, and just 26 for the whole of Aquitaine. Out of a sample of 475 charters issued in Normandy, 171 were for English beneficiaries. It might be thought that this imbalance is primarily the result of differing rates of survival; charters issued by kings of England retained their value after 1204 much better in England than in France. But a count of the charters registered in the charter roll for the first year (May 1199 to May 1200) of John’s reign, the first charter roll, demonstrates that in this respect the pattern revealed by the extant charters for Henry II’s was more real than apparent. Of the 493 acts recorded, 347 (70 per cent) were for English beneficiaries, 65 (13 per cent) for Norman, 53 (11 percent) for the rest of France, 28 (6 per cent) for Wales and Ireland. The much greater number of English charters is not a direct reflection of John’s itinerary during 1199–1200. In the first year of his reign John spent nine months in France, mostly in Normandy. Of the 276 documents issued in Normandy, more than half (156 or 57%) concern England. Evidently the na-

114) Substantial parts of the Norman rolls survive for the exchequer years 1179–1180, 1194–1195, 1197–1198, and 1202–1203. A badly needed new edition is being prepared by Vincent Moss.
116) Thus although Louis VII was duke of Aquitaine for a much shorter period than Henry II, there are more surviving charters for Aquitanian beneficiaries in his name than in Henry’s. Vincent, King Henry (as n. 112) p. 130.
117) Interestingly although the charter roll confirms the geographical pattern indicated by surviving acta, it demolishes the pattern of social distribution. Whereas 88 % of the acta for Henry II’s reign were for ec-
nature of the government of England was such that royal charters were far more useful there than in the other parts of the Angevin dominions, and English beneficiaries were prepared to cross the sea to get them. Equally evidently, more charters survive from Normandy than for any other of their French territories. Here are real differences in the nature of government in the different provinces. Not surprisingly the more a past government used the written word the more advanced it has been thought to be – and the more advanced the stronger. In practice historians of structures have tended to conclude that Angevin government was strong in England, quite strong in Normandy, and then increasingly weak the further south. It may be so, but is not necessarily so.

In any event, any explanation for the political and military collapse of 1203–04 couched in structural terms such as these, faces the fatal flaw that the king of England held on to Gascony where his administration was allegedly weakest, yet lost Normandy, the province which of all his continental lands was the one most closely integrated with England. The apparent paradox is one which is easily explained. Normandy was lost in 1203–04, as was Anjou, because it was here, and not against Poitou or Gascony, that Philip concentrated his attack. In theory it could be, of course, that the success of Philip’s invasion of Normandy was, in part at least, a consequence of underlying structural changes. Had England and Normandy become less of a single whole than they had been under the Norman kings? With the passage of time even those Norman families which had become Anglo-Norman in the wake of 1066 had tended to divide into English and Norman branches. Even so in 1200 most of the greatest families in Normandy still had important possessions in England, and sometimes in Wales and Ireland as well. They had good reason to want the cross-Channel connection to continue, and indeed, as recent studies have shown, for several decades after 1204 they hoped that it could be restored. Naturally many Norman landowners, those who held little land in England, did not share this outlook. This was especially the case with those lords whose estates lay along the Norman border, and who often had much closer ties with their neighbours in France than they did with the ducal court. In fact this was not a new situation in 1200. Not only does it explain why the revolt of 1173–74 was so serious on Normandy (see below p. 118); it also explains why

clesiastical beneficiaries, only 33% of the documents registered in the charter roll were. As Holt noted, this means that a far higher proportion of acts in favour of the laity have been lost, perhaps 80% of the total issued. Holt, The Writs of Henry II (as n. 111) p. 47–64, 59–61.


Henry I too had faced real problems in Normandy (see above p. 104). What was new in 1200 was the new king-duke\textsuperscript{120}. Hence Daniel Power’s conclusion: ‘John lost the active support of most Normans while they were still free of pressure from either the king of France or the lords of Maine and Brittany; and his own errors must account for their failure to defend Normandy for their duke’\textsuperscript{121}.

A Partible Inheritance?

Even if, however, the absence of an integrated administrative and social structure played little or no part in the ‘disintegration’ of 1203–04, there are questions worth considering. Did the kings of England have any sort of policy of integration in their continental dominions similar to that (see above p. 101) announced for Ireland? Did some integration occur though in an unplanned and unintended kind of way? We must start with the matter of the unity of the empire. A ruler who assumed that his dominions would soon be partitioned was, we might think, unlikely to see the point of a conscious policy of integration.

This was clearly Henry II’s situation, at least from 1159 onwards when Aquitaine was assigned to Richard\textsuperscript{122}. It was principally this that led the biographer of Henry II to argue that the empire lacked any principle of unity\textsuperscript{123}. By the later years of Henry III’s reign a principle of unity had in fact been enunciated. In Henry III’s apanage grant to Edward, his eldest son, in 1254 Edward was given Ireland, Gascony, Oléron and the Channel Islands, as well as estates in England and Wales, and all ‘in such manner that the said lands ... may never be separated from the crown ... but they should remain to the king of England for ever’\textsuperscript{124}. Edward’s subordinate role was emphasised by the fact that while his father lived he was never called duke of Aquitaine or lord of Ireland; these titles remained the exclu-

\textsuperscript{120} It has been been argued that also new c. 1200 was a new language of politics, one in which the hierarchical superiority of the king of France over those who might be said to owe him service was given more weight than previously, van Eickels, Vom inszenierten Konsens (as n. 103). It may well be that this discourse was developed by Capetian spokesmen in response to the threat posed by the wealth and power of the Angevin kings, Bernd Schneidmüller, Nomen Patriae (1987) p. 228ff. I doubt though that it was a new political discourse that made Philip’s interventions in Normandy and Anjou so much more successful than similar interventions by earlier French kings.

\textsuperscript{121} Daniel Power, King John and the Norman Aristocracy, in: King John (as n. 77) p. 117–136, here p. 136. This implies that Normandy in 1199 was no more exhausted by war and war taxation than Capetian France at the same date; see John Gillingham, Richard I (1999) p. 341–347.

\textsuperscript{122} There is very little sign that he ever intended to yield any of his dominions to his younger brothers, both of whom were dead by 1164.

\textsuperscript{123} W. Lewis Warren, Henry II (1973) 228–230.

sive prerogative of the king. Clearly by this time there was, in theory, a unified Plantagenet empire – but it can hardly be called an ›Angevin‹ Empire – since by this date most of the continental lands, including Anjou itself, had been lost.

If we turn from theory to practice, then it would seem that there had been a unified empire well before 1254. Family law made a distinction between inheritance and acquisition. What a man inherited he should pass on to his eldest son; what he acquired – whether by conquest, purchase or by marriage – he could dispose of much more freely, often to provide for younger sons. If a man had a single heir then that heir would receive both inheritance and acquisition and in turn ought to pass both on, now united, to his own eldest son. The father’s acquisition would have become the son’s patrimony:

›Thus Normandy and England, separable as inheritance and acquisition in 1087, became a single patrimony after 1135; England/Normandy and Maine/Anjou separable under Geoffrey of Anjou, became a single inheritance under Henry II. The Norman/Angevin dominions and the lands of Eleanor of Aquitaine, separable under Henry II, were treated as a single inheritance after 1189.‹

In 1189 two of Henry II’s acquisitions, Brittany and Ireland, went to provide for his grandson Arthur and his son John, but all the rest was inherited by Richard. In a treaty he made with Philip at Messina in March 1191 Richard envisaged either Normandy or Anjou and Maine or Aquitaine and Poitou being held by a younger son in the event of him having two or more male heirs. After the breakdown of marital relations between him and Berengaria it must have seemed unlikely that he would have legitimate sons, and there is no evidence that he ever planned to divide his dominions between John and Arthur. Although the succession dispute of 1199 might have resulted in a partition, in the event only Brittany did not fall to John. Writing c. 1209 Gerald de Barri suggested that Ireland would make a suitable kingdom for a younger son. It looks as though by this date he assumed that all the rest of the Angevin dominions (and claims to dominion) comprised a single inheritance. Over two generations the Angevin Empire, once – like the Norman empire – a distinctly partible empire, had become – again like the Norman empire – a much more impartible one. This suggests that attitudes towards unity and integration may also have changed over time, just as they had in the case of the Norman empire.

