

*The Hospitallers of Rhodes: Prospectives, Problems, Possibilities*¹⁾

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The Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem, Rhodes and Malta has almost always lacked effective historiographical machinery²⁾. There is only one complete history of the Hospital which is seriously founded on the main archive sources in Malta and Rome, that of Giacomo Bosio who died more than 350 years ago in 1627.³⁾ Individual scholars have produced works on particular topics, periods or regions, but many of them are limited in scope or largely repetitive; often they fail to utilize significant materials, published or unpublished. The Hospital has survived as a chivalric or hospitaller institution; but it has been separated from its own archives on Malta since 1798 and it does not naturally produce historians of its own, while Maltese scholars have ignored the history of the Hospital during the centuries before it reached their own island in 1530.⁴⁾ The Military Orders do attract a fringe of writers interested in bogus modern foundations or esoteric revivals, some of which are inspired by a scarcely scientific attraction for the glammers of titles,

1) The standard work is J. DELAVILLE LE ROULX, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes jusqu'à la mort de Philibert de Naillac: 1310-1421* (Paris, 1913; reprinted with preface by A. LUTTRELL: London, 1974), supplemented by the survey in A. LUTTRELL, "The Hospitallers at Rhodes: 1306-1421," in *A History of the Crusades*, gen. ed. K. SETTON, iii (Madison, Wisc., 1975). This item and 23 other articles are reprinted in A. LUTTRELL, *The Hospitallers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West, 1291-1440: Collected Studies* (London, 1978). The present paper looks to future problems and possibilities rather than the repetition of what has recently been published; it concentrates on the years before 1421.

2) A. LUTTRELL, "The Hospitallers' Historical Activities: [1291-1630]," *Annales de l'Ordre Souverain Militaire de Malte*, xxiv-xxvi (1966-1968); this work requires revision, which is under way. See also R. HIESTAND, *Papsturkunden für Templer und Johanniter* (Göttingen, 1972), 12-38.

3) G. BOSIO, *Dell'Istoria della sacra religione et ill.ma militia di San Giovanni Gerosolimitano*, 3 vols. (2nd ed. of vols. i-ii: Rome, 1622-1629; vol. iii one ed. only: Rome, 1602, reprinted Naples, 1684).

4) The Malta period offers numerous opportunities for study; even the 1565 siege awaits proper analysis. Historians tend at present to show more interest in the indigenous Maltese than in the Hospital, but R. CAVALIERO, *The Last of the Crusaders: The Knights of St. John and Malta in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1960), partly fills a serious gap. Studies on the modern period have concentrated in particular on the juridical status of the Order in international law, and on emphasizing the continuities of Hospitaller achievement, the work of the Malteser-Hilfsdienst in Vietnam and other contemporary activities elsewhere.

genealogies, medals and uniforms, but serious Hospitaller history before 1530 is no one's history, devoid of effective support, of a scholarly journal, of any coherent programme. The archives are widely scattered and sometimes difficult of access. Some individual priories and commanderies have been the subject of studies which are excellent within their limitations, but the problems in the largely unexplored central archive are almost overwhelming.

The centuries before 1310, the year by which the conquest of Rhodes had definitively been concluded, are comparatively well covered for they form part of the general history of the crusades, and it was possible for Joseph Delaville le Roulx, who had a team of assistants, to collect and print the bulk of the major sources in the four mammoth volumes of his *Cartulaire*.⁵ Delaville himself wrote a book and numerous studies on the period⁶, and in 1967 Jonathan Riley-Smith published an admirable synthesis of the materials available, incorporating valuable topographical studies into new interpretations which are placed within a broad understanding of the whole crusading movement; this is the outstanding recent contribution to Hospitaller studies, especially because it provides so clear a picture of the Order's institutions.⁷ Extensions or improvements are conceivable, but they would probably have made the book unmanageable and perhaps have prevented its completion. Riley-Smith makes little use of unpublished sources, although these are quite plentiful for the late thirteenth century and not insignificant for the twelfth century.⁸ The lack of detailed treatment of Western affairs, though largely excusable for a period when the Hospital held extensive Eastern estates, leaves certain aspects of the Order's history untouched. Attitudes and spiritual impulses, as well as men and money, originated in the Latin West where, in Spain for example, the Hospitallers played a major role in local affairs. Much can be done with the archives of the priories, though they are probably better studied on a topographical basis across a span of centuries rather than within narrow chronological divisions. Riley-Smith's treatment of the Cypriot interlude which followed the fall of Acre in 1291 is inevitably incomplete, for at that point the papal registers, the Aragonese and other archives, the chronicles and the crusading treatises all begin to provide a mass of material, much of it not fully published.

There would be advantages in a periodization of Hospitaller history which emphasized admittedly arbitrary turning points such as 1271, with the fall of *Krac des Chevaliers*, or 1334, with the renewal of active Hospitaller crusading, rather than the habitual 1291 or

5) *Cartulaire général de l'Ordre des Hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem*, ed. J. DELAVILLE LE ROULX, 4 vols. (Paris, 1894-1906).

6) IDEM, *Les Hospitaliers en Terre Sainte et à Chypre: 1100-1310* (Paris, 1904); IDEM, *Mélanges sur l'Ordre de S. Jean de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1910).

7) J. RILEY-SMITH, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus: c. 1050-1310* (London, 1967).

8) Cf. HIESTAND, 43-200 et passim. Archaeological evidence naturally continues to emerge in Acre and other towns, in castles and villages: M. BENVENISTI, *The Crusaders in the Holy Land* (trans: New York, 1972).

1310, just as it was in many ways the great siege of Malta in 1565 rather the loss of Rhodes in 1522 or the acquisition of Malta in 1530 which truly marked the beginning of a new epoch.⁹⁾ The problems of the period from 1310 to 1522, for which the second edition of Bosio of 1629 is still the only overall coverage, lie not merely in the quantity of unpublished sources but also in their inequalities, since the fifteenth-century material is more considerable and consistent than that for the fourteenth century, particularly after 1459 when many texts illustrating the decision-making processes become available in the *Libri Conciliorum*. In some ways the Rhodes period needs to be studied and interpreted as a whole; in fact, given the lack of fourteenth-century documents, certain institutional themes can be treated only in that way. Delaville le Roulx' volume on the years 1310 to 1421 appeared posthumously and was never continued to 1522 as its author had intended, and most subsequent studies have been concerned primarily with the pre-1421 period. The massive documentation at Malta, in the prioral archives, and in other published and unpublished sources very largely remains to be exploited. The Greek and Turkish materials, together with a daunting and almost inexhaustible range of printed items of astonishing diversity in topic and quality, are still to be studied, as are a wide variety of problems stretching right across Mediterranean and Western history. The history of the Hospital from 1421 to 1565 awaits its historians.

Delaville le Roulx' final work contains much information for the period down to 1421 and it outlines the broad political developments, but his book is awkwardly arranged in such a way that chapters correspond chronologically to successive Masters of the Hospital which impedes any coherent treatment of institutional arrangements. Delaville failed, furthermore, to overcome the difficult problem of integrating two major complications into his account. One of these was the continued disturbance caused in the Order's affairs by that extraordinary personality the Aragonese Hospitaller Fr. Juan Fernández de Heredia; the other was the papal schism which from 1378 onwards impinged heavily, though not in the end disastrously, on numerous aspects of the Hospital's activities. For the rest, Delaville's genealogical hypotheses occupy space which would now be devoted to social and economic realities, while Hospitaller attitudes and motivations demand interpretation. Financial and manpower resources, royal and papal policies require investigation, and the whole context of developments throughout the East and West, and especially in the priories, remains to be elaborated and related to the Hospital's central problems at Rhodes.¹⁰⁾

9) L. BUTLER, "The Maltese People and the Order of St. John in the Sixteenth Century," *Annales de l'Ordre Souverain Militaire de Malte*, xxiii-xxiv (1963-1964).

10) Cf. A. LUTTRELL'S introduction to the 1974 reprint of DELAVILLE (1913).

Apart from difficulties with bibliographies¹¹⁾ and with finding books,¹²⁾ there can be little immediate hope of cataloguing or absorbing the narrative sources or the contents of the greater and lesser archival repositories which should eventually produce major contributions to the Hospital's history. The archives of priories and commanderies contain a mass of valuable local information and occasional items of direct central importance.¹³⁾ The Malta documents are incompletely, but none the less usefully, catalogued.¹⁴⁾ The earliest surviving portion of a Master's annual register dates to 1346, and there are registers for the years 1347/8, 1351/2, 1358/9, 1365/6 and 1374, but the rest of the period from 1310 to 1380 has to be studied from original papal and Magistral bulls, from the acts of the Chapters-General and from other miscellaneous materials; these must be supplemented from the priorial archives, from the Vatican registers and from sundry information gathered here and there. The Magistral registers from 1381 to 1396 were mostly kept in Avignon where the Master was then residing, and only in 1399 does a regular series of Rhodian registers commence. Hospitaller studies therefore require a combination of scattered archival sources, and the need to work in Malta and Rome as well as in Madrid, Marseilles, Venice, London or elsewhere is one of the factors which make Hospitaller research so complex and slow.

11) The compilation of a satisfactorily complete bibliography presents almost totally insuperable problems. Much important material is contained in works with a title which has no connection with the Order; other items which do deal directly with the Hospital are valueless or trivial. The standard work is F. de HELLWALD, *Bibliographie méthodique de l'Ordre de S. Jean de Jérusalem* (Rome, 1885), which omits many works, and the *aggiunta* to it in E. ROSSI, *Riassunto storico del S. M. Ordine di San Giovanni Gerosolimitano* (Rome, 1924); these two works were reprinted in one volume in 1968. ROSSI published further *aggiunte* in revised editions of his *Riassunto* (Rome, 1929, 1934). Many recent works are listed in J. MIZZI, "A Bibliography of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem: 1925-1969", in *The Order of St. John in Malta*, ed. for the Council of Europe (Malta, 1970), which records 1507 titles. See also G. FUMAGALLI, *Bibliografia rodia* (Florence, 1937), and the "Aggiunte e correzioni" to it published by E. ARMAO, in *La Bibliofilia*, xlvi (1944). Other bibliographies are listed in MIZZI, 108-117, and P. XUEREB, *A Bibliography of Maltese Bibliographies* (Malta, 1978). Also useful are H. MAYER, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Hanover, 1960), and IDEM, "Literaturbericht über die Geschichte der Kreuzzüge: Veröffentlichungen 1958-1967," *Historische Zeitschrift*, ccvii (1969).

12) Some relevant works are expensive, rare or unobtainable even in major national libraries, but many books, together with invaluable collections of offprints and other opuscula, can be found in special collections, notably the Order's own library at Palazzo Malta, Via Condotti, Rome; the "Melitensia" collection at the University of Malta; the library at St. John's Gate, Clerkenwell, London; the Scicluna Collection at Rhodes House, Oxford; and the Foster Stearns Collection at the Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, catalogued in O. KAPSNER, *A Catalog of the Foster Stearns Collection . . .* (Washington, 1955).

13) Eg. text in LUTTRELL (1978), III 771-773. On the priorial archives, see DELAVILLE, *Cartulaire*, i. pp. XXVII-CCXXX; HIESTAND, 47-168.

14) A. ZAMMIT GABARRETTA et al., *Catalogue of the Records of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in the Royal Malta Library*, i- (Malta, 1964-).

Delaville's Cartulaire closes in 1310 and, despite the many losses in the archives, there can be no question of continuing it to include the voluminous and almost entirely unpublished body of later documents. However, in addition to the major publication of the papal inquests of 1373,¹⁵⁾ other editions are under way. The statutes for 1330 have been printed¹⁶⁾ and those for 1311 and 1315 are in preparation, while the statutes subsequent to 1330 also await publication, a matter much complicated by their survival in variant manuscripts and languages.¹⁷⁾ Two versions of the brief but informative obituaries known as the *Cronica Magistrorum Defunctorum* are in print,¹⁸⁾ but the wide variety of redactions, translations and local variants of this short chronicle is being collated. A fascinating, but seriously mutilated, roll of proposals for the reform of the Hospital made between 1334 and 1342 by an anonymous Hospitaller is also being prepared for publication,¹⁹⁾ as are various detailed financial accounts, mostly those of the Receiver-General in the West, which date from 1365 onwards.²⁰⁾ These are some of the major *desiderata*. Other materials might more usefully be calendared; for example, a list of all surviving Magistral bulls from 1310 to 1346 would not only be of general utility but would facilitate the study of Hospitaller chancery practice. The poor handwriting of many scribes at Rhodes, some of them possibly Greeks, creates real difficulties, but it seems important that scholars should have at least some published specimen texts to give an idea of the form and phrasing of Hospitaller documents.²¹⁾

Turning from texts to topics, many subjects await research: the colonization and defence of the Rhodian islands; the condition of their Greek inhabitants; the background of crusading and trading affairs, of Byzantine collapse and Turkish expansion; and relations with the popes and princes, bankers and sea-captains on whom the Hospital depended. Hospitaller studies can provide new insights into relatively unexplored areas; they also possess a certain topical relevance in that they illuminate a late-medieval "NATO-cum-Red Cross" type of organization operating on the front line of an ideologi-

15) *Infra*, 257–258, 260.

16) Text in C. TIPTON, "The 1330 Chapter General of the Knights Hospitallers at Montpellier", *Traditio*, xxiv (1968).

17) There was no Chapter-General in 1370, a confusion deriving from errors in the contemporary sources and found in BOSIO, ii, 117, and in DELAVILLE (1913), 166–169. There was an unnoticed Hospitaller assembly at Montpellier in 1325: *Archivio Vaticano*, Reg. Vat. 81, f. 397–401v.

18) In W. DUGDALE, *Monasticon Anglicanum*, vi part 2 (London, 1830), 796–798, and in L. DE MAS LATRIE, "Notice sur les Archives de Malte à Cité-la-Valette," *Archives des missions scientifiques et littéraires*, 1 ser., vi (1857), 26–30.

19) Toulouse, *Archives départementales de la Haute-Garonne*: H. Malte 237.

20) Specimen text and details in J. NISBET, "Treasury Records of the Knights of St. John in Rhodes," *Melita Historica*, ii no. 2 (1957); cf. LUTTRELL (1978), VII, VIII. Some general accounts from the West dating ca. 1319/1325 are printed in J. MIRET Y SANS, *Les cases de Templiers y Hospitalers en Catalunya* (Barcelona, 1910), 317–402.

21) As eg. in LUTTRELL (1978), III 771–775, IX 382–383, XIV 511; on the chancery *ibid.*, XV.

cal "cold war" between two very different societies. The Hospitallers were defending the frontiers of Christendom in general and not those of their own homelands, while they differed from other Military Orders in their "multi-national" composition, with brethren of many tongues or *langues* residing together inside their *collachium* or convent walls yet living in daily confrontation with Greeks, Turks and others.

To what extent a body of such diverse social, educational and geographical origins possessed a collective ethos or mentality is hard to determine from the type of documentation available concerning so largely illiterate a group. As Philippe de Mézières alleged, many became Hospitallers and made a brief visit to Rhodes merely in order to secure a comfortable livelihood on a European commandery,²² possibly doing a term of garrison duty without any active fighting against the infidel in order to secure promotion and a safe career in the West with a routine devoted to the liturgy, to estate management and to participation in local affairs. Some never went to the Levant; in point of fact, the majority of brethren were priests. Most Hospitallers were essentially normal men who had chosen a marginally unusual life. They were not the *pauperes* or flagellants, the husbands escaping from wives or other types of hysterical pilgrim so convincingly studied by sociologically-minded crusading historians. Nor had their activity much to do with chivalry. The Hospital provided a permanent, disciplined, experienced, even brutal corps of trained military men whose value in action went far beyond their restricted numbers. There was a mystique of martyrdom for the Cross of the type which Catherine of Siena propounded to the Prior of Pisa before the Hospital's *passagium* of 1378 – "bathe yourself in the blood of Christ crucified";²³ yet few men can have been drawn to the Order by such sententious ideals. There may have been families with a tradition of entry into the Order, but it is doubtful how far one can positively identify a Hospitaller mentality, a residue of military-monastic sentiment supposedly preserved in a life of poverty, chastity and obedience spent apart from family, women and children. Despite a degree of laxity in observing the rules, this renunciation constituted a genuine problem. Even that profound idealist Philippe de Mézières in drawing up the rules for his model Military Order provided for his *chevaliers* to live in conjugal chastity with wives, since complete chastity was difficult to achieve and he considered that its demands were seriously restricting recruitment to other existing Orders;²⁴ the Spanish Order of Santiago did in fact allow marriage for its brethren and a conventual life for their families. There must have been established traditions and an *esprit de corps* at Rhodes, but convincing generalizations demand a great gathering of biographi-

22) Cited in LUTTRELL (1978), I 300.

23) Epistole devotissime de sancta Catharina da Siena . . . (Venice, 1500), no. xlvi, to Niccolò, Prior of Pisa, who had gone to Venice to prepare the *passagium*. This was presumably the prior's mission of April 1377: LUTTRELL (1978) V 207. The Prior of Pisa, Fr. Niccolò de Strozzi of Florence, was at Vionitza with the *passagium* on 24 April 1378: Malta, cod. 48, f. 168v–169.

24) Text in A. HAMDY, "Philippe de Mézières and the New Order of the Passion," Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts [Alexandria], xviii (1964), 81; cf. PHILIPPE DE MÉZIÈRES, Letter to King Richard II, ed. G. COOPLAND (Liverpool, 1975).

cal details on the careers of individual brethren, with literary texts and informal non-chancery documents perhaps offering the clearest insights into Hospitaller attitudes.