According to Le Patourel, the idea that law is territorial and that each land should be governed according to its own native laws and institutions when one prince ruled several became a fundamental principle of the Angevin empire. On his deathbed Henry II’s father is supposed to have forbidden his son to introduce Norman or English customs into Anjou or vice versa: Henrico heredi suo interdixit ne Normannie vel Anglie consuetudines in consulsatus sui terram vel e converso, varie vicissitudinis alternatione, permutaret. In line with this Holt reckoned that there were only two clear-cut cases of what he called imperial legislation, edicts intended to apply to the whole empire: the edict of Verneuil in 1177 and the Assize of Arms of 1181. At Verneuil, in Howden’s words: Hoc statutum et consuetudinem statuit dominus rex, et teneri praecepit in omnibus villis suis, et ubique in potestate sua, scilicet in Normannia, et Aquitania et Andegavia et Britannia, generale et rum. According to Roger of Howden, the Assize of Arms, per totam terram suam transmarinam publico edicto, was issued after the Christmas court 1180 at Le Mans, which had been attended by the archbishop of Bordeaux and many bishops, and counts and barons of the whole province. On arrival in England, Henry then published its equivalent for England. In the light of this assize, it is going against the evidence to say that there was no common military organisation. A few more examples of imperial legislation can be found. The provisions set out in October 1190 concerning the inheritance of property of those caught up in a shipwreck applied per totam Angliam et ultra mare. Administrative responses to new challenges such as the need to raise money on a new scale to meet the needs of Jerusalem tended in the direction of uniformity. The same measures were adopted everywhere for the collection of the tax in aid of the land of Jerusalem in 1184 and of the Saladin Tithe in 1188. All that we can safely infer from Geoffrey Plantagenet’s famous last words is that our informant, John of Marmoutier, writing c. 1170, was concerned

127) Le Patourel, The Norman Empire (as n. 95) p. 276.
130) Gesta regis Henrici secundi Benedicti abbatis. The Chronicle of the Reigns of Henry II. and Richard I., A.D. 1169–1192, ed. William Stubbs (1867) 1 p. 194. The fact that Howden names only English and Norman bishops and counts as being present at the assembly, although the edict was issued at the request of the Bons Hommes of Grandmont, is revealing of the range of his knowledge and/or interest.
131) Ibid. 1 p. 269f., 278–280.
132) Ibid. 2 p. 139f.
133) The 1184 subsidy was to be collected in the same way in every parish in Henry’s dominions on both sides of the sea, Recueil des Actes de Philippe Auguste 1 (as n. 126) no. 123 (p. 151–153); the Saladin tithe ordinance was issued first at Le Mans in January 1188 and then next month at Geddington, Gesta regis Henrici (as n. 130) 2 p.30–33.
by the possibility of Norman or English custom being introduced into Anjou. Presumably he believed either that such introductions had already occurred or that they were likely to occur. And perhaps he was right. Boussard’s study of the office of seneschal in Anjou led him to the conclusion that the county was losing its individuality and being merged into the ensemble of Angevin territories, a development highlighted by the appointment of the Englishman Robert of Thornham as seneschal of Anjou in 1195. Ralph of Diceto’s account of how the young Philip Augustus was advised to copy the methods which Henry used to govern England (ut igitur in amministrazione regni tanti principis in-formaretur exemplo) strongly suggests that in English court circles English methods of government were thought good enough to introduce anywhere.

To Jean Yver, taking a broad view, it seemed that Norman custom belonged within a Western – or Plantagenet – group which included the customs of Brittany, Maine, Anjou, Touraine and Poitou, a group which was clearly different from the customs of eastern – or Capetian – France. Taking a broader view still, Paul Hyams has argued that the common law of England, should also be placed in Yver’s group of customs of the West. Even if the king merely wished to ensure that lords enforced their own local custom properly, the likelihood is that if the king had power enough then his definition of what was proper would be the one which carried weight. In that case royal jurisdiction would tend to result in similar procedures and similar devices being adopted in the different provinces. By setting limits to what a lord could do with the goods of his men, the edict of Verneuil intervened in what might have been regarded as a purely private matter between lords and men, none of the king’s business. Furthermore there is clear charter and chronicle evidence that the custom which legal historians regard as being Anglo-Norman par excellence, i.e. the custom of seigneurial wardship, was applied throughout their dominions by all three Angevin kings – despite the fact that there is no surviving evidence of any legislation requiring this. (In the absence of contemporary legal literature from the lands south of Normandy it is unrealistic to expect to find any.) Since this gave the king-duke control of the marriages of heirs and heiresses who were taken into his custody, it was a custom of crucial political importance – above all so when the future of principalities and great hon-

135) Diceto, Opera Historica (as n. 40) 2 p. 8.
138) Apart, that is, for the assize of 1185 by which Geoffrey of Brittany established primogeniture and regulated wardship and relief, opening a loophole for the application of seigneurial wardship in those cases where the deceased left no living brothers. See Judith Everard, Brittany and the Angevins (2000) p. 182–203.
ours, such as the duchy of Brittany, the viscounty of Limoges, or the honour of Châteauroux, was at stake\(^{139}\). Inevitably seigneurial wardship was a custom disliked by those who lost out, i.e. those members of the ward’s family who were not themselves high in favour at court. Its application therefore was largely the result of determined government action, the power of the ruler to overcome opposition and push regional variants in the direction of legal uniformity. It begins to look, in other words, as though we are dealing with a body of custom which is tending towards an approximate uniformity throughout the whole of the Angevin Empire.

**An Angevin ›imperial aristocracy‹?**

If there were ever to be an Angevin ›imperial aristocracy‹ equivalent to the post–1066 cross-Channel Norman aristocracy, then the custom of seigneurial wardship would have been central to its emergence. The astonishing combination of boldness and good fortune that attended Henry II in the early 1150s meant that he was never faced by the kinds of problem that had faced the conqueror after 1066, and which led William to force through the virtually total dispossession of the old English elite – a dispossession which created unparalleled opportunities for patronage. Indeed more Angevin and Poitevin nobles got lands in England after 1066 than after 1154. Nowhere were Henry II and his sons in a position to remodel a whole regional aristocracy as William I had done; they could only tinker with what was already there. To have tried anything else would have been counter-productive. Even so marriage could have been used as a means of gradually establishing a ›pattern of Cross-Channel, Anglo-Angevin or Anglo-Poitevin baronies, to bind together the various disparate parts of the Plantagenet dominions under the authority of one, cosmopolitan landowning class‹. But Vincent has demonstrated that Henry II was unwilling to promote men from both Anjou and Aquitaine to estates in England\(^{140}\). Whereas Anglo-Norman courtiers acquired office or an heiress in Poitou, most notably when in 1177 Henry II gave the richest heiress in Berry, Denise of Déols, to Baldwin de Redvers\(^{141}\),

\(^{139}\) GILLINGHAM, Angevin Empire (as n. 8) p. 78–82.

\(^{140}\) Angevin families such as Craon and Chaworth had been in England since 1066. VINCENT, King Henry II and the Poitevins (as n. 112) p. 121–124. Only his own brothers, William (who died without heirs in 1164) and Hamelin, the two of them successively husbands of the Warenne heiress, gained much in England and Normandy thanks to Henry II’s generosity. On them see Thomas K. KEEFE, Place-Date Distribution of Royal Charters and the Historical Geography of Patronage Strategies at the Court of King Henry II Plantagenet, Haskins Society Journal 2 (1990) p. 185–187; van HOUTS, The Warenne View (as n. 36).

\(^{141}\) After Baldwin’s death, Henry promised her first to William Marshal and then to Baldwin of Béthune. On this see the important document recently discovered and published by Nicholas VINCENT, William Marshal, King Henry II and the honour of Châteauroux, Archives 25 (2000) p. 1–14.
there is virtually no evidence of Poitevins being promoted to reciprocal favours north of the Loire.\textsuperscript{142} The one significant exception to this came early in the reign when Sarah of Cornwall, a daughter of Earl Reginald of Cornwall, was given in marriage to Aimar viscount of Limoges, then in Henry’s custody. At this stage Henry II had some admirers in Poitou, including the Cluniac chronicler Richard the Poitevin who, writing c. 1162, awarded him high marks as a bringer of peace\textsuperscript{143}. This gave Aimar every reason to expect to inherit estates in England, but he was disappointed when after the death of his father-in-law in 1175, Henry II took the Cornwall estates into his own hand in order to provide for his youngest son, John. The king’s sharp practice triggered the first of several rebellions by the viscount of Limoges\textsuperscript{144}. While Henry was thinking in terms of a partition of his dominions between the sons born to him and Eleanor, there was not much incentive for him to think in the long term of creating links between its various parts. However it is often, as in the case of the Norman Conquest of England, short-term patterns of thought that produce results. Henry unquestionably knew the value of granting estates in England to great and potentially independent-minded continental lords. By allowing, for example, Duke Conan IV of Brittany to have possession of the huge northern honour of Richmond he was able to enforce first his loyalty and then his abdication in favour of his infant daughter Constance and her husband-to-be, Henry’s son Geoffrey\textsuperscript{145}. After Henry II’s death there remained the same need for short-term political calculation. Thus in 1189 Richard I provided Geoffrey, heir to the strategically important county of Perche, with a considerable landed stake in England in the shape of the dowry he bestowed upon Geoffrey’s bride, his niece Matilda, daughter of Henry the Lion\textsuperscript{146}.

But in other respects the situation changed. A ruler of the second generation was more likely to think in terms of a continuing unity of empire after his death (see above p. 111); he might therefore be more interested in establishing links between all the parts. Moreover by 1189 Richard had naturally acquired an entourage that was largely Poitevin, and they might now expect to do well. Some certainly did. Richard gave the countess of Aumale, together with her great estates in England as well as Normandy, to William de Fors. He

\textsuperscript{142} Vincent, King Henry II and the Poitevins (as n. 112) 119–124. Only one Poitevin noble, Ralph de Faye, obtained a baronial estate (Bramley, Surrey) in England. He lost it as a consequence of his participation in the rebellion of 1173–74, but it was restored to his son in 1199. The act of restoration, together with the fact that Ralph II de Faye married a niece of Robert of Thornham, John’s seneschal of Poitou, is indicative of the way things were developing in the next generation.

\textsuperscript{143} L. A. Muratori, Antiquitates Italicae Medii Aevii 4 (1741) cols. 1102f. After the murder of Thomas Becket, Richard changed his tune.

\textsuperscript{144} Gillingham, Richard I (as n. 121) p. 53f.

\textsuperscript{145} Everard, Brittany (as n. 138) p. 38–44.

\textsuperscript{146} Kathleen Thompson, Power and Border Lordship in Medieval France. The County of the Perche, 1000–1226 (2002) p. 171–180.
gave Alice, heiress to the county of Eu and the lordship (rape) of Hastings, to a Lusignan, Ralph of Exoudun\(^{147}\).

**At the king’s court**

It seems clear that while Henry II was king there were no Poitevins with influence at his court. In that sense he became, in the eyes of his southern subjects, a northern outsider, the ‘King of the North’, as he was called in a highly-wrought denunciation of him associated with the chronicle of Richard the Poitevin\(^{148}\). For much of his reign Eleanor and Richard exercised both titular and day to day authority over the southern duchy. They, not Henry, controlled the sources of ducal wealth and power in Aquitaine; it was, in other words, to their court, rather than to Henry’s, that southern courtiers would have flocked. Grants made to Fontevraud illustrate the point neatly. Henry gave Fontevraud revenues from England and Anjou. Eleanor added revenues from tolls on trade at Poitiers and Benon. Her charter, issued at Alençon, was witnessed by Poitevins. Her husband’s, also issued at Alençon, confirmed her grant; yet his charter was ‘witnessed exclusively by Anglo-Norman or Angevin courtiers’\(^{149}\). In this respect the conventional view that the Angevin Empire was ruled from a single court needs to be modified. During Henry II’s reign there were subsidiary courts, the court of the duchy of Aquitaine and, between 1181 and 1186, the court of Geoffrey of Brittany\(^{150}\). The evidence for tensions between these courts would certainly seem to support Norgate’s view of rival centres of authority within the empire\(^{151}\).

But what happened after Henry II’s death? At any rate while Richard I was a free man and travelling within his own dominions there were clearly fewer and lesser rival courts than there had been during the last twenty years of Henry II’s life\(^{152}\). Was the court of the

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148) Bouquet 12 (1877) p. 418–421. Even here, however, the author remembered that in his first years Henry had ruled *moderately et pacifice*.

149) Vincent, King Henry II and the Poitevins (as n.112) p. 117–119.

150) Everard, Brittany (as n. 138) p. 99–122.

151) And between 1170 and 1183 there had been the rather different tension between the courts of Henry II and Henry III.

152) In 1189 Richard asserted his sovereignty over Brittany more actively than his father had been doing in recent years. He took Constance’s daughter Eleanor into his custody; the bishops of Rennes and Nantes attended his court at Angers and Domfront in early 1190. For this and for the fierce struggle for control of Brittany between 1196 and 1199, see Everard, Brittany (as n. 138) p. 158–167.
new king of England just as much dominated by Anglo-Normans as the court of his father had been? Did, as the extant charters seem to suggest, Richard take only a few southerners with him when, as king, he spent time in England and Normandy? Or did the heavy Anglo-Norman bias of the charters mean that more Poitevins and Gascons than we can ever know may have continued to attend Richard’s court after 1189? Because it was conventional for a royal charter to be witnessed by witnesses who came either from the region in which the charter was issued or from the same region as the beneficiary, it follows that evidence drawn from these witness lists will tend to exaggerate the proportion of English and Anglo-Normans among the royal familiares. It is striking that if we consider only those charters issued and treaties made during the course of the Third Crusade, then we find Poitevins witnessing at least as frequently as men from England and Normandy – but there was little or no call for Poitevins to witness charters drawn up in England or Normandy or issued on behalf of English or Norman beneficiaries. One of Richard’s most celebrated followers was his cousin Andrew de Chauvigny. Indeed Andrew was so famous that Roger of Howden reported his marriage to Denise, daughter of Ralph de Déols, in August 1189. This great society wedding conducted by the bishop of Rochester took place at Salisbury. Thanks to Howden’s report we know that Andrew travelled with the royal court to England (and presumably also to Normandy). Yet his name never once appears among the witnesses to the many charters issued by King Richard during the first year of his reign. How many other Poitevins, men not famous enough for their names to be known to English chroniclers, may also have followed Richard north in 1189–90, or were at court in the years after 1194 when the king spent most of his time in Normandy? The arithmetic of charter witness lists is treacherous ground on which to base conclusions about the nature of government and the royal household.

Where the method works much better is when it is used to illuminate the structure of politics within a single region for which there is a sufficient and coherent sample. Thus Nicholas Vincent’s analysis of Henry II’s Norman charters has shown that the king used ducal resources in Normandy to provide for his family, not to attract more Norman barons to his side. Analysis of the witness lists reveals how important a group were the Anglo-Normans, men with substantial estates on both sides of the Channel, and often men such

154) Gesta regis Henrici (as n. 130) 2 p. 76. The list of wedding guests was headed by Richard, by implication, and by his mother Eleanor.
155) Thus in Landon’s list of charters, Andrew first appears in number 328, dated 5 July, a charter for the count of St Pol; Landon, Itinerary (as n. 126) p. 37. But a Geoffrey de Chauvigny, chamberlain, probably Andrew’s brother witnesses a number of charters in 1189/90. Andrew’s prowess on crusade ensured that he became one of its legendary heroes. On his marriage and death see Vincent, William Marshal (as n. 141) p. 12f.
as Richard de Canville or Bertram de Verdun who held administrative posts in both England and Normandy. Other witnesses were more clearly Normans in the sense that the bulk of their lands lay in Normandy. But the majority of the greater Norman barons either rarely or never witnessed the king-duke’s charters. Indeed, and most significantly, none of those who rebelled in 1173–74 had done so. This confirms the opinion of the annalist of Jumièges who observed that in 1173–74 ›in Normandy, there were few nobles who stood by the Old King‹ and that those who did remain loyal were ›the bishops and the people (pauperes), and the urbi et castellorum communione‹. It is to the role of the bishops and townspeople as integrative elements that I now turn.

The bishops

The church was certainly a source of cohesion and loyalty to the ruler. In many parts of their dominions the Angevins were able to control higher church appointments. Their relative lack of family entanglements meant that clerks were more mobile than secular nobles, and more easily moved from one part of the Angevin Empire to another, usually at the behest of the king. Thus in 1162 the Englishman, John of Canterbury, ›aux Belles-mains‹, became bishop of Poitiers. In 1160 and in 1173 Hardouin dean of Le Mans and William abbot of Reading became archbishops of Bordeaux. In 1195 Richard I’s trusted clerk, Philip of Poitiers, was elected bishop of Durham; in 1205 the Tourangeau, Peter des Roches, became bishop of Winchester. As men professionally dedicated to peace and hence, in nearly all circumstances, to the status quo, churchmen could be relied upon to be loyal to the reigning king. Nothing illustrates this better than the remarkable degree of support Henry II obtained from the higher clergy of his dominions in the aftermath of the murder of Thomas Becket. In 1176 Becket’s friend, John, bishop of Poitiers, was even ready to go to war when it came to confronting the armed rebellion of Vulgrin, count of Angoulême. David Spear’s researches have shown that the ties between the English and Norman churches remained very close as men close to the court were promoted to rich benefices on both sides of the Channel. Thus his conclusion: ›in many respects the English and Norman churches between 1066 and 1204 are best viewed as a single, Anglo-Norman configuration‹. It is certain that links between the churches in the other parts of the

156) Vincent, Les Normands (as n. 115) p. 82–88.
157) It seemed to this observer that in 1173–74 that counts and barons throughout his dominions turned against the king, Les Annales de l’abbaye Saint-Pierre de Jumièges, ed. Jean Laporte (1954) p. 69, 71.
159) Diceto, Opera Historica (as n. 40) 1 p. 407, and Gillingham, Richard I (as n. 121) p. 54 n.7.
empire were not as close as this, and it may be, as is often claimed, that bishops and cathedral chapters in the south were not as much under the ruler’s control as they were in England and Normandy. But in the absence of the amount and type of evidence that we have for England and Normandy, a degree of caution is called for; here I am chiefly concerned to consider what conclusions about the bishops of Greater Anjou and Aquitaine can be drawn from the few fragments of evidence that survive.  