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The Hospital of St. John was founded at the beginning of the twelfth century as a charitable and medical body, but it gradually acquired a predominantly military character. Like the Temple, the Teutonic Order and the Hispanic Orders of Santiago, Calatrava and Alcántara, the Hospital had its own rule which in the Hospitallers' case was a variation on that of the Augustinians; it had its Master and governing officers, dependent ultimately on the pope; its priories and commanderies with their *militēs*, sergeants-at-arms and priests, together with the lay brethren and female members; its privileges, exemptions, estates and incomes; and its military and colonizing functions. In addition to the lesser Orders and the predominantly local confraternities, there were numerous exclusively hospitaller Orders as well as the select chivalric groups such as the Orders of the Garter and the Golden Fleece, but these lacked any genuinely military character.²⁵ The Hospital and the Temple developed above all in Latin Syria where both Orders played a leading role in the kingdom's political and military affairs, acquiring great estates, building castles, shaping policies and increasing their own importance as the Latin domain dwindled to a slim seaboard strip which was finally extinguished with the fall of Acre in 1291, when the two Orders withdrew to Cyprus. There ensued an epoch of crises and confusions which set new patterns for decades to come. The papacy came under lay attack and moved to France; while the affairs of Greeks, Turks and Armenians, Mongols and Mamluks, were all in upheaval. The crusade changed its character and, directly or indirectly, the whole context in which the Hospital operated was reshuffled so that the Order was forced to alter many of its modes of existence. Cyprus proved an unsatisfactory base. The Temple was attacked in 1307 and suppressed in 1312; the Teutonic Order, which had retreated from Syria to Venice, transferred its headquarters to Prussia in 1309; and between 1306 and 1310 the Hospital conquered Rhodes. This conquest and the settlement of the island, together with the lengthy process of absorbing the Templars' goods into the Hospital, form two principal early fourteenth-century themes.

Turning from this *mélange* of problems and prospectives to matters more securely established, an understanding of the Hospitallers' difficulties during the years after 1291 is essential. The hostile attitudes and perennial instabilities of the Cypriot Crown, the mirage of Mongol collaboration, and the impracticability of old-style anti-Mamluk crusading directed towards Egypt and Syria, all constituted serious drawbacks. The Latins' strength was in their sea-power but the Military Orders, though now established on an island, continued to lack effective fleets. The Templars defended the island of Ruad off Tortosa until 1302. The Hospitallers seriously considered a major commitment in Christian

25) No comprehensive bibliography covers these lesser orders, but note A. FOREY, "The Military Order of St. Thomas of Acre," *English Historical Review*, xciii (1977).

Cilicia²⁶) but eventually they opted for the acquisition of Rhodes which ultimately did provide a defensible, independent base for crusading activity. However, important questions remain concerning the conquest of Rhodes. It is not yet clear to what extent it had previously been under Turkish control; what were the motives of the Hospital's Genoese allies; whether the conquest was really completed in 1308, 1309, or 1310; or whereabouts the mainland acquisitions which came with the islands were situated. The affairs of the Emirate of Menteshe and the identity of the Turks with whom the Hospitallers made an alliance remain obscure, though their leader may have been the Emir's son-in-law Sasa.²⁷) Equally obscure are the machinations of the Master Fr. Foulques de Villaret who spent much of the time from 1307 to 1309 at the papal *curia* negotiating for the money and shipping which sailed eastwards in 1310 apparently to accomplish little more than the final subjection of the Rhodian islands which had already been largely subdued.

A complete muster of all the evidence – Turkish, Greek, Catalan, papal and so forth – might well reveal ambiguities amounting to fraud in the Hospitallers' declarations of intent, as the Aragonese party at Avignon and others indeed alleged. The papal bulls and the *Vitae Paparum* were possibly inspired by deceptions engineered by Fr. Foulques de Villaret, who may have misled the pope not only about events at Rhodes but also about his own intentions; possibly he was manoeuvring to grab Greek islands by securing troops and credits in the West on false pretences while treating with the Turks in the East and thus ensuring the Hospital's acquisition of Rhodes and, indirectly, the Order's very survival. After Boniface VIII's quarrel with the French Crown the papacy moved to France and the Templars were attacked. This created a psychological climate in which it was essential for the Hospital to succeed, where the Temple had partly failed, in projecting a defensible image before pope, council and public opinion. The sources for the final decades of the Templars' history are more numerous than has generally been recognized,²⁸) and much

26) A. LUTTRELL, "The Hospitallers' Interventions in Cilician Armenia: 1291–1375," in *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia*, ed. T. BOASE (Edinburgh, 1978).

27) LUTTRELL (1978), I 287, states that Villaret "curbed the power of Orkhan, Emir of Menteshe, and incited the other emirs . . ." However, Marino Sanudo actually wrote that Villaret supported Orkhan *e suo fratello Strumbachi* against Orkhan's father, the emir. Possibly *Strumbachi* was Sasa (described by Pachymeres as the emir's "son-in-law") who captured Ephesus in 1304 but then went over to the Christians and was slain: the sources, listed in P. LEMERLE, *L'Émirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident* (Paris, 1957), 16, 20–24, may require detailed reinterpretation. A late source suggests that Nisyros was taken from the Turks before mid-1316: LUTTRELL (1978), III 759 n. 2. Villaret himself was accused of treating with the Turks: DELAVILLE (1913), 16. Turkish disruption on Rhodes may be reflected by the discovery in a grotto just above a frescoed chapel of 34 gold Byzantine coins, the latest datable 1282–1328, and 39 silver Muslim coins, the latest datable 1290: C. BRANDI, "La Cappella rupestre del Monte Paradiso", *Memorie: Istituto Storico-Archeologico di Rodi*, iii (1938), 10, mistakenly giving Hegira 689 as 1311 rather than 1290.

28) Apart from the detailed analysis of a great deal of prosopographical material in the sources already published and the reworking of the Aragonese materials used by HEINRICH FINKE, there is the possibility of using computer techniques to restore passages in largely illegible documents such as the

remains to be explained not merely about their dissolution but about the reasons why the Hospital, though it was criticized, was seldom accused in the same way as the Temple, and why the Hospitallers not only escaped unscathed but even received the bulk of the Templars' goods. There had long been a strong current of criticism in the West directed against all the Military Orders in general and especially against their privileges, but opinion looked to the union or reform of the two great Orders rather than for their abolition. It was probably true, though it would be difficult to demonstrate with precision, that the Hospitallers were more subtle than the Templars in avoiding provocation and that they had less wealth and were less involved in financial operations, though these do not seem entirely adequate explanations for an extremely complex problem.

In one sense the pope, unintentionally perhaps, sacrificed the Temple to save the Hospital, at the same time securing in practice that union of the two Orders which had so frequently been advocated. Certain cardinals were anxious that the Temple's goods should continue to be devoted to the crusade, while the French king, having secured the destruction of the Templars who had opposed his plans for a single unified Order, perhaps hoped to gain control of the Hospital. In the great struggle between popes, kings, cardinals, counsellors and propagandists for the very considerable wealth still theoretically devoted to the crusade, only one party could claim a victory; the triumph of Foulques de Villaret and the Hospital was as spectacular as the failure of Jacques de Molay and the Temple. This extraordinary achievement has seldom been appreciated, and its explanation awaits a major study devoted to that single extremely complex point, for the collapse of the Temple cannot be understood without a clarification of the Hospital's role, while the history of the Hospital is explicable only in the light of the Temple *affaire*.²⁹⁾ The Hospitallers realized that they had profitted, and their Lieutenant in the West even told the pope on 30 March 1313 that he had made them a greater gift than the Donation of

Templar inquest in the Papal States: A. GILMOUR-BRYSON, in *Manuscripta*, xxi no. 1 (1977), 14; xxii no. 1 (1978), 7-8. See also M. BARBER, *The Trial of the Templars* (Cambridge, 1978), which had not appeared at the time of writing.

29) The details of Villaret's itinerary and the chronology and background of the conquest in France and Aragon are still confused: see especially J. HILLGARTH, *Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France* (Oxford, 1971), 64-107; L. THIER, *Kreuzzugsbemühungen unter Papst Clemens V.: 1305-1314* (Werb, 1973), 82-89; M. BULSTE-THIELE, *Sacrae Domus Militiae Templi Hierosolymitani Magistri: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Templerordens 1118/9-1314* (Göttingen, 1975), 313-316, 344-346. BULSTE-THIELE, 350, misinterprets a passage now in LUTTRELL (1978), XI 2, which does not indicate acceptance of the French king's charges against the Temple. J. FAVIER, *Philippe le Bel* (Paris, 1978), 425-480, restates the case for the king, emphasizing the deficiencies of the French Templars. J. FAVIER, *Un Conseiller de Philippe le Bel: Enguerran de Marigny* (Paris, 1963), 123-124, 143-148, 185-188, shows how Marigny worked to secure the Temple goods for the Hospital because this was in the king's interest; his reiterated assertion that the Hospitallers influenced, or even bribed, Marigny is not supported by the documents.

Constantine,³⁰) but the experience of the brutal tortures used to destroy the Temple and the memory of the burning of the Master and many other brethren must have haunted the Hospitallers for many decades.

The move to Rhodes almost suggests that the Hospitallers, having acknowledged the general renunciation of Jerusalem as a practical goal, had shrewdly anticipated the transformation of the crusade into a defensive struggle against the Turks.³¹) Latin society, in which an *esprit laïque* was increasingly strong, was turning not only against the papacy but also against the crusade which too often seemed to be a papal instrument exploited largely for political ends. The Hospital was an integral part of the Church and as such dependent on the papacy, and all the more obviously and inescapably so after the dissolution of the Temple; yet if it could not abandon the crusade which was its *raison d'être* it could in its own ways divert, or even pervert, it. Idealistic theorists such as Ramon Llull and Philippe de Mézières were not without their practical influence, but more decisive considerations were those of money. Western governments exercised a measure of control over ecclesiastical wealth and nominations. They could prevent Hospitallers and their monies leaving for the East and could convert the Order's resources for their own temporal ends, while by influencing appointments they were able to secure the effective "nationalization" of the Military Orders. Rulers who asserted the Templars' innocence none the less seized, and often retained, their goods while the flow of endowments and donations to the Hospital diminished to a sporadic trickle. Behind these secularizing trends lay unavoidable determinations of finance. The Templars' financial activities had something to do with their downfall; the Hospitallers' crusade of 1310 augmented the debts which dominated their policies until about 1334. Crusading activities and inactivities, constitutional disputes, promotions and indiscipline, royal and papal policies, in fact almost every aspect of Hospitaller affairs, turned on the availability of funds or on schemes to appropriate or misappropriate crusading and Hospitaller incomes, so that the genuinely ideological content in the Order's policies was often largely obscured.