Ralph Turner has argued that “except at Angers, Henry and Richard never succeeded outside the old Anglo-Norman realm in planting their own clerks, bound to them by personal attachment and committed to the cause of an Angevin empire.” Here again we encounter the familiar contrast between a tightly integrated and strongly governed Anglo-Norman realm and a semi-independent Aquitaine. But the royal charters that tell us so much about the personnel of the English and Norman churches, reveal very little about those clerks who attended the courts held by Richard and Eleanor in Aquitaine. Or indeed about relations between Aquitanian prelates and the king. Archbishop William of Bordeaux, for instance, witnessed only one of Henry II’s charters. Yet thanks to Roger of Howden’s chronicle we know of at least two other occasions when he was at court, once at Grandmont in 1177, and once at Le Mans for Christmas 1180. This Christmas feast, we are told by Howden, was attended not only by the archbishop, but also by many bishops, counts and barons of the whole province. In the absence of a significant body of charter evidence there is no good way of knowing whether the majority of men who were elected bishops in Aquitaine had connections with the ducal court or not. It is, however, striking that it was not just English and Norman bishops – Baldwin of Canterbury, Hubert Walter of Salisbury and John of Evreux – who went on crusade with Richard. Archbishop Gerard of Auch and Bishop Bernard of Bayonne were among those whom the king appointed as commanders of his crusading fleet in 1190. For their part in the crusade we are almost entirely dependent upon the information supplied by the English chronicler Roger of Howden. Since Howden himself returned home after the capture of Acre, this

161) The evidence is scrappy, but not quite as scrappy as is implied by the very few lines devoted to the subject in the brief sketch by Odette Pontal, Les évêques dans le monde Plantagenêt, Cahiers de civilisation médiévale 29 (1986) p. 129–137. Raymonde Foreville, Innocent III et les élections épiscopales dans l’espace Plantagenêt, de 1198 à 1205, Cahiers des Annales de Normandie 23 (1990) p. 293–299, found rather more.


163) Dated 1172x1178, Vincent, Henry II and the Poitevins (as n. 112) p. 111.

164) Gesta regis Henrici (as n. 130) 1 p. 197, 269.

165) Gesta regis Ricardi (as n. 130) 2 p. 110, 115, 128, 134, 140, 153, 167, 181. Similarly it is only thanks to Howden that we know that a royal chaplain named Nicholas went on crusade married Richard and Beren-
means that we lose sight of them after July 1191. Their activities were of no interest to Ambroise, the Norman author of the Estoire de la guerre sainte.\textsuperscript{166} Does their crusading record mean that the ties between these prelates and Richard, both as duke and as king, were closer than has been thought? Or does it mean that the extraordinary enterprise of the crusade brought within the orbit of the court men who at other times preferred to keep their distance? It is not easy to be confident that we know the answer. On the other hand, it is only because of the crusade that we know of one connection between Richard and an archbishop of Bordeaux who did not go on crusade. Roger of Howden reports that when Richard visited Ostia in August 1190 he accused the Roman church of simony because of the large sums of money it had demanded for settling ecclesiastical matters, among them

\textit{ne deponeretur Burdegalensis, qui a clericis suis accusatur de crimine}.\textsuperscript{167} Richard's indignation on the subject of the costs involved in ensuring that Hélie de Malemort kept Bordeaux suggests that he saw him as a thoroughly acceptable archbishop – and the fact that Hélie came from the Limousin might imply that someone had drawn the attention of the Bordeaux chapter to this outsider as a candidate for the archbishopric. What is certain is that after 1199 Archbishop Hélie was to be one of the chief supports of the Plantagenet regime in the south. In 1200 he, together with the bishops of Saintes and Poitiers gave John the annulment he wanted, and it was he who celebrated John's marriage to Isabella of Angoulême.\textsuperscript{168} Even an English chronicler, Ralph of Coggeshall, recognised the crucial support given to John by Archbishop Hélie in the war of 1203–04.\textsuperscript{169}

Most monks and cathedral canons knew that it was in the material interest of their abbey or cathedral for them to elect superiors in good standing at court. The people who in 1155–56 supported at the papal curia the king's argument that he was entitled to choose the bishop of Angers from three candidates presented by the cathedral chapter were other prelates: the bishops of Le Mans and Evreux, the abbot of St Aubin at Angers and the dean

garia at Limassol in May 1191 (ibid. p. 166f.). He has been identified with the Nicholas who had been dean of Le Mans since 1180, and was elected bishop of Le Mans in 1214.

\textsuperscript{166} Ambroise believed that at a difficult moment in the Third Crusade, Richard received crucial encouragement and advice from a chaplain of his own country William of Poitiers, The History of the Holy War. Ambroise's Estoire de la Guerre Sainte, ed. and trans. Marianne Ailes/Malcolm Barber (2003) lines 9531f. But who this chaplain was has never been discovered, and it is quite possible that Ambroise's ignorance of Poitevins meant that he was mistaken.

\textsuperscript{167} Gesta regis Ricardi (as n. 130) 2 p. 114. For a later reminiscence of this see Innocent III's letter of January 1204, Die Register Innocenz' III., vol. 6 no. 215 (216), ed. Othmar HAGENEDER/John C. Moore/Andrea SOMMERLECHNER (Publikationen des Historischen Instituts beim Österreichischen Kulturinstitut im Rom II/1/6, 1995) p. 367.

\textsuperscript{168} Frédéric BOUTOULLE, Hélie de Malemort, archevêque de Bordeaux: un prêtre politique au service de Jean sans Terre, Revue Historique de Bordeaux et du département de la Gironde (forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{169} Ralph de Coggeshall, Chronicle Anglicanum, ed. Joseph STEVENSON (1875) p. 146f.
of St Laud. Although Pope Hadrian IV rejected the argument, the chapter ended by electing as bishop an abbot of St Florent de Saumur who had long been on good terms with Henry and his father Count Geoffrey. There are a few cases where Henry II had to give way and accept the election of a bishop whom he did not want – as at Bordeaux in 1158 and Limoges in 1178, but these were rare. In the case of the election to the archbishopric of Bordeaux in 1158, the bishops of Agen, Périgueux, Poitiers and Saintes would all have acquiesced in Henry II’s presence at their electoral meeting, had it not been for the heroic stance adopted by Bishop Hugh of Angoulême – that at least is the story as told by the author of the Historia pontificum et comitum Engolismensium. And the king’s disappointed candidate in 1158, Jean de Sie, master of the schools at Poitiers, was soon afterwards consoled with the see of Perigueux. Sebrand of Limoges was certainly chosen against the wishes of King Henry and Duke Richard – in 1178 very much his father’s loyal agent – but once king and bishop were reconciled, he seems to have been entirely loyal. He excommunicated the Young King when he rebelled in 1183 and he visited Richard while a prisoner in Germany, witnessing a charter drawn up at Speyer in 1194.

The only bishop known to have been elected against Richard’s wishes was Adhemar de Peirat, chosen as bishop of Poitiers in a disputed election in 1197. His election was confirmed and he was consecrated by Innocent III, but by December 1198 he was dead and the pope had recognised the opposing ‘ducal’ candidate, Maurice de Blazon, bishop of Nantes. According to Innocent, he confirmed Maurice at the request of the archbishops of Bourges and Bordeaux as well as of the dean and chapter of Poitiers. According to Bernard Itier’s brief account of the disputed election at Limoges in 1197, at least one of the candidates, Archdeacon Hugh Saldebrol, was on his way to the ducal court when he died, leaving the field free for the former dean of Limoges, Jean de Veyrac. Ironically in view of the consensus emphasising the strength of ducal control of the Norman church, the only continental bishop known to have been elected against John’s wishes is Sylvester, bishop

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170) For this and other material on the episcopate in Greater Anjou I am considerably indebted to an as yet unpublished paper by Jörg Peltzer.
172) Landon, Itinerary (as n. 126) no. 390.
173) Die Register Innocenz’ III., vol. 1 nos. 75, 490f., ed. Othmar HAGENEDER/Anton HAIDACHER (Publikationen der Abteilung für Historische Studien des Österreichischen Kulturinstituts im Rom II/1/1, 1964). Given the fact that he was a Poitevin and kinsman of Queen Eleanor, it seems likely that court influence played a part in Maurice de Blazon’s election as bishop of Nantes in 1185, Everard, Brittany (as n. 138) p. 119.
of Séez. By contrast in the far south of their dominions he and Eleanor at least helped to secure the translation of the bishop of Lectoure to Auch in 1202.

One consequence of the belief that there was something inevitable about the collapse of 1203–04 is the suggestion that relations between the Angevin kings and the churchmen of their French domains, particularly in Normandy, grew steadily worse with time. By the end of the twelfth century many Normans, clerical and lay, longed for peace even at the cost of annexation by the French king. The bishops’ defection to the Capetians was a harsh blow to the Plantagenet defense of Normandy. There was, however, no defection of the Norman bishops. Far from it. If anything, the Norman bishops accepted the fait accompli of 1204 with reluctance, writing to Innocent III in 1205 to ask whether it was right for them to swear allegiance to King Philip. One implication of the notion that by the end of the twelfth century the Norman episcopate was ready to defect to King Philip is that the church was on worse terms with Richard than with his father – which is a bit odd. From an ecclesiastical point of view Richard was clearly preferable to his father. No one held him responsible for murdering an archbishop, and he enjoyed a crusader’s reputation; unlike his father, he filled ecclesiastical vacancies rapidly. Once Richard’s quarrel with Archbishop Walter of Rouen over the site at Andeli had been settled, as it had been – and on generous terms – by 1197, there is certainly no evidence to support such a view.

During the civil war of 1173–74, the chapter of Tours risked electing as archbishop a kinsman of Eleanor and a man whom Henry II evidently disliked – as can be seen from his subsequent support for the claim of the church of Dol to be an archbishopric and hence independent of Tours. But after 1189 Richard was entirely successful in restoring good relations with Archbishop Bartholomew, to such an extent indeed that, together with the archbishop of Rouen, in 1196 Bartholomew became one of Richard’s sureties for the treaty of Louviers with Philip, and in 1198 he, again together with the archbishop of Rouen, was criticised by Innocent III for supporting Richard’s candidate for the church of Angers. By January 1199 indeed Philip Augustus was willing to give up the king of France’s old claim to patronage over the see of Tours.

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178) Gillingham, Richard I (as n. 121) p. 301 s., 344 s.
The church was, in general, a pillar of support for the ruling dynasty. Most prelates evidently shared the views of the dean of St Paul’s in London (Ralph Diceto) and of the abbot of Mont Saint Michel (Robert of Torigni). Usually only when the dynasty was divided against itself, as in 1173–4, in 1193 and in 1199, do we find a few bishops in opposition to the king. Thus Arnulf of Lisieux appeared to take the Young King’s side in 1173–74 and Hugh de Nonant, bishop of Coventry, supported John against Richard in 1193. Arthur of Brittany’s claim meant that the churches in the Loire Valley counties faced hard choices in 1199. In January 1200 John described Bishop Hamelin of Le Mans as *persone nostre et regni persecutor publicus*. Was there any defection of the bishops? The one case that might be argued is that of Jean de Veyrac, bishop of Limoges. In 1203 the bishop with the help of barons, prelates and people defeated at Noblac the routiers who had been devastating the land, *et sic brachium regis Anglie in Aquitania primo contractum et per manum episcopi terra ad Francorum dominium est reducta*. The fact that Noblac was perceived as a setback for King John suggests that the routiers were his mercenary troops. In this case the role of the routiers in determining political allegiances in the Limousin would have been similar to their role in central Normandy, when, according to the author of the History of William the Marshal, ‘John was unable to keep the love of his people because Louvrecaire maltreated them and pillaged them as though he were in enemy country’.

A Common Market

One of the strongest forces holding the Angevin Empire together was commerce, in particular a growing volume of maritime trade. When Henry II added Brittany, south and east Ireland and south Wales to the lands he inherited and acquired by marriage, he completed his control of the coasts of North West Europe. It was in these terms that Wace, himself a Channel Islander, represented the lands Henry held: *Engleterre et la terre marage, entre Espaingne et Escoce, de rivage en rivage*. Henry and his sons ruled over all the major ports of north-western Europe – Bayonne, Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Nantes, Rouen, Dublin, Bristol, Southampton and London. Their empire was a seaborne empire, comprising a number of increasingly interdependent economies. Two towns reflect the dy-

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180) Jörg Peltzer, Henry II and the Norman Bishops (as n. 158) p. 1218.
181) Rotuli Chartarum (as n. 8) col. 31b.
183) On this see Power, King John (as n. 121) p. 133f.
185) Gillingham, Angevin Empire (as n. 8) p. 61–66.
namism of this growing commerce particularly well, Rouen and La Rochelle. Within its recently extended walls Rouen, it has been suggested, was in the later twelfth century a larger city than Paris. According to William of Newburgh, it was one of the great European cities (*una ex clarissimis Europae civitatis*). In 1174 the besiegers gathered an army the like of which had not been seen in Europe for many years, but they were able to lay siege only to about one third of its walls. La Rochelle, *ville champignon* (Georges Pon), a new creation of second third of the twelfth century, rapidly became the principal Atlantic port for the wine trade, and was possibly the most successful new town of twelfth-century Europe. La Rochelle’s wealth meant that it attracted Jews and Templars and became an important financial and banking centre. Two figures who may be said to represent its links with England are Benedict of Talmont, the Jew largely responsible for supervising the work of the Exchequer of the Jews in England in and after 1198; Issembard of Saintes, responsible for building the bridges at Saintes and La Rochelle, and whose skills were recommended to the mayor and citizens of London in 1202.

These towns and their trade represented a great source of wealth to the Angevins. Because in so many cases they ruled over consumers as well as producers, ports of import as well as ports of export, they were beautifully placed to impose tolls and customs duties. Once again the English and Norman exchequer records provide the kind of information which is available from no other part of the empire. They demonstrate that by 1194–5 Richard I had introduced a customs duty levied at the rate of one-tenth. The pipe roll for 1203–4 reveals that nearly £5,000 was collected from the ports of the south and east coasts from Fowey to Newcastle in the sixteen months between July 1203 and November 1204. Recent research on the Norman Exchequer rolls by Vincent Moss has emphasised the importance of the sums raised by Norman towns in the 1190s. The merchants paid

187) William of Newburgh, Historia rerum Anglicarum (as n. 59) lib. 2 c. 36 (p. 190).
189) On Benedict see Richardson, The English Jewry (as n. 5), 3, 117, 135f.; on Issembard, Rotuli Litterarum Patentium, ed. Thomas Duffus Hardy (1835) col. 9b.
190) In that year William of Yarmouth accounted for £537 14s 2d from the tenth raised in the ports of Norfolk and Lincolnshire, but because as with other revenues raised from new sources, customs revenue was not systematically subjected to the bureaucratic procedure of an exchequer audit, the national yield is unknown.
rectas et debitas consuetudines – and in John’s reign these customs were normally defined as those that had prevailed during the reigns of our father and our brother – for example the unus pictavinus paid by merchants entering La Rochelle. Yet despite being apparently heavily taxed, the towns remained consistently loyal. In the crisis of the great rebellion when Louis VII, the Young King and the count of Flanders laid siege to Rouen (July–August 1174) the citizens resisted stoutly. When many Poitevin lords followed Eleanor and Richard into revolt, La Rochelle stood out for its loyalty to the Old King; Jordan Fantosme wrote fulsomely of the loyalty of the Londoners. While Richard was in prison in Germany, Philip Augustus and Count Baldwin of Flanders and Hainault threatened Rouen in 1193 and again in February 1194, on one occasion with 23 siege machines. Rouen capitulated in 1204, as it had in 1144, only when the rest of Normandy had fallen and there was no hope left. In 1204, according to Coggeshall, Philip subjugated almost the whole of Poitou, excepta Rochella, quae se per totum illud anni spatium viriliter contra omnes tuebatur. In 1205–06 the invasion of Alfonso of Castile was halted at the gates of Bordeaux and Bayonne. It was not only the walls, militia and fighting spirit of the towns that assisted the Angevin kings, but also their financial muscle. During the impoverished minority of Henry III when the regional aristocracy abandoned the cause of the king of England, it was only loans from towns such as La Rochelle, Niort and Bordeaux that prevented the complete collapse of ducal administration in Aquitaine. And in the end it was the surrender of La Rochelle, abandoned in 1224 much as Rouen had been in 1204, which marked the real end of the Angevin Empire. Even so ›English‹ Gascony survived, and in the crisis of 1224 that too was thanks to the loyalty of Bordeaux and Bayonne keeping Hugh of Lusignan at bay. It is not at all surprising that by 1219 the English chancery was referring to ›our good towns of Poitou and Gascony."