In the absence of detailed accounts before about 1365³²) the very real financial obstacles to crusading action can be estimated only indirectly. The number of brethren who could be supported in Cyprus had to be limited in 1295,³³) and eleven years later only two galleys were available for the invasion of Rhodes.³⁴) In 1320 the enormous debts which had been

30) . . . *et quod maiorem donationem fecerat inde Hospitali, quam fuisset facta per aliquem citra donationem, quam fecit Constantinus imperator ecclesie Romanie*: text in H. FINKE, *Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens*, ii (Münster, 1907), 219–221.

31) Cf. F. CARDINI, "La Crociata nel Duecento: L'Avatars di una ideale," *Archivio Storico Italiano*, cxxxv (1977).

32) While incomes are not generally available, there are totals of *responiones* theoretically due; for the dues fixed in 1330, see the text in TIPTON, 301–304.

33) Unpublished magistral bull dated Nicosia, 31 March 1295, in Malta, cod. 16 no. 8, summarized in DELAVILLE, *Cartulaire*, iii, no. 4276.

34) LUTTRELL (1978), II 163 n. 3.

incurred to finance the acquisition of the Temple's lands stood at more than 580,000 florins, more than twice the ordinary annual income of the papacy, and they could not be extinguished until about 1334, despite extraordinary impositions and the large-scale alienation of Templar properties.³⁵⁾ A credit then accumulated and in 1334 and 1335 the Hospital was actively pursuing an aggressive crusading programme around Smyrna.³⁶⁾ The new pope, Benedict XII, seems deliberately to have obstructed these initiatives, partly to avoid the papal declaration of a crusade which would have involved the assignation of clerical crusading tenths to the French king who would almost certainly have employed the incomes for his English war.³⁷⁾ Benedict must furthermore have realized that a Hospitaller crusade would mean the withdrawal of funds from the pope's own banks, which were in serious difficulties. He may, therefore, have discouraged Hospitaller activity and, when the Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli went bankrupt soon after, the Hospital lost the very large reserve of some 360,000 florins which it had deposited with them; by 1351 the number of brethren at Rhodes had to be restricted.³⁸⁾ Nevertheless, the Hospital continued to participate in crusading initiatives, most spectacularly in the Latin recapture of the castle in Smyrna harbour in 1344, in the sack of Alexandria in 1365, and in the Nicopolis crusade of 1396.

The Hospital also resisted in other ways of its own, defending the seas around Rhodes, defeating the Turks of Miletus in 1312 and those of Ephesus in 1319, and to some extent bottling them up so that the Emir of Aydin moved his naval operations northwards to Smyrna.³⁹⁾ After the Christians recaptured Smyrna in 1344, the Hospitallers became

35) LUTTRELL (1978), VIII 317–318.

36) The account of the attack on Lesbos, in which the Hospital at first participated, given in LUTTRELL (1978), I 293, is too condensed. Lesbos seems to have been invaded late in 1334: P. SCHREINER, "Zur Geschichte Philadelphieas im 14. Jahrhundert: 1293–1390," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, xxxv (1969), 398, 418. Difficulties remain, but this invasion may have followed the unsuccessful Byzantine-Cypriot-Hospitaller attack on Smyrna in or after September 1334: LEMERLE, 100–101. The Hospitallers withdrew either because Cattaneo cheated them or in the face of a Byzantine counter-attack; LEMERLE, 108, is scarcely justified in saying that Cattaneo evicted them. The chronology of this period will be further revised in forthcoming publications by Dr. Elisabeth Zachariadou.

37) A. LUTTRELL, "The Crusade in the Fourteenth Century," in J. HALE et al., *Europe in the Late Middle Ages* (London, 1965), 133–134; LUTTRELL (1978), I 293–294 et passim. Other objectives were Lesbos, and, possibly, Armenian Cilicia.

38) LUTTRELL (1978), I 294–296; VIII 318–319.

39) LUTTRELL (1978), I 288–289, 293, describes three battles, reduced to two in *ibid.*, XXV 1. L. GATTO, "Per la storia di Martino Zaccaria signore di Chio," *Bulletino dell'Archivio Paleografico Italiano*, ns. ii–iii (1956–1957), publishes further documents but is probably incorrect in dating that of 1 September to 1318. Distressingly little is known about the Emirate of Menteshe in classical Caria. P. WITTEK, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche: Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13.–15. Jh.* (Istanbul, 1934), now requires amendment; the present author plans to publish a study of Hospitaller relations with the Turks between 1306 and 1344.

increasingly responsible for the castle's defence and between 1343 and 1349 they had charge of the papal payments for the Genoese galleys serving the Latin league in the Aegean; in 1359 Fr. Niccolò Benedetti became papal Captain of Smyrna, receiving various pecuniary and commercial rewards.⁴⁰⁾ In 1374, following scandals over the accounts of the Genoese captains who were supposed to pay the garrison, Smyrna castle was entrusted entirely to the Hospital,⁴¹⁾ and in 1391, as Turkish pressure grew, Pope Clement VII granted a special indulgence which raised considerable sums for its defence.⁴²⁾ In 1402 Smyrna castle was brutally destroyed by the Mongol leader Timur. The Hospitallers began to rebuild the castle and when their new work was dismantled by the Ottoman Mehmed, the Master reportedly protested to the Turks that the pope would send a great force to destroy Mehmed's realms.⁴³⁾ The Hospitallers clearly felt the need of a substitute for Smyrna, and they soon constructed a new castle on the mainland opposite Kos on the site – though they did not know it – of the ancient Halikarnassos, securing a new, and presumably lucrative, papal indulgence for it in 1409.⁴⁴⁾ The Hospital defended its own territories while presenting the West with a show of crusading action which had across the years after 1306 gone at least some way towards containing the Turks of the Anatolian seaboard.

A particular current of Hospitaller opinion looked, chiefly to Greece, for a less routine, more active field of action or at least for wider, richer lands to dominate. In 1351 the Hospital briefly acquired the castle of Karystos on Negroponte; in 1356 and 1357 an obscure and secret *negotium Achaye* concerned the Morea, possibly Corinth; in 1376 the Hospitallers leased the Principality of Achaea for five years, but were eventually driven out by the mercenaries of the Navarrese Companies; in 1378 the Hospitallers, having secured rights to the Principality of Achaea and to the port of Vonitza, invaded Epirus with a small expedition which was ignominiously ambushed by the Albanians of Arta, who captured and ransomed the Master Fr. Juan Fernández de Heredia; from 1384 that Master made repeated attempts to acquire claims and launch interventions in the Morea; and between 1397 and 1404, at a crucial moment of danger from the Turks, the Hospital defended the Castellany of Corinth and the Despotate of the Morea, which it had purchased from the Byzantine Despot Theodore. Then, in 1405, the Hospitallers proposed to refortify the

40) Details in K. SETTON, *The Papacy and the Levant: 1204–1571*, i (Philadelphia, 1976), 186–187, 191, 194 n. 165, 202–203, 208–210, 218, 222–223, 234–236.

41) Cf. SETTON, i, 328.

42) DELAVILLE (1913), 231.

43) DUCAS, translated in *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks*, ed. H. MAGOULIAS (Detroit, 1975), 117–118; the chronology of this episode is obscure.