NEY (1999) p. 38–57, esp. p. 54–56 where he estimates that in 1198 as much as 20–25% of ducal revenue may have come from the towns.
192) Rotuli Chartarum (as n. 8) col. 148a. For rectas et debitas consuetudines see Rotuli Litterarum Patentium (as n. 189) cols. 5b, 6a and passim.
193) Annales, ed. LAPORTE (as n. 157) p. 69, 71.
195) Chronica magistri Rogeri de Hovedene, ed. William STUBBS (1870) vol. 3 p. 207; Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton 1–2, ed. H. François DELABORDE (1882), vol. 1 p. 125f. Cives viriliter se defendebant, et ceteri Normanmi eos adiuvabant, was how the Jumièges annalist summed up Philip’s second attack on Rouen under 1194, Annales, ed. LAPORTE (as n. 157) p. 75.
196) Coggeshall, ed. STEVENSON (as n. 169) p. 146. In 1204–06 La Rochelle and Oléron proved to be the bridgehead from which John was able to recover parts of Poitou.
198) Rotuli Litterarum Clausarum, ed. Thomas Duffus HARDY (1833) col. 397a.
How are we to explain this consistent loyalty? In part no doubt by the fact that the Angevins were sometimes prepared to give the towns what they wanted, a notable early example being Geoffrey’s privilege for Rouen, confirmed by Henry in 1150–51\(^{199}\). In particular the degree of self-government which was guaranteed by communal status. By 1204 no fewer than seventeen Norman towns had been granted communes; and outside Normandy by the same date there were communes at La Rochelle, Bayonne, Dax, Oléron, Niort, St-Jean d’Angély, Saintes and St-Émilion\(^{200}\). The most famous urban privilege of Normandy, the *Établissements de Rouen*, was enjoyed by non-Norman as well as by Norman towns. But in most cases the grant of urban liberties is likely to have been the reward for a pre-existing loyalty – as it certainly was at La Rochelle and Angers in 1175 and Bordeaux after 1205–06 – so its purpose was to reinforce rather than create. Presumably what really counted was that the urban ruling elites believed that the Angevin Empire was in some sense ‘good for business’ and should, therefore, be supported. While, for example, England and Poitou were ruled by one and the same prince it was reasonable to expect that – so long as the due customs were paid – trade between England and Poitou would be protected and encouraged. Thanks to the chancery rolls we can see that this was indeed the case after 1199, and presumably had been before. In August 1203, for example, John explained why he was ordering Geoffrey fitz Peter to see that merchants of Poitou and Gascony receive immediately the money owing them: ‘if they are properly paid now an increased supply of wine will come *in terram nostram* from their parts; if they are not, they might bring about a wine shortage’\(^{201}\). The English market encouraged wine production in the Aunis, Saintonge and Gascony. This is why the English connection was cherished. In 1220 the mayor and commune of Niort wrote to Henry III: ‘we beseech you in every way we can to send us a governor who will defend both us and your land of Poitou. … Do not appoint someone from round here as seneschal, but send us a noble, prudent and influential man from England’\(^{202}\). Even at those times when trade with partners outside the Angevin Empire (notably with Flanders) was disrupted as a result of embargoes imposed for political and military reasons, the existence of so many economies inside the empire meant that there were still plenty of opportunities and customers for enterprising businessmen. By contrast when Philip conquered Normandy he refused to allow ships carry-

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201) *Rotuli de Liberate ac de Misis et de Praestitis regnante Johnanne*, ed. Thomas Duffus Hardy (1844) p. 60.
ing wine from Poitou, Gascony and Anjou to enter the duchy. The conquest was a ser-
ious blow to the prosperity of Rouen as well as to Channel coast ports such as Dieppe
and Barfleur. While the empire lasted, its inhabitants gained.

Monetary Union?

But if there was an Angevin free trade zone, there was, of course, no common currency. In
theory there remained the fundamental split between England and the king’s French ter-
ritories. The ordinance *ad subveniendum terre Jerusalem* issued jointly by Philip and
Henry in 1184 laid down that the money was to be collected in deniers angevins on the
continent and in sterling in England: *in terra regis Anglie cismarina duos denarios An-
degavensis monete, et in Anglia unus sterlings,*

In tota terra regis Francie duos denarios Proveniens monete vel equipollens,

In England Henry II had issued an entirely new silver coinage, the Cross-and-Crosslets or ‘Tealby’
coinage in 1157–8. Whereas up until this date the fineness and weight of coins had fluctuated considerably from issue
to issue, there now began a much more stable system: a series of coinages of fixed types
each lasting for many years. In 1180 a new type, the Short Cross, based on a design by
Philip Aymer of Tours, was issued and lasted until 1247. Coin finds suggest that follow-
ing this re-coingage, foreign silver coins, including the Scottish coins that in the north had
earlier made up a significant proportion of the currency, were eliminated from circula-
tion.

Richard FitzNigel reckoned that Henry II deserved praise for insisting that pay-
ments into the treasury from Northumberland and Cumberland had to be made in the cur-
rent and legal coin just as from the rest of the counties, and not as they formerly had been,
in coin of any currency. There was to be just one weight and one money throughout all
the realm.

When the Angevins took over Normandy, the penny of Rouen ceased to be minted and
the denier angevin spread rapidly everywhere, even into diocese of Rouen. In economic
terms this was an extension of the earlier, from the mid eleventh century onwards, spread

203) Recueil des Actes de Philippe Auguste, roi de France 2, ed. H.-François Delaborde/Ch. Petit-Du-
taillis (1916) no. 865 (p. 453).
204) Dunbabin, France in the Making (as n. 7) p. 346f. Amongst those who gained were the Channel
Islanders – so much indeed that to this day they remain attached to the English crown. See now J. A.
205) In tota terra regis Francie duos denarios Proveniens monete vel equipollens, Recueil des Actes de
Philippe Auguste 1 (as n. 126) no. 123 (p. 152).
207) B. J. Cook, Foreign coins in medieval England, in: Local coins, foreign coins: Italy and Europe 11th
208) FitzNigel, Dialogus (as n. 1) p. 9 s. At a theoretical level the notion that only one currency should cir-
culate throughout the realm had existed since the tenth century.
209) Françoise Dumas, Les monnaies normandes (Xe–XIIe s.), Revue numismatique 21 (1979) p. 84–103.
into western Normandy of payments in deniers mansois as a result of l’importance de l’axe économique Le Mans-Alençon-Argentan-Falaise-Caen\textsuperscript{210}). Although, as the 1184 ordinance indicates, the angevin was the official Angevin coinage throughout their continental dominions, the evidence of coin finds produces a very different picture. Other coins, tournois and mansois and especially guincamp, the deniers minted by the counts of Penthièvre, circulated north of the Loire. South of Loire deniers angevins were rarely found. Here the full diversity of traditional seigneurial mints remained in operation. In 1177–78 the mint at Déols switched to issuing angevins after Henry acquired the honour of Châteauroux, but apart from this and the fact that Richard had his name inscribed on the coins of Poitou and Bordeaux, the old, apparently chaotic, system remained untouched. This diversity, it has been said, was a marque de faiblesse which explains the rapid success of the tournois royal in the 13\textsuperscript{th} century, first north and then south of the Loire\textsuperscript{211}).

The apparently relaxed attitude taken by Henry II and Richard to traditional coinages on the continent has always seemed to be in marked contrast to the active policy adopted by Philip Augustus. By closing the mints at Amiens and (with the consent of their lords) the seigneurial mints at Corbie, Noyon and Laon, then starting to mint parisis at Arras, St Omer and Péronne after he got them in 1192, he turned the parisis which had been coin for Paris itself into the main coin of north and north east France. After the conquest of Normandy he took a clear political stand in taking measures to drive out both sterling and the angevin; rather than try to impose the parisis, he opted for the tournois, a coin which had already been circulating there\textsuperscript{212}). This marked the beginning of the slow process whereby the royal coinage came to dominate the kingdom. It is clearly the case that Philip was more concerned to press in the direction of, if not a single currency, then at least a greater uniformity of coinage than Henry II and Richard were. But whether this should be treated as a sign of weakness or as a failure to integrate the different parts of the Angevin dominions is another matter altogether. In a situation where silver coins of one denomination only (the penny or denier) were issued, a single uniform coinage had the huge limi-

\textsuperscript{210} Lucien Musset, Réflexions sur les moyens de paiement en Normandie au XI\textsuperscript{er} et XII\textsuperscript{e} siècles, in: Aspects de la société et de l’économie dans la Normandie médiévale (Cahier des Annales de Normandie 22, 1988) p. 83–85.

\textsuperscript{211} «En fait cette monnaie est aussi diverse que les possessions territoriales des Plantagenêt ... le droit monétaire est partagé entre eux et divers seigneurs», Françoise Dumas, La monnaie dans les domaines Plantagenêt, Cahiers de civilisation médiévale 29 (1986) p. 53–59, here p. 53.

tation, from the user’s point of view, of inflexibility, of providing a coin of one value only. Thus in England anyone who wanted a low value coin had to cut the penny into halves or quarters, which had the disadvantage of creating fragments of silver that were unattractively small. The rigidity of the currency system was an obstacle to trade by small households. So long as there was a known exchange rate between the various currencies there was a clear advantage in allowing a number of different coins to circulate. Thus the guin- camp, as a coin of very low value, was particularly widely used and hence prominent in Norman hoards; sterling pennies too are found, but, as a higher value coin, in smaller numbers. Gold coins were of such great value that none dating from this period have been found in the ground; none the less, English and Norman record evidence shows that such coins, either bezants, worth 2 shillings each, or Almohad dinars known as oboli de Muscze, were in circulation in late twelfth and early thirteenth-century England and Normandy, functioning as a coin useful in international trade or high prestige transactions.