44) DELAVILLE (1913), 318. The present author is preparing a study of these fortifications between 1407 and 1421 in collaboration with Professor Kristian Jeppesen and the Danish mission excavating the nearby Mausoleum.

island of Tenedos at the mouth of the Dardanelles. This whole complicated trend of interest in Greece requires detailed elucidation.⁴⁵⁾

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Many aspects of Hospitaller rule await investigation in the Malta archives, and researches there should be supplemented by survey and excavation work in the Rhodian islands. The massive sixteenth-century gunpowder fortifications at Rhodes largely obliterated the earlier defences which require a theoretical reconstruction built up through a topographical approach.⁴⁶⁾ Place-names, patterns of agrarian settlement and the castles defending Rhodes and the other islands all need further study. A considerable emporium, a naval base and a banking centre developed at Rhodes, where the Hospitallers and other Latins protected corsairs, trafficked in slaves and imported foodstuffs, horses, war materials and Western cloth. The registers at Malta document militiamen and galley-crews, Greek and Latin colonists, taxation and justice, land-holding, the pilgrim trade, the Order's great hospital, the position of the Greek church, and the Jewish and Armenian minorities. The Hospitallers evolved a system of relations between rulers and ruled which is difficult to parallel elsewhere, and its study should take account of developments on Chios, Cyprus, Crete and other islands. Rhodes was a colonial society in so far as a Latin class governed a Greek population, but it was not a typical colony exploited by a foreign metropolis; in fact, in Hospitaller terminology *outramer* meant Western Europe. Feudal contracts were rare, and the land was not held by foreign dynasties established on it as a perpetual nobility. Though they certainly disrupted Greek ways of life, the Latins somehow established a paternalistic relationship, perhaps evolved in Syria, with their subjects who were reasonably secure and well treated. There were no uprisings of indigenous Greeks or Latin colonists such as occurred, for example, on nearby Crete.⁴⁷⁾

The government of the Order involved very much more than the limited problems of the Rhodian islands, which were managed by the Master and a group of senior brethren. Periodical Chapters-General met at Rhodes or sometimes in Southern France to promulgate new statutes and to deal with promotions, discipline and taxation. The Hospital was

45) LUTTRELL (1978), I 296-297, 302-303, 306-310, V 208-210; A. LUTTRELL, "La Corona de Aragón y la Grecia Catalana: 1379-1394," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales*, vi (1969), 242-248. Concerning Tenedos, see SETTON, i. 326. These matters will be covered in a forthcoming biography of Juan Fernández de Heredia; an edition and study of the Aragonese version of the Chronicle of the Morea compiled for Fernández de Heredia is also in preparation.

46) References in LUTTRELL (1978), I 292 n. 22, 311 n. 65. The well-preserved medieval Latin town, now dramatically threatened by plaster-wash, concrete, tourists and new "medieval" building, urgently requires, at the very least, an emergency campaign of photographic record. Recent archaeological activity is recorded in the journal *Archaeologikon Deltion*; on the Byzantine church beneath Santa Maria del Castello, *ibid.*, xxv (1970), 518-527.

47) Cf. LUTTRELL (1978), *passim*, and A. LUTTRELL, "Slavery at Rhodes: 1306-1440", *Bulletin de l'Institut Historique Belge de Rome*, xlvii-xlviii (1976-1977).

largely dominated by a majority of French-speaking brethren, some of whom had predominantly Levantine careers at Rhodes while others controlled the French priories; until 1377 the Master was always a Frenchman. This quasi-monopoly of power was periodically resisted by brethren of other *languages*, and occasionally it was seriously threatened. Fr. Foulques de Villaret, the over-mighty Master who conquered Rhodes, was forcibly deposed in 1317. The ensuing squabble was settled by Pope John XXII who chose his successor, reflecting the universal trend towards papal interference and papal provisions throughout the Roman Church. This danger was enhanced by the pope's power to threaten disestablishment Temple-style, and it became more real when the Aragonese Hospitaller Fr. Juan Fernández de Heredia obtained the patronage of a succession of popes who encouraged his insubordinations and his self-aggrandizement in the Western priories, of which at one point he controlled no less than three, and who in 1377 invoked papal prerogatives to provide him, against the protests of the French oligarchy at Rhodes, to the Mastership itself. Such developments can be studied in various ways. The Vatican archives naturally reflect the changing nature of papal interference; thus Fernández de Heredia's election, previously misunderstood and explained in various misleading ways, has now been documented from Gregory XI's registers.⁴⁸⁾ Papal relations can also be illustrated iconographically. A Hospitaller *cubicularius* guards a sleeping pope in a fresco at Assisi.⁴⁹⁾ Fr. Juan Fernández de Heredia stands in a papal group in what may be to some extent a crusading scene painted in the great *ecclesia* fresco at Santa Maria Novella in Florence.⁵⁰⁾ Ulrich Richental's *Konzilschronik* shows the Master, Fr. Philibert de Naillac, holding the key to the conclave and crowning Pope Martin V at the Council of Constance in 1417.⁵¹⁾

As with every administration, there were perennial acts of indiscipline which included the non-payment of the *responsiones*, the monies owed to Rhodes. The extent and seriousness of such troubles, which varied greatly from one priory to another, are difficult to gauge. The statutes emphasized the brethren's liturgical life which had to be maintained, but in the West their charitable and medical obligations seem to have been much neglected. Some preceptors and priors, notably those in France, continued to pay their dues and to travel to give service at Rhodes, at least as far as wars and economic conditions permitted.

48) LUTTRELL (1978), VIII 323.

49) LUTTRELL (1978), X 104–105, and a manuscript of 1343 which shows Benedict XI holding court in Perugia with three Hospitaller attendants sitting on the ground: G. LADNER, *Die Papstbildnisse des Altertums und des Mittelalters*, ii (Vatican, 1970), 347–349; Taf. lxxxiii: (information kindly provided by Miss Joanna Cannon). These scenes support Professor Hans Belting's thesis that the Assisi programme was papally-inspired.

50) A. LUTTRELL, "A Hospitaller in a Florentine Fresco: 1366/8" *Burlington Magazine*, cxiv (1972). S. ROMANO, "Due affreschi del Cappellone degli Spagnoli: Problemi iconologici", *Storia dell'Arte*, xxviii (1976), correctly casts some doubt on this interpretation, especially as Urban V, unlike the pope in the fresco, was not bearded; the present author will publish further considerations on this problem.

51) Reproduced in A. HAIDACHER, *Geschichte der Päpste in Bildern* (Heidelberg, 1965), 115; sources collected in *The Council of Constance: the Unification of the Church*, ed. J. MUNDY – K. WOODY (New York, 1961), 92, 102, 110, 162–164, 170–171, 385, 422–423, 429, 467.

Others, the Portuguese were an extreme example, did neither. Sometimes priors played a leading role in national politics. Juan Fernández de Heredia was the outstanding instance, but there were others such as Fr. Robert Hales, Prior of England and royal Treasurer, who was beheaded during the Peasants' Revolt of 1381. The ruling body of the Order at Rhodes could summon brethren to the East, manage the *responsiones*, send visitors to the priories and threaten depositions, and it had a Lieutenant in the West, procurators and cardinal-protectors in the *curia* at Avignon, and a Receiver-General in Languedoc who accounted for incoming monies and sent them to Rhodes, often using Florentine and other bankers to transfer funds. An unofficial law school was set up at Paris to train brethren in law so that they could play their part in this Hospitaller bureaucracy.

The real problems of government were more political than bureaucratic. Local interference and secular resistance could be decisive when rulers determined appointments, imposed taxes or prevented the departure for Rhodes of men and money. Relations, generally friendly, with the Genoese were important but await detailed research. Venice was particularly hostile, and other Latin powers ignored Hospitaller demands and protests. The pope could commandeer individual brethren for his own service or secure favours for others, and he exercised an overall surveillance of policies. Popes could summon assemblies to Avignon, seek to impose reforms or changes, and divert Hospitaller resources to papally-oriented crusading schemes. By 1373 the Hospital was the only power on which Pope Gregory XI could rely for even a semblance of military action in the East, for the defence of Smyrna, for diplomatic interventions in Cyprus, for a fact-finding mission to Constantinople, and ultimately in 1378 for a minor crusading *passagium* against the Turks. It was presumably Gregory XI's realization of this state of affairs which led him to initiate the episcopal inquests of 1373 which were designed to provide statistics regarding the extent of the Hospital's wealth and manpower and the way in which they were employed, even if the pope subsequently ignored the results of his own inquiry when he issued summonses for many more brethren than existed to serve on the *passagium* which eventually invaded Greece in 1378.⁵² Papal interventions were not, however, always disadvantageous; quarrels among the brethren had to be settled and monies to be raised, while protection was needed against both secular and ecclesiastical interferences.

The impact of the great plague, of innumerable European conflicts, of general economic recession and other such universal afflictions was inescapable. As conservative landholders, the Hospitallers' incomes suffered dramatically from devaluation, depopulation and destructive wars to which they often had to contribute taxes and manpower. The inquest of

52) On Gregory XI, the crusade, and the general situation in the priories, A. LUTTRELL, "The Papal Inquest into the Hospital of 1373 and its Historical Background" (forthcoming). See also IDEM, "Popes and Crusades: 1362-1394", in *Genèse et débuts du Grand Schisme d'Occident: 1362-1394* (Avignon, 1978). If Urban VI failed to support the Hospitaller *passagium* in 1378, he forcefully rejected a suggestion from the cardinals that he should seize all the Hospital's lands: text in O. RINALDI, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, vii (Lucca, 1752), 315.

1373 showed the Hospital reluctant to give up the administration of its own estates. The demand for an estimate of the incomes which would result from each commandery being farmed out to a secular agent raised issues which were unlikely to be resolved in purely economic terms. Individual witnesses were obviously incapable of analyzing such a problem with any precision, though they may have reacted with sound management instincts.⁵³⁾ By 1373 recruitment and incomes had fallen; lands lay uncultivated and buildings in ruin; the brethren had become astonishingly aged and non-military. The Priory of France in north-western France supported some 250 or 300 *fratres* including 20 or 30 serving at Rhodes or elsewhere, a decline of about one-third with respect to 1319. 124 out of 178 named *fratres*, roughly 70 percent, were *presbiteri* or priests, 49 were *sergentes* or sergeants-at-arms, and no more than 4 or 5 were *milites*. Of the 54 who were theoretically fighting men, 81 percent were more than forty years of age and roughly 60 percent were over fifty.⁵⁴⁾ In many dioceses the inquests were never conducted or have not survived, but in general they revealed an alarming crisis in the West, and if Rhodes was reasonably safe difficulties were increasing there as well. Eventually the inquests and, where they are lacking, the painstaking accumulation of other information should produce an almost complete prosopography of the brethren in 1373, with precious details on backgrounds, ages, incomes, length of service and promotions. It will probably emerge that the few *milites* came from the petty nobility, from royal service or from the urban patriciate.