At about the same time as Henry introduced the Cross-and-Crosslets coinage in England, he decreed in Normandy that 4 angevins were worth 3 tournois, and that a mark of silver could be paid to the king either as 13s 4d sterling, 26s 8d mansois or 53s 4d tournois. Each of the new Cross-and-Crosslet pennies weighed 1.46 grams, which meant that the English monetary or Tower pound (350 g) was created by 240 of them, and the Tower mark (233 g) by 160 of them. Since it followed that twelve of these pennies (i.e. a total of 17.5 g) would make up the difference between the Tower pound and the troy pound of 367.5g, it seems that Henry had in effect linked the English penny to continental troy weight-standards. This can be regarded equally well as imposing continental standards on England or as extending the sterling area into continental Europe.

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214) Dumas refers to "ce système de simple, double et quadruple" in the Plantagenêt lands, but without commenting on the commercial advantages it bestowed, Dumas, La Monnaie au temps (as n. 212) p. 547.
215) Jean Yvon, Esterlins à la croix courte dans les trésors français de la fin du XIIe et de la première moitié du XIIIe siècle, British Numismatic Journal 39 (1970) p. 26. In the south-west of France in the twelfth century the high value morlan, minted by the viscounts of Béarn, performed the same function as sterling.
succès en Europe occidentale as a coin of high value at a time when high denomination silver coins were still not being minted. Henry II and his sons may have shown less anxiety than Philip Augustus to achieve a uniform currency, but it is hard not to believe that their subjects, in particular the businessmen among them, did not prefer to have a system which, so long as exchange rates remained reasonably stable, gave them access to a wider range of coins of different values. In this sense, by conforming to the needs of consumers and businessmen rather than bureaucrats, the Angevin coinage system may be said to have contributed to the commercial and economic integration of the empire.

An Angevin Culture?

As Jean Dunbabin points out, what distinguished the Angevin empire from others was simply that it did not last long enough to acquire a justifying ideology. During the half century between 1154 and 1204 was any attempt made to acquire one? Did the culture of the royal court, for example, act as a magnet bringing together scholars and artists from many different parts of the empire? In the rest of this paper I shall limit myself to a few words on the subject of literary culture. Undoubtedly the courts of the twelfth-century Angevins played a prominent role in Latin and vernacular literary culture. For Walter Schirmer, Henry II’s was the most important intellectual centre in the West; according to Georges Duby, la cour la plus brillante d’Europe se réunissait autour ce prince. Since Henry II and Richard were both well-educated and immensely wealthy it was only natural that many aspiring authors and scholars should look to them for support and advancement. Some authors would have visited the court, whether the king’s court, or the queen’s, or the court of one of their sons, when that court came to the region in which they lived. A few authors were not only for a while more closely attached to the royal court – that notoriously most protéan of things – but also seem to have composed the works for which they are famous while members of it. Among them we can count the Frenchman, Peter of Blois; three Englishmen, Richard FitzNigel, Roger of Howden and the unknown author of the treatise on English law known as Glanvill; and two Anglo-Welsh authors, Walter Map and Gerald de Barri. In three of his songs, the Limousin poet, Bernart de Ventadorn,

219) Dumas, La monnaie dans les domaines Plantagenêt (as n. 211) p. 54.
220) Dunbabin, France in the Making (as n. 7) p. 346.
221) But on the prestige attached to schemes of building see Lindy Grant, Le patronage architectural d’Henri II et de son entourage, Cahiers de civilisation médiévale 39 (1994) p. 73–84. For Norman ecclesiastical architecture in political and social context see now Lindy Grant, Architecture and Society in Normandy 1120–1270 (2005).
implies that he sometimes attended Henry II’s court, even when it took him across ‘the wild, deep sea’ to England\textsuperscript{223}). To judge from the dedication and language of her Lais, Marie \textit{de France} may also have come from the Île de France to add lustre to the court of Henry II or of Henry his son. Similarly the courts of high-ranking Angevin servants such as chancellors Thomas Becket and William Longchamp, or Walter of Coutances, keeper of the seal and archbishop of Rouen, attracted authors like John of Salisbury, Nigel Wireker (Whiteacre) and John de Hauville\textsuperscript{224}). In this sense these Angevin courts may be said to have contributed to the cultural integration of the ruler’s dominions, and no doubt it all added to their prestige. Even though there is no evidence linking Chrétien de Troyes with the Angevin court, it does look as though in Erec et Enide and Cligès the Britain of King Arthur was delineated as though it were the England of Henry II.

A work such as Jordan Fantosme’s Chronique, the verse history of the 1173–74 war between the English and the Scots, can plausibly be described as a work written with integrative intention. As Matthew Strickland has convincingly argued, it was clearly intended for recitation at Henry II’s court after the rebellion of 1173–74, and with two main political purposes: first, to promote reconciliation between Henry II and his son the Young King, and second, to praise the loyalty and bravery of the old king’s nobles during the war. In pursuing these aims Jordan was quite prepared to criticise as well as praise Henry II\textsuperscript{225}). Other authors were more clearly impressed by the power and glamour of the kings and wrote works that reflect this. Richard FitzNigel and Diceto on Henry II and Ambroise on Richard I are three cases that spring to mind.

Although there was never an ‘official Angevin’ history of the ruler’s deeds in the manner of Otto of Freising’s Gesta Friderici, or Rigord’s and William the Breton’s Gesta Philippi, modern historians have sometimes suggested that Henry II, faced by the problem of how to govern so large and heterogeneous an empire, saw in history the literature most likely to persuade so many different peoples that he was their rightful ruler, and that in consequence he actively encouraged the writing of this allegedly useful genre\textsuperscript{226}). According to Bernard Guenée, ‘Les Plantagenêts, au XIIe siècle, jouèrent consciemment et massivement de l’histoire pour établir l’illustre origine de leur lignage et justifier leur domination dans les pays qu’ils s’étaient acquis. Et, soucieux de convaincre d’abord leurs chevaliers, ils furent même les premiers à patronner une littérature en langue française\textsuperscript{227}). This is indeed a plausible interpretation of the only two vernacular works that Henry is

\textsuperscript{223) Bernart von Ventadorn: seine Lieder, ed. and trans. Carl Appel (1915) poems 21, 26, 33, datable only to 1154–c.1180.}
\textsuperscript{224) And to the list we might add Archbishop Baldwin of Canterbury as patron of Joseph of Exeter.}
\textsuperscript{226) For the notion of ‘eine regelrechte Schule von Historiographen’, see Schirmer/Broich, Studien zum literarischen Patronat (as n. 222) 44f.}
known to have commissioned: Wace’s Roman de Rou and Benoit’s Chronique des ducs de Normandie – two versions of a verse history of the dukes of Normandy. There can be little doubt that they were intended to reinforce the legitimacy of Henry’s own rule over Normandy\(^{228}\). According to Wace himself, he ›spoke in honour of the second Henry, who was born of the lineage of Rou‹. He also tells us (assuming, that is, that he wrote the so-called Chronique ascendante), that he began to write the Rou in 1160\(^{229}\). This date fits neatly with Henry II’s interest in the translation of the bodies of Dukes Richard I and Richard II to a more elevated place in the monastic church of Fécamp. This took place in March 1162 and according to Benoit, it was done ›Par le buen rei, cil qui fu fiz/Maheut, la bonne empereriz,/Par le buen rei Henri segunt,/Flor des princes de tot le munt‹\(^{230}\). But it is striking that both Wace and Benoit have virtually nothing to say about Henry II’s own period of rule, and very little about the reign of his grandfather, Henry I. This does not suggest that Henry II was much interested in promoting contemporary or near contemporary history.

Indeed a survey of historical writing during his reign, not just in Normandy, but also in England, Anjou and Aquitaine, shows that, for all Henry’s fine education, he showed very little interest in historical writing in Latin\(^{231}\). A number of authors were keen to offer works of history to him, but he evidently gave them little or no encouragement. The only Latin ›historical‹ work that he may have asked for is the short tract *De majoratu et senescalcia Franciae*, composed in order to prove, with all manner of epic circumstantial detail, that the count of Anjou was the seneschal of France. It looks as though this was written in 1158 when Henry was about to invade Brittany, presumably in the hope of persuading a worried King Louis VII that the planned attack was being carried out in his name and by one of his officers\(^{232}\). The author, Hugues de Claye, was a knight attached to Henry’s household, and it seems highly probable that Henry knew what he was up to\(^{233}\). The

\(^{228}\) Schirmer/Broich, Studien zum literarischen Patronat (as n. 222) p. 92, 200.