The study of Hospitaller finances would not produce a full picture – that was not really available even to contemporaries – but it would assist in interpreting policies by providing details of monies received in Southern France and either expended there or forwarded to Rhodes in cash, credit, cloth or silver. Complications with currencies and exchange rates, the partial nature of the statistics and non-payment by some priories all obscure the picture, but reasonably reliable overall figures could be secured. Extraordinary imposts, mortgages and, after 1391, the profits from the special indulgences granted to the Hospital by the pope permitted an astonishing and as yet unexplained growth in incomes, even allowing for inflation. The average receipts of the Receiver-General in the West between 1367 and 1373 probably stood around 22,700 florins annually; those for 1378 to 1399 around 38,500 florins, an increase of about 70 percent which was all the more remarkable in that it was achieved in a period of schism during which some priories paid little or

53) W. KULA, *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy: 1500–1800* (trans: London, 1976), considers such difficulties. It may have been felt that the *milites* should be serving in the East and not engaged in rural administration, and Philippe de Mézières made this a rule for his proposed Order: text in HAMDY (1964), 82.

54) These surprising statistics are supplied from detailed work in A.-M. LEGRAS, *L'Enquête pontificale de 1373 sur l'Ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem: édition et commentaire des documents relatifs au Grand Prieuré de France* (unpublished thesis: Paris, 1976).

nothing.⁵⁵⁾ In December 1398 the commanders of the Priory of Catalunya refused to provide a subsidy for Pope Benedict XIII on the grounds that only nine out of twenty-one priories were sending their *responsiones* to Rhodes, that the pope was no longer paying for the defence of Smyrna so that the burden fell on the Hospital, that the Priory of Catalunya had to pay 3600 of the 25,000 florins which, they claimed, had to be spent each year on defence against the Turks, and that the whole priory was in financial straits.⁵⁶⁾

The schism in the papacy, which lasted nearly forty years from 1378 until 1417, revealed surprising strengths in the Hospital. Fr. Juan Fernández de Heredia was undoubtedly the legally-elected Master but, together with the majority of the brethren, he supported the Avignonese “anti-popes” though a number of Italian, German and other Hospitallers followed an “anti-Master” nominated by the Roman pope in 1383.⁵⁷⁾ A plot to win Rhodes over to the Roman obedience failed miserably; overall incomes were actually increased; and the English Hospitallers, whose government recognized the Roman pope, continued with explicit royal support to travel to Rhodes and to send considerable sums there.⁵⁸⁾ For a brief period between 1394, when Pedro de Luna was elected pope as Benedict XIII, and 1396, when Fr. Juan Fernández de Heredia died, both the Avignonese pope and the Master of the Hospital were natives of *Aragón* proper. Meanwhile when the Romanist “anti-Master” died in 1395 the Roman pope decided not to replace him. Fr. Philibert de Naillac, the Master elected at Rhodes in 1396, spent many years in the West struggling with the problems of the schism. In 1409 he was at the Council of Pisa, where he guarded the conclave, and the Hospitallers recognized the pope, Alexander V, elected there. In 1410 a compromise arrangement ended the schism in the Hospital, seven years before that in the papacy. Fr. Philibert de Naillac worked hard to end the schism in both Church and Hospital, and the Prior of the Convent at Rhodes, Fr. Gautier le Gras, was one of the electors who chose Martin V as pope at Constance in 1417.⁵⁹⁾ At a local level the schism was often disruptive and damaging. It was not so much that the Hospital split into two clearly-aligned diplomatic camps, but rather that brethren tried to secure the confir-

55) Approximate figures calculated from NISBETT, 102–104. In 1448 the Commander of Torrente and Valencia claimed that out of a total income of 411 libras, he had expenses of 312, paid 60 to Rhodes and kept a balance of 39 for himself: MA. D. CABANES PECOURT, “Las Órdenes Militares en el reino de Valencia: notas sobre su economía”, *Hispania*, cxiii (1969), 515–516.

56) Text in MIRET, 456–458.

57) LUTTRELL (1978), XXIII; on the “anti-Master” and the “anti-Lieutenant” who succeeded him, see A. STRNAD, “Caracciolo, Riccardo”, and A. ESCH, “Carafa, Bartolomeo”, both in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, xix (Rome, 1976), 443–446, and 494–496.

58) C. TIPTON, “The English Hospitallers during the Great Schism”, *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, iv (1967); the important “revisionist” points advanced result from the combination of material from the English and the Malta archives; note also P. FIELD, “Sir Robert Malory, Prior of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem in England: 1432–1439/40”, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, xxviii (1977).

59) DELAVILLE (1913), 262, 305–306, 311–318, 329–335; *supra*, 256.

mation of their positions from both popes and both Masters while at the same time giving obedience and *responsiones* to neither. Yet the Hospital did retain its lands and incomes, thus conserving the strength to defend Rhodes against major Mamluk and Ottoman assaults later in the fifteenth century.

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The foundations of Hospitaller power, that is the uninterrupted flow of funds and brethren and the continued will to resist, largely derived from the extensive European hinterland. The Western priories have received some study, but they have too often been left out of the Hospital's general history, too often been studied without reference to its central archives. The large-scale investigation into the inquests of 1373, of which the first volume is nearing completion, should gradually fill many gaps. It involves the compilation of a complete bibliography for every priory and every commandery, the identification of properties and toponyms, their incomes and methods of exploitation, and the *curriculum vitae* of every *frater* mentioned in 1373. The information from each of the surviving inquests is roughly comparable, since the same six questions were to be asked in every diocese, but there are many technical difficulties, especially as diocesan boundaries did not correspond to Hospitaller commanderies. The inquests have to be supplemented from the Maltese archives and from other sources, and even where the inquests are not available it is possible to assemble bibliographies and data to complete the picture.⁶⁰⁾

The surveying of material remains has become dramatically urgent as roads and other modern developments destroy buildings and mechanized agriculture eliminates chapels, barns, hedges, paths and other landmarks. Hospitaller structures have on occasion been excavated scientifically, notably in Poland and England,⁶¹⁾ and a collection of photographs is being built up in France; twenty minutes with a camera and a measuring tape can save precious information about a building. Much topographical data is contained in the archives where the early-modern estate-books, the *terriers* or *cabrei*, are especially valuable. Local histories, prints and other antiquarian materials can be used in conjunction with old maps, aerial photographs and inspections *in situ*. The extent of Hospitaller estates, the disposition of churches, hospices, cemeteries, stables, mills and fields can be re-created. Frescoes and paintings, liturgical manuscripts and tombstones can provide iconographical clues concerning the Hospitallers' cults and mentalities or their dress, equipment and material culture.⁶²⁾

The information in print relating to the priories is most unequal, and it indicates great diversities between one region and another. The French priories, together with those of

60) The inquests are now being published; cf. J. GLÉNISSON, "L'Enquête pontificale de 1373 sur les possessions des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem", *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, cxxix (1971), and A. LUTTRELL - A.-M. LEGRAS, "Les Hospitaliers autour de Gap: une enquête de 1330", *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome: Moyen Age - Temps Modernes*, xc (1978).

61) Cf. LUTTRELL (1978), X 90 n. 2.

62) Cf. LUTTRELL (1978), X et passim.

Spain and Italy, were, statistically speaking, the most important. Others, such as Portugal, Ireland or Poland, were scarcely in touch with Rhodes, owing partly to distance and partly to local preoccupations. There were usually a few German brethren in the East,⁶³ yet the German Hospitallers were not fully integrated into the Order. In the first half of the fourteenth century certain brethren and certain districts sided with Lewis of Bavaria in his disputes with the pope.⁶⁴ The Hospitallers of Brandenburg achieved an astonishing, and officially recognized, quasi-independence while there were difficulties in Bohemia even before the papal schism and the Hussite movement.⁶⁵ The bulk of the German commanderies were situated further west in the lands along the Rhine where they did not come directly in contact with Poles or Slavs or in open competition with the Hospital's ancient rivals of the Teutonic Order. There was evidently an active liturgical life, with a highly developed emphasis on the cult of the dead.⁶⁶ The extensive bibliography on the *lingua* of *Alamania* is predominantly local in orientation and seldom uses Maltese materials,⁶⁷ though the very detailed work of Walter Rödel is based on visitations of 1494/5 and 1540/1 preserved in Malta, and his book includes a good deal of much earlier information concerning commanderies and incomes;⁶⁸ the 1494/5 visitation itself contains important documents and details referring to earlier periods.⁶⁹ Rödel did not utilize the Magistral registers in which the German materials are always grouped together into the same section so that their rapid consultation is relatively easy. Inquests of 1373 survive only for Prague, Minden, Osnabruck and some marginal dioceses,⁷⁰ but topographical work, the gathering of prosopographical and other detail at Malta and the rearrangement of Rödel's materials would permit the construction of a general picture of the German Hospital.