\(^{229}\) Wace, The Roman de Rou (as n. 184) Part 3, lines 185–6, Part 1, lines 1–4. The Chronique ascendante contains about 100 lines devoted to an extremely flattering assessment of Henry II’s rule.

\(^{230}\) Benoit, Chronique des ducs de Normandie 2, ed. Carin Fahlin (1951–1954) lines 3259–62. Strikingly Wace tells us that he attended the ceremony, but does not mention the king’s presence, Roman de Rou (as n. 184) lines 2241–46.


\(^{232}\) This brief work survives in just one manuscript. Chroniques des comtes d’Anjou (as n. 128) p. xc–xciii, 37, 239–246.

\(^{233}\) In a document dated 1158 and witnessed by Hugues de Claye, Henry II announced that at Orléans *in communi audientia recognovit quod custodia abbate sancti Juliani Turonensis ad me pertinet ex dignitate dapiferatus mei, unde servire debo regi Franciae sicut comes Andegavorum*. Recueil des Actes de Henri II, roi d’Angleterre et duc de Normandie, concernant les provinces françaises et les affaires de France 1–3, ed. Léopold Delisle/Élie Berger (1909–1927) vol. I no. 87. Twenty five other *acta* printed by Delisle
most striking illustration of Henry’s lack of interest in contemporary history comes from England. One of his achievements here was to put an end to the flowering of history that had characterised the second quarter of the twelfth century. After 1154 no one in England wrote anything remotely approaching a king-centred history until Roger of Howden took up the pen nearly 20 years later, in the early 1170s. Roger was a royal clerk and active in royal service for some thirty years, from the early 1170s to 1201, but there is no sign that either his Gesta Henrici et Ricardi or his Chronica were intended to be presented to or dedicated to the king.

Until the late 1180s, when he was joined by Diceto, Gervase of Canterbury and Gerald de Barri, in England Roger of Howden ploughed a lonely furrow. It was after the fall of Jerusalem in 1187 that the real surge in the volume of historical writing came here. The links between court and history became much closer in Richard I’s reign. He and his advisers were clearly interested in using contemporary history for political and propaganda purposes. Indeed the newsletters, including forgeries, sent out on Richard’s behalf meant that he became the first king since Alfred to intend systematically to mould English public opinion by means of the written word. Moreover by combining newsletters sent to the abbot of Clairvaux with an annual donation to meet the costs of holding the Cistercian General Chapter, Richard evidently hoped to reach a much wider public opinion.

It has often been suggested that the Angevins exploited the figure of King Arthur for political and integrative ends. Peter Johanek, characterising Henry II as a ruler “der alles nutzte, was die divergenten Glieder seines Reichs enger aneinanderband”, wrote: “Heinrich II. hat auch die Integrationskraft, die der Figur des Königs Arthur in der höfischen Gesellschaft des 12. Jahrhunderts zuzuwachsen begann, in den Dienst der Idee vom ange-
vinischen Grossreich gestellt\textsuperscript{238}). Henry undoubtedly did come to be seen in Arthurian light. In the mid 13\textsuperscript{th} century Matthew Paris, for example, wrote that in Henry’s reign it seemed that the days of King Arthur had been renewed\textsuperscript{239}). But it seems very unlikely that this is how the Old King himself had wanted to be portrayed. Admittedly in his Topographia Hibernica, Gerald de Barri referred to Arthur, \textit{famosus ille Britonum rex}, as the overlord of Ireland and in a context supportive of Henry II’s claim to the island\textsuperscript{240}). But these words were not written until 1188 or 1189, in the second edition of the work – in the first edition he did not mention Arthur – when Gerald was already thinking about potential patrons from among the next generation. The first clear evidence for an Angevin king being involved in the turning of Arthur into the model English king that he later became, dates from the 1190s, and from reign of Richard I – in his military prowess a far more Arthurian king than his father had been. By taking Excalibur with him on crusade, Richard consciously associated himself with the legendary king. In his journal of the Third Crusade Roger of Howden referred to the sword that Richard gave to Tancred of Sicily in March 1191 as \textit{gladium optimum Arcturi, nobilis quondam regis Britonum, quem Britones vocauerunt Caliburnum}. A few years later, when Roger re-wrote this passage, he referred to Arthur as \textit{rex Anglie}\textsuperscript{241}). It is also in the early 1190s that we must place the famous excavation at Glastonbury that uncovered the bodies of Arthur and Guinevere\textsuperscript{242}). The abbot of Glastonbury responsible for this piece of theatre was Henry de Sully, formerly prior of Bermondsey, chosen abbot at an assembly at Pipewell in September 1189 – an assembly dominated by the new king\textsuperscript{243}). Before this date it looks as though Arthur was still too much thought of as the Welsh and Breton king who one day would return to drive out the English and the Normans to be readily exploited as a specifically Plantagenet hero\textsuperscript{244}). In some circles indeed he remained so in the 1190s and later. William of Newburgh believed


\textsuperscript{239} Matthew Paris, Historia Anglorum 1–3, ed. Frederic Madden (1866–1869) vol. 1 p. 397f.

\textsuperscript{240} Giraldus, Topographia Hibernica, ed. J. F. Dimock (1867) p. 148.

\textsuperscript{241} Gesta regis Ricardi (as n. 130) 2 p. 159; Howden, Chronica (as n. 195) 3 p. 97. See John Gillingham, Context and Purposes of Geoffrey of Monmouth’s History of the Kings of Britain, in: The English (as n. 3) p. 19–39, 23 n. 23. Moreover in October 1190 Richard had recognised his nephew Arthur as heir to the kingdom of England should he die without legitimate issue.


\textsuperscript{243} Gesta regis Ricardi (as n. 130) 2 p. 85.

\textsuperscript{244} Hence it seems much more likely that the Arthurian episode in Stephen of Rouen’s \textit{Draco Norman nicus}, written in the late 1160s, was a literary joke rather than, pace Johanek, König Arthur (as n. 238) p. 384–389, a reflection of Henry II’s real view of King Arthur. See Aurell, L’Empire des Plantagenêt (as
that the Bretons defied Henry II when they gave the name Arthur to his grandson, the posthumous son of Geoffrey of Brittany. The Barnwell chronicler’s comment on the disappearance of Arthur of Brittany in 1203 was that it was God’s punishment for Breton impudence in taking the name as an augury and boasting that they would kill the English and recover the kingdom.

But if it was not until the 1190s that Arthur really started to be turned into the emphatically dead king of England that he became, then the loss of continental territories so soon afterwards, in 1202–04, had the effect of ensuring that the subsequent political resonance of an English King Arthur was restricted to that of a king intensifying his rule over the rest of Britain. In any case, as the romances of Chrétien of Troyes make plain, the literary magic of the court of King Arthur, of the Knights of the Round Table, of Lancelot, Gawain, Perceval and the others, was so great that it had already overflowed the boundaries of the Angevin Empire and become part of the common currency of western European literature. In any event, however impressive the court culture over which Henry, Eleanor and Richard presided may or may not have been, the fact remains that with the accession of King John it all came to an abrupt end. He neither encouraged nor inspired literature of any sort. This is very much how, long ago, Powicke saw it. Philip Augustus, he wrote, was outshone by Henry’s powerful and brilliant court and by Richard’s chivalry.

But with John all was changed.

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n. 8) p. 170–172 for the ‘registre burlesque’ in this scene. As Aurell (p. 155–157) points out, attempts to use epic and romance literature instrumentally for political purposes would have been perilous.  
245) William of Newburgh, Historia rerum Anglicarum (as n. 59) lib. 3 c.7 (p. 235). Memoriale fratris Walteri de Coventria (as n. 76) 2 p. 196. Both Howden and Diceto are oddly explicit that it was the Bretons who gave Arthur his name, Howden, Gesta regis Henrici (as n. 130) 1 p. 361; Diceto, Opera Historica (as n. 40) 2 p. 48. Cf. ‘The Arthurian legend had not been employed in any purposeful way to enhance the prestige of the Angevin dynasty in England. On the contrary, Breton resistance to Angevin hegemony was signalled when the heir to the duchy ... was named Arthur’, Emma Mason, The Hero’s Invincible Sword, in: The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood 3, eds. Christopher Harper-Bill/Ruth Harvey (1990) p. 31.  
246) Even Gerald de Barri, always desperately keen to acquire powerful patronage, did no more than, evidently without much hope of reward, send John a dedicatory letter together with a copy of a text of the Expugnatio Hibernica as revised in the 1190s. Bartlett, Gerald of Wales (as n. 32) p. 215.  
247) Powicke, Loss of Normandy (as n. 104) p. 302f.