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63) Eg. LUTTRELL (1978), I 288–289, 303–304, 311; XXII 35, 39–40.

64) J. VON PFLUGK-HARTTUNG, *Der Johanniter und der Deutsche Orden im Kampfe Ludwigs des Bayern mit der Kurie* (Leipzig, 1900).

(65) DELAVILLE (1913), 72–75, 217–219 et passim. E. OPGENOORTH, *Die Ballei Brandenburg des Johanniterordens im Zeitalter der Reformation und Gegenreformation* (Würzburg, 1963), 29–47, is useful though brief and based mainly on German sources. No attempt at a bibliography on the German Hospital is attempted here, but see *infra* notes 67–68.

66) B. WALSTEIN-WARTENBERG, “Beiträge zur mittelalterlichen Liturgie des Johanniterordens, I: Der Festkalender; II: Das Totengedächtnis”, *Annales de l'Ordre Souverain Militaire de Malte*, xxx (1972); cf. *IDEM*, “Die kulturellen Leistungen des Grosspriorates Böhmen–Österreich im Mittelalter”, *ibid.*, xxxiii (1975).

67) Cf. *Der Johanniterorden – Der Malteserorden: Der Ritterliche Orden des hl. Johannes vom Spital zu Jerusalem. Seine Aufgaben, seine Geschichte*, ed. A. WIENAND (Cologne, 1970), with end-map of commanderies. Note particularly B. WALDSTEIN-WARTENBURG, “Donaten-Confratres-Pfründner: Die Bruderschaften des Ordens”, *Annales de l'Ordre Souverain Militaire de Malte*, xxxi (1973).

68) W. RÖDEL, *Das Grosspriorat Deutschland des Johanniter-Ordens im Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Reformation* (Cologne, 1972), with useful bibliography.

69) Malta, cod. 45.

70) GLÉNISSON, 110.

Although the Military Orders of Santiago, Calatrava and Alcántara evidently exercised a profound influence on the evolution of Castilian society, there is no detailed historical vision of their overall development as an institution; old clichés still await new interpretations.⁷¹⁾ It is claimed that the Military Orders replaced the primitive rural communities of Castile, which were supposedly characterized by their free *concejos* or councils, by their Muslim agrarian traditions, and by a system of *latifundios*; and furthermore that

the pure warriors of the Military Orders deformed the original nature of the Castilian resettlement and raised a barrier of social prejudices between the north and south of the country, creating a new Castilian character – anti-economic, anarchic, domineering.⁷²⁾

Such affirmations, debatable even for Southern Castile, derive from a conception of the Orders in post-medieval times when they had indeed become largely a source of wealth and of honours for those concerned with nobility or *hidalguía* and purity of blood or *limpieza de sangre*. Historians of early modern Spain may well judge that the Orders became “venerable archaisms, shocking or comic”, neither religious nor military, “ossified forms” dissociated from reality;⁷³⁾ the problem is to analyze this process and to establish how far it had advanced by 1300 or 1400. The evidence for a preoccupation with nobility, however defined, among the medieval Orders is partial and inconclusive, though the Knights of Santiago were raising the barriers in the late thirteenth century;⁷⁴⁾ in 1338 King Alfonso founded the *Real Cofradía del Santísimo y Santiago* at Burgos, apparently as a substitute for Santiago intended to satisfy the *caballeros villanos*, the non-noble knights who constituted the town’s élite.⁷⁵⁾

An important turning-point came when the fall of Granada in 1492 concluded the

71) Extensive bibliographies in E. BENITO RUANO, “La investigación reciente sobre las Órdenes Militares Hispánicas”, *A Cidade de Évora*, lix (1976); D. LOMAX, “Las Órdenes Militares en la Península Ibérica durante la Edad Media”, in *Repertorio de Historia de las Ciencias Eclesiásticas en España*, vi (Salamanca, 1976). Note especially E. BENITO RUANO, *Estudios Santiaguistas* (León, 1978), and the works of A. FOREY, A. JAVIERRE MUR, D. LOMAX and J. O’CALLAGHAN. What follows is based on A. LUTTRELL, “Las Órdenes Militares en la Sociedad Hispánica – los Hospitalarios Aragoneses: 1340–1360”, communicated to the unpublished *Congreso Internacional Hispano-Portugués sobre las Órdenes Militares en la Península durante la Edad Media: 1971*. Work by the present author on the Hospital in Castile and Portugal awaits publication.

72) J. VICENS VIVES, *Aproximación a la Historia de España* (revised ed: Barcelona, 1960), 91, 232; more balanced views in C. BISHKO, “The Castilian as Plainsman: the Medieval Ranching Frontier in La Mancha and Extremadura”, in *The New World Looks at its History*, ed. A. LEWIS – T. MCGANN (Austin, Texas, 1963).

73) A. DOMÍNGUEZ ORTIZ, *La Sociedad Española en el siglo XVII*, i (Madrid, 1963), 198.

74) D. LOMAX, *La Orden de Santiago: 1170–1275* (Madrid, 1965), 87–88. Calatrava restricted entry to the sons of *caballeros* or *escuderos* in 1325, but Montesa did not exclude non-nobles until 1468: J. O’CALLAGHAN, *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and its Affiliates* (London, 1975), I 11–12, X 225.

75) T. RUIZ, “The Transformation of the Castilian Municipalities: the Case of Burgos, 1248–1350”, *Past and Present*, lxxvii (1977), 17–18.

Orders' military mission within the peninsula, provoking a great debate over their functions and leading to the incorporation of the national Orders into the Crown through the *Consejo de las Órdenes Militares*, which completed their reduction to a source of royal wealth and patronage.⁷⁶⁾ Yet the earlier changes which followed the attack on the Temple were probably even more decisive. The Aragonese Templars defended themselves against the Crown for months in their castles, demonstrating a military capacity which worried the king who had probably well over 150 Templars within his realms.⁷⁷⁾ Their downfall precipitated protracted negotiations concerning the activities and justifications of all the Orders in the Iberian kingdoms where the Templars' lands were specially exempted by the papal bull of 1312 from passing automatically to the Hospital; eventually the Hospital did secure most of the Templar possessions in *Aragón* and *Catalunya* and some of those in Castile. Though they played some part in campaigns against the Muslims of Granada, the Spanish Hospitallers were supposedly concerned with the Eastern Mediterranean, and they were subject to foreign control; the Templar lands would have made them immensely powerful. The Iberian kings therefore insisted on a form of quasi-secularization through the creation, from the Templars' possessions, of the Orders of Christ in Portugal and of Montesa in Valencia, and they partially subordinated all the Orders through their influence over nominations to the Masterships; long before 1492 this control led to the domination of the Castilian Orders by the Crown, which secured the Masterships and extensive incomes for its own royal cadets or favourites, with resultant quarrels and abuses within the Orders.⁷⁸⁾ In 1331 the Castilian king did seek to create a new Order with the Temple goods, a proposal rejected by the pope on the grounds that the Hospital could make more satisfactory use of those goods and that internal dissensions within the new Orders of Christ and Montesa cast doubts on their utility.⁷⁹⁾ Decades later, on 28 January 1388, Pope Clement VII authorized King Juan of Castile to found a new Order in Tarifa to fight the Muslims of Africa⁸⁰⁾ yet it was the Portuguese who captured the African town of Ceuta in 1415 and the Order of Christ which subsequently fought in Morocco. The Hospitallers scarcely participated in the conquest of Africa and the Atlantic islands, a process which raised awkward questions concerning the justification of crusading action against pagans as opposed to *infideles*. This problem also arose in Poland where Paulus Wladimiri and other jurists developed paradoxical notions of a »just war« directed against the Teutonic

76) L. WRIGHT, "The Military Orders in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Spanish Society: the Institutional Embodiment of a Historical Tradition", *Past and Present*, xliii (1969), 37 et passim.

77) A. FOREY, *The Templars in the "Corona de Aragón"* (London, 1973), 27–28, 276–278 et passim.

78) O'CALLAGHAN, I, VIII, X; LUTTRELL (1978), XI–XII; A. JAVIERRE MUR, "Pedro IV el Cerimonioso y la Orden de Montesa", in Martínez Ferrando, *Archivero: Miscelánea de estudios dedicados a su memoria* (Madrid, 1968). The Hospitallers' lands in Valencia passed to Montesa, as did those of the Temple.

79) *Archivio Vaticano*, Reg. Vat. 116, f. 84v–85 (16 April 1331).

80) *Archivio Vaticano*, Reg. Vat. 299, f. 49v.

Order.⁸¹⁾ Early in the sixteenth century the Military Orders were finally secularized in the Protestant lands of England and Prussia but they had not altogether outlived their utility; the new maritime Order of Santo Stefano was founded in Tuscany in 1562, and the Hospitallers fought the Turks and defended Malta until 1798.

These are preliminary and uncertain conclusions, demanding much further research. The Hospitallers' Priory of *Aragón*, known as the *Castellania de Amposta*, provides an excellent opportunity for a case-study in depth of a segment of an Order in Spain. There are no 1373 inquests for Spain but the *Registros de Amposta* contain a mass of information from 1340 onwards,⁸²⁾ and this can be supplemented with numerous other documents from that priory and from the archives of the Priory of Catalunya, of the Aragonese Crown, of the papacy and of the Masters of Rhodes. Existing works seldom go beyond 1300,⁸³⁾ yet brethren and incomes could be counted, the origins and careers of Hospitallers established, and general Aragonese problems, such as urban topography or the status of the Muslim population, elucidated.⁸⁴⁾ After its separation from the Priory of Catalunya in 1319 the *Castellania* had some thirty commanderies. Forty-two brethren attended the prioral chapter of 1351⁸⁵⁾ while others remained on their commanderies and a few were at Rhodes, making a total, perhaps, of more than a hundred. Many brethren came from the lesser nobility or the bourgeoisie though Magistral documents stipulated that the *fratres milites*, whose numbers await calculation, should be legitimately born *ex utroque parente nobili*.⁸⁶⁾ More serious discrimination came after 1420.⁸⁷⁾ In Catalunya the *consellers* of Barcelona were resisting attempts from Rhodes to exclude non-military citizens from the Order in

81) J. WOŚ, "Sul concetto della guerra giusta e l'intervento degli *infideles* alla battaglia di Grunwald: 1410", *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa: classe di lettere e filosofia*, III ser., ii (1972).

82) *Registros de Amposta*, I-IV = Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Sección de Códices, 599-B a 602-B.

83) S. GARCÍA LARRAGUETA, *El gran priorado de Navarra de la Orden de San Juan de Jerusalén: siglos XII-XIII*, 2 vols. (Pamplona, 1957); A. UBIETO ARTETA, *El real monasterio de Sigüenza: 1188-1300* (Valencia, 1966); MA. L. LEDESMA RUBIÓ, *La Encomienda de Zaragoza de la Orden de San Juan de Jerusalén en los siglos XII-XIII* (Zaragoza, 1967).

84) Preliminary studies in LUTTRELL (1978), XI-XIV; MA. L. LEDESMA RUBIÓ, "La Zuda de Zaragoza y la Orden de San Juan de Jerusalén", *Cuadernos de Historia Jerónimo Zurita*, xvi-xviii (1963-1965); IDEM, "La población mudéjar en la vega baja de Jalón", in *Miscelánea ofrecida al Ilmo. Sr. D. José María Lacarra y de Miguel* (Zaragoza, 1968).

85) Madrid, Registro de Amposta, III, f. 17-20.

86) Text of 1351 in LUTTRELL (1978), XIV 511.

87) Statutes of 1262 and 1270 established that a *miles* had to be legitimately born of noble or knightly lineage or, if illegitimate, a *filius principis aut domini maioris*: DELAVILLE, *Cartulaire*, iii, docs. 3039, 3396. In 1420, because the rule had been badly observed during the papal schism, it was reaffirmed that a *miles* had to be of *lignage*. A statute of 1428 added that a *miles* was to be *gentil homme de nom et d'armes Et de leal marriage*, and another of 1433 that he was to be of *lignage* or, if illegitimate, the son of a count or greater lord, and that he was to be admitted only after an inquiry into his birth: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Ms. français 17,255, f. 92v, 100, 111-111v.

1437⁸⁸) and in 1447 the burgesses claimed to belong to the military class and therefore be eligible.⁸⁹) The great plague of 1347 produced a manpower crisis in *Aragón*; prices rose and rents had to be lowered in order to keep fields under cultivation. Some land was farmed indirectly, sometimes through contracts for improvements *ad plantandum*. At moments of trouble the Priory of *Aragón* produced large sums of money for the king, who also summoned it to provide military forces, seventy horsemen in 1342 for example. For such reasons the Crown sought to establish a degree of control over the Order. Successive kings insisted on retaining their overall *dominium* and on occasion they effectively vetoed certain Magistral appointments by refusing to accept homage from the Master's nominees. The result was a compromise, a sharing of resources between the Aragonese Crown and the Hospital at Rhodes.⁹⁰)

Though the Temple *affaire* changed the whole climate within which the Orders operated in Spain, the Hospital continued to play a positive role in Aragonese life. Nepotism and concubinage, the preoccupation with nobility and the corruption of benefices were probably no more widespread than in other branches of the Church. The *reconquista* was largely at a halt after the failure to take Gibraltar in 1350, but the Hospitallers had repopulated and continued to cultivate extensive areas, supervising estates, collecting rents and administering justice. They constituted a stable, conservative element in society, and they continued furthermore to send at least some men and money to Rhodes. All the Hispanic Orders were progressively »nationalized« but the Aragonese Crown established only a partial control over the Hospitallers, who retained a significant function and the lands and privileges which enabled them to fulfill it.

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88) *Item sien membrants los Consellers esdevenidors de proseguir ab nostre sant pare la revocacio del stament odios fet per lo Mestre e capitol de Rodes, per lo qual, en gran destruccio e prejudici del stament dels honorables ciutadans e honorables homens de ciudats, viles e lochs de la senyoria del senyor rey, han statuit que algu no sie admes a religio del dit orde si no es militar de paratge*. Text partially edited in C. CARRÈRE, *Barcelone, centre économique à l'époque des difficultés: 1380–1462*, ii (Paris, 1967), 642 n. 3.

89) *A 7, de Agost 1447, y a 27, y 28 de Febrer 1448, scriuen al Rey querellantse del Mestre de Rodes, y son Convent, que havian fet un Statut, que aquells sols qui devallaran de Linatge militar sien admesos en la Religio de St. Joan, per que en Cathalunya lo Stat militar, e dels Ciutadans Burgesos, y homens honrats de Viles, axi per Constitucions, com altrament son reputats en un mateix grau, e stament, e axi en guerres en qualsevol parts, com en tots actes, y armes ques pertanyen a Cavalleria*. Text in *Rúbriques de Bruniquer: Cerimonial dels Magnífichs Consellers y Regiment de la Ciutat de Barcelona*, ed. F. CARRERAS I CANDI–B. GUNYALONS I BOU, v (Barcelona, 1916), 153, misleadingly cited in LUTTRELL (1978), XI 3. Note that a notable *mercader* of Barcelona was received in 1438 after an investigation into his *linatge, custumes e vida* had shown him to be related, through his mother, to several families of *gentils homens*: text in MIRET, 430–431.

90) Details in LUTTRELL (1978), XI–XIV. Apart from the un-typical Commanderies of Zaragoza and Sigena studied by LEDESMA and UBIETO, the question of agrarian exploitation awaits research. FOREY (1973), 189, concludes that the Temple "normally sought to retain direct control over its lordships and estates."

The Hospital should be studied within the context of the Military Orders considered as a category. The only reasonably modern general consideration of the Orders was published in 1908 and halts at 1312,⁹¹⁾ but new work covering many aspects of different Orders now provides considerable scope for comparisons and generalizations. Thus the German Hospital, theoretically concerned with distant Rhodes, could be contrasted with the Teutonic Knights who became a compact »national« Order of great efficiency and with a rather special ideology of its own, expansionist, colonizing, militaristic.⁹²⁾ The Hispanic Orders provide the obvious points of comparison. Their non-Christian opponents were cultural equals or superiors whom they seldom converted by force, so that the conflict lacked the ferocity of that in Germany. Losing much of their conquering and colonizing role during the thirteenth century, the Hispanic Orders never achieved the power or independence of the Teutonic »state«. As for the Hospital, only in the seventeenth or eighteenth century at Malta can it be described as a »state«. At Rhodes the Hospital, unlike Orders such as Calatrava which depended juridically on the Order of Cîteaux and was visited by its abbots, was largely independent politically and, saving the powers of the pope, jurisdictionally. Yet its relations with its subjects were conceived much as they had been in Cyprus or Syria; legislation in the statutes might affect the Rhodians very directly⁹³⁾ but it was intended primarily for the Order. In considering such varied questions the need is not for a facile »sociology« of the Orders but for the collection and interpretation of information about each of them, their relations with each other, with the Church and with society as a whole. The Hospitallers lived within the community and were in fact subject to a multiplicity of allegiances, some of which conflicted with each other. Most standard surveys of medieval Europe or of the medieval Church devote little or no space to what Bernard of Clairvaux had recognized as »a new type of *militia*«, the warrior-monks who did not fit neatly into conventional divisions of society, yet the Military Orders deserve appreciation as a distinctive, individual element in Western life, its expansion, its evolution and its defence.

91) H. PRUTZ, *Die geistlichen Ritterorden: Ihre Stellung zur kirchlichen, politischen, gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung des Mittelalters* (Berlin, 1908). The semi-popular work by D. SEWARD, *The Monks of War: the Military Religious Orders* (London, 1972), is much wider in scope.

92) The bibliography is most extensive. For a Polish view, K. GÓRSKI, *L'Ordine Teutonico alle Origini dello Stato Prussiano* (Turin, 1971); reply in U. ARNOLD, "L'Ordine Teutonico alle Origini dello Stato Prussiano", *Römische Historische Mitteilungen*, xvi (1974); countered in K. GÓRSKI, "Polemica ad Udo Arnold", *ibid.*, xix (1977). Note the curious Danish-Polish proposal of 1418 to transfer the Teutonic Order to Novgorod, Jerusalem, Cyprus or Rhodes: E. JOACHIM – W. HUBATSCH, *Regesta Historico-Diplomatica Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum: 1198–1528*, i (Göttingen, 1948), 176.

93) Eg. LUTTRELL (1978), IV; the juridical bases of Hospitaller statutes and edicts require investigation.